Press translations [Japan]. Editorial Series 0278, 1946-01-21.
Date21 January, 1946
translation numbereditorial-0872
call numberDS801 .S82
Persistent Identifier
EDITORIAL SERIES: 278
ITEM 1 Reconstruction of the Metropolitan Area - Asahi Shimbun - 20 Jan 46. Translator K. Nobunga.
Full Translation:
A directive SCAP issued recently has prohibited entrance into certain cities without
permission so that the abnormal growth of
cities may be prevented. These cities are not only the six large cities, but also
those with populations of over 100,000. No
less than 10 per cent of the population of 70 million lived in metropolitan districts
as consumers. Nevertheless, the
Government had taken no extraordinary measures against their expansion. Therefore,
in only one or two air raids, not only
clothing, food and housing, but also the water supply, gas and electric supply, transportation,
medical treatment and
education were totally destroyed.
FUJINUMA, Shohei, newly appointed head of the metropolitan district and Police Chief
was the former Governor of TOKYO-Fu and
has experience as head of the Metropolitan Police Office and as Chief Secretary of
the Cabinet. For this reason, he may avoid
useless collisions between the metropolitan district and the police, and is a person
fit for the reconstruction and
maintenance of public order in the metropolitan district. On the other hand, when
Governor, he foolishly assisted the late
Mayor NAGATA, Hidejiro in carrying out the unnecessary 35 Ku System in TOKYO. We desire
that he make efforts for the
development of the metropolitan district in atonement for this failure.
ITEM 2 Liberal KONOE - Asahi Shimbun - 20 Jan 46. Translator; M. Kato.
Full Translation:
Freedom and responsibility are both aspects of the same thing. JAPAN is now in a
position to devote herself to the
construction of a democratic country or society. Even though she had been victorious,
a similar state would have been
experienced. Although defeated, JAPAN is fortunate enough to have a revolution without
bloodshed. It is not altogether
fortunate, however, because the motive of this revolution is not likely to be fully
appreciated. In consequence, the
democratization of our country will undeniably not be thorough. Freedom should be
most highly regarded in establishing a
democratic country or society. However, this freedom should be combined with joint
or common responsibility which forms the
foundation of national or social life. Otherwise freedom cannot be the motive power
of democratization.
I was impressed with the fact that late Prince KONOE was a liberal when I read the
momorandum regarding the negotiations
between the UNITED STATES and JAPAN which was published in serial form at the end
of last year in ASAHI. By these memoirs was
clarified the truth
EDITORIAL SERIES: 278 (Continued)
ITEM 2 (Continued)
of the negotiations together with the facts that lay behind them that a few men were
playing a vital role in connection with
the fate of our country.
At the time of the negotiations no opportunity was afforded even to those closely
connected with KONOE to detect the truth or
the aspects of the negotiations along with the influences working upon them. In contrast,
however, there was an impression, as
we read in this memorandum, that some secret was kept which seemed unnatural to those
who read it. The last of the serial was
published on 30 December and this led us to the conclusion that late Prince KONOE
was, after all, a liberal. No sense of
responsibility was implied in his memorandum.
It is most doubtful whether his death was fortunate or not for our country. Some
people are of the opinion that KONOE should
have survived to relate what he believed at the international court of justice. I
am doubtful as to whether his free
expression of belief at the international court in order to avoid war crime accusations
would have brought good luck to him.
On the contrary, it would have brought great misfortune and would have done great
harm, to our country. In short, his
memorandum was little else but a thorough expression of irresponsible freedom for
the purpose of protecting himself. I was
reminded of this fact, although I had hardly seen him before an official business.
The truth is this: On9 August last year the conference of advisors to the Throne
was to be held. Unexpectedly however the
a[illegible]-bomb attack and the participation of RUSSIA in the war caused the Cabinet to hold
an
important conference to find a remedy for this grave situation; the scheduled conference
of advisors to the Throne was
suspended. The late Prince KONOE now free, was at a dinner party with a certain group.
The conversation naturally passed to
the Cabinet meeting where a vital problem of war or peace was to be discussed.
All present were of the unanimous opinion that KONOE should stand by the Cabinet
as one of the chief advisors to the Throne.
Some even expressed an opinion advising KONOE to risk even his life for the attainment
of this object. The late Prince's reply
was, "I will, of course, devote myself to this important task; however, in case the
Government should be forced to bow to the
Supreme Command's decision, and enter into war, I shall be helpless." The Government,
alongside which I shall, of course,
stand, should persistently oppose the military, leaving the issue of war or peace
to the decision of the Throne. I believe
that what you must now do is encourage the Government."
This was KONOE's response, and he was right. If this correct manner of seeing things
and of functioning on the part of KONOE
had been realized in his third Cabinet in 1941 what would have resulted? In the Imperial
Conference held on 6 September 1941
an item wa3 discussed, as KONOE's memoirs revealed, that preparations for conflict
should be made in case there was no
prospect of reaching an agreement even at the beginning of October. According to his
memoirs, this means that had there been
no prospect of peace, preparation would have been made for war, and regarding that
prospect, at the beginning of October, the
problem should have been re-examined.
- 2 -
EDITORIAL SERIES: 278 (Continued)
ITEM 2 (Continued)
This, therefore, did not imply, according to KONOE's view, that preparation for the
war would not necessarily he started at
the beginning of October. However once such a resolution were made, the Government
was unable to control the High Command and
discussion at the beginning of October on the prospects of peace would be useless.
This is a self-evident fact. Why didn't the
Government resort to the measure of submitting the issue to the Throne at a time when
the Government and the Supreme Command
stood in opposition? The reason is obvious enough; Prince KOSOE was a liberal.
On 12 September of the same year there took place in TEKIGAISO an important conference
where discussion continued for two or
three days resulting in a disagreement among the Cabinet members and caused the resignation
of the third KONOE Cabinet; this
was likewise related in his memoirs. Careful reading of his memoirs revealed the fact
that there was a difference of opinion
between the Supreme Command and the Government. The Navy, however, submitted the decision
to Prime Minister KONOE. Since any
war was expected to be fought in the sphere of the Pacific, the Navy had almost all
the opportunity to speak.
Prince KONOE to whom this right was pointed out, was, on the other hand, the representative
of the Government. This implied
that KONOE's opinion would represent that of the Government and, at the same time,
represent more than half of the voice of
the Supreme Command. His resignation was induced by his intention of avoiding the
responsibility which would result from his
expressing his opinions in that capacity. Prince KONOE's correct attitude at the juncture
according to the example of the
SUZUKI Cabinet, would have been the opening of the Imperial Conference where the decision
of the Throne could be expected at
his request, prior to his resignation and the tendering of a statement to the Throne
concerning the state wherein the
Government and the Supreme Command stood in opposition. This is the duty of an advisor
to the Throne.
Furthermore, Prince KONOE could have found some solution without troubling the Throne
had he had firm convictions of
self-sacrifice. This is easily seen from the attitude of War Minister TOJO as described
in Prince KONOE's memoirs. His blunder
was the repetition of that made on 6 September. His statements to the Throne should
have been made after the Imperial decision
that peace should be maintained to the last.
However, it is quite evident that as long as he was responsible for state affairs
such an Imperial decision could never have
been expected. Here again was expressed the shameful attitude of an irresponsible
liberal. Whether we want it or not, the
trend of democracy in our country is prevailing, even though we are being guided by
the present Cabinet's poor leadership.
This is an inevitable aspect of defeated JAPAN. The SHIDEPARA Cabinet is unsuited
for self-rennovation. Nevertheless, we
cannot but put up with it, now that it has been decided to keep it in power until
the election.
The only prerequisite is the full appreciation of self revolution. It should be the
true employment of normal intelligence and
the united efforts of the Japanese race based on the necessity for reconstructing
JAPAN and it should never be the rebuilding
of defeated JAPAN. It is high time that the truth be spoken, and acted on. The time
has come when every Japanese should devote
himself or herself to the construction of new JAPAN. (by NAGAT Mineo, a diplomat,
TOKYO.)
DISTRIBUTION "X"
- 3 -
Loading...