Press translations [Japan]. Political Series 0117, 1945-12-24.
Date24 December, 1945
translation numberpolitical-0504
call numberDS801 .S85
Persistent Identifier
POLITICAL SERIES: 117
ITEM 1 Prince KONOE's Memoirs on Japanese American Negotiations - Asahi Shimbun - 23 Dec 45. Translator: J. Weiller.
Full Translation:
Prince KONE's Memoir on JAPAN-AMERICA Negotiation.
The reply from GERMANY did not arrive. In the meantime, the Foreign Minister was
putting off, day after day, our reply to
AMERICA, while the Army and Navy were requesting him for a speedy answer. In the end,
in view of the necessity of our answer
being in American hands in time for the Presidential speech, which was scheduled for
14 May, we had to cable, without waiting
for a German reply, to Ambassador NOMURA that he might open negotiations at noon of
the 12 May, according to the Japanese wire
of the previous day. Thereupon, Ambassador NOMURA called on Secretary of State HULL
on 11 May (Japanese Time, 12) and 12 May
and, presenting our statement, made explanations. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA sent a
message again on 13 May to Secretary of
State HULL in which he emphasised that the reason for JAPAN'S insistence on Japanese-American
negotiations was on the
assumption that, (l) AMERICA would not participate in the European War and (2) she
would immediately recommend to Chiang KAI
SHEK that he open peace negotiations with JAPAN. Secretary of State HULL agreed with
Ambassador NOMURA again, "The parley now
going on between the two countries is not yet a negotiation conducted on a definite
basis, but is unofficial, so let us have a
frank chat together."
Regarding the Japanese note handed over by the Ambassador, he revealed not a little
suspicion of our having omitted a
guarantee clause to the effect that JAPAN would not make armed advances to the South.
He also showed special concern over the
CHINA Incident and asked the Ambassador various questions. He further disclosed that
he had to obtain an understanding from
ENGLAND on this question.
HULL went on to explain that internal circumstances were in no way facilitating negotiations
with JAPAN. He maintained a very
careful attitude in the matter. Not only was the President's speech, to be delivered
on l4 May, postponed (to 29 May), but
arguments became heated on the convoy question and, pressed by both internal and external
affairs AMERICA appeared to be
unable to decide her attitude easily. In any case, in spite of our expectation, her
reply did not come soon.
The reason Foreign Minister MATSUOKA delayed the reply to AMERICA to such an extent
was that he war waiting for an answer from
GERMANY, but, impatient of the delay, he dispatched instructions on 12 May. Immediately
afterward the long awaited answer
arrived from GERMANY, the gist of which was that AMERICA'S secret intention was to
plunge into war against GERMANY, after
having completed conciliation with JAPAN; the Japanese
POLITICAL SERIES: 117 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
Government should notify AMERICA that, (l) the Japanese Government would consider
the guard and convoy systems practiced by
AMERICA as acts inciting war; (2) Should AMERICA refrain from such acts, JAPAN was
prepared to study her proposal. The reply
contained the request that in view of the effect the question had on the [illegible]ri-Partite Pact,
GERMANY's opinion should be sought in case of our dispatch of a final reply.
The Italian Government sent notice to the effect that the German reply should be
deemed similar to her own.
On 19 May, as vaguely expected, Ambassador OTTO intimated his Government's dissatisfaction
on our replying to AMERICA before
the arrival of the German reply. According to him, in case a signatory of the Tri-Partite
Pact arrived at an agreement with a
third country, it would weaken the front of the Tri-Partite Pact. He implied a fundamental
objection to the JAPAN-AMERICA
negotiations demanding, "the American Government's obligation of non-intervention
in the war between ENGLAND and the Axis
Countries" and, "JAPAN's obligation arising from the Tri-Partite Agreement should
be accurately and clearly defined." The note
went on quite high-handedly in concluding that "The German Government, must assert
its desire that it completely participate
in the Japanese-American negotiations and obtain immediate information regarding the
American reply. It is not in comformity
with the Tri-Partite Pact if the Japanese Government listens to an American proposal
without an understanding with the German
Government on the whole aspect of the said important question."
At the same time, Ambassador OSHIMA wired from GERMANY, reporting on the extreme
antipathy entertained by the German leaders
toward the Japanese-American negotiations and adding his own opposition in a vehement
tone.
Conferences were held in TOKYO on 15 and 22 May but they were no mere than exchanges
of intelligance and opinions. The Foreign
Minister, however, appeared to have been influenced by the German note and repeated
statements of the opinion from Ambassador
OSHIMA, as his originally vague attitude became still more vague and opposed to the
other Cabinet Ministers. At the conference
on 22 May Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, asked Chief Secretary. TOMITA
to tell the Foreign Minister that. "If
the Foreign Minister has such a dissenting opinion there is a danger of a split in
the Cabinet in case of the conclusion of
the agreement. You had better take such a possibility into consideration." On 23 May
the Foreign Minister had a talk with me,
telling me quite plainly, "The Army and Navy leaders appear to be favoring the Japanese-American
understanding, even at the
cost of offending GERMANY and ITALY. What can we do if we are so weak-kneed?" Furthermore,
regarding the interpretation of
[illegible]rticle three of the Tri-Partite Pact, in case GERMANY attacked an American convoy
he
maintained his assertion that JAPAN would be forced to participate in the war. Actually
Ambassador G[illegible]repeatedly stressed this point, According to the Foreign Minister, by this acting,
we might be able to
check AMERICA's participation.
According to the Foreign Minister's views, the American President had already made
up his mind for participation so that the
understanding would not be worth while. In such an emergency [illegible]e thought, the present attitude of
the Army and Navy could never satisfy the Nation: a riot might breakout. In any case,
JAPAN was compelled to clarify her
attitude; she must side with either ENGLAND and AMERICA [illegible]n one hand, or GERMANY and ITALY on the
ether, as Foreign Minister, [illegible]was determined to side with the letter countries. He consluded his
argument
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POLITICAL SERIES: 117 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
by saying "as His Majesty's subject, I have no other course than to obey His wishes".
In a sense, he hinted at his final move
as Foreign Minister.
ADDENDUM
At the beginning of the 3rd installment which appeared in yesterday's edition, the
following memoir is added:
After the conference of 18 May the Army, the Navy, and the Foreign Officers at once
set about to study the draft of a note to
AMERICA. Meanwhile, Chief of the American Bureau TERAZAKI, after consulting with MUTO
and OKA, Chiefs of Military and Naval
Affairs Bureau respectively, tried to instruct Ambassador NOMURA to convoy to AMERICA
that "We agree in principle", but,
though Vice-Minister OHASHI approved the suggestion, he suppressed it on the ground
that they ought to await Foreign Minister
MATSUOKA's return to TOKYO. MATSUOKA arrived at DAIREN on 20 May. I at once got in
touch with him by telephone. The Foreign
Minister is said to have told a man near by, "The American proposal is perhaps the
realization of what I told STEI[illegible]T in MOSCOW." Actually, on trips to and from EUROPE, the Foreign Minister had intimate
talks with
Ambassador STEINHART, his old acquaintance, and asked him to advise President ROOSEVELT
that if the President liked gambling
he ought to trust JAPAN and play a part in the realization of the Sino-Japanese Peace.
He also telegraphed me of this on 8
April, and appeared to have secretly expected that his action would bear fruit.
His return was put off for a day owing to the weather and he came back on 22 April.
I personally went to TACHIKAWA Airfield to
see him. As he is a man of delicate sentiment, I thought the time when the American
proposal was first shown him would be
important, and accordingly intended to explain the circumstances in the car, on our
way back. However, as his program was to
go to NIJUBASHI (T.N. The bridge in front of the Palace) to pay his respects, Vice-Minister
OHASHI, in place of me,
accompanied him in the car, having been assigned to this delicate mission. As excepted,
the Foreign Minister disclosed extreme
ill-humor and behaved as if he had no interest at all in the problem.
On the night of his return a conference was held at which he boasted about his visit
to EUROPE. But when the talk was shifted
to the important American proposals, he showed signs of excitement, and especially
emphasised fidelity to GERMANY, stating
that he interpreted the proposal in question as containing 70 per cent ill will and
30 per cent good will. He reminded us that
during the first Great War, AMERICA, having protected herself against outside enemies
by concluding the ISHII-LANSING
Agreement, participated in the War and that after having used us to her heart's content,
revoked the agreement on the
termination of the War. After asking for a fortnight's time to think over the question,
he left us at the conference at about
2300. The conference was carried on until after midnight and an agreement was reached
among us. "In spite of the Foreign
Minister, the question will be settled as quickly as possible: The next day, on the
23rd, I called him to [illegible]y house and after an intimate talk he appeared to have more or less recovered his
composure. But he
did not go beyond saying to me, "As I have forgotten about EUROPE for the time being
let me consider the question a little
more."
Among the Army and Navy leaders, autogrenism to the Foreign Minister was geightened.
Some of them insisted on putting the
matter into execution, by changing the Minister if necessary. Knowing his complicated
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POLITICAL SERIES: 117 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
temperament I thought it best to leave the matter in his hands for the time being.
The next day I was laid up with a cold and
confined myself at [illegible]GIKUBC, while the Foreign Minister, also ill, spent his time in bed.
During the internal both MUTO and OKA repeatedly called on him, jointly or separately,
and tried their best to soften his mind
and get a reply sent to AMERICA as early as possible. However, either under the plea
of illness or by putting up objections to
the phraseology in the draft, he did not comply with their wishes.
DISTRIBUTION "X"
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