Press translations [Japan]. Editorial Series 0089, 1945-12-14.
Date14 December, 1945
translation numbereditorial-0315
call numberDS801 .S82
Persistent Identifier
EDITORIAL SERIES: 89
ITEM 1 Increased Voters and Preparation of Parties - Nigata Nippo - 7 Dec 45. Translator: K. Nagatani.
Full Translation:
Voters in NIGATA Prefecture for the forthcoming general election are estimated to
be 1,270,000. This means nearly 55 per cent
of the whole population in this prefecture will participate in politics through the
general election. The figure of 1,270,000
voters is three times as large as that in the preceding general election of 410,000.
Now that the voting age has been lowered
to 20 years and woman's suffrage has been instituted 60,000 young men and 689,000
women are expected to vote. In addition, the
majority of the demobilized servicemen, numbering 67,000, are entitled to vote. The
participation in politics of such great
numbers of the people marks a great moment in our march toward the democratization
of JAPAN.
In view of the present acute shortage of food, some are assuming that many voters
in this prefecture will abstain from voting.
The authority must do their best lest people should abstain from voting, by stressing
that the general election is the first
step toward the solution of our pressing problems, including food production. In the
preceding general election the non-voting
percentage in this prefecture was l6.8 per cent. Considering that women will participate
in the coming election, perhaps the
abstention rate may be higher. However, we strongly encourage our officials to institute
political and civic education for the
people to make them realize the idea of democracy.
The names of political parties and statesmen are becoming mere familiar. For example,
prefectural chapters of the Liberal and
progressive Parties have been organized, while the Social Democratic Party is concentrating
an gathering local members. But
our scrupulous investigation of the Progressive and Liberal Parties shows that both
are mostly comprised of super-politicians.
It is absurd to find some cases in which the same politician is associated with both
parties. Some politicians are being
dragged into party movements before they are aware of it, and are util[illegible]to curry the favor of the
prefectural citizens. We can not but sympathy with these innocent automatons, but,
at the same time, we question the sincerity
of parties.
The formation of the present political parties has not emanated from the people,
but the fact of surrender motivated
politicians to form parties. Therefore, we must be broadminded enough to allow some
disorder at this stage of events.
Nevertheless , the above parties are to be blamed for gathering as many members as
possible, whether or not they are already
forsaken by the people or whether or not they are leaders from the old political circles
and are now worthy of sharp public
criticism. Such being the case, both parties must be considered as being actuated
more
EDITORIAL SERIES: 89 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
by political tactics to gain superiority in the general election than by a sense
of duty to execute their respective
platforms. Under such circumstances, breakup or collapse is inevitable in both parties
so it is absurd to think that our
prefectural citizens will place confidence in either party.
Of course, we never intend to criticize new political parties unduly. On the contrary,
we are very eager for them to attain
fair maturity. To this end, our political parties should replace out dated, undemocratic
ideas by fresh, democratic ones.
Political parties should appeal to the younger generation and women, and be ready
to win the confidence of our prefectural
people. A total of 1,270,000 voters in NIGATA prefecture are expected to comprehend
the true meaning of democracy, scrutinize
the platforms of parties, and vote for good statesmen. In short, all the Japanese,
including their statesmen, should act
wisely.
ITEM 2 The Temporary Five-year Financial Programme - Chubu Nippon Shimbun - 7 Dec 45. Translator: B. Ishibashi.
Summary:
The five-year financial program, which was submitted and explained by the Finance
Minister to the Diet on 5 December is
nothing but a makeshift only at best , and hardly seems to be worthy of criticism.
The reasons for such an indictment are as
follows.
Our financial system, after will inevitably include so many indefinite factors that
it cannot be expressed as a definite one.
The Finance Minister is not to blamed for this.
The second reason is that this program was made up hastily as the result of an interpellation
by KAWASAKI, Koku. The latter
stressed that a speciic financial program should be made public by the Government,
now that the settlement of the wartime
profit tax and the property tax has been determined; Whereupon the Finance minister
submitted the above program to the Diet
too days afterward. So, it is only makeshift at be It may be said that he lacked the
statesmanship and boldness to frankly
reply "no". For all this, the program should be studied here in its outline, because
it was presented to the Diet.
Let us begin with the conclusion we have drawn. We can see that the Finance Minister
is too absorbed in optimistic opinions
and never once seems to be conscious of our trying situation. His opinion is that
although the deficit will inevitably amount
to about 2,000 million yen in the first years, it will eventually become liquidated
in 1948. If the war profits tax were put
into effect, a surplus fund more than 3,500 million yen could result. Then the financial
system of JAPAN could be said to be
normal again.
But we must realize that in our homeland colossal capital sums and industrial potential
will be confiscated by the Allied
Powers, with a resulting decrease and decrease in production and the people's income.
In addition, our nation will lose not
only capital, facilities and important resources in foreign countries but also shall
have to indemni[illegible]a part of the currencies connected with the yen. Such being the case, these estmates
of the
Government, of (1) 9,300 million yen of internal revenue in each of the five years
, (2) 2,000 million yen of annual revenue
from the sale of Government enterprises , (3) 300 million yen per year to be payed
into the Bank of JAPAN, and (4 ) 800
million yen of annual revenue resulting from the sale of national property, have no
factual basis.
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EDITORIAL SERIES: 89 (Continued)
ITEM 2 (Continued)
By such a mere guess, to calculate a 12,000 million yen annual revenue at present
and to predict it to be 13,000 million yen
in 1950 is nothing but playing with figures . And still more, as to the program of
annual expenditures, which is distributed
among such categories as (1) special expenditure (2) general expenditure, and (3)
other expenditures, and still itemized in a
complicated manner, we can only say that it is too formal. We cannot find any such
basis for our nation's economy.
For example, consider the 4,500 million yen of the Governments yearly debt interest,
Is it possible to consider this as stable
for the year 1945 through 1948? After 1946 it is calculated as 5,700 million yen per
year. Still further, inregard to (1)
1,300 million yen of foreign loans, the expenditure for its interest must be presumed
to increase more and more, because it
will inevitably be affected by a decline in the exchange rate, (2) 100 million yen
of annual expenditure for pensions it
cannot be considered as stable throughout the five years, (3) The reserve fund, which
amounted to the colossal sum of 4,200
million yen in 1945, it is to be fixed at 100 million yen beginning with the next
fiscal year and although we can see his
administrative will in it, it is very doubtf[illegible]whether it is possible to carry out such a program
over the next four years with the projected figures: (4 ) general administrative expenditure,
it is to be reduced to about
1,500 million yen beginning with the next fiscal year, is it possible to go through
the next four years with this projected
figure? One question is followed by another.
As has been shown, the so-called "five-year financial program" is nothing but "a
painted rice cake". The conclusion which is
deduced from it is much more discreditable and all the more important. SHIBUZAWA concludes
that the collection of the two war
profit taxes may help to repay half the Government loans of 100,000 million yen, and
thereby 3,500 million yen will be sliced
off the expenditures for its interest. Obviously, this conclusion has no concrete
basis. Of course such a program is bound to
include some vague points. In connection with this, we stress that such a lack of
political responsibility, exposed as it is
above, is bound to fundament all shake the people's confidence in the Government.
We cannot but hope for a more cautious
attitude from all the other members of this cabinet as well as from the Finance Minister.
ITEM 3 Goal mines to be under Government Control - Tokyo Shimbun - 10 Dec 45. Translator: Y. A. Suzuki.
Full Translation:
Resolutions to relieve the cool famine passed the Diet and the Government will now
organize a coal administration office. By
this we know that the Government has a will to cope with the coal crisis, but if it
simply entails passing resolutions we
could say that this coal office was organized only to relieve jobless officials.
There is no sense in increasing coal miners rice rations from five go to five go
five shaku, as long as their families must go
hungry. Though the mines are so-called hells on earth, no collier would ever deny
his ration to his wife and children. The
Government might also think that it had taken a drastic step in raising unskilled
colliers' wages by several tens of yen, but
such means nothing compared with black market
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EDITORIAL SERIES: 89 (Continued)
ITEM 3 (Continued)
prices. We give credit for orders to start work which were given with hope of alleviating
the present crises, yet it steps are
not taken to improve the livelihood of the miners, their orders will be senseless.
One can not work when hungry and there would be much confusion with men taking days
off, trying to obtain food. Nor can we
assert that no stri[illegible]would be held now that workers have won their freedom with the
inprovem[illegible]in rights, protection and treatment, This means that unless the Governs adopts their
measures at the same time it adopts this emergency pleasure the coal famine will never
be conquered. The famine is simply the
result of evil practises, which grew steadily worse during the war. A hundred resolutions
and thousand offices can not
fundamentally solve their probl[illegible]if no understanding is reached.
We propose state-operated mines, a solution pressed by the Social Democratic Party.
ENGLAND'S example is outstanding but,
thinking of our Nation alone, as long as electric power as a source of heat is under
Government control, it is natural for the
coal mines to be state-operated, too. The electricity problem was solved first, only
because its owners had weaker support in
the Government than the mine owners who hold great influence in the Diet.
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