Press translations [Japan]. Editorial Series 0349, 1946-02-03.

Full Translation:

The argument of Mr. OUCHI, Hype, which vas presented in public to the minister of Finance at the and of last year, in favor of the disavowal of the Government's pledges, has increased in merit, when we consider the present state of inflation. To the current national debt of 130 billion yen, will be added a new debt of more than 100 billion, - 45 billion for indemnities to munition industries and several tens of billions for compensations to the companies whose plants and equipment will be used for reparations.

The Allied directive of 24 January prohibited the Government's from borrowing from the Bank of JAPAN to make good its financial deficits. This attests to the propriety of arguments in favor of the denunciation of the war-time commitments. We may well contend that such an enormous national debt will finally invite national ruin, directly aggravating inflation and indirectly making the balance of finances unfavorable in view of tae large amount of interest-payments.

In face of this crisis, the Minister of Finance has held out, in practice, against the disavowal of pledges. He has done nothing more than block the indemnities, the estimation of which has never been accurate. Moreover, he went so far as to pay a high interest-ra[illegible]of 3.8 per cent. A new directive which prohibits the payment of interest to frozen indemnities shows us again the lack of [illegible]on the part of the Government.

Be that as it may, the Government's police to compensate, for the losses of the munition companies, is far from being fair and democratic. They had already enlarged their equipment under governmental financial protection and had obtained large profits during the war. Moreover, just before and after the end of the war, they received the entire value of their finished and half-finished goods, in addition to the amount insured for war a damage.

Now, when we are threatened by vicious inflation on one side and by financial collapse on the other, the Government should take some steps which will be tantamount to non-fulfilment of pledges. We cannot, agree with the opinion that the enforcement of the three new taxes will confiscate the indemnities, because the amount to be collected by these taxes is too small compared with the generous indemnities received by munition companies.

The main reason why the Government cannot decline to pay indemnities is that the current Cabinet has too many capitalistic tendensies. The next reason is its blind faith in the maintenance of financial capital. The third reason is that the Government is as self-centered as ever, in spite of its pledge to bring about political and economic [illegible]. The first and third reasons will dis[illegible]ear in time. As

EDITORIAL SERIES: 349 (Continued)

ITEM 1 (Continued)

for the third, some awakened financiers profess that even if the loan advanced to [illegible]ition companies prove a dead loss, they can maintain business by the operation of accumulated funds and a reduction in the rate of dividends.

The above-mentioned argument deserves further discussion. However, we want to point out a couple of events reported on 24 January. One is about the reparations problem. When about four hundred important factories in the homeland were named for removal as a result of Mr. PAULERY's report, the Ministry of Finance declared its intention to allow several tens of billions of yen in national bonds to compensate for removal, without clarifying the means of valuation, the sale price or the reconstruction price or the value of profit-capitalization. The other concerns a reduction in the interest rate of national [illegible]. The report says that the authorities have decided to consider lowering the interest on national bonds from the current 3.5 Per cent to 2 per cent, in the anticipation that at the end of next year interest payments will amount to more than seven billion yen, with more than two hundred billion yen in capital.

Readers must have realized the theoretical contradiction between these two decisions. The former indicates an opposition to the non-fulfilment of the Government's war-time commitments and a lack of cautiousness in the estimation of indemnities. On the contrary, the latter advocates a onesided reduction in the interest rate on national bonds which are protected under bond laws. Again, the former disa[illegible]roves of non-payment even in the face of the speeding up of inflation, while the latter approves of non-payment to save interest payments as small as 1,700,000,000 yen..

What is in the minds of government officials who present such inconsistent logic? The liquidation of national bonds and conversion to lower bonds is the fundamental basis for sound finances. [illegible]enforcement of this is urgently needed not only to alleviate the burden on the Treasury but also to promote economic reconstruction by the lowering of interest on industrial funds. However, in order to take such steps, the mere anticipation of the Diet's approval of reform bills to that effect is not enough. The authorities are not qualified to decide, with the self-cente[illegible]dness peculiar to bureaucrats, such a change as will affect the fundamental and universal foundation of JAPAN's economy before they have presented their ideas for debating at the epoch-making session of the Diet to be convened after the general election.

Apart from the Diet's approval, the authorities should first consult public opinion and examine all platforms of every political party, and then draft a bill. It is common sense in democratic politics, When the Labor Party Cabinet of ENGLAND in 1927 converted more than half of seven billion pounds of national bonds into lower priced bonds and the other half into non-red[illegible]mable bonds, the authorities left to the people the alternative of the two kinds of bonds, and. succeeded in inviting people to take the one which the Government desired. This is a very good example of fair parliamentarianism for our bureaucrats.

After all, the fact that bureaucrats consider themselves [illegible]to plan on and effect such important problems as influence the whole economy shows a lack of genuine understanding of democracy. If they truly realize the current economic crisis and have the confidence and courage to denounce pledges, they should go farther to reexamine the whole system of war-time indemnification in order to be consistent in their policies.

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EDITORIAL SERIES: 349 (Continued)

Full Translation:

At his reception, held on 27 January, Mr. NOZAKA, the prominent communist, stated as follows. "The majority of those who are gathered here are above 40. But in our camp, people in their twenties and thirties have little experience in theory and practice, and their thoughts have become blank. Therefore, filling up this blank will be a duty of us elderly persons ……”.

In the period of TAISHO after the Great European War, the waves of democracy swept over all the young men's circles in JAPAN, and developed into communism in the first stage of SHOWA, Those in the forties and in the fifties at present are those who were in school or engaged in the labor movement at that time. A person in his thirties [illegible]from university after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. Consequently, they know no social movement excepting these patriotic ones which merely flattered militarism. Hence, their lives, to the end of this war, had nothing to do with democracy.

Apart from the problem of whether communism and socialism are good or not, those who have been washed or effected even a little by the waves of these thoughts, or have engaged in their movements, have got into the habit of thinking matters over. But the others are unfortunate and have grown up without the habit of thinking, being confined in the frame of thought control by the military clique and bureaucrats.

People of 50 and 60 have grown up in the golden age of capitalistic economy. But people above 70, just as Messrs. OZAKI, and KOJIMA, the prominent politicians, for example, had passed through age of their struggle in which they risked their lives for the free civil rights to establish party politics, fighting against the clan ascendency. Therefore, they have an iron will.

The Japanese boys and girls have met an unprecedented national crisis, and they are now being washed by the waves of democracy. Furthermore, they will form the habit of thinking having sufficient training from now on. Ten or twenty years after this, therefore, JAPAN will arrive at a rich age of thought.

Full Translation:

No agreement has yet been reached between the Social Democratic and the Communist parties with regard to the formation of a democratic front, and there are certainly enough reasons for both parties to disagree. The Communist Party expressed the view that on urgent problems, if not on fundamental policies, agreement can be reached through their talks and thus a joint front can be formed. The Social Democratic Party is of the opinion that so long as the basic policies of the Communist Party are not clear even to that party itself, as well as to the general, public, an immediate co-operative move with the Communists is not to expected.

Although this disagreement may be pardonable after considering each party's standpoint, it only serves to give us the impression that the formation of a joint front is deadlocked. Since the Communist Party has changed its policies for the better by throwing away its former sectionalism and adopting the policy of "Being Loved by the People" there is a ray of hope in the solution of this problem. The time is already ripe for their coalition. In the local districts, instances of

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EDITORIAL SERIES: 349 (Continued)

ITEM 3 (Continued)

movements in concert with the other party have already been reported pertaining to the (solution of urgent problems. This trend clearly shows that there if much possibility of a concrete combination of both parties. Thus, the perfect conjunction of both parties is not necessarily impossible. Co-operative movements, either regarding basic policies or pressing questions, of these two parties will form the chief influence on the "Democratic Front". The general public is therefore expecting adequate steps to be taken by the leaders of the two parties with respect to the time and method of the coalition of both parties, why do the people at large expect it? The answer is simple enough.

Nothing at present is mere pressing for the people than the question of social unrest. The people have not yet reached the constructive stage of a new society by their own hands. They are only looking forward to the stabilization of their social life to be realized by new leadership. This is the desire of the majority of the Japanese people. They therefore will not choose the party. So long as it serves the purpose, any party, whether it be Social Democratic, Communist, Liberal, or Progressive will do. However, popularity has centered around these two parties to such an extent that popular attention is being given exclusively to their every move.

Of course, this may only attest to the low level of popular political consciousness. It is a case of the people's minds being stirred as in the presence of a popular star in a theatrical performance. It my be said to be caused by mass psychology. At any rate, the leaders of both parties are responsible, in consideration of this fact, for elevating the political level of those supporters as a, means of answering the popular expectations.

It must be borne in mind that the coalition of both parties implies this important task of enlightening the public. This fact likewise leads to the conclusion that in case of antagonism between these two parties in the discussion. of urgent problems revealing their, defects, the separation between the parties and the general public may occur. Such instances have been recorded in political history as in the instance of the old political parties. Prudence on the part of the two parties is necessary in encouraging the populace. But depending or the slogan "Popular Front", or "Democratic Front" is not desirable.

To give an example, food control by the people is not as yet fully appreciated by the masses.

The singular incident at ITABASHI of arbitary distribution of hidden foodstuffs is now well known. Of course, it will be a great disadvantage for the Communist Party to be judged by the people on this incident. The popular expectation for the elimination of social unrest along with political and social stabilization is based on the expectation of their conjunction. The public has less regard for the essential character or the substantial nature of these parties. With full appreciation then, of these actuality, can't the prudent actions of these two parties lead to their coalition?

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