Press translations [Japan]. Economic Series 0156, 1946-01-13.

Summary:

Among leading prewar industries in JAPAN, the textile industry topped the field. While the cotton-spinning industry was in full swing, the ratio of male and female workers was almost 50-50, but during the war, the female have outnumbered the males in the ratio of 100 to 40. Since 80 per cent of the cotton textile work has been performed by female workers, this change in ratio is evidence of the decline of the cotton textile industry which occurred during the war because of the rise of munitions industries.

Now that the war is over the textile industry should again regain its leading position as is evidenced by the fact that the prewar cotton spinning industry output alone amounted to 34 per cent of the whole Japanese industrial production and 45 per cent of all Japanese workers were occupied in the industry. In 1934, 66 per cont of Japanese exports and 70 per cent of imports consisted of textile goods. By 1931, raw silk ranked high among textile exports, reaching more than 50 per cent of all other textile exports combined, but the export of raw silk had been on the down-grade since that year.

The position held by raw silk in exports was taken over by the cotton spinning industry, and the rayon industry became an important export industry by 1935, with rayon occupying 12 per cent of all textile exports. The cotton spinning and woolen textile industries depended exclusively upon imported raw materials, but raw silk is the only Japanese textile which is independent of imports, but being a luxry article, it is subjected to fluctuations in demand.

Heavy industries and chemical industries, which are principally of a military nature, controlled by XAIBATSU and run on a large scale, form a contrast with textile industries which are not necessarily operated on a gigantic scale and are more or less free from ZAIBATSU control. The steel industry, for instance, which dates its origin with the incorporation of YAWATA Iron Works (YAWATA SEITETSUJO) back in 1901, has developed since 1931. The JAPAN Steel Company (NITTETSU) was organized by the merger of YAWATA Steel and the principal steel producing enterprises of the country which produced 96 per cent of the pig iron and 44 per cent of the steel consumed in the country. But this industry is heavily dependent on iron ore and scrap iron imports which, incidentally, reached 74 per cent in 1936. The loss of KOREA and MANCHURIA thus will prove to be a great blow to the Japanese iron industry.

The ship building industry developed after the outbreak of World War 1 during which the annual output reached 600,000 tons, but slackened since the end of the war until 1932 when it was revived again through Government subsidy. As for the production of machines and tools, both the State and ZAIBATSU were not keenly interested in this until the last

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stage of their development set in. Thus the growth of the industry had long been retarded, though it had made some progress stimulated by the Russo-Japanese War, World War 1, and the Manchurian Incident.

By the chemical industry we mean the production of industrial chemicals, paper, pulp, dye stuffs, paints, soap, cosmetics, rubber goods, artifical fertilizer, rayon, and so forth. This industry was not old or well-established under ZABATSU control, but rested in the hands of newly developed ZAIBATSU such as the NIPPON Soda and the NIPPON Nitrates Company (NIPPON CHISSO). The heavy industries and these chemical industries which had been militaristic in nature are now doomed to be eliminated.

Summary:

I shall begin with an explanation of budgetary revenue. For example, of the total revenue for 1944, amounting to 20,173,000,000 yen, chiefly made up of taxes and public loans, two-thirds is tax, and the remaining third is public loans. However, if we examine the gross total of the above mentioned general account and the extraordinary wartime expenditure, which is 50,838,000,000 yen, one-third is tax, and the remaining two-thirds is public loan. Thus the proportion of taxes to public loans is the opposite of what it is in the general accounts only.

The degree of dependence upon public loans is greater in a wartime budget. However, as a result of the experience of postwar inflation after the last war, efforts were made in every country to depend as much as possible upon taxes rather than on public loans. Toward the end of the war, revenue in BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES was made up half by taxes and half by public loans.

It is often said that while a tax is borne by the people in the same generation, a public loan is handed down to future generation. In my opinion, however, both of them are borne by the people of the present generation, if the loan is not a foreign loan. Because the prosecution of a war requires labor and material, the standard of living during the war must be lowered, and people have to work harder, and some must spend savings accumulated in the past. Our standard of living has, in fact, dropped considerably and our savings are spent. The result is the same, whether we were deprived of our purchasing power directly by taxation or indirectly by a rise in prices caused by public loans. War expenses might have been covered by taxes only. Of course, economic friction would obviously have been unavoidable, but if the Government had been firmly resolved and efficient in its method of collecting taxes most of the budget revenue might have been covered by taxes alone. It is quite obvious that the government avoided the difficulty of levying heavy taxes and adopted the easier method of public loans, which unnecessarily enlarged the degree of dependence upon public loan.

A public loan is a debt if it is looked at from the Government's point of view, but it is not a debt if it is looked at from the stand point of national economy as a whole, inasmuch as it is national loan within the country. If the money so raised by public loan is spent on material and labor, that labor and material will be lost to the national economy.

Unfortunately, we shall have to pay reparations, which may be considered a kind of foreign loan. In this case it means an obvious deficit both to the Government and to the Nation. Payment of reparations is the same as payment of a foreign loan, and it means that that amount of material and labor is lost from the national economy. If the reparations are to be paid with overseas investments, it will mean that we shall get no more interest from that capital. Thus, the national

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economy is bound to suffer. On the other hand this would never happen as a result of paying off a domestic debt, as the production of goods would continue on at least the same scale.

Summary:

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry announced its reorganization and the shift of senior officials on 10 January 1946. The new bureaus are the Minister's Secretariate (DAIJIN KANBO), the Commerce Bureau (SHOMU-KYOKU), the Industry Bureau (KOMU-KYOKU), the Industry Bureau (KOMU-KYOKU), the Textile Bureau (SEMI-KYOKU), the Mining Bureau (KOZAN-KYOKU), the Electric Power Bureau (DENRYOKU-KYOKU), and the Adjustment Section (SEIRIHBU). The new machinery consists of five bureaus, one section including thirty departments, the outside two boards, and six bureaus including nineteen departments. This is rather an enormous structure in spite of the adjustment.

The appointed officers follow: Chief of the Commerce Bureau, Mr. KAYABA, Shoji; Chief of the Inspection Department (KANSATSU-KA) of the Minister's Secretariate, Mr. SAITO, Daiske; Chief of the Welfare Department (KOSEI-KA) of the Minister's Secreteriate, Mr. KIRIYAMA, Kiichiro; Chief of the General Department (SOMU-KA) of the Commerce Bureau, Mr. OGASA, Kosho; Chief of the Demand-Supply Departmentj (JUKYU-KA) of the Commerce Bureau, Mr. ISHIWARA, Takeo; Chief of the Financial Department (ZAIMUKA) of the Commerce Bureau, Mr. TANAKA, Shigeru; Chief of the Investigation Department (CHOSA-KA) of the Commerce Bureau, Mr. IWASAKI, Matsuyoshi; Acting Chief of the Automobile Department (JIDOSHA-KA) of the Industry Bureau, Mr. OKUDA, Shinzo; Chief of the Chemical Department (KAGAKU-KA) of the Industry Bureay, Mr. SAEKI, Shinichi; Acting Chief of the Chemical Fertilizer Department (KAGAKU HIRYO-KA) of the Industry Bureau, Mr. OKUDA, Shinzo; Chief of the Fermentative Industry (HAKKO KOGYO-KA) of the Industry Bureau, Mr. SHIBAHARA, Todao; Chief of the Textile Industry Department (SENI KOGYO-KA) of the Textile Bureau, Mr. UENO, Koshichi; Chief of the Textile Product Department (SENI SEIHINKA) of the Textile Bureau, Mr. NAGASE, Shinetsu; Chief of the Daily Essentials Department (NICHIYOHIN-KA) of the Textile Bureau, Mr. KONDO, Tomefumi; Chief of the Mining Administration Department (KOSEI-KA) of the Mining Bureau, Mr. YAMACHI, Hachiro; Chief of the Patroleum Department (SEKIYU-KA) of the Mining Bureau; Mr. NAKAJIMA, Seiho; Chief of the Electric Administration Department (DENSEI-KA) of the Electric Power Bureau, Mr. TAMAK Keigo; Chief of the Electric Enterprise Department (DENGYO-KA) of the Electric Power Bureau, Mr. TOYOSHIMA, Yoshizo; Chief of the Adjustment Department (SEIRI-KA) of the Adjustment Section, Mr. TAKAHASHI, Michio; Chief of the Conversion Department (TENKAN-KA) of the Adjustment Section, Mr. EBIHARA, Shun; Chief of the Subsidy Department (HOSHO-KA) of the Adjustment Bureau, Mr. MATSUO, Kinzo; Chief of the Indemnity Department (BAISHO-KA) of the Adjustment Section, Mr. SAKAI, Hiroshi.

The number of officers and employees of the Commerce and Industry Ministry by the end of March 1946 will he cut 50 per cent at the main offices, 30 per cent at the former Mining Bureau, and 20 per cent at the former Commercial and Industrial Adjustment Section (SHOKO SHORI-BU). In actuality the cut at the main offices will be 20 per cent due to existing vacancies.

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