Press translations [Japan]. Political Series 0097, 1945-12-20.
Date20 December, 1945
translation numberpolitical-0432
call numberDS801 .S85
Persistent Identifier
POLITICAL SERIES: 97
ITEM 1 Prelude to Defeat - Tokyo Shimbun - 18 Dec 45. Translator: J. Weiller.
Full Translation:
Prelude to Defeat
by TAMAKA, Ryukichi
Ex-Chief of Military Administration Bureau
The writer of this memorandum was once the Chief of the Army Administration Bureau,
outside the so-called military clique, and
was known to be diametrically opposed to General MUTO, the Chief of the Military Affairs
Bureau. Pessimistic about our natural
resources and the future of the war, he became ill with worry. This became a topic
of conversation among well-informed circles
as TAMAKA's "Patriotic mania". He left his position a year after the outbreak of war
as the result of a dispute with War
Minister TOJO and Vice-Minister KIMURA. He has recently published a book called "In
the Face of Defeat". In answer to our
special request that he reveal some facts on the history of the defeat to the public,
he has written this memorandum. The
writer adds that his intention is not merely to expose, but also to warn the Nation
against following these same erroneous
steps in the future.
The Year Before the War
General TOJO was, from the beginning, a supporter of dual front tactics. The reason
he had to leave his position as
Vice-Minister of ar under General ITAGAKI in 1938, only four months after the appointment,
was that he had made a belligerent
speech at an ex-servicemen's meeting, held in September, in which he said that he
was not afraid of dual front tactics for
bringing about a settlement of the CHINA Incident. Since War Minister ITAGAKI agreed
with General TADA, Vice-Chief of the Army
General Staff, that the CHINA Incident must immediately be solved, he pressed TOJO
to resign because of this imprudent speech.
However, the latter did not accede to the demand, saying, "Since the Vice-Minister's
function is that of a civil officer I
will not resign, even at the risk of a disciplinary dismissal, unless Vice-Chief TADA
is also made to resign". Genial General
ITAGAKI at last dismissed both TOJO and TADA simultaneously. At that time many officers
in the Array supported TOJO's demand
for strong measures; ITAGAKI, consequently, became unpopular.
Lieutenant General ISHIWARA was instrumental in making TADA and ITAGAKI co-operate
with each other in adopting conciliatory
measures toward CHINA.
POLITICAL SERIES: 97 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
As soon as he left the post TOJO ordered KATO, Hakujiro (then commander of the TOKYO
Military Police), to restrain and examine
Mr. ASAHARA, Kenzo, who was on intimate terms with ITAGAKI, TADA and ISHIWARA. He
concocted a false story to the effect that
these three were making common cause with a communist. He tried to [illegible]ostracize them from the Army.
This plot, however, ended in failure, thanks to Colonel WATANABE's (then the commander
of the Defeuse Corps) fair judgment.
Following is the gist of the so-called ASAHARA Incident.
Perfection of Militaristic Politics
When he became War Minister in the KONOYE Cabinet in 1940, TOJO at once dismissed
ISHIWARA, put TADA on the reserve list and
transferred ITAGAKI to CHOSEN in order to keep him entirely out of current affairs.
Furthermore, he (TOJO) tried to dismiss
him more than once, but due to my opposition (I was then the Chief of the Army Administration
Bureau), he wasn't able to do
so. Expelling all the advocates of peace with CHINA, TOJO steadily set about preparing
for war against ENGLAND, AMERICA and
SOVIET RUSSIA. With the appearance of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in
the fall of 1940, the Army's influence in
politics and economics began to roach its height. It finally became dominant when
the TOJO Cabinet was formed the following
year (1941).
While TOJO was still War minister, GERMANY declared war on the U.S.S.R., in June
1941. He at once ordered the occupation of
Southern INDO-CHINA. Mr. OHASHI, Chuichi, then Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, fearing
that ENGLAND and AMERICA would surely
resort to economic retaliation of JAPAN sent her troops into that region, tried to
persuade the Army to desist from the
attempt, saying that without the determination to fight with these two countries we
should not commit this outrage. But the
Army was adament, asserting that neither ENGLAND nor AMERICA would dare retaliate.
The result, however, has endorsed Mr. OHASHI's prediction. Surprised at the economic
retaliation and the gravity of the
resultant situation, Premier KONOYE at once dismissed Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, put
Admiral TOYODA in his place and opened
conciliatory negotiations with AMERICA. The Army's attitude toward this was extremely
cold.
In September, 1941, Prince KONOYE planned an interview with President ROOSEVELT in
HAWAII for the purpose of coming to terms
with AMERICA, but having failed to secure the Army's support the plan was allowed
to drift into obscurity. This was confirmed
by the decision reached in the council in the Emperor's presence on 2 (or 6) September
to the effect that "unless the
negotiations) be settled by the middle of October the Army would start preparing for
war". As TOJO had already made up his
mind to fight he did not look favorably on the proposed ROOSEVELT-KONOYE interview.
In the middle of October TOJO succeeded in overthrouing the KONOYE Cabinet. Behind
the formation of the TOJO Cabinet were
intripus by military politicians. The Chief of Military Affairs, MUTO, was very close
to TOJO and persuaded General HAYASHI
and ABE to approve his becoming Premier, while major General KATO, Chief of General
Affairs of the Gendarmery Headquarters,
told marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, that unless General TOJO came into
political power,
- 2 -
POLITICAL SERIES: 97 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
the Army would because unmanageable. The TOJO Cabinet owed its formation to the recommendation
of ABE, HAYASHI, and KIDO. The
JUSHIN earnestly requested TOJO to go to any extremes to suppress the radical elements
in the Army for the sake of an amicable
settlement with AMERICA. They were innocent and ignorant enough not to realize that
the foremost advocate of a strong-handed
policy was TOJO himself, that it was be who controlled both the military Affairs Bureau
and the Army General Staff.
How foolish to hope for conciliation with AMERICA after appointing such a champion
of jingoism.
Army's Plans of Operations All Failures
Well then, on what basis did General Headquarters plan operations against ENGLAND
and AMERICA? I do not know much of the
details preceding the war, having learnt the decision at noon on 7 December, but,
judging from the talks of the Chief of
Military Affairs, MUTO, and other high officers of General Headquarters, the belief
was that "By the end of 1942 GERMANY would
thoroughly crush the SOVIET UNION and, as a result, ENGLAND would surrender. Then
naturally, AMERICA would lose its
belligerence and JAPAN would lead the war to a successful conclusion by the end of
1942." Premier TOJO's so-called belief in
certain victory did not mean JAPAN's victory by her own hand but a victory almost
entirely dependent upon a GERMAN
victory.
According to the various data I collected after the outbreak of war, our war stocks
wore sufficient for only one year, while
we depended on the southan regions for foodstuffs. Shipping problems were not taken
into consignation. The maximum production
of iron and steel was 4,300,000 tons per year, but in order to satisfy the Navy's
demands the Board of Planning changed
500,000 tons to 4,800,000 tons on paper. We looked to the PHILIPPINES for copper,
to the DUTCH EAST INDIES for oil. We came to
the hasty conclusion that our monopoly of rubber, zinc and quinine would seal the
fate of ENGLAND and AMERICA.
One Defeat After Another Since MIDWAY
The naval battle at MIDWAY made our invincible navy vulnerable. The defeat at GUADALCANAL
made our invincible army trouble to
the ground. All the operations since these two reverses, except those on the Asiatic
Continent, were a weries of failures
steadily forcing us to the acceptance of the [illegible]SDAM Declaration and unconditional surrender.
In spite of the JUSHIN's intention to carry out negotiations with AMERICA, TOJO intended
to crush AMERICA and ENGLAND by fair
means or foul. In accordance with the plan of the Military Affairs Bureau the despatch
of Ambassador KURUSU was a means of
camouflaging our preparation for war. It was pre-arranged that the ultimatum handed
to the UNITED STATES state Department on 8
December would be simulteneous with the attack on PEARL HARBOR.
- 3 -
POLITICAL SERIES: 97 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
Another indication that General TOJO was an advocate of a strong policy toward ENGLAND
and AMERICA, for the sake of settling
the CHINA Incidnet, is the following: In October 1940 RIBBENTROP, the German Foreign
Minister, as a result of overtures to
CHIANG KAI SHEK through Mr. CHIN KAI, the Chinese Minister to GERMANY, proposed Peace
negotiations on the condition that JAPAN
withdraw her troops from CHINA. Notwithstanding Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's approval,
TOJO, though he first agreed to the
plan, afterward rejected the proposal on the ground that "we would have no word of
apology to the holy spirits of YASUKUNI"
(TN: The YASUKUNI Shrine where the war dead are deified). It was indeed JAPAN's misfortunes
to have a mystic like TOJO at the
head of the Government.
One Year After the Outbreak of War
On 9 December I stated to Vice-minister KIMURA, "This war began by an apparently
unified nation, but, actually, according to
reports I have collected from the Military Police and the Home Department, all the
intelligentsia are opposed to it, while the
masses blindly submit to the authoritic. I am afraid serious internal problems will
arise in the near future.
To this KIMURA replied, "I do not think so, for there have been many who have committed
HARAKIRI in front of the Imperial
Palace because they are against war with ENGLAND and AMERICA. This is sure proof".
In view of the fact that even the Chief of the Bureau of Military Administration
did not know of impending war with AMERICA
until the day previous, to the general public the news must have been like a bolt
from the blue. They were too dazed to say
anything against it, except that some of them danced for joy at the exaggerated news
of the success at PEARL HARBOR. In the
Army itself there were many who opposed the war, like Generals HATA, UMEZU, and FUJIE.
They all, directly or indirectly,
expressed such opinions to me. However, as I was outside the political and economic
circles I had no means of voicing my
opinion. Those who expressed the strongest opposition were General TATSUMI, a military
attach's to the Embassy in LONDON, and
General YAMAOKA, a military attach's to the Embassy in MOSCOW. Their strenuous objections
were of no avail.
5,000 Yen for the Recommendation Election
In April the notorious recommendation elections took place. As far as I know, 5,000
yen per candidate was spent out of the
Extraordinary Military Expense Fund for election campaigns, to the indignation of
thoughtful soldiers. Lieutenant Colonel
FUJII, for example, whose duty was the maintenance of order in case of emergency,
was purple with rage when he heard of the
plan. The result of this election made the Diet as gentle as a lamb before the clattering
of sabers. There could be neither
popular will nor public opinion. The only thing that was expected of the people was
unconditional submission to Government
orders. The slightest opposition was mercilessly dealt with by the Special Police.
- 4 -
POLITICAL SERIES: 97 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
In May, Mr. KYOSEI's son-in-law, Mr. CHOMEI of the CHUNG-KING Government, came to
JAPAN and hinted that CHINA would accept a
peace offer if FRENCH INDO-CHINA be ceded to her in exchange for MANCHURIA. Mr. CHOMEI
is my intimate friend, but as I did not
concern myself directly with diplomacy, I introduced him to Generals DOIHARA and HONJO,
who tried to induce General TOJO and
General SUGIYAMA, the Chief of the General Staff, to accept the offer. They flatly
refused because "crushing the CHUNG-KING
Government was a national policy". Peace between JAPAN and CHINA would have meant
the end of the Greater East Asia War, but
those leaders who were intoxicated with their initial successes lacked the ability
to see this.
Wounded Confined in Hospitals
About this time our Navy suffered a crushing defeat at MIDWAY, causing consternation
in General Headquarters. The wounded sent
back from the front were all confined in the Naval Hospital at YOKOSUKA and contact
with the outside was entirely cut off.
Only three men in the Army know the result of the battle - the Minister, Vice-Minister
and Chief of the Military Affairs
Bureau. Learning of the disaster earlier than others, I made a suggestion to TOJO
to the effect that "the Government ought to
make known the real situation to the people without reserve. The Japanese are people
who will fight to the bitter end whether
the situation be good or bad. To tell the truth is the best way to encourage them.
However, he was stubborn and rejected my
advice, saying "The masses are fools. If we tell them the truth they will be disheartened."
General Headquarters, believing the MIDWAY defeat was due to espionage activities,
started a Nation wide spy hunt but they
could round up no spies. They did not know that the real spy was AMERICA's radar.
The Air Defense equipment of the country was primitive. The Military Administration
Bureau, knowing this, frequently asked for
improvements but was turned down every time, by Premier TOJO, on the ground that"
all the materials required for defense
should be sent to the front". General Headquarters greatly feared air raids but they
said "So long as stratospperic planes are
not developed, a large scale air raid on the homeland is impossible." I, representing
the Military Administratic Bureau,
demanded perfection of air defense equipment but was always laughed at as an incurable
persimist and coward.
Despite TOJO's bragging about victory, I had come to the conclusion that unless we
did not terminate the war at the first
opportunity JAPAN would be ruined.
The Downfall of the TOJO Cabinet
My firm belief was that so long as the military politicians were interfering with
politics and finance, the war would drive
this country into ruin, and, as a result, I came to the conclusion that the TOJO Cabinet
must be overthrown. However, as I had
been a constant opponent of Military participation in politics, I hesitated now to
enter into political activities. The
question of establishing the Department of Great East Asia Affairs was a good opportunity
to put my plans into
- 5 -
POLITICAL SERIES: 97 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
execution. I now could effect the downfall of the Cabinet, probably with the help
of Mr. TOGO, the Foreign Minister, who is a
very intimate friend of mine. I encouraged Mr. TOGO, and at the same time I promised
him my resignation on the ground that,
should the undertaking fail, my constant opposition to military interference in politics
and finance would be frustrated and
of no avail.
Mr. TOGO had to leave his post without attaining his objective, having been prevailed
upon to do so by Admiral SHIMADA, the
Navy Minister, and I resigned from my position the next day, 22 September.
The unruliness of some of the military forces at the front was really beyond discription,
especially among the officers. On
tenering my resignation I said to War Minister TOJO, "Four Excellency is an optimist
regarding this war, while I am a
pessimist, as that if I remain any longer under your command I may impede the conduct
of the war. At any rate, I am leaving
because of my health. The last thing I would like to point out to your Excellency
is the degeneration of army discipline not
only among Generals but among all grades of commanding officers. If they carry on
in this way the future is really
disheartening."
My resignation was sudden and came as a surprise to my subordinates. Some of them
begged me to forgive them for the
insufficient help they rendered, but I said, "I am solely to blame for what has happened;
it is not your fault. I am beaten.
If the Army's intervention in political and financial questions is left unchecked,
JAPAN'S ruin is inevitable. Please do your
best to save the country".
I left the War Department on 22 September and so ended my 30 years as a soldier,
I have become a mere "has-been".
DISTRIBUTION: "X"
- 6 -
Loading...