Skip to main content
 Previous Next
  • Zoom In (+)
  • Zoom Out (-)
  • Rotate CW (r)
  • Rotate CCW (R)
  • Overview (h)
Press translations [Japan]. Political Series 0181, 1946-01-14.
Supreme Commander for The Allied Powers. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.

translation-number: political-0756

call-number: DS801 .S85

(View Page Image)
No. 756 Date: 14 Jan 46


ITEM 1 Mass Meeting of Agricultural Ministry Employees - Asahi Shimbun 13 Jan 46. Translator: S. Kawasaki.
Full Translation:
The Staff Association of the Ministry of agriculture and Forestry, which is demanding democratization of governmental offices, will stage a mass meeting at the Central Agriculture Building at 1230 on 15 January. The Association will submit a plan to establish four organs, such as the Personnel Affairs Control Committee, the Treatment Improvement Committee, the Food Problem Research Committee and the Government Office Representatives' Conference. In case of the forthcoming administrative readjustment, at the general meeting the attitude and policy which will be adopted by the Personnel Affairs Control Committee will be decided. In the future, specific personnel affairs will be dealt with.
The Treatment Improvement Committee will investigate household economic affairs of the officials. In addition to demanding increased salaries computed on a scientific basis, a co-operative welfare society is to be established.
The Food-stuff Problem Research Committee is to be established in order that the staffs of the Ministry of agriculture and Forestry can study a policy hinged on the development of the food supply situation, and put that policy to practical use.
Furthermore, concerning the combination of various Governmental Offices, on 11 January, the representatives of Ministries of Justice, Commerce and Industry. Transportation, the Board of Communication, and TOKYO Metropolitan Office, gathered at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and held a conference.
As a result, the Governmental Office Representative Conference, was established on 15 January. Hereafter, with this Conference as its center, the democratization Campaign of various governmental offices will be promoted; and various offices will proceed toward the accomplishment of their aims.
ITEM 2 Successors to fill the Vacancies [illegible]Created By Outgoing State Ministers In Purged Cabinet - Asahi Shimbun - 13 Jan 46. Translator: H. Kate.
Privy Councillor MITSUJI, Chuzo, 76 year old native of KAGAWA-Ken, was unoffically chosen to be the Home Minister and Transportation Minister. He has unexpectedly come back after the scandal of the TEIKOKU Rayon Company Incident. Being a hardworking veteran in politics, he may be a pillar of the reorganized SHIDEHARA Cabinet. His career since 1913 is as follows: A member of the House of Representatives 10 times, a State Minister four times, in the Education, Finance, Communication and Railway

(View Page Image)
POLITICAL SERIES: 181 (Continued)
ITEM 2 (Continued)
Ministries respectively, he was specially granted the privileges of his former post in 1943 and was Privy Councillor in 1945 as a senior member in the political world.
Director of the First High School ABE, Yoshinori, excellent disciple of the eminent Japanese author NATSUME, Sosek[illegible]was informally appointed to be the Education Minister. He went to [illegible]European countries to study philosophy and the history of philosophy in 1929, After that time he was a profoss[illegible]at KE[illegible]O [illegible]University for about 16 years till he succeeded the former [illegible]Education Minister HASHIDA, Kunihiko[illegible], as a director of the First High School. He is a fine philosopher standing aloof from the [illegible]owd[illegible]and his writings "The Times and Culture[illegible]was suppressed for promoting individualistic trends in the dras[illegible]proh[illegible]of liberalistic and individualistic publication in 1941. He was nominated as member of the House of Peers by the Emperor last year.
SOEJIMA, Senhachi, is expected to be Agriculture and Forestry Minister, He, a native of SAGA-Ken and was a classmate of HATOYAMA, President of the Liberal Party. His career is as follows. Director of the Provisions Board of the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry (later the Rice Board) in 1921; Vice-President of the YAWATA Iron Foundry in 1922, Director of the Commerce Board in 1924, Managing Director of the SHOWA Steel Manufacturing Company in 1929, Chief Director of the OSAKA Stock Exchange from 1932 to 1936, Head Official of the International Exhibition (BANKOKU HAKURANKAI) in 1937, Chief Director of the TOKYO Stock Exchange in 1939, Vice-President of the NIPPON Bill Exchange in 1943. He is not an utter stranger to the rice problem with the foregoing careers and in the pressing food and other problems great hopes are entained of him.
Director of the Cabinet Board: of Legislation, NARAHASHI, Wataru, 75 years old, is expected to be Chief Cabinet Secretary and Minister without Portfolio. He is a self-educated lawyer who enjoyed successful fame in the TOKYO FRANCE Debt Case. As for his political career he was a member of the House of Representatives from his native FUKUOKA and then became Director of the Cabinet Board of Legislation. It is because Prime Minister SH[illegible]IARA was aware of his talent that he was nominated as the [illegible]net Chief Secretary in place of TSUGITA.
ISHIGURO, Takeshige, was unofficially chosen to be Director of the C[illegible]abinet Board of Legislation. His career is as follows: Head of the Economic Revival Section of the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry and Governor of YAMAGATA-Ken in 1939: Director of the Fiber Board of the Commerce and Industry Ministry and Director of the Trade Board in 1940, Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in 1941, Chariman of the Commodities Price Committee and President of the Greengrocer Supply Control Company in 1942 and Chief Secretary of the Privy Council in 1945. Being a clever and versatile official, he will enter a new phase of his career as one of the brains of the SHIDEHARA Cabinet.
ITEM 3 True Circumstances at Time of Surrender (Pare 1) - Asahi Shimbun - 13 Jan 46. Translator: J. Weiller.
Now the whole nation perfectly understands that the war was lost, but when it suddenly heard the news of the end of war and of defeat in the [illegible]t of frantic orders for decisive battles on the mainland
- 2 -

(View Page Image)
POLITICAL SERIES: 181 (Continued)
ITEM 3 (Continued)
the nation, as a matter of fact, was struck dumb. We asked Mr. SEKO[illegible]IZU, Tsunehisa, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet in the SUZUKI Cabinet which accomplished the great task of ending the war to publish the intricacies of the then prevailing situation to which he consented. He contributed the following memoirs:
"The SUZUKI Cabinet was formed in April, 1945. I do not know whether or not the Premier had a plan in for the end of war at the time of formation of his cabinet but from the fact that immediately after inauguration he ordered a thorough study of d[illegible]capacity for carrying on the war. I presume his determination was not solely for continuing the war.
"An old American friend of mine is now here as a captain of the occupying forces. According to him, when he found my among the personnel in the news of the formation of the SUZUK[illegible]Cabinet, after putting that fact together with the Premier's personality, he predicted to his friends in AMERIC that the war would come to an end within six months. So it seems that abroad, too, the SUZUKI Cabinet was not regarded as a mere wartime Government.
"According to the Premier's orders, minute studies were made, based on detailed statistics and forecasts regarding the munition industries, food and trends of public feelings, by military, naval and other related authorities with the Investigation Bureau of the Cabinet as the center. While making an estimate of changes in our national strength, s[illegible]nles were also being pushed regarding other countries' attitudes toward us. The conclusion was arrived at in the middle of May, and it became evident that unless some miraculous methods were worked out, the prevailing internal situation could not stand the war any more.
"If was judged that, following the collapse of GERMANY, the other Powers' attitudes toward us would become all the more uncompromising and that we would have to expect a declaration of war by the SOVIET UNION about the end of September. Under such a forecast our conclusion was that with the termination of war at the end of July or August, at the latest, as an objective, we must establish complete mobilization and complete use of equipment; otherwise it would not only become difficult to hold OKINAWA but the decisive battles on the mainland would [illegible]by no means be easy matters.
"It was considered, however, very difficult to realize these objectives. Since the beginning of May, frequent meetings were held by the Premier, the Foreign, War, and Navy Ministers, and Chiefs of [illegible]the Army and Navy General Staffs. The contents of those meetings were kept strictly secret from me and also from the lower organization of the Army and Navy but the result was the so-called HIROTA - MALICK private interviews. The objectives of the interviews were, first, to improve JAPAN-SOVIET relations in order to make the SOVIET UNION clarify her neutral stand. (The SOVIET UNION announced the abrogation of the Non-Agression Pact at the beginning of April), and further, if possible, to end the war with the SOVIET UNION as an intermediary. At the beginning the situation was thought hopeful.
"In fact, an attempt was made by the KOISO Cabinet to end the war by means of the SOVIET'S intervention, but before it materialized the question was dropped. Subsequently when the battle for OKINAWA began to look bad for us the necessity for deciding on the fundamental principle for the future guidance of war was felt, and as a result, a conference in the Emperor's presence was held on 9 June.
- 3 -

(View Page Image)
POLITICAL SERIES: 181 (Continued)
ITEM 3 (Continued)
At this conference discussions were put[illegible]forward based on the above mentioned estimate of national strength and judgment of the international situation, and the conclusion reached was that ending the war without sacrificing the national polity and the Imperial land was desirable. The expression of this conclusion contained profound meaning. It meant that so long as the national polity was upheld and the Imperial land was preserved, the war would be regarded as over, but on account of the surrounding situation the phrase completion of the war was ostensibly adopted.
"On the heels of this conference an extraordinary Session the Diet was convened at which the epoch-making Law of Emergency Wartime Measures was submitted. Many members asked the Government why the Extraordinary Imperial Prerogative, according to Article 31 of the Constitution, was not put into action. They argued that the introduction of such a law showed the Government's cowardly attitue in putting responsibility on the Diet. The aim of the introduction of this law was to help execute the war by a wholesale revision of the various controlling regulations which were hindrances to the manipulation of total national strength. The reason why the Premier specially chose the form of law instead of an Extraordinary Imperial Order based on Article 31 was that he feared unnecessarily involving the Emperor by the latter method. Therefore, he preferred constitutional measures like the former procedure. Witnessing debates in the Diet, I secretly regretted the attitude of the legislature. As a result of the passage of this bill the Government[illegible]t once set about eliminating certain obstacles.
"In the meantime the situation on OKINAWA was fast growing worse and in spite of strenuous co-operation of the Army and Navy it reached the last stage. Public opinion was aroused and loud voices were heard attacking the lack of harmony between the two fighting forces.
"This friction was often pointed out since the beginning of the war, and on the formation of the SUZUKI Cabinet, the unity of the forces having become a question, the Premier had interviews with both Army and Navy leaders and tried to accelerate mutual co-operation between the two. However, as far as the OKINAWA Campaign was concerned the tactical co-operation between the two forces was regarded as satisfactory, but nothing could be done to compensate for the shortage of materials. For example, the fleet under Admiral ITO had to use unsatisfactory oil due to the shortage of crude oil. It is also regrettable that the weather did net favor the attack by air torpedo fleet(GIRETSU). OKINAWA was lost in this way, plunging the whole nation into uneasiness. On 22 June the Prime Minister, the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the Military and Navy General Staffs, were unexpectedly summoned to the palace and were instructed by the Emperor to consider means to end the war as speedily as possible.
"The Premier, after returning to the Official residence, told me, without revealing the particulars, that the Emperor frankly indicated to him what he could dare not tell to the others, After the Imperial summons the six leaders had repeated conferences and as a result decided to send a special mission to the SOVIET UNION with a view of discussing adjustment of the relations between the two countries and to request intervention in connection with the end of the war. As special envoy, Prince KONOYE was chosen by His Majesty's gracious will."
- 4 -
HomePress translations [Japan]. Political Series 0181, 1946-01-14.
 Text Only
 Text & Inline Image
 Text & Image Viewer
 Image Viewer Only