AN AMERICAN BODY/POLITIC

A DELEUZIAN APPROACH

BERND HERZOGENRATH
An American Body | Politic
The emergence of Transnational American Studies in the wake of the Cold War marks the most significant reconfiguration of American Studies since its inception. The shock waves generated by a newly globalized world order demanded an understanding of America’s embeddedness within global and local processes rather than scholarly reaffirmations of its splendid isolation. The series Re-Mapping the Transnational seeks to foster the cross-national dialogues needed to sustain the vitality of this emergent field. To advance a truly comparativist understanding of this scholarly endeavor, Dartmouth College Press welcomes monographs from scholars both inside and outside the United States.

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To the Memory of Emory Elliott

For Claudia

For Frank
CONTENTS

List of Illustrations  ix
Acknowledgments  xi

INTRODUCTION  1

O BODY|THEORY|POLITIC: Body|Theory  20

1 THE PURITANS’ TWO BODIES  54

2 A “PHYSICS’ OF POWER”: Phase Transitions and Turbulence in the Antinomian Controversy  92

3 COTTON MATHER: The Angel and the Animalcula  116

4 “I AM THE POET OF LITTLE THINGS”: Walt Whitman and Minor Poetics|Politics  171

5 A PHYSICAL THEORY OF HEREDITY|HERESY: The Education of Henry Adams  208

6 “A SONOROUS PEOPLE”: Techno|Music and the Joyful Body|Politic  233

CONCLUSION  253

Notes  259
Bibliography  285
Index  313
ILLUSTRATIONS

Frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* [1651] 5
Benjamin Franklin, “JOIN, or DIE” [1754] 8
Benjamin Franklin, Fugio coin [1787] 9
Marquis de Barbi-Marbois, *Allegory of the American Union* [1784] 12
“The Inward Man,” from Andreas Vesalius, *De Humani Corporis Fabrica* [1541] 80
Reed Brockway Bontecou, “Field Day” [1865] 200
Wounded Civil War soldier in heroic pose 201
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An American Body Politic
This study explores the oscillation between the ‘real,’ material body, and the social ‘body politic’ in American culture—an oscillation that I will call Body|Politic (I use both single quotation marks and italics for emphasis). My topic is how the materiality of the body [its biological, physical, and other systems] ‘prefigures’ and constitutes models of the social and the political. Thus, this study will necessarily occupy a space between ‘the natural’ and ‘the cultural,’ an interdisciplinary space that ranges across and connects the physical and the social sciences, biology and political theory, life sciences and cultural studies. It aims at opening up the traditional figure of the Body|Politic so as to focus on specific materialities that ground this metaphor, asking not primarily about how the Body|Politic—as a ‘universal metaphor’—inscribes actual bodies into a system [the ‘default’ impact of cultural studies], but about what ‘version’ of the material body grounds the image of the Body|Politic. One of the guiding questions of this study can be posed as follows: What is the relation between the material body and the anthropomorphic metaphor, or on what kind of body is this metaphor based? Perhaps, ultimately, the concept of the Body|Politic is not only a figure of speech. Maybe there is a relation between the body and the ‘body politic’ that goes beyond [metaphorical] representation. Since in this book I want to offer a reading of the Body|Politic in Deleuzian terms, I will first attempt to clarify the term Body|Politic, and then ask what a Deleuzian approach has to offer for a revision of that concept.

In his seminal book *Imagined Communities*, a study on the origins of nationalism, Benedict Anderson sets out to show that the idea of a ‘nation’ and the corresponding personal and cultural feeling of ‘belonging’ are “cultural and historical artifacts of a particular kind” (4). According to Anderson, a nation’s biography—like an individual’s identity—“because it can not be ‘remembered,’ must be narrated” (204). If one accepts Anderson’s proposal that the nation is an imagined community, and that “communities are to be distinguished . . . by the style in which they are imagined” (6), then
one also has to analyze which images—taken, as it were, from the Hegelian unconscious and “nocturnal pit,” that reservoir of images on which consciousness can draw (Hegel 260)—a community, nation, or state uses to ground its metaphors to write its history, to write itself. As Roland Barthes has suggested, history always “maintains a permanent relation to a phantasma”: history builds on “that to the highest degree phantasmatic space: that of the human body” (Leçon/Lektion 65, my translation), which can be considered one of the prime icons/metaphors for a community, a highly suggestive epistemological prism through which social structures and processes can be conceived.

The history of the Body/Politic has been the history of an image—of representations of the human body as an analogue for the state, for a political system. An established, integral part of what might be termed the political imaginary, its origins can be traced back to antiquity, to Plato’s and Aristotle’s prescriptions of how a society should function and how it should be ruled. In their accounts, in which bodily images and metaphors abound, one can find the origin of the organic conception of politeia, of the way the polis, or city, should be organized. With regard to Plato’s Republic, Ernest Barker has described this ‘organicist conception’ of the state: “An organism is a unity, where each member is an instrument (or organon) in the general plan; where each member has its appointed purpose or function (ergon); where each member can only act, and be understood, and indeed exist, through the end and aim of the whole. But such is the unity of the State and such is the relation of the individual to the State: the State is an organism and its citizens are its members” (Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle 127).

This reciprocity of state and organism sometimes also led to attempts to reverse the direction of the analogy, so that material bodies are seen in terms of a polis:

We should consider the organization of an animal to resemble that of a city well-governed by laws. For once order is established in a city, there is no need of a separate monarch to preside over every activity; each man does his own work as assigned, and one thing follows another because of habit. In animals this same thing happens because of nature: specifically because each part of them, since they are so ordered, is naturally disposed to do its own task. There is, then, no need of soul in each part: it is in some governing origin of the body, and other parts live because they are naturally attached, and do their tasks because of nature. (Aristotle 52).

In these analogies, the tertium comparationis of the state and the organism is their unity, totality, and principle of cooperation, since in the natural as well as the political body there has to be, as Leonard Barkan argues, “an
equal commitment of all the members to the well-being of the whole body” (78). And although Aristotle denies the “need of a separate monarch” in his analogy, what he calls the “habit” of each man—which, by analogy to the animal, is almost a natural disposition—is nothing but the ‘introjection’ of law and order, of the structure of monarchical government into the body. Thus, the concepts of unity and cooperation necessary for the corporeal analogy to function imply order, control, and hierarchy: some members|parts of the body are more important than others. The body proved to be a plausible and useful metaphor for the organization of a social group, since it provided a most ‘natural’ embodiment of unity and order, which was regulated by means of the mind|body dichotomy: the conscious will of the mind [represented by the head] ensured that the actions of the body were ‘rational.’ The metaphor of the natural organism already implied notions of hierarchy and control, which were seen as necessary for a well-functioning Body|Politic.

However, the more immediate origin of what is referred to as a Body|Politic is to be found in the theologico-political matrix of the king’s two bodies, prominent in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. In Elizabethan England, ideas about the body not only represented current thinking on the individual body, or notions and assumptions about what the real physical body actually involved, but were also blueprints of how society should operate. In order to secure the continuity of the country’s unity, in spite of the mortality of the actual monarch, the Body|Politic was conceived in analogy to the ‘mystical body’ of the church, which was ‘one in Christ.’ In addition to concepts of wholeness, unity, autonomy, the structure of the state was compared to the anatomy of the body. Thus, the body model of that period was characterized by a strict hierarchy that corresponded to the monarchic hierarchy, with the king, representing the head, at the top of the social ladder, and the peasants, or the extremities, at the bottom. Ernst Kantorowicz, in his seminal study The King’s Two Bodies, has analyzed that “curious legal fiction of the ‘King’s Two Bodies’ as developed in Elizabethan England” (11) and its contribution to grounding in what Ernst Cassirer has termed the “myth of the state.” According to the conflation of theology and politics in that concept, Edmund Plowden, an Elizabethan lawyer, states that the monarch consisted of two bodies:

the one whereof is a Body natural, consisting of natural Members as every other Man has, and in this he is subject to Passions and Death as other Men are; the other is a Body politic, and the Members thereof are his Subjects, and he and his Subjects together compose the Corporation, as Southcote said, and he is incorporated with them, and they with him, and he is the Head, and they
are the Members, and he has the sole Government of them; and this Body is not subject to Passions as the other is, nor to Death, for as to this Body the King never dies, and his natural Death is not called in our Law (as Harper said), the Death of the King, but the Demise of the King, not signifying by the Word (*Demise*) that the Body politic of the King is dead, but that there is a Separation of the two Bodies. (quoted in Kantorowicz 13)

In addition to his mortal body, then, the king had a second body—that of the totality of his subjects—of which he was the head. In this way, the king—by analogy the ‘cognitive center’ of the body—was seen as the natural embodiment of this totality. The monarch as an individual person may die, but in his death, “the Body politic is transferred and conveyed over from the Body natural now dead, or now removed from the Dignity royal, to another Body natural. So that it signifies a Removal of the Body politic of the King of this Realm from one Body natural to another” (ibid.). This heuristic fiction ensured continuity in the monarch’s government by introducing a split between the symbolic function of king and the human being placed in that position.

Renaissance England saw itself represented by its Virgin Queen: the body of the immaculate Elizabeth I served as a politicized metaphor for the ‘untouchability’ of England’s autonomy. This was also the age of the explorers—of Richard Hakluyt, Sir Walter Raleigh, and John Smith, and their expeditions to the New World. The tradition of this anthropomorphic trope was transferred to that New World, as proved by the name of the first English settlement, Virginia—after the Virgin Queen. Throughout the seventeenth century, the corporeal metaphor was still widely employed. James I, in a speech to Parliament in 1603, stated the corporeal metaphor in clearly gendered terms, declaring: “I am the Husband, and all the whole Isle is my lawfull Wife; I am the Head, and it is my Body” (James 272). Like a faithful wife, England was to give natural and unconditional loyalty to the monarch as its rightful husband. Stressing the divine rights of the monarchy against Parliament, James clearly made his point: “The king to his people is rightly compared to . . . the head of a body composed of diuers members” (64).

One of the most prominent examples of the Body|Politic—in fact, I argue, the icon most often referred to as a Body|Politic—is the image of the sovereign in the frontispiece of the first edition of Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. While it still retains the interplay of head and body, unity and diversity, Hobbes’s idea [and the corresponding image] show a new, more human-centered line of thought that pays greater attention to the abilities—and the needs—of the people. Whereas the traditional fiction of the king’s two bodies had justified the king’s power as God-given and had supported the hierarchical structure
Frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* [1651].
of state and society as unalterable, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes argued that government was not divine or natural at all, but an invention of mankind for mankind. With its shift from the embodiment of the nation in the king as instituted by [and with] God’s authority, Hobbes’s book can be regarded as the beginning of modern political theory: it attempts to logically and reasonably explain the need for a sovereign who is appointed by the people and who represents them. Godlike power and divine filiation, the traditional markers of the head of the Body|Politic, are reduced to a man-made and necessary representational structure. The visual image of the Leviathan suggests a solution to the problem of the one and the many, of individual and collective identity—one of the basic problems of politics in general. A gigantic male figure, the Leviathan—adorned with crown, sword, and scepter as insignias of power—watches over a city. In this figure of the sovereign, the crowned head is of particular prominence, since it faces and addresses the reader. The sovereign’s body seems to be protected by armor but in fact consists of an almost infinite number of small human figures—faceless beings who all direct their gaze toward the head of the sovereign [the only ‘organ’ that is not a ‘composite member,’ and the place where a privileged metonymical part represents a complex body, where a potential many is resolved and channeled into a one, into a hierarchical fixation of authority and wholeness].

Hobbes’s solution provides a model of a ‘monarchical contract,’ a contract entered into not because of moral obligations, but because of self-interest and social agreement alone; not because of any inherent human striving for goodness and peace, but because if it were not for this contract, people would kill each other. In Hobbes’s view, a coercive government was more than necessary, since its absence would have lethal consequences—otherwise life would be a constant civil war. In the natural state of things, he argues, before any governments existed at all, life was a war of one against all. As long as this “naturall condition” (*Leviathan* 183) prevailed, “as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be)” (190). The only way out of such misery, Hobbes claimed, was for people to protect themselves by forming societies, with each person agreeing not to harm others in exchange for not being harmed by anyone else. The natural state would be a state of pure anarchy, and, according to Hobbes, for the above reason, despotism is preferable to anarchy. Since people could not, in his view, be trusted to avoid harming others for their own gain, a strong, centralized government was necessary. The government Hobbes envisioned as necessary for this task was enormous and powerful—so powerful that he named his *Leviathan* after a biblical sea monster.
Once people surrendered power to the government, Hobbes said, they could not take it back. Only something ‘artificial,’ a symbolic contract, could counter the natural state of war and anarchy. Hence, for Hobbes, this government, this mechanical Body|Politic, is an “artificial man.” Critics such as Wolfgang Kersting have wondered why Hobbes used the image of the Leviathan as the model for his state. A tentative answer might point out that first of all, Hobbes is thus able to emphasize one of the most beneficial, though potentially oppressive, attributes of this Body|Politic: its immense power. The political community will function as a unified whole only if this power is concentrated in the sovereign. The value and benefit of such a unified community emerges from the description of the Leviathan and his scales in the book of Job: “His rows of scales are his pride, shut up tightly as with a seal; One is so near another that no air can come between them; They are joined one to another, they stick together and cannot be parted” (41:15–17). The frontispiece of Hobbes’s Leviathan visualizes this strengthening armor of scales as the united multiplicity of the consenting individuals, which creates the person of the state, the identity of the Body|Politic, the unity of which is achieved only in|by representation: “A Multitude of Men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented . . . For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One” (Leviathan 220).

Hobbes’s model of the commonwealth had taken its name and image from a gigantic coiling serpent. A hundred years later, in 1754, at a time when the ‘representational Body|Politic’ had already become part and parcel of the political rhetoric, another serpent, one that was native to the English colonies in North America—a rattlesnake—made its appearance in what is considered to be the first American political cartoon, created by Benjamin Franklin. France, England’s long-time enemy and rival for control of North America, had, with the assistance of Native American allies, won a series of victories over English colonial troops from Virginia through New England. These widespread attacks led to a call for the unity of America’s colonies. Following Major George Washington’s surrender to the French, Franklin, in his Pennsylvania Gazette, depicted the British colonies as a dismembered snake. The snake’s body was cut into eight pieces, representing the colonies, the curves of its body suggesting the shape of the Atlantic coastline, and the labels on its segments in geographical order, from “N.E.”—New England—at the head to “S.C.”—South Carolina—at the tail. The motto underneath reads “JOIN, or DIE.” Franklin presumably chose the image of the rattlesnake because of the popular myth that a snake that had been cut in two would come to life again if the pieces were recombined before sunset.
and an article called “Reasons and Motives” a few weeks before the congress convened in order to promote his Albany Plan of Union, in which he put forward the idea that a “union of the colonies is absolutely necessary for their preservation” (383). Ultimately, the plan was not ratified, as none of the colonies was willing to transfer authority to a central government. In Franklin’s attempt at unification, one can already see at work the ideas that later led to the first motto of the United States of America: *e pluribus unum*—out of many, one.

The interrelation of individuality and collectivity, the multitude of members and the unity of a ‘legal person,’ that had been at the heart of Hobbes’s *Leviathan* also defined the problematics of American politics in Franklin’s time. Hobbes starts with the *pluribus* and resolves it in a representational *unum* [only to discard the *pluribus* later, as I will show], making unity and wholeness not so much a cause, but an effect to be achieved. Franklin adopted this ‘directionality’ in images such as his 1787 designs for the American currency, the so-called Fugio coins with a circle of thirteen interlocking rings surrounding the central motto, “WE ARE ONE.” The motif of the ‘fugue’ also provides a bridge between the visual arts and music in early America. The same motif can be found in Paul Revere’s frontispiece to William Billings’s *The New England Psalm Singer* (1770), where the singers are singing
a ‘fuging-tune,’ or canon, and each taps on his neighbor’s sheet to tell him when it is his turn to start singing. The canon itself, it should be noted, is shaped like a circle, so that the complete round of the canon can be said to form interlocking circles, a perfect interrelation between individual and community, yet presided over by the singing master in the right corner of the engraving. Franklin’s snake woodcut, however, confronts us with a different scenario, which in its political rhetoric is all the more powerful: here, not only are the colonies not seen as artificial [as in Hobbes’s “Artificiall man”], but as a ‘natural body,’ an organism. In contrast to Hobbes, who showed the Body|Politic as a composite body, finding its unity in the act of representation [in ‘artifice’], Franklin also reverses the temporality: the image of the snake points to a unity that was there at the beginning, has been dismembered, and has to be subsequently reunited. Rather than reaching unity as an effect, Franklin’s drawing shows unity as a phantasmatic starting point to be reestablished—wholeness and unity are here regarded as the natural state of
being, envisioned as a mythical origin to which America must return, if it wants to survive.

This temporality becomes even clearer in the most explicit predecessor of Franklin’s woodcut—Nicholas Verrien’s emblem book of 1685, in which there is an image of a snake divided into two parts, with the motto “se re-joindre ou mourir.” Franklin’s image is on the one hand a wrong or misleading one, insofar as there was no such thing as previous unity. On the other hand, of course, the ideological impact of his reterritorialization of a previous wholeness was much stronger in that it claimed cohesion before it actually existed, urging a return to a former wholeness and making an ‘outside enemy’ ultimately responsible for the “present disunited State” (Franklin 376) of the colonies. Franklin’s woodcut presents history encoded in visual shorthand. His drawing came to be known as “the snake device.” A device differs from another pictorial representation—the emblem—in that it does not use the human figure in its representation. Both a good device and a good emblem are necessarily composed of two parts: the image itself, which is called ‘the body,’ and the motto—‘the soul.’ As with Kant’s insistence that “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (93), an image without a motto rendered the device ‘dumb,’ and a motto by itself made a ‘blind’ emblem (Sommer 57). In Franklin’s device, the motto addresses the fragmented image with an imperative to a wholeness that had already existed. In his vision of a Body|Politic under a centralist power, Franklin was already arguing from the position of a national subject, which, in its representational unity, translates the materiality of a multitude of members into the power relations of ‘a people’ [or nation or state]. As in Hobbes, the principle of organicity that governs the Body|Politic, although conceived in terms of a ‘real body,’ takes its corporeal workings as institutionalized into a corporate mode of functioning—the divine body of the king is superseded by the represented unity of the people, the symbolic identity of the nation. From such a symbolic perspective, nonorganization—nonrepresentation—necessarily equals dismemberment.

A temporality similar to the one operative in Franklin’s snake device is also at work in the Declaration of Independence. This ‘founding document’—seemingly simple and straightforward—presents a whole chain of interrelated and retroactive representations. Thomas Jefferson drafted the declaration on behalf of a committee appointed by the Continental Congress—thus, Jefferson speaks for a committee that represents Congress, which in turn represents ‘one people’ that at the very moment of declaration is neither ‘one’ nor ‘a people.’ In a lecture to mark the bicentennial of the Declaration of Independence in 1976, Derrida attempted a reading of the document in terms of the performative act of founding an institution. In asking “who
signs, and with what so-called proper name, the declarative act” (“Declarations” 10), Derrida links his critique of the concept of the author to a particular temporality. With regard to the “we” of the declaration, he writes: “But this people does not exist. They do not exist as an entity, it does not exist, before this declaration, not as such. If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as possible signer, this can hold only in the act of the signature. The signature invents the signer” (ibid., emphasis in the original).

In a comment on this text, Christopher Norris states that the frequent use of performative [speech] acts in the declaration opens the question as to “how the change is effected from a given [preconstitutional] state of affairs to a new political order which would then provide the legitimizing terms of its own constitution” (196). A possible answer is given by Derrida in the following remark: “This signer can only authorize him- or herself to sign once he or she has come to the end . . . , if one can say this, of his or her own signature, in a sort of fabulous retroactivity” (“Declarations” 10). This logic of belatedness—the logic of representation—the signature—parallels Hobbes’s contention that it is ultimately representation, the “Unity of the Representer,” that creates identity [individual and political] in the first place, a unity that is paradoxically fixed in the performative act of the declaration’s “we, the people.”

The American Body-Politic and its unity in representation was not only symbolically performed in the Declaration of Independence, but also ‘iconized’ in one of the suggestions for the U.S. Great Seal, commissioned by Congress on July 4, 1776, in John Adams’s proposal of the figure of Hercules. Although this suggestion was ultimately rejected in favor of the bald eagle and the motto e pluribus unum, the figure of Hercules resurfaced in the Marquis de Barbi-Marbois’s 1784 painting Allegory of the American Union. The monolithic figure of Hercules takes Hobbes’s Leviathan to its extreme: the multitude of members has been completely unified into a Body-Politic without fissure, with the unum an invincible solidity.

Today, it seems, the image-metaphor of the Body-Politic in its traditional sense has lost its appeal; it has become a dead metaphor. On the level of political theory, this can be attributed to the fact that in the era of modern democracies, a return to a premodern conception seems antiquated. As Claude Lefort has argued, the development of Western democracies and the overthrow of monarchies, which sometimes even resulted in the decapitation of the head of state, instituted “a society without a body, . . . a society which undermines the representation of an organic totality” (Democracy 18). While in the theologico-political framework, the Body-Politic was the king, who gave society its body, in democracy, “the locus of power becomes an empty place . . . it cannot be occupied—it is such that no individual and
no group can be consubstantial with it—and it cannot be represented” (17). Lefort and other political thinkers of democracy, such as Laclau and Mouffe,7 are following a Lacanian approach to politics here, viewing politics ultimately as a shift from the aggressivity of the imaginary to the pacifying strategy of the symbolic—a move from Hobbes’s prepolitical ‘state of nature’ to the Oedipal register of culture and society. Thus, the “empty place” of democracy that Lefort hints at precisely marks the structural place of the Lacanian real—the impossible und unspeakable materiality that representation cannot access directly. Because of its inaccessibility, then, the real becomes an effect of representation, but since the systems of representation can never fully represent, they are marked by a constitutive gap. The retroactive logics of representation—the logic of the signifier—rules out the notion of a ‘grounding totality’ and also of a metalanguage. The unmasking

Marquis de Barbi-Marbois, Allegory of the American Union [1784]. Courtesy of the American Philosophical Society.
of that “empty place” reveals how every symbolic Body|Politic mystifies its own lack of origin [or, rather, the origin of its ‘authority’] in a violent assumption of that place. However, this does not yet change the nature of the relation between representation and matter. Theorists in the wake of Lacan who have commented on the formation of political identity are mostly concerned with the logic of representation, and not with the question of the materiality of the body that representation misses. Homi Bhabha has analyzed the “idea of a nation as a continuous narrative of national progress” and the “narcissism of self-generation” involved in the process (1). Such a concept of the Body|Politic is ultimately indebted to the narrative culture of the autobiography and the realist novel; it is a ‘discursive formation’ in the Foucauldian sense. Bhabha points out that “to encounter the nation as it is written displays a temporality of culture and social consciousness . . . in tune with the partial, overdetermined process by which textual meaning is produced” (2). The temporality that Bhabha alludes to is once more the temporality of belatedness that underlies the logic of representation. Such a logic produces the fiction of a bodiless Body|Politic, since representation functions as the presence of a fundamental absence—and democracy seems to most fundamentally [dis]embody this fiction: “In democracy, power is not occupied by a king, a party leader, an egocrat or a Führer, rather it is ultimately empty; no one holds the place of power. Democracy entails a disincorporation of the body politic, which begins with a literal or metaphorical act of decapitation” (Critchley 80).

The absence of a unifying representative is equated with the lack of a body, and it is here that I see an almost uncanny structural similarity between premodern politics and postmodern theory. The shift from the theologico-political concept of the godlike king to the Hobbesian unity in representation parallels the shift from essentialism to cultural|linguistic constructivism of Lacan, Derrida, Butler, and others. The connection between those two series is also shown by the fact that the metaphor of the Body|Politic in recent academic discourse rather refers to ‘body politics,’ which is not so much concerned with the ‘body of the state’ anymore, but with how the state—the system of representation—infiltrates, controls, and in fact produces the bodies [in terms of races, classes, and genders] of its members.8

It is in this shift from materiality to the representation of materiality and the almost ‘foundational gesture’ of representation that questions of identity formation and political theory become prevalent in much of today’s cultural studies. To introduce Body|Theory, the theoretical framework of this book, I will first outline the basic tenets of cultural studies, which I will take as an umbrella term for cultural|linguistic constructivism. Cultural studies has been instrumental in instigating the necessary shift away from essentialism,
in critiquing an ideology based on the notion of ‘naturality’ [which serves to justify as an unchanging status quo certain historical concepts, such as patriarchy and heteronormativity]. However, cultural studies had to pay a price for its political agenda. With its insistence on the social and cultural constructedness of the world, cultural studies has created and moves within a hermetically sealed universe of discourse—Derrida’s well-known claim that there is nothing outside the text might serve as a paradigmatic example here. The notion of the “always already” referred to with regard to Lacan—by which the “outside of the text,” or the referent, is seen as a retro-effect of the text—by default eliminates any access to that outside. By seeing everything from the viewpoint of representation, cultural studies has created and cultivated a kind of blind spot in its field: materiality and the body, which in cultural studies are approached almost exclusively in terms of the materiality of language, or cultural body-images. While this is a significant step away from essentialist determinism, cultural studies is in danger of creating its own brand of cultural or discursive essentialism. Furthermore, the logic of belatedness, the conviction that everything is only in [or mediated by] language, has created a one-way directionality between the terms culture and nature, representation and materiality. Activity is always on the side of culture and representation; since materiality and the body are linguistically and socially constructed, change can be effected only via discursive operations. What is conspicuously absent in cultural studies is the possibility of an activity on the side of materiality, of feedback loops between nature and culture, which use different registers of ‘information’ than that used by human systems of communication. This absence is also reflected in the lack of interest on the part of cultural studies in contemporary scientific fields such as complexity theory, a discipline that focuses on isomorphic dynamic patterns in physical, biological, and social systems. Opening up cultural studies to the materiality of the body would be a fruitful endeavor and would ultimately result in a revision of that closed-off field, making it more inclusive. The aim is not to replace ‘cultural laws’ with ‘natural laws,’ not to leave the important notions of cultural linguistic constructivism behind for a thinly disguised ‘essentialism,’ but to describe and analyze the continuum of nature and culture through systemic operations and routines underlying both.

If much of today’s theory is arrested in this deadlock between too much representation and the impossibility of falling back into essentialism, the thesis of an isomorphism between the premodern Body|Politic and postmodern thought might point a way out of this impasse. If the outdatedness of the analogy of body and state owes much to the fact that its conception as a unity in representation seems no longer tenable, then maybe a change
in the conception of the body might offer ways that lead out of the dead-end street that is the closed-off field of representation. At approximately the same time that Hobbes published *Leviathan*, with its axiom of the Body|Politic as the ‘unity of the representer,’ a logic that results in the ultimate overcoding of the represented by the representer [the logic of representation], Spinoza was developing a Body|Politic that focused on the interior workings of the represented body, workings that created a kind of order and sovereignty without adding an additional instance of regulation and control. Spinoza achieves a way of imagining the Body|Politic that neither returns to the older conception of essentialism, nor throws out the baby [the body] with the bath water. It does not return to a theologico-political concept of identity [of body and state], nor does it see the logics of representation as the only force at work. Again, if my proposed analogy holds, what is needed to find a way out of the deadlock of cultural|linguistic constructivism is an approach that is to Lacan, Derrida, Butler, and others what Spinoza is to Hobbes. This study proposes that the ‘intelligent materialism’ of Gilles Deleuze [and Félix Guattari and Michel Serres] provides exactly this approach, and the fact that Deleuze aligns himself with a ‘repressed tradition’ within the history of philosophy—basically, the tradition of materialism, in which Spinoza figures prominently—will, I hope, substantiate my point. I will conclude this introduction with a juxtaposition of the Hobbesian and the Spinozian Body|Politic from a Deleuzian perspective.

In what follows, I will analyze both canonical and lesser known texts of American culture with regard to the various models of the Body|Politic they propose. The traditional Body|Politic, composed as it is of mind and body, cognition and materiality, privileges a certain organ—the head that thinks and that controls the body, the rational mind that imposes form onto an otherwise passive materiality. One logic—the logic of thinking and representation, a *psychic* logic—overcodes the second logic, that of materiality and production, a *physical* logic. Regulation comes to the body from an outside agency—be it sovereign, state, or reason. The body, it seems, is stretched between two poles—either|or. It is either reason, control, order, or materiality, anarchy, chaos. This study is interested in the field in between, and although there are always tendencies toward one of these poles, I will put the focus on Bodies|Politic that are nearer the pole of materiality, that try to escape the forces of rigid organization and striation—Bodies|Politic that are not shaped by external and transcendental causes and forms, but that follow the dynamics of material self-ordering, of self-organization.
Any study that attempts to cover a field as large as the one outlined by the following chapters necessarily makes omissions, leaves many roads not taken. My study is more defined by taking cuts out of the continuum than by presenting the continuum as such. These cuts—chapters—proceed by what I personally feel as the ultimate Deleuzian gesture: affirmative readings that do not primarily focus on logical inconsistencies within texts but that take whatever valuable positions and insights—whatever ‘concepts’—a given text offers. In his preface to *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze proposes that “the history of philosophy should play a role roughly analogous to that of *collage* in painting” (xxi). In analogy to Duchamp’s mustached Mona Lisa, Deleuze considers his history of philosophy to “act as a veritable double and bear the maximal modification appropriate to a double. (One imagines a *philosophically* bearded Hegel, a *philosophically* clean-shaven Marx” (ibid.). In a similar vein, my readings will sometimes present a philosophically dewigged Cotton Mather, a philosophically cleanshaven Walt Whitman, and so on.

Before outlining my theoretical toolbox,9 the concept of a Deleuzian materialism and its implications for a revision/redefinition of the Body/Politic, I want to point out Deleuze’s relation to the field of American studies. So far, the affinity between Deleuze and American studies has been a largely one-sided affair. While Deleuze has frequently published essays on American literature and refers to American history as well as to American popular culture, American studies has largely ignored Deleuze’s writings. As Simon Schleusener has pointed out, in an essay on the unlikely alliance10 of Deleuze and American studies, one reason for this foreclosure might be Deleuze|Guattari’s seeming romanticization of America. In a 1985 interview with Félix Guattari, Charles Stivale voices his amazement about Guattari’s “impression of a kind of romanticism about America” most clearly, pointing out the “references to the American nomadism, the country of continuous displacement, deterritorialization” (206). Stivale, who considers himself “too close to daily life in the States, and [who] see[s] so much stupidity in all . . . areas” there (209), cannot seem to agree with Deleuze|Guattari’s image of America. To Stivale, it is more “a utopic dream without any future” that began long ago: “America reterritorializes what the English do, and they lose everything. That began with the Colonies and continues today” (ibid.). Guattari’s reply—“A dream is necessarily utopic, in any case” (210)—focuses not so much on the content, or meaning, of that “special America” (206), but on the more fundamental question: “Has it been useful for you that we had that dream?” (210). Yet, even on the level of what Deleuze|Guattari actually say about America, this is far from any easy sentimentalization or romanticization. In their introductory chapter to *A Thousand*
Plateaus, they strategically posit a mode of thought that they call tree-like, or “arborescent”—hierarchical, ordered, centrifugal, based on binary logic—as opposed to a “rhizomatic” way of thinking—heterogeneous, not centralized, nomadic, working not by means of dialectics and subsumption but through expansion and connection. They claim:

America is a special case. Of course it is not immune from domination by trees or the search for roots. This is evident even in the literature, in the quest for a national identity and even for a European ancestry or genealogy . . . Nevertheless, everything important that has happened or is happening takes the route of the American rhizome: the beatniks, the underground, bands and gangs, successive lateral offshoots in immediate connection with an outside. (19)

And not only is America not located unambiguously, the seemingly clear-cut binarism of tree and rhizome is not unequivocal either:

We are on the wrong track with all these geographical distributions . . . for there is no dualism, no ontological dualism between here and there, no axiological dualism between good or bad, no blend or American synthesis. There are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in roots . . . The important point is that the root-tree and canal-rhizome are not two opposed models: the first operates as a transcendent model and tracing, even if it engenders its own escapes; the second operates as an immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map, even if it constitutes its own hierarchies, even if it gives rise to a despotic channel. (20)

For Deleuze|Guattari, dialectics and binarisms give way to a continuum, a perpetually constructing and constructed fold in between the two extremes of tree and rhizome. And although there is a tendency toward the side of the rhizome and toward deterritorialization, de- and reterritorialization always work together. There are always systems with a transcendent dimension [(n + 1)] and “system[s] without a General” (21) [(n – 1)] intermingled: what is important is the system’s overriding operational logic, whether it be arborescent or rhizomatic. As it is, “in America everything comes together, tree and channel, root and rhizome” (20). Thus, given that the reproach of romanticization holds for only a very superficial reading of Deleuze|Guattari’s concept of America, there must be another reason.

The last major strand of a revision of American studies took place in the 1980s, with the movement that came to be known as the new Americanism. In a move comparable to the major change brought to cultural studies by the advent of new historicism, the new Americanists drew on theoretical
approaches such as deconstruction, “neo-Marxist, poststructuralist, and other literary practices” in order to reflect on, as well as shift, the prevailing “organizing principles and the self-understanding of American studies.” Ultimately, the new Americanists sought to provide an ideological critique of what they saw as a liberal consensus within the field of American studies, a consensus that attempted to place itself in a field outside of politics and ideology. In contrast, the new Americanists aimed at constructing a counter-hegemonic reading of ‘the canon’ by realigning aesthetics and politics in a more theoretically and politically informed manner. Deleuze and Guattari are conspicuously absent from the illustrious group of theoreticians and thinkers whose work provides the background for the new Americanists’ interventions into the canon—Foucault, Lacan, Derrida, Laclau, and others. Why is that so?

Simon Schleusener and Theo D’haen—whose approach to Deleuzian ‘applications’ to American literature Schleusener follows—rightly propose a Deleuzian intervention into the new Americanists’ project of exposing the ideological tenets of what Donald Pease calls the old Americanists’ essentialist and exceptionalist “field-Imaginary [and] the field’s fundamental syntax—its tacit assumptions, convictions, primal words, and the charged relations binding them together” (“New Americanists” 11). As D’Haen suggests, Deleuze|Guattari’s conception of a minor literature would fit snugly in this project while simultaneously bypassing the ‘new’ essentialism inherent to the new Americanists’ approach: “Old and New Americanists . . . take the same ‘essentialist’ attitude toward their object of study, the Old Americanists seeking a unitary sensibility expressive of the essence of ‘Americanness,’ the New Americanists positing a minority essence as essential to being American multicultural-style” (“Deleuze, Guattari, Glissant” 399).

For D’haen and Schleusener, then, Deleuze|Guattari’s concept of minor literature significantly contributes to and enhances the new Americanists’ project—it “might at least, if only provisionally or temporarily, or as a horizon of possibilities, provide a useful ground from which to start to rethink ‘American’ literature” (D’Haen, “‘America’ and ‘Deleuze’” 52). While this is undoubtedly true and important, in particular for a postcolonial and/or multicultural approach to America, I would propose another approach, an altogether different use of Deleuze for yet another revision of American studies [and ultimately of the larger field of cultural studies in general]. According to the new Americanists, the old Americanists held one particular truth to be self-evident: “that American literary imagination transcends the realm of political ideology” (Pease, “New Americanists” 5). The new Americanists, in contrast, challenge this belief by “insist[ing] on literature as an agency within the political world and . . . returning a historical context to
American studies” (16). Their crucial contribution, their “changes in the materials in the field-Imaginary of American studies [is] the recovery of the relationship between the cultural and the political sphere . . . and the New Historicist return of the repressed context” (32). The result of such an “imaginary separation between the cultural and the public sphere” (8) was a naturalized and retroactive construction of a homogeneous American essence, of a timeless American experience. However, both spheres—the literary and the political—remain within the hermetically sealed realm of culture. The change in the “field-Imaginary,” the recovery of the lost relationship, ultimately remains a question of textuality and representation, a recovery of ‘the repressed context.’ The ‘identity-machine’ of the old Americanists’ “field-Imaginary”—a national narrative producing national identities—is as closely “related to the field-Symbolic as paradigm is to syntagm” (Pease, “National Identities” 8), and this “field-Symbolic” consists of a “national symbolic order and matters (of race, gender, class) external to it” (3). The terms imaginary and symbolic evoke the Lacanian distinction between reality [which is defined by the suture of the imaginary and symbolic register] and the real [which is exactly what is sutured off by reality]. What such a perspective fails to consider is this ‘real,’ the ‘other’ of culture—materiality and the body, or what Deleuze and Guattari call the rhizomatic and “immediate connection with an outside” (Thousand Plateaus 19). This is a general problem with much of today’s cultural studies [as I will outline in a moment], and Deleuzian thought enfolds its innovative and revisionist potential in opening up the cultural field to materiality—neither a field-Imaginary nor a field-Symbolic, but rather a field of [physical and cultural] forces. It is in this in between culture and nature, representation and production, physical body and body politic that the object of my study—the Body|Politic—is situated.
The last two decades have witnessed a boom in Body|Theory. In cultural studies, the market value of ‘the body’ has risen to immense heights: the body has become one of the most analyzed topics of postmodern thought. Particularly in the field of feminism, the body has become a contested site of analysis and political struggle, mainly revolving around the gender|sex issue. After gender had been established as a cultural category, as socially constructed rather than biologically or ‘naturally’ given, sex posed a threat, being something like an essentialist residue in the equation. Almost hand in hand with that field of study goes a skepticism and criticism of the tradition of Western philosophy and its ‘grand narratives.’ Feminists—but not only feminists—have become wary of the often misogynist and patriarchal conceptions mainly connected with the two traditions known as Platonism and Cartesian dualism. Equating the body with nature and femininity, Plato and Descartes stand for an essentialism that has to be categorically rejected. In addition, with the growing rise of both ‘the leisure class’ and consumption during the 1980s, the social sciences also saw a need to address ‘the body,’ which had so far been conspicuously absent.

Books dealing with the body from various angles and disciplines attest to the variety within the field of Body|Theory. The heterogeneity of it—almost too vast to comprehend—has led Terry Eagleton to claim that “there would no doubt soon be more bodies in literary criticism than on the fields of Waterloo” (17). This outcry, maybe inadvertently, captures a relevant aspect of these postmodern bodies: in a way, they are all dead, turned into corpses for the sake of theory. The bodies of postmodern thought—and I am aware of the danger of generalizing here—are by default culturized, semiotic bodies, the bodies of social and/or linguistic constructivism, connected mainly with the theories of Foucault, Lacan, Derrida, and Butler. Postmodern body theory writes “a history of ‘body building,’ of the different modes of construction of the human body” (Feher 159), but it is not concerned with the body’s materiality. Whereas Merleau-Ponty saw the body as a site “wherever
there is something to be done” (250), Foucault, Butler, and others—the “new somatics,” as Eagleton calls them—see “the body [as a place] where something—gazing, imprinting, regulating—is being done to you” (Eagleton 71). Such a shift implies a move away from essentialism, however defined—something postmodern body theory fears most. There is no natural and originary body; at least, there is no access to such a chimera, since it is always already outside of culture and language. Although the alternative cannot be to go back behind the findings and analyses of postmodern body theory, it should be nevertheless noted that the dominant version of poststructuralism in the guise of culturallinguistic constructivism has ultimately dismissed the category of the body—the materiality of the body—by aiming to translate it without remainder [or only as negativity, as the impossible real] into the realm of representation.

According to the Lacanian dictum that “the unconscious is structured like a language” (Four Fundamental Concepts 20), one can know about the impossible real [which denotes the strategic place of the unconscious, the body, pure materiality, and the referent] only through representation. According to Lacan, the speaking human subject qua signifier is always already inscribed in the symbolic, so that the body is always more than just a biological given or natural fact—“nature provides . . . signifiers, and these signifiers organize human relations in a creative way, providing them with structures and shaping them” (ibid.), and a human being’s body is one of the most libidinally invested signifiers nature provides. In fact, for Lacan, “the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing” (Écrits 104). To describe the ontological structure of the subject’s reality, Lacan uses the topology of the Möbius strip: the two sides represent the imaginary and the symbolic, with the real functioning as the cut. As an effect of the torsion of the strip, the real becomes structurally inherent to the figure, rather than ‘having a place.’ The cut designates the impossibility that the imaginary and the symbolic will meet the real, while at the same time the real is inherent in representation as negativity.

Derrida also evokes the topology of the Möbius strip, claiming that “the outside is the inside” (Of Grammatology 44). Along with his claim that “there is nothing outside of the text [il n’y a pas de hors-texte] . . . there has never been anything but writing; . . . that what opens meaning and language is writing as the disappearance of natural presence” (158–59), Derrida indicates that even if outside the text there are material conditions, these outside conditions are always already represented, materialities turned into mere context. These versions of poststructuralism have exorcised bodily materiality out of representation and have closed representation in on itself. The body in much of postmodern gender theory is “a product of discourse or
intersecting textualities, as the world becomes a ceaseless play of interlocking and conflicting texts, spoken from different locations and negotiated across different perspectives” (Zita 89). Thus, “postmodernism brings into focus first of all the ‘locatedness’ of one’s body as a place from which particular viewpoints on reality can be generated” (88). “Locatedness” here has to be read as referring to the body’s [re]-construction|representation in language, as a belated effect of discourse, since the body’s materiality—the real body—is situated outside of and is inaccessible to language. As a consequence of such textualization, Susan Bordo observes, “if the body is a metaphor for our locatedness in space and time and thus for the finitude of human perception and knowledge, then the postmodern body is no body at all” (229).2

In Bodies That Matter, Judith Butler responds to the criticism of her earlier work. Summarizing those critiques that accused her of dissolving the body into speech acts and discourse, Butler asks: “What about the materiality of the body?” (ix). Yet even Butler, who professes to reincorporate materiality into representation, ultimately fails to escape the exclusionary logic of belatedness, according to which materiality is always already a function of discourse. Her theory of gender performativity is ultimately an updated version of cultural|linguistic constructivism, a construction understood here as a process of materialization constituting types of bodies by means of the repetition of gender norms. Butler goes so far as to acknowledge that matter has a certain dynamism, but this dynamism is a product of the discursive powers that matter is subjected to and that impose [symbolically constructed] forms from the outside, “a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs” (1). Butler’s materiality is ultimately one suspended in quotation marks: “It must be possible to concede and affirm an array of ‘materialities’ that pertain to the body, that which is signified by the domains of biology, anatomy, physiology, hormonal and chemical composition, illness, age, weight, metabolism, life and death. None of this can be denied. But the undeniability of these ‘materialities’ in no way implies what it means to affirm them, indeed, what interpretative matrices condition, enable and limit that necessary affirmation” (67).

For Butler, then, material amounts to factual, to a materiality that matters, that is always already cited: it is a result of the one-way influence of discourse that [in]forms materiality. This concept does not allow for the reverse operation of materiality affecting discourse. As she admits: “I am not a very good materialist. Every time I try to write about the body, the writing ends up being about language” (Undoing Gender 198). In this self-generating circularity, matter for Butler is ultimately what “we call matter” (Bodies That Matter 9), what we perceive as matter, “a process of material-
ization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface” (9). For Butler, matter is its own cultural script.

Although she is referring to the natural sciences in the above quotation, Butler regards them to be in a dangerous proximity to an essentialist position: since her theoretical approach is closely linked to a political agenda, she fears that such a position would lead her straight back to Freud’s claim in “The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex” that “anatomy is destiny” (320). Butler’s ultimate aim is to liberate the category of sex—not only that of gender—from essentialism, to deconstruct the “material irreducibility of sex” (Bodies That Matter 28). Rather than an essentialist bedrock of identity, sex is discursively constructed by hetero-normative rules, norms that pose as ‘the law,’ or even as ‘natural,’ but are not. And in contrast to biological givens, norms can be challenged and changed. Butler eschews essentialism [which she equates with biologism], but does the fact that the ‘biological argument’ serves patriarchal and sexist ideologies ‘codify’ once and for all that ‘biology’ exclusively denotes the discursive result of these ideologies?3 On the other hand, cultural|linguistic constructivism—or culturalism—is as much of a reductionism, only into the opposite direction. As Richard Morris has observed, “in order to dispose of bigoted essentialist notions . . . , Butler virtually discards the physical human body and those connections to and interactions with human culture” (15). Closely comparable to a speech-act, sex—and with it the material body—for Butler is a praxis of citation, “a process whereby regulatory norms materialize ‘sex’ and achieve this materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms” (Bodies That Matter 2). It becomes clear that Butler cannot think the powers and forces constructing sex and the material body are other than social and discursive.

In The History of Sexuality, Foucault discusses the question of who should have the power of life and death. Yet, even though he makes the point that “bio-power” (143) has in modern times increasingly been wielded by discourses rather than individuals, he still stresses that “it is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them” (ibid.). Foucault’s notion that “bio-power” emanates from discourses and discursive practices has laid the conceptual foundation for the cultural|linguistic constructivism that Butler and others have developed. However, the adoption of Foucauldian concepts has also lead to an ‘adaptation,’ a transformation, since Foucault’s own considerations of the importance of a material grounding have not yet been properly taken into account. He explicitly and decisively gives a negative answer to the question of whether “the analysis of sexuality necessarily impl[ies] the elision of the body, anatomy, the biological, the functional” (151). Similar to Louis Althusser’s claim that “ideology has a material existence” (112), Foucault
states that “the deployments of power are directly connected to the body—to bodies, functions, physiological processes, sensations, and pleasures” (*History of Sexuality* 151–52).

This intricate and complex connection between the material body and the realm of representation might be argued to be the blind spot of a constructivism that, as Deleuze has observed, is “directed at rendering . . . representation infinite (orgiastic)” (*Difference and Repetition* 262). Thus, a new perspective that allows for the incorporation of the workings of the ‘repressed’ of representation [namely, of the real, nature, the body, matter] is needed to “make it [the body] visible through an analysis in which the biological and the historical are not consecutive to one another, as in the evolutionism of the first sociologists, but are bound together in an increasingly complex fashion in accordance with the development of the modern technologies of power that take life as their objective. Hence I do not envisage a ‘history of mentalities’ that would take account of bodies only through the manner in which they have been perceived and given meaning and value; but a ‘history of bodies’ and the manner in which what is most material and most vital in them has been invested” (Foucault, *History of Sexuality* 152).

How, then, can materiality—the body—be thought differently? Or, to put the question in Butler’s words: “How can there be an activity, a constructing, without presupposing an agent who precedes and performs that activity?” (*Bodies That Matter* 7).

The intelligent materialism of Deleuze does not fall into the ‘trap of essentialism’ of which cultural|linguistic constructivism is so scared—simply because ‘essence’ in itself does not exist in Deleuze’s account of things. What we see as essences are in fact machinic aggregations. Deleuze|Guattari categorically state that a machine is “at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever said *the* id. Everywhere it is machines” (*Anti-Oedipus* 1). The concept of the machine neither proceeds from nor leads to an organic whole, a unity—an essence. Yet, the Deleuzian machine is not a machine in the sense of a mechanical apparatus or tool. It starts in the middle of things—neither at the beginning, nor at the end—to think and describe an immanent production, without intention or end, with neither subjectivity nor other outside controlling agency. The machine is nothing more—and nothing less—than the connections and assemblages it consists of, and its productions. Matter is machinic in the sense that the world is a multiplicity, consisting of a variety of machines, such as self-organizing machines, ordered and static machines, dynamic machines, biological machines, and also the discursive and cultural machines of representation—but this last type of machine is only one among many, and not the overriding machine.
that cultural linguistic constructivism wants it to be. It has no access to language or the ‘outside.’ There are various machines, and there are the feedback loops between them. Accordingly, for Deleuze, “neither do . . . differences pass between the natural and the artificial since they both belong to the machine and interchange there. Nor between the spontaneous and the organized, since the only question is one of modes of organization” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 143). For Deleuze|Guattari, matter is “molecular material” (Thousand Plateaus 342), equipped with the capacity for self-organization—matter is alive, informed rather than informe [formless]: “matter . . . is not dead, brute, homogeneous matter, but a matter-movement bearing singularities or haecceities, qualities and even operations” (512).

True to the chaos and complexity theories, two scientific notions that underlie much of Deleuze’s thought, matter’s autopoietic capacities reveal themselves at states ‘far from equilibrium,’ when matter crosses thresholds [e.g., phase states]. These capacities are hidden at a state of equilibrium, and yet it is exactly this state of equilibrium that in traditional science is regularly taken as the characteristic and essential feature of matter. Thus, strategies of slowing down, stabilizing, and homogenizing matter result in an account of matter as passive, chaotic, and ‘stupid’—a mere ‘mass’ or object to be ‘informed’ by an outside spirit, force, subject, or God.

‘Intelligent materialism’ is so designated not because it is supposed to be a more intelligent version of classical materialism, but because it is preoccupied with ‘intelligent matter’ and supports a belief in the force and richness of matter itself: one that is not dominated by form, one that does not need form to be imposed on it to become alive, but is in and of itself animate and informed. Matter engenders its own formations and differentiations because it carries them in itself, as potentialities, so that form|soul|mind is not something external to matter, but coextensive with it. Deleuze’s intelligent materialism claims that matter is not [only] an effect of representation—matter is productive, and this productivity must be accounted for by its own, immanent criteria. Deleuze’s “transcendental empiricism” [as he himself called his position in an early phase of his thinking] is an empiricism that thinks of experience as having no foundation outside itself—for example, in a subject, in a consciousness that is there first, and then experiences, reflects, and categorizes the world. For Deleuze, it is not so much that the conscious subject explains the world—it is more a question of accounting for how a subject is formed from experience, from a singular affect or perception, from a preindividual relation to materiality. The subject thus aligns itself with views such as realism, materialism, and pragmatism, but without the specter of ‘essentialism.’ All these ‘practices’ simply denote a turn toward matter and materiality, and a move away from the constructivist, impoverished
concept of matter as passive and chaotic, where an organizing and transcendent agent is needed to make matter work, make it live—if matter is passive, it cannot by itself account for the emergence of newness; if matter is chaotic, it cannot by itself account for order. Deleuze’s intelligent materialism can account for the world’s order and creativity without resorting to essentialism or determinism, nor to any ‘transcendent vitalism,’ since life for Deleuze is the very property of matter itself.

Whereas cultural/linguistic constructivism is concerned with representation, the symbolic, and ultimately ‘psychic reality,’ an intelligent materialism widens the spectrum by being concerned with production, the real, ‘lived reality.’ In the question concerning nature or nurture, such a position obviously claims that there is no either/or—all that exists are feedback loops. Materiality—the unconscious, the body, ultimately life—is productive and autopoietic; the culturally/discursively constructed body/materiality/unconscious is only one small part of the whole, and not even the most important one, more like the tip of the iceberg. As Serres has stated:

At this point the unconscious gives way from below; there are as many unconsciousnesses in the system as there are integration levels. It is merely a question, in general, of that for which we in generally possess no information. . . . Each level of information functions as an unconscious for the global level bordering it . . . What remains unknown and unconscious is, at the chain’s furthermost limit, the din of energy transformations: this must be so, for the din is by definition stripped of all meaning, like a set of pure signals or aleatory movements. These packages of chance are filtered, level after level, by the subtle transformer constituted by the organism. . . . In this sense, the traditional view of the unconscious would seem to be the final black box, the clearest box for us since it has its own language in the full sense. (Hermes 80)

Thus, below the socially/linguistically constituted reality, there is the noise of the nonhuman, of chemical, biological, and other energy transformations. According to Serres, “our body integrates the noise of minute perceptions into sensible signals” (Genesis 20)—the organism serves as a translation machine and an integrative filter. Both Serres and Deleuze refer to Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, and Leibniz in their work, uncovering a tradition of materiality and the body quite at odds with the Platonic model that Butler equates with Western philosophy per se. In this ‘materialist tradition,’ natural sciences and politics—the body and the body politic—are closely connected and related to an ethics not derived from any presupposed transcendent model of morality, but an ‘ethics of immanence.’ In their development of complex machinic interactions between bodies—and also their
redefinitions of the body—these philosophers point in a direction that Deleuze’s concept of the machinic is clearly indebted to.

The machine in the Deleuzian sense encompasses both culture and nature—both are parts of the same continuum. Thus, it would seem somewhat one-sided to concentrate on culture, psychic reality, and representation only. If Lacan, Derrida, and Butler deal with nature, materiality, and the ‘real’ body at all, they do so as a belated effect of language, the symbolic. The very resistance to seriously engage with the ‘outside’ of language is revealed in their distrust of and lack of interest in the natural sciences. Although Butler concedes the importance of “the domains of biology, anatomy, physiology, hormonal and chemical composition” (*Bodies That Matter* 67), she ultimately shies away from discussing the ‘real’ workings of matter—her insistence on the discursive formations of matter does not allow her to consider working on the non- or prediscursive level on which, for example, hormones, chemicals, and genetic coding operate. The same holds true for Derrida. Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, the self-appointed policemen safeguarding the disciplinary border between the ‘two cultures’ turn Derrida’s neglect of the sciences into a badge of honor when they state that “since there is no systematic misuse of [or indeed attention to] science in Derrida’s work, there is no chapter on Derrida in this book” (7). In this way, important and necessary as their work is, the analyses of Lacan, Butler, and Derrida cannot be more than “of propaedeutic value in the reflection on and intervention into the convergent fields assuming the highest importance in the material structuring of the current global system of bodies politic: recombinant genetics, cognitive science, dynamical systems theory and others,” as John Protevi has argued in *Political Physics*. The title of Protevi’s study should serve as the fundamental and programmatic figure of thought of my study—which is a political physics in the sense of a systemic dynamics underlying history and politics, with both politics and physics conceived as a science of [power] relations. Protevi’s invaluable study is the only one, as far as I can see, that develops a Deleuzian materialism in its relation to politics. While Protevi’s book is concerned both with a reading of political ‘founding texts’ by Plato, Aristotle, Heidegger, and Kant and with a double transversal—“crossing the transversal of Derrida and Deleuze with that of philosophy and science” (1)—my study, while sharing Protevi’s interest and premises and being indebted to his approach, differs in its focus on examples of a Deleuzian Body/Politic in an American context.

While cultural/linguistic constructivism—in particular, its questioning of the ‘grand narratives’ and its showing the constructedness of ‘presences’ and ‘essences’—is immensely important, it does not go far enough. By default, it leaves out the field of materiality and the body, and the sciences that most
prominently deal with these issues. Against Derrida’s [and culturallinguistic constructivism’s] agenda of deconstructing the metaphysics of presence, Deleuze decidedly poses an ontology of difference: instead of pointing out the impossibility of grounding Being in a transcendent or unitary entity or structure [God, or the signifier], Deleuze develops a differential metaphysics, focusing on becoming and multiplicities. In an interview with Raymond Bellour and François Ewald, Deleuze stated, “I’ve never been worried about going beyond metaphysics or any death of philosophy. The function of philosophy, still thoroughly relevant, is to create concepts” (Negotiations 136). This affirmative function of philosophy is also a call to transdisciplinarity, so that even when Deleuze was working on “painting and cinema: images, on the face of it . . . [he] was writing philosophy books” (137).

In a defense of Deleuze against Sokal|Bricmont’s attempt to control and regulate the limits of the disciplinary fields, Paul Harris points out that Deleuze’s work in contrast shows “how productive it is to work with and think through material from others and other fields . . . , working with ideas cooked up in geology and geography, zoology and ornithology, archeology and paleontology, and even mathematics and physics” (24–25). According to Deleuze, the philosophical practice of ‘creating concepts,’ as a creation of ‘newness’ as well, requires philosophy to enter into manifold relations with the arts and sciences, since philosophy “creates and expounds its concepts only in relation to what it can grasp of scientific functions and artistic constructions . . . Philosophy cannot be undertaken independently of science or art” (Difference and Repetition xvi). It is these resonances and exchanges between philosophy, science, and art that make philosophy creative, not reflective. Since from the perspective of philosophy these relations are vital, for reasons internal to philosophy itself—that is, vital for the creation of ‘concepts’ [in contrast to the functions of science, and the percepts and affects of art]—Deleuze is also aware of “the dangers of citing scientific propositions outside their own sphere. It is the danger of arbitrary metaphor or of forced application. But perhaps these dangers are averted if we restrict ourselves to taking from scientific operators a particular conceptualizable character which itself refers to non-scientific areas, and converges with science without applying it or making it a metaphor” (Cinema 2 129).

The body and the human organism have always offered metaphors for the cultural, social, and political realms. As the sociologist Bryan Turner states, “the body is a material organism, but also a metaphor” (7). True enough. However, in most of postmodern Body|Theory, only the metaphorical side of the equation has been analyzed in detail. But a reversal of that sentence—“the body is a metaphor, but also a material organism”—is valid as well, and from a Deleuzian context, the interesting and important ques-
tion is how these two fields interrelate, how we can develop a way of folding nature and the physical into culture and the psychic—and vice versa—rather than having culture represent nature, a materiality, and a body seen as passive and ‘uninformed.’ In fact, Deleuze’s intelligent materialism aims at the “abolishing of all metaphor; all that consists is Real” (Thousand Plateaus 69). Another way of putting it amounts to a rethinking of the concept of writing, in a more radical way than Derrida’s opening up of the concept of text. Extending the field of writing into the fields of materiality and the body, “writing now functions on the same level as the real, and the real materiality writes” (141). Adding material differences to a Derridean difference might also explain why Deleuze [in contrast to Derrida and Butler] is so interested in the natural sciences, most notably in chaos and complexity theory and the new physics. Deleuze accommodates the paradigm shift that has taken place in the sciences. From traditional physics, traditional metaphysics takes generalizations and abstractions and turns them into immutable givens—transcendence, it can be argued, is in fact produced from material immanence and then posited as an overcoding system of truth. A ‘new metaphysics’ [or ontology] in the Deleuzian sense is inextricably linked to the material sciences, the natural sciences, the life sciences. In contrast to the positivistic approach of the traditional sciences, the ‘modern sciences’ call for a different ontology—an ‘ontology of difference.’ A new metaphysics for the new physics—this is part of the Deleuzian project: “I consider myself a Bergsonian, because Bergson says that modern science has not found its own metaphysics, the kind of metaphysics that it would need. It is this metaphysics I am interested in . . . I consider myself a pure metaphysician.” The new physics—in particular, chaos theory—also has a specific relation to the field of possibilities and multiplicities, the field of the virtual that philosophy is so engaged with. In fact, philosophy, [the new] science[s], and art are involved in what DeleuzeGuattari call a “struggle against chaos” (What Is Philosophy? 203)—or “chaotic virtuality” (155)—that “does not take place without an affinity with the enemy” (203), that is not aimed at reducing the dynamic differences to a conceptual identity. And it is this engagement with the virtual, with chaos, that attracts DeleuzeGuattari to chaoscomplexity theory, a science that “is inspired less by the concern for unification in an ordered actual system than by a desire not to distance itself too much from chaos, to seek out potentials in order to seize and carry off a part of that which haunts it, the secret of the chaos behind it, the pressure of the virtual” (156).

Deleuze’s metaphysics puts the focus on immanence [versus transcendence], on production [versus representation], on materiality [versus language]. In contrast, the Lacanian ‘real,’ the realm of the unconscious, the
body, and materiality [in semiotic terms, the referent] is structured like a
language. Lacan ultimately equates materiality with the materiality of the
signifier, the body with the body of language, the machine with the sym-

colic: “The most complicated machines are made only with words . . . The
symbolic world is the world of the machine” (Seminar II 47). Lacan’s the-

ory of the mirror stage, however, where the realm of the imaginary [visual
perception] most intimately touches, even emerges from, the field of the real,
simultaneously shows the indebtedness to the representational logic of be-
latedness, and points in the direction of a way out.

In “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I,” Lacan re-
veals the ego to be not a prereflexive entity, a stable core of the self which
gradually evolves. Instead, the ego is already based on reflection. Constructed
within visual space, the ego is the result of various identificatory processes,
of the constant oscillation between ‘self’ and ‘other’: there is no chance of
perceiving one’s own identity as separate from what is exterior to it. The ego
is not so much the source of self-knowledge but the result of a fundamental
“méconnaissance” (Écrits 6). As a dialectical movement, the mirror stage
can be roughly subdivided into three substages. The first substage is the
alienating moment. There exists what Lacan calls a “primordial Discord”
(4), the effect of that physiological “prematurity of birth” (ibid.) character-
istic of the human newborn that shows itself in its “motor incapacity and
nursling dependence” (2). The child experiences its own body in terms of
incompleteness, insufficiency, and lack of motor coordination. The next step
is the anticipatorial identification with the image of one’s own body in the
mirror, with “the whole form of the body by which the subject anticipates
in a mirage the maturation of his power . . . , in an exteriority in which this
form is certainly more constituent than constituted” (ibid.). This “Ideal-I,”
because it situates the ego in a virtual and therefore “fictional” space, func-
tions as a lure that seems to promise autonomy. The ego is an ego only inso-
far as it is a “coming-into-being” (ibid.), an unstable result of the oscillation
between those two substages, and—as a provisory synthesis of this dialec-
tical movement always at play—can find its ‘place’ only in an alienating
identity. The promised and illusory totality of the ego is always threatened
by phantasmatic returns of images of the incompleteness experienced in the
first substage. Thus, the mirror stage is “a drama whose internal thrust is
precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation—and which manufactures
for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession
of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its
totality that I shall call orthopaedic—and, lastly, to the assumption of an
alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s
entire mental development” (4, my emphases).
Lacan shows how identity is constructed, is an effect rather than a cause, and is forever situated as a precarious balance between the whole body and the fragmented body, the corps morcelé. Every identity is a fictitious invention and rests on a fundamental misconception. By the child’s “jubilant assumption” (2) of and identification with the imaginary mirage of the whole body, the ‘real’ fragmented body is repressed. However, this sense of unity is very frail, and the images of the fragmented body haunt and subvert any illusion of wholeness: “This fragmented body . . . appears in the form of disjointed limbs, or of those organs represented in exoscopy, growing wings and taking up arms for intestinal persecution—the very same that the visionary Hieronymus Bosch has fixed, for all time, in painting . . . But this form is even tangibly revealed at the organic level, in the lines of ‘fragilization’ that define the anatomy of phantasy, as exhibited in the schizoid and spasmodic symptoms of hysteria” (5).

Deleuze|Guattari see Lacan’s fragmented body under opposite signs—not as a fiction of belatedness, not as a state of regression, and most important not as an image. In fact, Lacan himself later disengages the corps morcelé from its mere iconicity by stating that the human subject is “originally an inchoate collection of desires—there you have the true sense of the expression fragmented body” (Seminar III 39). Yet, according to Deleuze|Guattari, “it is not at all a question of a fragmented, splintered body, of organs without the body (OwB). The BwO is exactly the opposite. There are not organs in the sense of fragments in relation to a lost unity, nor is there a return to the undifferentiated in relation to a differentiable totality . . . The error of psychoanalysis was to understand BwO phenomena as regressions, projections, phantasies, in terms of an image of the body. As a result, it only grasps the flipside of the BwO and immediately substitutes . . . part-objects for a worldwide intensity map” (Thousand Plateaus 165).

What Lacan sees as a negativity, as “fragilization,” Deleuze|Guattari see from the opposite perspective of the Body without Organs as a positive capacity for growth, dynamic openness, and new connections—as potentiality, a capacity for creating possibilities. The BwO—in contrast to any unified and stable organism or organization—is “permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles” (40). Deleuze|Guattari quote Antonin Artaud [from whom they adopted the name and concept of the BwO]: “The body is the body/is it all by itself/and has no need of organs/the body is never an organism/organisms are the enemies of the body” (Anti-Oedipus 9). They later specify: “The BwO is not opposed to the organs; rather, the BwO . . . [is] opposed to the organism, the organic organization of the organs” (Thousand Plateaus 158).
With Artaud, Deleuze|Guattari see the “organism [as] the judgment of God” (159); in a similar way, “the strata are judgments of God” (40). The organism—the transcendent stratum that the organism is—is a “phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labor from the BwO, imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations, organized transcendences” (159). Instead of the body as a coherent thing, a unified and stratified organism, Deleuze|Guattari propose the BwO, which corresponds with their the notion of the body as a machine, an assemblage—not as a [however complex] whole that can be analyzed and reduced into components [or part-objects], and that adds up to a ‘unified structure’ again, into a stratified system the behavior of which can be fully ‘explained’ and controlled, but as a dynamic aggregate that allows for emergence and self-organization. A body is not a discrete entity but an interactive collective, not an isolated system, but a whole environment—as Deleuze states, “our body is a type of world full of an infinity of creatures” (The Fold 109)—viral, chemical, hormonal, informational, even technological. These ‘two bodies’ exist contemporaneously with and alongside each other—they correspond to two different states of matter, the molecular and the molar. Simply put, the dyad molecular|molar refers to dynamic and processual versus closed and massive bodies|systems. And although the first type of matter|body “is not lacking in systematic interactions,” it is in the second articulation in particular that phenomena constituting an overcoding are produced, phenomena of centering, unification, totalization, integration, hierarchization, and finalization” (Thousand Plateaus 41)—and it is exactly this overcoding that Deleuze|Guattari oppose. The body is neither a ‘container’ of self-identical personhood, of essence, nor a fixed and bounded unity, an essence in itself, but a field of forces and intensities—“pure positive multiplicities where everything is possible, without exclusiveness or negation, syntheses operating without a plan, . . . indifferent to their underlying support, since this matter that serves them precisely as a support receives no structural unity, but appears as the body without organs” (Anti-Oedipus 309).

These productive multiplicities are the “reverse side” of representational unity, and although they do not explicitly refer to the Lacanian [and Derridean] topology of the Möbius strip, the following critique that Deleuze Guattari aim at Lacanian psychoanalysis can be understood only in the terms of the strip: “To trace back from images to the structure would have little significance and would not rescue us from representation, if the structure did not have a reverse side that is like the real production of desire. This reverse side is the real inorganization of the molecular elements: partial objects that enter into syntheses or interactions, since they are not partial in the
sense of extensive parts, but rather partial like the intensities under which a unit of matter always fills space in varying degrees” (ibid.). The inchoateness [or even disorganization] of the BwO is not a negativity, a lack, an absence of unity and plenitude, but a pool of potential for connections and syntheses—the Deleuzian body is not only an organism that represents [and is represented], but also a machine that produces [and is produced].

Similarly, for Deleuze|Guattari, the Body|Politic ultimately oscillates between two poles, “the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole, and the schizoid revolutionary pole” (366). It is important to point out that, despite the origin of the terms paranoiac and schizoid in psychoanalysis, Deleuze|Guattari use the terms to refer to different logics and dynamics of social organization. Whereas paranoia designates an Oedipal and ultimately transcendental mode of an hierarchically structured and rigidly segmented, striated, and solid Body|Politic, controlled by an external authority, schizophrenia denotes liberating potentialities and ‘lines of flight,’ vectors of deterriorization—a fluid Body|Politic constituted by openness, dynamics, self-organization, and by a constant becoming. For Deleuze|Guattari, the two poles of the Body|Politic

are defined, the one by the enslavement of production and the desiring-machines to the gregarious aggregates that they constitute on a large scale under a given form of sovereignty; the other by the inverse subordination and the overthrow of power. The one by these molar structured aggregates that crush singularities, select them, and regularize those they retain in codes or axiomatics; the other by the molecular multiplicities of singularities that on the contrary treat the large aggregates as so many useful materials for their own elaborations. The one by the lines of integration and territorialization that arrest the flows, constrict them, turn them back, break them according to the limits interior to the system . . . , the other by lines of escape that follow the decoded and deterriorialized flows, inventing their own nonfigurative breaks or schizzes that produce new flows, always breaching the coded wall or the territorialized limit that separates them from desiring-production. (366–77)

It is the idea that a body is a set of [ever changing] relations rather than a fixed form that makes the Deleuzian body exceed the concept of the ‘traditional body’—as Deleuze himself puts it, “every relationship of forces constitutes a body—whether it is chemical, biological, social, or political” (Nietzsche and Philosophy 40). Due to the dynamic interplay of forces, a body is ultimately “composed of an infinite number of particles; . . . the relations of motion and rest, of speeds and slownesses between particles . . . this capacity for affecting and being affected.” (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy 123). The Deleuzian notion of a body [because, ultimately, there
is no such thing as *the body* refers to both *more* [groups, packs, societies—multitudes] and *less* [viruses, chemicals, hormones] than the ‘human body’ [or the ‘individual,’ for that matter], and includes ‘nonhuman’ bodies [animals, solids, fluids, etc.] as well: “A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity” (127).

Such a transdisciplinary approach and attitude not only allows a reading of ‘the body’ with Deleuze—that is, as Protevi puts it, with a “radically materialist philosophy that engages all the powers of contemporary physics and biology” (*Political Physics* 2–3)—it also calls for a reading of the political, social body, or Body|Politic, on that same conceptual level. The Body|Politic is no metaphor, since all bodies follow the same underlying diagram, the same operational logic: a body is a relational field of forces, capable of autopoietic self-organization, and the Body|Politic is as much a matter of physics and biology as it is a matter of [state] government; it is as much a question of material as of political constitution. Again, this study is not arguing for an exchange of one logic [the logic of materiality] for another [the logic of material production], but rather attempts to see how those different logics can be connected *without* one’s overcoding the other. As Deleuze|Guattari put it, “it is not a matter of biologizing human history, nor of anthropologizing natural history. It is a matter of showing the common participation of the social machines and the organic machines” (*Anti-Oedipus* 289).

In her introduction to the philosophy of Deleuze, Claire Colebrook has outlined the difference between the molar body-as-organism and the molecular body-as-machine [or a BwO as a set of relations|connections|forces] most succinctly: “An *organism* is a bounded whole with an identity and end. A *mechanism* is a closed machine with a specific function. A *machine*, however, is nothing more than its connections; it is not made by anything, is not for anything and has no closed identity” (56).

This ‘conceptual taxonomy’ also evokes a history of the concept of the Body|Politic, since the three ‘stages’—organic, mechanic, machinic—parallel the ‘developmental phases’ of the Body|Politic from Plato’s organicist model in *Republic*, via Hobbes’s “Artificial man” in *Leviathan*, to the ‘multitudes’ that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri described in *Empire*. Yet it should be noted that these different bodies exist side by side—the organic, mechanic, and machinic Body|Politic, like the molar and the molecular, are by no means mutually exclusive. As Deleuze|Guattari point out with regard to their universal history, as they develop it in their *Anti-Oedipus*, territorial, despotic, and axiomatic machines cannot be regarded as a linear sequence of one historical stage following another in succession. Rather, these stages
[or machines] coexist on different plateaus, like physical phase states in mutual interrelation and processes of becoming—it is the discipline and discourse of history that creates the illusion of progress: “All history does is to translate a co-existence of becomings into a succession” (*Anti-Oedipus* 430). Thus, I will focus on attempts to escape the organicist/mechanistic logic of the Body|Politic taking place even before the twentieth century [and it should be noted that Hardt|Negri owe their notion of the postcapitalist multitudes to Spinoza].

If traditionally [that is, according to the ‘image of thought’ of transcendental metaphysics], the body [as organism or mechanism] is seen in terms of wholeness, unity, and individuality [which is exactly what makes it attractive as a model for a Body|Politic], then from this perspective of organization and striation, the ‘other end’ [the BwO] cannot but stand for chaos and anarchy: every step in this direction is regarded as a regression toward disorder. Metaphysics according to Deleuze imposes the following alternative: “either an undifferentiated ground, a formless nonbeing, or an abyss without differences and without properties, or a supremely individuated Being and an intensely personalized Form. Without this Being or this Form, you will have only chaos” (*Logic of Sense* 106). This alternative is ultimately based on the “hyloomorphic model” (*Thousand Plateaus* 408), a doctrine going back to Aristotle that claims that every ‘body’ is the result of an imposition of a transcendent form [or soul] on chaotic or passive matter. Protevi has succinctly articulated the consequences of the hylomorphic model for the Body|Politic: “Under the rule of the soul, the body becomes unified, a single organ . . . Any formation of a unity is always that of ruler/ruled . . . *Psychic organization entails somatic enslavement*” (“Organism” 33).

Deleuze|Guattari follow Gilbert Simondon in suggesting that the form-matter division is never absolute, since it “leaves many things, active and affective, by the wayside” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus* 408). Not only does it “assume a fixed form and a matter deemed homogeneous” (408), but for Deleuze, matter is not inert in the first place; rather, it is informed, for it consistently contains and produces emergent structures and potentials. The hylomorphic model emphasizes the constituted individual, and ignores the very process by which the individual comes to be. In contrast, Simondon proposes to regard the individual as an ongoing dynamic: an individual constantly individualizing itself out of a preindividual field of singularities or potentialities. Thus, “instead of imposing a form upon a matter: what one addresses is less a matter submitted to laws than a materiality possessing a *nomos*” (408).13
I will now focus on a paradigmatic example of the difference between a hierarchically structured and a self-organizing—or between an organicist mechanistic and a machinic—Body|Politic by contrasting the processes of social formation described by Hobbes and Spinoza. I have chosen these models as a kind of Urszene for what is to follow not only because of their paradigmatic character, and because of the fact that Deleuze regards Spinoza highly, but also because both political models were in the air when the Puritans left England to launch their project of the City on a Hill in America.

In a text published shortly after Deleuze’s death, Paul Patton and his coauthors remark that “if, as he and Guattari suggested, Spinoza was the Christ of philosophers, then Deleuze was surely one of his saints” (“Symposium” 2). Spinoza remained one of the great and lifelong influences on Deleuze’s thought. As the philosopher of immanence, the “infinite becoming-philosopher” (Deleuze, What Is Philosophy? 60), Spinoza was important for Deleuze in that he was an anomalous philosopher of a materialist tradition to which Deleuze was indebted, sharing such important concepts such as affirmation, immanence, affects, and ethics. For Deleuze, “Spinoza... showed, drew up, and thought the ‘best’ plane of immanence—that is, the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the transcendent or restore any transcendent, the one that inspires the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions” (ibid.).

Although Hobbes is also considered a materialist philosopher, Deleuze points out that he is radically different from Spinoza.14 Both philosophers start with ‘the multitude,’ but in Hobbes, the multitude plays a role quite different from the one it plays in the philosophy of Spinoza. With Hobbes, the sovereign emerges from the multitude only to establish a break with it, and is transferred into a transcendent agency that fixes and overcodes the whole Body|Politic. And although Hobbes explicitly mentions alternatives to such a molar apparatus, he immediately discards them since they contradict his pessimistic view of man. Thus, Leviathan starts at the bottom but, after establishing itself, turns into a top-down organization. Spinoza, in contrast, explicitly maintains the bottom-up structure of the multitude. What aligns Spinoza with Deleuze is that while Hobbes’s materialism is a mechanic materialism, the materialism of Spinoza is a machinic one. The legal political philosophy of Hobbes,15 which bases political agency in the law and its institutions, including the contract, differs from what Deleuze calls the “anti-legalist” tradition of Spinoza, and these differences are closely connected to two radically different conceptions of power and knowledge. While Hardt|Negri have explored in detail the concept of the Spinozist mul-
titude and its political impact on and in the contemporary empire, what I do not see in their account is an explanation of how this power of the multitude arises. I will try to make up for this lack by linking the power of the multitude to Spinoza’s “common notions” and by showing how such affective operational rules can produce something akin to swarm intelligence.16

One of the most influential and persistent arguments for the need of a strong government has been advanced by Hobbes in *Leviathan*. In the state of nature, which means in the condition defined by the absence of sovereign power, human beings live in “a condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as if of every man, against every man” (185). In such a state, life of man is “solitary, nasty, brutish, and short” (186). The only reasonable way out of such a scenario of endemic violence is for people to protect themselves by forming societies and transferring all individual rights to the sovereign, who is to represent these wills as one. Once people surrender their power to the sovereign, they cannot take it back. Only something artificial, a symbolic contract, can counter the natural state of war and anarchy. Civil war for Hobbes presents a regression to such anarchy—the Behemoth that can be controlled only by an even more powerful monster, the Leviathan. In a thought experiment, Hobbes imagines this state of being as the *original* situation of man—before the advent of the civic state—out of which the emergence of such a reasonable sovereign apparatus has to be explained. In the state of nature, man is equipped with power. This power, however, is ultimately distributed more or less equally, so that “if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End . . . endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other” (184). Since the state of nature is marked by individual power and the absence of normative restrictions on man’s desire, what is needed in order to make it safe for man is “a power able to over-awe them all” (185). It is thus only rational to enter a contract, “a Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner . . . I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner” (227). As a result, Hobbes argues, “the multitude [is] so united in one Person . . . that great Leviathan” (227) of the people.

For Hobbes, the opposition of the multitude|many and of the people|one is decisive. It has to be noted, however, that this clear-cut opposition is the result of a rhetorical operation and an overcoding. Hobbes concedes that “the word *people* hath a double signification. In one sense it signifieth only a number of men, distinguished by the place of their habitation . . . which is no more, but the multitude of those particular persons that inhabit those regions, without consideration of any contracts or covenants amongst them,
by which any one of them is obliged to the rest. In another sense, it signifieth a person civil, that is to say, either one man, or one council, in the will whereof is included and involved the will of every one in particular” (Elements of Law 124).

It is the contract that fixes and codifies the oscillation of “multitude” and “person civil”—of the many and the one—into the unanimity of the people, turning multitude and people into two mutually exclusive forces. It is this distinction that empowers the people to unanimous [and hence effective] action. For Hobbes, “the People is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action might be attributed” (De Cive 151), whereas “a multitude . . . is . . . not any one body, but many men, whereof each hath his owne will” (91), thus, “a Multitude cannot promise, contract, acquire Right” (92). It is basically the establishment of the sovereign that creates the people, the one, and not the other way round—before, there can have been only the multitude, in the natural state of anarchy and war. The contract transfers the immanent power of the multitude to a transcendental sovereign power that controls it, as it were, from the outside:

A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude. And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he shall represent them, none of them oweth more, than they gave him commission to Act. (Leviathan 220–21)

I will now turn to the philosophy of Spinoza and his different view of the multitude. Hobbes conceives of the multitude only as the regression and decomposition of the sum of the people into their disconnected parts, but for Spinoza the multitude turns out to be the central focus of his analysis. As Étienne Balibar points out, for Hobbes, the unanimity of the people is the cause, “the essence of the political machine . . . For Spinoza, unanimity is a problem” (17).

In his preface to Negri’s The Savage Anomaly, Deleuze points out the aspects in which Spinoza radically differs from Hobbes, aspects in which Negri’s and Deleuze’s own project of reading Spinoza intersect. The legall
contractual tradition of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel implies: 1) that forces have an individual or private origin; 2) that they must be socialized to bring about adequate relationships corresponding to them; 3) that there is mediation of a Power (‘Potestas’); and 4) that the horizon is inseparable from crisis, war or antagonism that Power proposes to solve, though an ‘antagonist solution’ (‘Preface’ 190). Spinoza’s ‘Anti-Legalism,’ his fundamental idea that there is a “spontaneous development of forces, at least virtually” (ibid.), opposes all of those aspects.

By equating the sovereign state with the contract, and with mediation and representation, Hobbes presents the transition from the state of nature to the civil state as paralleled by the transition from mere appetites to reason—in fact, it might be argued that for Hobbes, language and representation are prerequisites for contracts and covenants, since beasts, for example, “though they have some use of voice, in making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent” (Leviathan 226). By means of egoistic calculation—a kind of instrumental reason—individuals transfer their ‘natural rights’ to a sovereign, and this contract effects a complete rupture between the “nasty” state of nature, and the ordered civil state. Ultimately, then, in Hobbes, as Deleuze points out, the sovereign is “a third party who gains by the contract made by individuals” (Expressionism 266). Whereas in Hobbes, the absolute power of man’s natural right is preserved only in the sovereign [whose power is enhanced precisely by amassing the powers conferred by individuals—note Hobbes’s rather essentialist notion of power], in Spinoza’s conception there is a continuum between the natural and the civil state. In the Spinozist version of the contract, then, no individual gives up his or her natural right, as that would be ultimately forbidden by the duty of self-preservation. Spinoza himself claims that “with regard to politics, the difference between Hobbes and me . . . consists in this, that I ever preserve the natural right intact so that the supreme power in a state has no more right over a subject than is proportionate to the power by which it is superior to the subject. This is what always takes place in the state of nature” (“Letter to Jarig Jelles”). In Hobbes, the contract—the act that constitutes, and is constituted by, the rupture between the natural and civil state—produces a Body/Politic that is a mechanical apparatus, an “Artificial man”:

* nature (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch)
have an artificial life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that Rational and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is created that great Leviathan called a Common-wealth, or State (in latine, Civitas), which is but an Artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the Soveraignty is an Artificial Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seat of the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to perform his duty) are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; the Wealth and Riches of all the particular members are the Strength; Salus Populi (the peoples safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an artificial Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sickness; and Civil war, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation. (Leviathan 81–82)

In Leviathan, then, the sovereign head controls the body of the community by giving laws. I would propose that in Deleuze|Guattari’s conception of the “body without organs,” one can read a direct response to and clear rejection of the Hobbesian organicist|mechanistic Body|Politic—“the BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs called the organism” (Thousand Plateaus 158). In fact, although it is taken from Artaud, Deleuze|Guattari’s concept of the BwO owes as much to Spinoza as it owes to Artaud. In Ethics, Spinoza states that “no one has thus far determined the power of the body, that is, no one has yet been taught by experience what the body can do merely by the laws of nature” (86). Deleuze|Guattari in fact reformulate, develop, and contextualize Spinoza’s ethical question in A Thousand Plateaus: “We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy that body or be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body” (257).

Because of the parallelism of mind and body in Spinoza—“the human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body” (Ethics 57)—there is no rupture between body and mind, just as there is no break between the
natural and the civic state. Matter, as Deleuze reads Spinoza, is informed, active, and dynamic—“in Spinoza, [material] forces are inseparable from a spontaneity and productivity that make possible their development without mediation [of reason]” (“Preface” 190). Deleuze notes that Spinoza, in contrast to Hobbes, is not so much interested in ‘the head’ that controls and regulates the Body|Politic as he is in the immanent affects and relations of the bodies themselves, and he opposes the liberal political tradition that focuses on the individual, be it the governor [sovereign], or the governed [subject]: “Spinoza immediately thinks in terms of ‘multitudes’ and not individuals . . . It is a conception of an ontological ‘constitution’ or of a physical and dynamic ‘composition’ that conflicts with the legal contract” (191). The transition from the natural to the civic state for Spinoza is a ‘spontaneous’ and ‘natural’ process—in Deleuzian terms, a machinic process—by no means at odds with natural rights and ‘affective life.’

Deleuze’s description of the “ontological ‘constitution’” and the “physical and dynamic ‘composition’” of the multitude in Spinoza echoes his description of two different structural principles of the relation between bodies and forces|powers. In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze refers to “two very contrary conceptions of the word ‘plan’” (128). On the one hand, there is the “plan of organization,” which is “any organization that comes from above and refers to a transcendence” (128). This “plan of organization”—or theological plan—“always has an additional dimension; it always implies a dimension supplementary to the dimension of the given” (128).22 On the other hand, there is “the plane of immanence”—the BwO—which “has no supplementary dimension: the process of composition must be apprehended for itself, through that which it gives, in that which it gives. It is a plan of composition, not of organization” (128). In contrast to Hobbes’s transcendent reductive one, Spinoza and Deleuze pose an immanent dynamic whole.

Those two plans [or planes] echo the natural state and the civil state respectively. For Hobbes, these two states or planes are separated by a break, the break that is the symbolic contract, while Spinoza preserves an inseparable connection between the two. For Hobbes, then, the state of nature can be conceptualized only in negative terms, as the absence of constraints, as anti–civic state, as anti–reason, whereas Spinoza sees this state as immanently structured and composed of affective and machinic operations and routines.23 To find out what a body can do—to find out about its power, agency, and activity—ultimately means to connect the body to the forces and relations that compose it, to experiment with and install oneself on the plan[e] of composition|immanence. It is there that the transition from powerless ignorance to active power takes place. Thus, for Deleuze, if “in the state of nature I live at the mercy of encounters” (Expressionism 260), then
the only way to make this state livable is “by striving to organize its encounters” (261). In contrast to the antagonistic perspective of Hobbes—“man is a wolf to man,” in his well-known phrase—Spinoza asserts that “Man is God to man” (Ethics 161). Since man in principle agrees with man, the attempt to organize encounters ultimately means “to form an association of men in relations that can be combined” (Deleuze, Expressionism 261). Spinoza is far from saying that there is an innate rationality in man that dictates him to do so, or an essence of goodness: Deleuze observes that activity, that is “reason, strength and freedom are in Spinoza inseparable from a development, a formative process” (262). In contrast to Hobbes, however, for whom there is an absolute break between passion/affects and reason, for Spinoza, reason is the result of experiment and good encounters: “Reason proceeds not by artifice, but by a natural combination of relations; it does not so much bring in calculation, as a kind of direct recognition of man by man” (264).

But how does reason emerge from these relations, which are still governed by passions and by what Spinoza calls “imagination,” which is rooted in bodily awareness? Spinoza’s answer is by way of the “common notions,” as he develops them in his Ethics. Before I turn to them in detail, I want to take a short detour and propose that complexity theory—in particular, game theory—can help in conceptualizing of how reason, or some practical kind of knowledge, can emerge from passions and affects. In his influential Theory of Justice, John Rawls states that a problem arises “whenever the outcome of the many individuals’ decisions made in isolation is worse for everyone than some other course of action, even though, taking the conduct of the others as given, each person’s decision is perfectly rational. This is simply the general case of the prisoner’s dilemma of which Hobbes’s state of nature is the classic example” (237–38). Rawls is referring here to one of the most discussed and analyzed puzzles of game theory, which was first formalized by Albert W. Tucker in the 1950s:

Two men, charged with a joint violation of the law, are held separately by the police. Each is told that

1. if one confesses and the other does not, the former will be given a reward of one unit, and the latter will be fined two units,
2. if both confess, each will be fined one unit.

At the same time each has good reason to believe that

3. If neither confesses, both will get clear.24

The dominant strategy in this dilemma would be to confess, since, logically, both parties would gain by confessing if the other does not, and even if the
other does confess as well, both would lose less. Thus, the rational and egoistic choice would always be: confess. Yet, on a collective level, both would be better off by cooperating.

Hobbes’s state of nature, I argue, does not fit the framework of the prisoner’s dilemma: in the Hobbesian war of every man against every man, cooperation is simply out of the question. In the state of nature, reason amounts to “anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him” (Leviathan 184). If Hobbes’s state of nature can be captured in terms of game theory, it would be what is called a zero-sum game, which categorically precludes cooperation, and which follows a logic of all-or-nothing, where one’s loss is another’s gain. In fact, it is the contract that transforms the zero-sum game into a prisoner’s dilemma by introducing the sovereign as a third player—or, rather, as a regulating central authority with the power to change the payoffs. Punishment for noncooperation becomes so great in the civil state that cooperation is enforced by law.

Although Hobbes points out that the laws of nature in fact allow for the possibility of mutual cooperation without enforcement, he discards this idea in the same breath. Considering the possibility of a contract based upon promise, he categorically states that “covenants, without the Sword, are but Words” (223). Even if the laws of nature allow for such notions as justice, mercy, and modesty, the laws are opposed to the natural passions and therefore can be ensured only by a greater power, or a greater passion—fear. To keep a promise, is “a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed on” (200). In a contract based on mere promise and empty words, as a rule, “he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his enemy” (196). Thus, with regard to a contract, the only “Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear” (200). Although Hobbes admits that “there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves than be governed by others” (201), Patton ultimately rules out the idea that, for Hobbes, the potential for “such self-government might extend to self-transformation” (“Politics and the Concept of Power” 151). Hobbes’s dilemma is to account for an atmosphere of trust and confidence in human beings who by nature are egoistic. The only solution seems to be to capitalize on the strong passion of fear by entering into a covenant that creates an even greater object of fear—the Leviathan—which ensures the adherence of the contract.

It is exactly this problem that parallels Robert Axelrod’s question in The Evolution of Cooperation: “Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?” (3). As Axelrod acknowledges, Hobbes’s answer was that it simply does not. Life in the state of nature is a zero-sum game, only the contract transfers it into a prisoner’s
dilemma—a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma that immediately dissolves, since the state by force solves any dilemma before it arises. In 1979, Axelrod asked professional game theorists to submit iterated prisoner’s dilemma’ strategies as computer programs, which were then played against each other in a round robin tournament, where each program played against itself, a random strategy [which was not a strategy at all, in the common sense], and each of the other entries [with none of the submitters knowing beforehand that each game in the tournament was to last 200 rounds]. Axelrod’s option to play an iterated version of the game [that is, in principle, endless repetitions] points to the fact that Hobbes somehow does not account for time and dynamics in his bleak and static vision: “What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact that players might meet again” (12). In addition, since no player knows how long the game will last, because no player knows when the final round will be played, the future becomes uncertain. Thus, ultimately there is no one dominant strategy, since every strategy depends on the relations to the other players, and their strategies.

The objective of that tournament was not to win each encounter, but to score the maximum number of points—that is, to do well overall. The program sent in by the game theorist Anatol Rapoport, by far the simplest of the submitted entries, won the competition. It was called TIT FOR TAT and was, in the 1970s, one of the most discussed strategies for playing the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. It was so simple that it consisted of only two rules: 1) start with cooperation, and 2) after that, do whatever the other player does—cooperate when he or she cooperates, betray when he or she betrays. While many of the competitors submitted programs with highly aggressive strategies that were variations of the egoistic strategy to always defect, many of the other programs that did worse than Rapoport’s were simply refinements of TIT FOR TAT. These versions, however, performed not a quarter as well as the original. Axelrod carefully analyzed the results of the competition and managed to identify the main characteristic of those programs that scored well: niceness, never be the first one to betray the other player. It also became clear that some other strategies would have beaten TIT FOR TAT, had they been entered. This important information, plus a detailed report of the tournament’s results, was sent out with an invitation to a follow-up round of the competition. Even more submissions arrived this time, and although there were no restrictions on the entries, only one TIT FOR TAT was submitted—again by Rapoport. Most of the participating programs were nice, except for some that tried to sneak in the occasional betrayal or that retaliated a bit harder, like TWO TITS FOR A TAT. The programs that Axelrod had come up with, which would have beaten TIT FOR TAT in the first round, were also included. But the winner again was TIT FOR TAT.
The key traits of *tit for tat* were: be nice, provoke and be provokable [if somebody does not respond to your offer of cooperation and betrays you, retaliate immediately . . . but just once], be forgiving [show good faith and return to cooperation if the other player does so as well], be clear [be consistent in your strategy],\(^{29}\) and play to gain most, not to win. All these characteristics show a high degree of responsiveness, and it appears that the best way of dealing with *tit for tat* is to cooperate. Even if you follow egoistical ends, cooperation is the best means to gain the most. Individual ends equal community ends, since everybody gains in cooperation. *Tit for Tat* solves *Leviathan*’s dilemma by generating a condition of responsiveness where mutual trust scores best, and even egoism is served. *Tit for Tat* is even able to stabilize itself in the long run—whereas cooperative assemblages, at least in small groups, can infiltrate and ultimately reverse noncooperative milieus, once stabilized, they cannot be defeated by an invasion of noncooperative strategies. There seems to be a kind of pawl in the evolution of cooperation, in which a complex composition emerges from simple affective rules. Thus, in response to the egoistic reason that is needed to transform the Hobbesian state of nature into a static civil state, the “only ‘cognitive abilities’ *tit for tat* needs are: (1) recognition of previous partners, and (2) memory of what happened last time with this partner” (D. Hofstadter 729).

Memory as a kind of reflex is also figured by Spinoza in that way—“if the human body has once been affected at the same time by two or more bodies, when the mind afterwards remembers any of them it will straightway remember the others . . . Hence we clearly understand what is memory (*memoria*). For it is nothing else than the concatenation of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside of the human body, and this takes place in the mind according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body” (*Ethics* 56). Memory is defined as a bodily and affective capacity: “The human body can suffer many changes and yet retain the impressions or traces of objects” (84). In such a “physics of action” (Deleuze, *Foucault* 72), *Tit for Tat* shows that a flexible and reflexive responsiveness [reflexive in the sense of a physical reflex] ultimately scores much better than Hobbes’s reflective rationality. This difference echoes Deleuze’s distinction between a “practical knowledge [*connaissance*],” which is rooted in an individual’s affective forces, and “forms of knowledge [*savoirs*]”—‘reason’ proper—that are “operating mechanisms which do not explain power, since they presuppose its relations and are content to ‘fix’ them as part of a function that is not productive but reproductive” (74).\(^{30}\) Such a ‘molar knowledge,’ then, can be upheld only by a constant check and confinement of the affective passions and spontaneity of thought.
The key characteristics of *tit for tat* are *affective reflexes* rather than rational strategies. As in Spinoza, knowledge *emerges* from intuition, and from encounters with other people, from what Spinoza calls “imagination” and “affect.” But joyful affects—those that individuals strive for in order to organize the chance encounters in the state of nature—can easily turn into sad passions as long as man remains in the state of inadequate ideas and pure imagination. In *Ethics*, Spinoza discusses the passage from imagination to reason—and thus, the passage from passive modes of existence [suffering from affects] to active modes [action based on adequate ideas]. He does so by introducing a new type of affects—the common notions—that is not in danger of becoming sad passions: “Besides the pleasure and desire which are passions, there are other emotions which are related to us in so far as we act” (123). Spinoza goes on to distinguish force or “fortitude” (*fortitudo*), which is “all actions which follow from the emotions which are related to the mind, in so far as it understands, . . . into courage (*animositas*) and generosity (*generositas*)” (124). In these strong affects, man’s activity surpasses the ruling dictate of imagination, and connects with [a practical] reason: “For I understand by courage the desire by which each endeavours to preserve what is his own according to the dictate of reason alone. But by generosity I understand the desire by which each endeavours by the dictate of reason alone to help and join to himself in friendship all other men” (124). Spinoza’s underlying category here is that of *utility*—anything is useful that enhances my capabilities to act. Reason, for Spinoza, is not a quality transcending the affects and the body—no sovereign agency—but an immanent part of the body and the natural state:31 “Since reason postulates nothing against nature, it postulates, therefore, that each man should love himself and seek what is useful to him . . . and desire whatever leads man truly to a greater state of perfection” (152)—and according to Spinoza, “there is nothing more useful to a man than a man” (161). To ‘become active’ implies the active organization of affects: “As long as we are not assailed by emotions which are contrary to our nature we have the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the order of the intellect” (201).

Cooperation arises from affective common notions such as generosity and courage—or, in terms of *tit for tat*, niceness, forgivingness, and provocability. According to Deleuze, Spinoza’s common notions are an art, the art of the *Ethics* itself: “organizing good encounters, composing actual relations, forming powers, experimenting” (*Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* 119). From the passions and the imagination [and also from sad passions such as egoism and self-love], active common notions arise: “There is a whole learning process involved in common notions, in our becoming active: we should
not overlook the importance in Spinozism of this formative process; we have to start from the least universal common notions, from the first we have a chance to form” (*Expressionism* 288). *Tit for Tat* and Axelrod’s *Evolution of Cooperation* provide us with a simulated model of how that formative process emerges and works ‘by itself.’ Knowledge here is a process of experimentation over time, almost a process of trial and error, and it is only the awareness of bodily ‘transitions,’ the affects of joy and sadness, that indicate what is good or bad for us, not any moral preconceptions. For Spinoza, the *conatus* of the individual, as the striving or desire for self-preservation, necessarily implies the relation with other bodies—objects or individuals, since “the human body needs for its preservation many other bodies from which it is, so to speak, continually regenerated” (*Ethics* 53)—hence the importance of the body’s capability to affect and be affected. Since the parallelism of mind and body implies that “the order of actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of actions and passions of our mind” (85), all the encounters with other bodies will simultaneously produce corresponding ideas. Thus, for Spinoza, “it is never we who affirm or deny something of a thing, but it is the thing itself that affirms or denies, in us, something of itself” (*Short Treatise* part 2, chap. 16, para. 5). Knowledge is a nonsubjective operation that depends on the composition of encounters between bodies—quite similar to the ‘cognitive abilities’ of *Tit for Tat*. The knowledge [common notions] that arises even from those chance encounters that the individual is subjected to in the state of nature is first of all the practical idea of *utility*—of all the bodies and objects we encounter, “none can be considered more excellent than those which agree with our nature. For (to give an example) if two individuals of the same nature were to combine, they would form one individual twice as strong as either individual” (*Ethics* 153). Ultimately, then, Spinoza’s experimental reason emerges from the individuals’ selection and organization of good encounters that result in an increase of power, which in turn produces adequate ideas—common notions, that is, which for Deleuze “are not so named because they are common to all minds, but primarily because they represent something common to bodies, either to all bodies (extension, motion and rest) or to some bodies (at least two, mine and another)” (*Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* 54).

The two simple rules of *Tit for Tat* may be regarded as equivalent to the ethology of affects that Deleuze points out—his main reference here is Jakob von Uexküll’s tick. And it is perhaps no coincidence that Hobbes also mentions the possibility of ‘self-government’ without coercive power in certain animals, which are explicitly defined by their lack of speech and instrumental reason—“Bees, and Ants, live sociably one with another, . . . and
yet have no other direction, than their particular . . . appetites; . . . among these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private” (Leviathan 225–26). Thus, from these “particular appetites” a kind of swarm intelligence emerges. The theory of swarm intelligence “shifts the explanation of mind away from the inner mechanisms of the individual—and especially from the brain, which is an entirely isolated piece of machinery—and out into the connections between people. The experience of thinking is contradicted by empirical evidence about what thinking really is. The prevailing myth is that of mind as an internal process, the myth of the given, the myth of consciousness, and we believe it as a fact” (Kennedy and Eberhart 419). On the contrary, with Spinoza, it can be argued that the mind is “the power, not of every individual, but of the multitude, which is guided, as it were, by one” (Theologico-Political Treatise 301)—a bottom-up composition, rather than a top-down organization, where simple immanent rules—common notions—that regulate local behavior result in complex compositions and formations. ‘Knowledge’ emerges from the interaction of the individual members.

Since the ‘cognitive abilities’ needed by Tit for Tat show that the “entities involved can be on the scale of bacteria, small animals, large animals, or nations” (D. Hofstadter 729) and computer programs, it can be safely inferred with Axelrod and Cohen that “social systems exhibit dynamic patterns analogous to physical, biological, and computational systems” (21)—this is precisely one of the assumptions that complexity theory is based on. Manuel De Landa has pointed out the importance of virtual environments in opening up and conceptualizing new ways of seeing, and he uses Axelrod’s experiments as a case in point (“Virtual Environments”). A virtual environment in a Deleuzian sense would refer not to the computer, but to the space of the virtual, the pool of pure potentiality that makes an infinity of actualizations possible at every instant, that is ultimately responsible for—to adapt his well-known phrase—what a body (or Body|Politic) can do. Spinoza’s definition of government ultimately points in that direction:

The ultimate aim of government is not to rule, or restrain, by fear, nor to exact obedience, but contrariwise, to free every man from fear, that he may live in all possible security; in other words, to strengthen his natural right to exist and work without injury to himself or others. No, the object of government is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develop their minds and bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither showing hatred, anger, or deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy and injustice. In fact, the true aim of government is liberty. (Theologico-Political Treatise 258–59)
The aim of government in Spinoza’s vision is to provide a space of freedom in which it becomes possible to open up new ways of seeing and to synthesize these insights. *Leviathan* figures here as a negative example only. The noise of the Behemoth [the horrible monster that Hobbes saw as the embodiment of the regression into anarchy, the civil war of his time, which for him necessitated the construction of a Leviathan] might refer not to the absence of order but to the emergence of self-organization, the music of the swarm that is *one* and *many* at the same time.

This study situates itself within a larger project of a Deleuzian historiography. The last major encounter between the historical sciences and post-structuralist theory dates back to the year 1973, when Hayden White’s *Metahistory* confronted the historical sciences’ claim to objectivity with the poststructuralist idea of the linguistic constructedness of reality. In a seminal article on “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact,” White asked the crucial question: “What authority can historical accounts claim as contributions to a secured knowledge of reality in general and to the human sciences in particular?” (277). He put the focus on the *graphein* in historiography and pointed the finger at the dilemma of the discipline of history, which saw itself as a science and not as part of the field of literature and fabulation. However, as interpretations of the past, White claims, historical narratives are “verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much *invented as found* and the forms of which have more in common with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the sciences” (278). He stresses the fact that the historian, as historiographer, *fabulates* history by sorting, interpreting, and contextualizing it, creating structures and causal relations and constructing history: “If we recognize that there is a fictive element in all historical narrative, we would find in the theory of language and narrative itself the basis for a more subtle presentation of what historiography consists of than that which simply tells the student to go and ‘find out the facts’ and write them up in such a way as to tell ‘what really happened’” (302). Repudiating Leopold von Ranke’s claim that the historian should—and is actually able to—reconstruct the past as it actually was, White imports concepts of deconstruction and cultural|linguistic constructivism into the historical sciences, concepts closely connected to the theories of Derrida and Foucault, according to which reality—life and history—are always already regulated and constituted discursively; reality is an effect of the logic of the signifier. Thus, if the historian aims at reconstructing a reality that is not found *in* the text, but *beyond* the text, and if this *beyond* [the textual
unconscious] is always already discursive [a Lacanian unconscious], then the historical sciences become a talking [better still, a writing] cure in which history finds itself. For White, the historical is “a prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them” (Metahistory 2).

If, in general, an awareness of the vicissitudes of representation is a good thing in that it raises questions about the existence of objective truth [or objective data] and of universal laws and teleologies [and ideologies], the result is—again—the disregard of the material constitution of history. As in cultural studies in general, historiography—or metahistory—concentrates mainly on representation, on the cultural|linguistic constructedness of reality, in order to ban essentialism. And again, the Deleuzian conception of a machinic nature|reality operating on complex and nonlinear logics bypasses the twin specters of essentialism and determinism: the concept of production connects nature and culture, materiality and history. History is a complex and nonlinear system, which means that between micro- and macrohistory, regional history and world history, part and whole, there are feedback loops, couplings, and interferences. In contrast to linear systems, nonlinear systems do not react proportionally to disturbances|turbulences. This is what the proverbial butterfly effect signifies, according to which a flap of a butterfly’s wing can trigger a tornado [or not]: the system’s sensitivity to initial conditions.

Deleuze ‘thinks history’ according to a completely different set of parameters, according to completely different concepts of time, event, and materiality. For Deleuze|Guattari, history is “a dynamic and open social reality, in a state of functional disequilibrium . . . comprising not only institutionalized conflicts but conflicts that generate changes, revolts, ruptures, and scissions” (Anti-Oedipus 150–51). Chance [the uncontrollability|indeterminacy of the event] plays a crucial role as well: history is “first of all . . . the history of contingencies, and not of necessity. Ruptures and limits, and not continuity . . . great accidents . . . and amazing encounters that could have happened elsewhere, or before, or might never have happened” (140). Thomas Carlyle, like Ranke a nineteenth-century historian, was aware of the important factor of ‘chance’ in the ‘construction’ of history, as this remarkable passage from his “On History” shows:

The most gifted man can observe, still more can record, only the series of his own impressions; his observation, therefore . . . must be successive, while the things done were often simultaneous; the things done were not a series, but a group. It is not in acted, as it is in written History: actual events are nowise so simply related to each other as parent and offspring are; every single event is the offspring not of one, but of all other events, prior or contemporaneous,
and will in its turn combine with all others to give birth to new: it is an ever-living, ever-working Chaos of Being, wherein shape after shape bodies itself forth from innumerable elements. (95)³⁴

Chance [the unpredictable complexity of material self-organization] is a determining factor in the overall system’s production of a new macrostate. Observable phase states [historical phases|epochs] that have remained stable over a period of time can perform a relatively fast and turbulent transition into another phase state. The phase state is always just a semistable system, a complex dynamic aggregate, and not a stable unity|entity—the more so since in one phase state, other states are ‘virtually’ present. In such a nonlinear conception of phase transitions, all phase states exist at the same time in a continuous process of change and becoming [with different temporalities of their own]. Because of the simultaneous activity of the ‘parts,’ the ‘whole’ of such a dynamic feedback system shows properties significantly different from that of the parts. As Deleuze|Guattari observe, “all history does is to translate a coexistence of becomings into a succession” (Thousand Plateaus 430), to translate nonlinearity into linearity. Such a ‘reductive analysis’ loses sight of those self-organizing emergences that nonlinear systems in particular reveal—a [nonlinear] history has to concentrate on precisely those modalities of becoming, on the becoming of the event itself.³⁵

The historical sciences break down the continuum of time—of history—into cuts, data|dates, historical events. These dates|events are then put into linear causal relations [this is where White’s critique comes in]. For Deleuze|Guattari, however, historiography is always a history of making cuts, of creating differences, hence of a perceiving consciousness, whereas “what we make history with is the matter of a becoming, not the subject matter of a story” (Thousand Plateaus 347). The Deleuzian event is precisely not the historical event, the date that the historical sciences are so obsessed with. It is neither the big historical event on the stage of world history, nor is it the culturally produced|represented fact|date. For Deleuze, events take place on all levels of life [and history]—on the level of the molecule as well as on the level of narration, on the level of the human and the conscious level [individual and/or institutional decisions] as much as on the level of the nonhuman and the unconscious and ‘non-historical’ [materiality, chance] level. The historical sciences run the risk of losing sight of the facts that the fact is a factum, made on an infinite number of levels at the same time, that it produces|is produced autopoietically, and that it is then reduced and condensed [in physical sense] to a date, a datum [a given], before it is condensed again [this time in the poetical sense] and inserted into causal chains. In between the cuts, in between the perceivable [historical] dates of historical science, there is the nonhistorical becoming, the complex dynamics of
multiplicities. A Deleuzian historiography has to focus on these multiplicities, these becomings. The consciously perceived and discursively represented date is only the tip of the iceberg, comparable, according to Deleuze, “to a mist rising over the prairie . . . precisely at the frontier, at the juncture of things and propositions” (Logic of Sense 24). With his focus on the becoming of the event, however, Deleuze is more concerned with a different kind of mist, what Nietzsche in On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life calls the “mist of the unhistorical” (11), with the differentiation [and ultimately combination] of historical fact/date and unhistorical becoming: “What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming . . . escapes History” (What Is Philosophy? 110). The “event in its becoming” is precisely the level of the historical fact/date that the [discursive] measuring devices of the historical sciences do not grasp. The becoming of the event “has neither beginning nor end but only a milieu. It is thus more geographical than historical” (ibid.)—geographically/physical insofar as its operations follow a dynamic and nonlinear logic. Deleuze/Guattari see history as a history of intensities, where historical dates do not so much signify objective facts, but force fields like “in physics, where proper names designate such effects within fields of potentials: the Joule effect, the Seebeck effect, the Kelvin effect. History is like physics: a Joan of Arc effect, a Heliogabalus effect” (Anti-Oedipus 86).

For Deleuze, becoming is closely connected to geography: “Becomings belong to geography, they are orientations, directions, entries and exits” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 2). Deleuze’s concept of history as becoming reveals a close proximity to the “geohistory” (What Is Philosophy? 95) of Fernand Braudel: “Geography wrests history from the cult of necessity in order to stress the irreducibility of contingency” (ibid., 96). With the concept of longue durée, Braudel commented on the geographic aspects of [historical] time itself. According to him, “history exists at different levels, I would even go so far as to say three levels but that would be . . . simplifying things too much. There are ten, a hundred levels to be examined, ten, a hundred different time spans” (74). History—thus Braudel, and thus Deleuze—happens at “ten, a hundred” levels and time spans [at a thousand plateaus] simultaneously. This coexistent and dynamic becoming is to the static succession of being what locus is to datum, what space is to time, and by analogy regards “geography as opposed to history, . . . the rhizome as opposed to arborescence” (Thousand Plateaus 296). History is a rhizome that historiography aims to translate into an arborescent order, with the rhizome standing for the complex interplay of necessity and chance, human and nonhuman, culture and materiality, intention and self-organization.
A historiography according to Deleuze|Guattari elevates the differences and multiplicity immanent to the event over concepts of unity and reconciliation, and focuses on the role of materiality and its self-organizing properties. The present study links up with this approach in that it aims to analyze the role of material self-organization in the concept of the Body|Politic. In their political manifesto Multitude, Hardt|Negri formulate the need “to write an anti-De Corpore that runs counter to all the modern treatises of the political body and grasps this new relationship between commonality and singularity in the flesh of the multitude. Once again, Spinoza is the one who most clearly anticipates this monstrous nature of the multitude . . . we can recognize these monstrous metamorphoses of the flesh not only as a danger but also as a possibility, the possibility to create an alternative society” (194).

In its analysis of alternative and immanent networks of alliances and social organization that run counter to the ‘traditional’ and ‘transcendent’ Body|Politic, this book wants to play a modest part in such a rewriting—by starting not from the Body|Politic’s unity, but from its multiplicity. Since every identity [body|politic] is a reduction|abstraction from an underlying multiplicity, a merely temporal and experimental identity based on difference, as one possible actualization of the virtual field of possibilities, these segmented identities always carry within them lines of flight, the possibilities of different actualizations and modes of composition of the underlying virtuality. In folding metaphysics into physics, the body politic into the physical body [and vice versa], my readings [with Deleuze|Guattari, Serres, and others] attempt to conceptualize the Body|Politic as a coupling of psychic and physical machines, of culture and representation with material production and self-organization, and to do so in terms of art, philosophy, and science, in the transdisciplinary mode outlined above: to show instances inof the American Body|Politic of an alternative to outside control and regulation. Such a Deleuzian Body|Politic is neither organic nor mechanistic, neither a fixed and bounded natural organism nor a carefully engineered apparatus—it is a practice, not an arrangement of identities, of self-enclosed elements, wrought into a fixed pattern. If there is a unity, it is not uniformity but an exploration of multiplicity, an experiment in diversity. The Body|Politic is not an island, isolated and with fixed boundaries, but an actualization of a virtual field; not a predicted and predictable interaction of particular [discrete and compartmentalized] identities, but a machinic aggregation—an experiment. Deleuze observes: “We do not even know of what a body is capable, says Spinoza” (Expressionism 226), and “politics is active experimentation since we do not know in advance which way a line is going to turn” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 137).
The Puritans who came to the New World were steeped in Renaissance thought. Almost all of the New England Puritans’ education, their “intellectual life, scientific knowledge, morality, manners and customs, notions and prejudices, was that of all Englishmen” (P. Miller and Johnson 1:7). Indeed, as Howard Mumford Jones has argued, “seventeenth century New England writing . . . began in the Renaissance, but it did not linger there” (107). Thus, it would be a mistake to think that “the real history of America is the history of the spread on the continent of Anglo-Saxon habits and Anglo-Saxon ideals” (Ziff xi). Furthermore, scholars disagree about whether New England Puritanism and its intellectual tradition had a significant impact on American life and letters. In the revisionist strand of American studies, New England and the Puritans have been denied this pivotal position in the creation of a genuinely American culture, refuting the positions of Perry Miller and Sacvan Bercovitch. While criticism of the one-sided focus of early American studies is indisputably justified [this focus in itself—at least partly—being an attempt of nineteenth-century historians to provide a point of origin for the new nation], I would nevertheless argue that American Puritanism must be regarded as an important factor, not as a homogeneous movement and a unidirectional influence, but as a network of different movements and tensions within early American society, and as such deserving of attention and analysis. I have decided to mainly focus on the writings of the Puritans of John Winthrop’s Massachusetts Bay Colony, since these documents have the advantage of providing the rhetoric of a rich discursive, as well as communal, ‘body.’

I do not want to go into a detailed discussion of the Puritan movement in England and the reasons that led to the Puritans’ leaving their mother country. It should suffice to stress that the Puritans’ exodus to America can be read as a consequence of what Hardt|Negri have termed the crisis inherent in [the beginning of] modernity. The revolutions around the time of the early Renaissance were grounded in a denial of transcendence and a focus on the
needs and powers of this world. This emergent radical revolutionary process of deterritorialization, however, with its tendency toward democracy, also brought with it the force of reterritorialization, a force attempting to contain and control these emerging dynamics: “It arose within the Renaissance revolution to divert its direction, transplant the new image of humanity to a transcendent plane . . . , and above all oppose the reappropriation of power on the part of the multitude. The second mode of modernity poses a transcendent constituted power against an immanent constituent power, order against desire” (Empire 74). This ‘quasi-return’ to an almost feudal structure, which closed off the space in Europe for the revolutionary movements of the multitude, led to the Puritans’ “nomadism and exodus, carrying with them the desire and hope of an irrepressible experience” (76). The Puritans who came to America, then, were positioned between the two modes of state centralization [in its ‘monarchic’ aspect, with its strategies of control and administration] on the one hand, and religious reformation [with its focus on the question of salvation] on the other hand. Foucault has argued that it is at this very intersection, at this very historical junction in which the Puritans were placed, that “the problem comes to pose itself with this peculiar intensity, of how to be ruled, how strictly, by whom, to what end, by what methods, and so on. There is a problematic of government in general” (“Governmentality,” Power 202). And it was this problematic that is placed at the core of the Puritan ‘civil and ecclesiastical’ Body|Politic.

In 1620, William Bradford and the Pilgrim separatists signed the Mayflower Compact, in which they stated: “We . . . Having undertaken for the Glory of God and advancement of the Christian Faith and Honour of our King and Country, a Voyage to plant the first Colony in the Northern Parts of Virginia, do by these presents solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and one of another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a Civil Body Politic, for our better ordering and preservation” (Bradford 83–84). The Puritans imported to the New World a metaphor that had a long history and tradition, yet they also modified it in a highly significant way. The fiction of the king’s two bodies had justified the king’s power as inaugurated by God, had supported the hierarchical structure of state and society as unalterable. It was “more than a device of rhetoric; it [was] a statement of truth, of a correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm which reveals an identical condition in both” (Hale 12); it had been, strictly speaking, no metaphor at all, but a ‘natural fact.’ As Foucault puts it, “in a society like that of the seventeenth century, the King’s body wasn’t a metaphor, but a political reality. Its physical presence was necessary for the functioning of the monarchy” (“Body/Power,” Power/Knowledge 55). The Puritans transferred this corporeal analogy to the American continent, and in the very
process literally translated the symbolic civil Body|Politic of Bradford and Winthrop. Here, the corporeal metaphor, applied in the formation of a new society, signifies both the autonomous political force as situated in the communal body [without the monarchic head] as well as the necessity of that very communal body to be yoked together—unity here is a cause more than an effect to be achieved. In their covenant theology and its social counterpart, the contract—Bradford’s “we . . . combine ourselves”—the American Puritans anticipated a model offered later by Hobbes.

Ten years after the Mayflower Compact, in his sermon “A Modell of Christian Charity,” Winthrop described in more detail how this combining into the civil Body|Politic should be achieved. In 1630, as the Arbella rode at anchor in Massachusetts Bay, he put forth the ideological basis for the Massachusetts Bay Colony, of which he was to be governor for the next twelve years. The central metaphor is that of a community of believers unified in the body of Jesus Christ, of which they are the members. In true Puritan fashion, Winthrop bases his argument on the Bible, his sermon being a long meditation on Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians. Since this letter provides Winthrop with a reading of the corporeal metaphor with respect to the Body|Politic’s order and hierarchy, the Massachusetts Bay settlement can be regarded as being grounded in Pauline dogma. Verses 12–27 of chapter 12 of the letter constitute a pivotal text for Winthrop’s idea of a community and deserve to be quoted in full:

For as the body is one, and hath many members and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit. For the body is not one member, but many. If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? And if the ear shall say, Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole were hearing, where were the smelling? But now hath God set the members every one of them in the body, as it hath pleased him. And if they were all one member, where were the body? But now are they many members, yet but one body. And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you. Nay, much more those members of the body, which seem to be more feeble, are necessary: and those members of the body, which we think to be less honorable, upon these we bestow more abundant honor; and our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness. For our comely parts have no need: but God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honor to that part which lacked: that there should
be no schism in the body; but *that* the members should have the same care one for another. And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honored, all the members rejoice with it. Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular.

In contrast to the concept of the king’s two bodies, which saw the BodyPolitic not so much as consisting of a multitude of citizens but as composed of the functional aspects of the governing ‘head,’ I argue that this Pauline view of the body, as adapted and revised by the Puritans, not only presents a much more structured and differentiated model of the BodyPolitic, but also transfers its cohesive force to the actual members of the body: the head is not a separate, controlling organ, but its function is incorporated in the body of the peoplecommunity. No longer functioning as a microcosm of the feudal state, this view of the body marks the emergence of a radically different concept of the BodyPolitic, in which the law establishes principles of social organization not by a royal or divine bloodline, but by a contract that owes more to strategies of mercantilist exchange than to monarchical structures of government. The traditional, medieval hierarchy was replaced by a model that highlighted the relationship between equal members, as well as their bond with God.

From this perspective, the Puritan BodyPolitic is more of an additive, heterogeneous, and composite body than the homogeneous totality envisioned in the king’s two bodies. In fact, by leaving the mother country, the Puritans were practically out of reach of the monarchic head and of the hierarchical structure of the English church. The ‘real’ head of their BodyPolitic was God—an invisible head, though no less real in his effects. Yet, as an invisible head, God worked his ‘cohesive power’ through the members of the body, by means of their love and obedience. In the early American communities, people joined together, electing political and spiritual leaders. Churches were organized into congregations. The ministers preached and interpreted the Bible, looking for signs of damnation or salvation, yet the laws of the congregation were mainly defined by self-discipline—ministerial control, imposing order on the community, was a foreign concept at least in the early years of the New England settlements. Thus, in the New England communal structure, some of the revolutionary spirit and the radical egalitarian principles of the English Levellers were brought over to America, where the early colonists gave life to these ideas. When New England writers referred to the traditional figure of the BodyPolitic, with the head on top, they did so not in order to evoke a familiar image, but to convey a different message with it. For example, Nathaniel Ward wrote in his satire *The Simple Cobler of Aggawam in America*: “Equity is as due to People, as Eminency to Princes:
Liberty to Subjects, as Royalty to Kings: If they cannot walk together lovingly hand in hand, *paripassu*, they must . . . part as good friends . . . ; the head and body must move alike: . . . *The body beares the head, the head the crown; If both beare not alike, then one will down*” (45). Despite its ultimately conservative stance on questions of religion and politics, Ward’s book almost reverses the figure of the traditional Body|Politic, or at least claims a mutual dependence quite different from the top-down hierarchic relation.

Thomas Lechford, an English Puritan and a resident in Boston from 1638 to 1641, accused the colonists of denying the divine right of a “hereditary, successive, *King, the son of Nobles*” (140) to appoint magistrates and ministers. Rather, the laymen had established themselves as equals to the ministers, and magistrates were appointed by popular election. Lechford was shocked at the form of “independent government of every congregational Church ruling it selfe, which introduceth not only one absolute Bishop in every Parish, but in effect so many men, so many Bishops, according to New-Englands rule, which in England would be Anarchie & confusion . . . for if all are Rulers, who shall be ruled?” (5). Lechford’s last question focuses on the very possibility of ‘state-constitution,’ for, according to Deleuze|Guattari, “the State is what makes the distinction between governors and governed possible” (*Thousand Plateaus* 359). The New England Congregational system, then, is a system of ‘alliances,’ organized more as what Deleuze|Guattari famously call a nomadic war machine—a decentralized aggregate that is more like a pack than a family—than as a state apparatus. Cut loose from the motherland, the New England Puritans share “the local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities . . . it is in bands that a religious formation begins to operate” (360). Consciously resisting every merely worldly authority [at least in principle], the Puritans saw their various churches iterating the Pauline model on which every singular church was built—although, as the clergyman John Davenport stated, “particular Churches be distinct and severall Independent bodies, every one as a city compact within itself, without subordination under, or dependence upon any other but Jesus Christ” (40). Conflating ecclesiastical [church] and civil [city] political bodies, Davenport’s prescription also reveals the dual nature of a constitution situated between the gravitational forces of both self-organization and imposed order. On the one hand, Davenport stresses independence; on the other hand, he comments that all “Churches [are] to walk one by one and the same rule, and by all means convenient, to have the counsell and help of one another, when need requireth, as members of one body, in the common faith under Christ their only Head” (ibid.).

Lechford, reporting back to the mother country, where “multitudes are corrupted with an opinion of the unlawfulness of the Church-government
by Diocesan Bishops” (3), sees the New England way as a challenge to mon-
archy, and he is eager to stress that this kind of popular government will 
eventually lead to fatal results: “In time their Churches will be more cor-
ruped then now they are . . . How can one deny this to be Anarchie and 
confusion?” (6). Drawing from experience, he concludes that “there is no 
such government for English men, or any Nation; as Monarchy; nor for 
Christians, as by a lawfull Ministerie, under godly Diocesan Bishops, deduc-
ing their station and calling from Christ and his Apostles, in descent or suc-
cession” (144). Popular election, in contrast, is unlawful, since even “the 
great body, heart and hands, and feete” (140) belong to the king, “but espe-
cially the Head” (140). Yet, on the basis of the Bay Colony Charter of 1629, 
the Massachusetts Bay Colony tried to establish a basically self-governed 
commonwealth.

Winthrop’s “A Modell of Christian Charity” starts with the fact of the 
various members’ social differences, which he justifies by referring to their 
necessity in God’s Plan: “God almighty in his most holy and wise provi-
dence, hath soe disposed of the condition of mankind, as in all times some 
must be rich, some poore, some high and eminent in power and dignitie; 
others mean and in submission” (33). This, Winthrop argues, is a condition 
in line with the whole of God’s creation; it parallels the “variety and differ-
ence of the creatures, and the glory of his power in ordering all these dif-
ferences for the preservation and good of the whole” (ibid.) on the smaller 
scale of the community. The reason for these [social] differences is that 
“every man might have need of others” (34)—thus, differences are the pre-
requisite of social cohesion, and fragmentation is the cause for striving for 
unity. The fact of differences, according to Winthrop, institutes a process of 
the Body|Politic’s self-ordering: such a divinely planned system “moderat[es] 
and restrain[s] them [the members of the community]: soo that the riche 
and mighty should not eate upp the poore nor the poore and dispised rise upp 
against and shake off theire yoake . . . In the regenerate, in exerciseing his 
graces in them, as in the grate ones, theire love, mercy, gentleness, temper-
ance &c., in the poore and inferior sorte, theire faithe, patience, obedience 
&c.” (ibid.). Revolution, as well as oppression, is ultimately a futile action 
in such a community, as Winthrop draws a conclusion supported by the 
Bible—“1 Cor. 12:26. If one member suffers, all suffer with it, if one be in 
honor, all rejoyce with it” (40). Rebellion would be close to self-mutilation. 
Thus, one significant revision of the traditional Body|Politic was that in the 
Puritan civil Body|Politic, the popular body—the people—was seen not as a 
chaotic mass, grotesque, or, as Foucault puts it, “a mass among which it was 
useless to differentiate” (Discipline and Punish 198), the very unreasonable 
body over which the head had to rule, and which in fact desperately needs
the head in order to survive. Instead it was seen as a body structured in itself, consisting of other bodies not dependent on the head only, but also on mutual obligations. Thus, what this system of differences ultimately instigates [and on which it in fact relies—otherwise the social body would break apart at these predetermined rupture joints] is love, so that, because of mutual dependence, “they might be all knit more nearly together in the Bonds of brotherly affection” (Modell 34). Love, in turn, is supported by the underlying imaginary dimension of identification based on likeness, “for the ground of loue is an apprehension of some resemblance in the things loused to that which affects it. This is the cause why the Lord loues the creature, soe farre as it hathe any of his Image in it; he loues his elect because they are like himselfe, he beholds them in his beloved sonne. So a mother loues her childe, because shee throughly conceives a resemblance of herselfe in it” (42). This passage points to the idea that, before Adam’s fall, God created man in His own image. After the fall, in man’s state of sin and corruption, it is no longer correct to speak of him as mirroring God, but the more man shows the signs of grace and salvation conferred on him—it is the elect who are already saved—the more he reclaims this original image.

The love between fellow men, or between husband and wife, is ultimately based on the model of Christ’s love, and it is this love that makes a whole and unified body—“Love is a bond of perfection . . . it makes the worke perfect” (40)—and this holds true for both the communal and the individual body. Like the civil Body|Politic that is knit together by brotherly affection and faith in and obedience to God’s word, the love of and for Christ provides the believer with the “best proportioned body in the world” (ibid.), taking the perfect body of Christ as example and paradigm. It is Christ’s love as “ligament” that connects the parts of both the communal and individual body, since “there is noe body but consists of partes and that which knitts these partes together, gives the body its perfection” (ibid.). The term ligament is of special significance here. On the one hand—in its anatomical sense—it refers to the sinews and the connective tissue that give cohesion to a body; that hold the body, its muscles and bones, together; that keep the joints stable. Less than a century before Winthrop’s sermon, Andreas Vesalius, the great Renaissance anatomist, had first revealed the importance of the ligaments, showing that the muscles were in fact composed of flesh and connective tissue, so that the body kept itself cohesive by this very substance, which made action possible. On the other hand, the term ligament also has a legal and symbolic sense and refers to the law that regulates and constitutes a social body. Sir John Fortescue, a Renaissance lawyer who had been fighting for the abolition of the categories of free and unfree, aiming for a new legal status of the subject that would eventually lead to the mod-
ern notion of citizenship, stated that the “law, by which a group of men is made into a people, resembles the nerves and sinews of a physical body, for just as the physical body is held together by the nerves and sinews, so this mystic body [of people] is bound together and united into one by the law, which is derived from the word ‘ligando’” (30). Thus, Perry Miller’s observation of the abundance of “highly legalistic formulations” (Jonathan Edwards 30) in seventeenth-century Puritan texts is concise but has to be read in various registers. In Winthrop’s plan for the Massachusetts Bay Colony, then, the ligament is the point where anatomy, love, contract, and law—as well as the real, imaginary, and symbolic bodies—intersect, resulting in a conflation of the corporeal and the corporate. The body of the community is ultimately envisioned as a rhizomatic, growing, and changeable body, self-organized by productive relations, given direction and tentative metastability by divine laws, yet still being not closed and static, but an open and dynamic hyperorganism, and capable of producing what Deleuze|Guattari would call “emergence-effects.” On the other hand, the very corporeal and organic metaphoricity also points toward the direction of overcoding and subordinating the potential multiplicity into one body. The Body|Politic of the Massachusetts Bay Colony consists of a complex interplay of both heterarchical|democratic and hierarchical|totalitarian tendencies.

Winthrop’s sermon reads like a manual for an aspiring community, and it almost exactly calls upon those forces and strategies that Freud—nearly three centuries later—would analyze in “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.” Freud here describes the “formula for the libidinal constitution of groups” (147), which parallels the formulas that Winthrop prescribes. Commenting on Gustave Le Bon’s study La psychologie des foules as well as other studies of group formation, Freud sees the tendency of these works to explain how “the members of a random crowd of people can constitute something like a group” resulting not only from the fact that the individuals forming a group “must have something in common with one another, a common interest in an object” (112), but also from what Le Bon terms “magnetic influence” (quoted in 102)—comparable to the force of suggestion employed by a hypnotizer. Simultaneously criticizing Le Bon’s omission of an analysis of the very nature of the “bond” (99) that holds the group together and “protesting against the view that suggestion, which explained everything, was itself to be exempt from explanation” (117–18), Freud attempts to employ the concept of libido in his explanation of the cohesive force present in group formation, noting that libido is “a concept which has done us such good service in the study of psychoneuroses” (119). He draws a close connection between individual psychology and the constitution of the Massenseele, a complicity that is nonetheless far from being a simple and
straightforward relation of cause and effect. Though Freud attempts to use
his analysis of the unconscious forces of the individual to explain aspects of
the mental life of groups, systematically arguing that group life arises from
these individual and unconscious forces, he also states that the opposite is
true: there is no way to understand the unconscious of the individual with-
out taking into account the mental life of the group to which he or she be-
longs: “The psychology of groups is the oldest human psychology; what we
have isolated as individual human psychology, by neglecting all traces of the
group, has only since come into prominence out of the old group psychology,
by a process which may still, perhaps, be described as incomplete” (155).
Ultimately, however, Freud concedes that both individual and group psy-
chology must have come into existence simultaneously, both “that of the
individual members of the group and that of the father, chief, or leader. The
members of the group were subject to ties just as we see them to-day, but
the father of the primal horde was free” (155–56). The relations of part and
whole, the various libidinous ties among the members of the horde as well
as to their “father, chief, or leader” now become the focal point of Freud’s
analysis of the cohesive forces at work within the group. He points out a
“double kind of tie” (162) operating in the libidinal structure of the group.
Similarly, Winthrop had stressed the fact that there are “two rules” directing
the communal interrelationship, “a double Law by which wee are regulated
in our conversation towards another” (“Modell” 34). Winthrop identifies
those two ties as “the lawe of nature and the lawe of grace,” or “the morall
lawe [and] the lawe of the gospell” or “mercy” respectively (ibid.). Reading
these two laws within the framework provided by the dual meaning of Win-
throp’s significant view of love as ligament, the moral law|law of nature
corresponds to the love among the members of the community [Winthrop
equates this law with the law that commands man “to love his neighbour
as himself . . . given to man in the estate of innocency” (34–35)], whereas
the second law [the law after the fall of Adam] introduces differences and
rules into this all-encompassing notion of love; it is more a law in the strictly
legal sense, a call for obedience and obligation. Thus, Winthrop proceeds by
giving exact rules to be followed according to the law of mercy. In Freud’s
text, this “double kind of tie” is analyzed according to the libidinal forces
at work. Following the various texts he discusses, Freud is quite free in his
use of the term group, referring to “very fleeting groups and extremely last-
ing ones; homogeneous ones, made up of the same sorts of individuals, and
unhomogeneous ones; natural groups, and artificial ones, requiring an ex-
ternal force to keep them together; primitive groups, and highly organized
ones with a definite structure” (“Group Psychology” 122)—ranging from
“groups of a short lived character” to “stable groups” (111). These various
modes and stages of organization are read into the kinds and forces of the libidinal connection operative in group formation.

The New England ‘primal hordes’ of Bradford and Winthrop, I argue, were positioned at a nodal point in between these two different group formations. On the social level, they were not a homogeneous group, as Winthrop’s sermon made unmistakably clear by referring to the differences between rich and poor; yet, on another level, they belonged to a structure that Freud uses as a paradigmatic example of an artificial group: the church. Winthrop points to this nodal position when he states that the Mayflower party set out, in “mutuall consent, through a speciall overvaluing providence and a more than an ordinary approbation of the Churches of Christ, to seeke out a place of cohabitation and Consorteshipp under a due forme of Government both ciuill and ecclesiasticall” (“Modell” 45). According to Freud, like the army, the church belongs to a group with a leader [n + 1], and he mentions the “possibility of a leading idea being substituted for a leader” (“Group Psychology” 124) and refers to the church and religious groups in general, noting that they, “with their invisible head, form a transitional stage” (129). Yet the “morphology of groups” (ibid.), however high its level of abstraction, is characterized by the two-fold libidinal ties providing its internal cohesion. First of all, there is a leader “who loves all the individuals in the group with equal love” (123). The love between the group members is the second feature in Freud’s “double kind of tie.” In artificial, highly organized groups such as the church [or the army], “each individual is bound by libidinal ties on the one hand to the leader (Christ, the Commander-in-Chief) and on the other hand to the other members of the group” (124–25). Thus, a “democratic strain runs through the Church, for the very reason that before Christ everyone is equal” (123). Accordingly, the members of the Church “call themselves brothers in Christ, that is, brothers through the love which Christ has for them.” For Freud, an atheist, this love of Christ is an “illusion” (ibid.). Winthrop, on the other hand, takes pains to stress that the love between the members of the community [which is modeled on the love of Christ] is “a real thing, not imaginarie . . . This love is as absolutely necessary to the being of the body of Christ, as the sinews and other ligaments of a naturall body are to the being of that body” (“Modell” 44).

Freud goes on to observe that in group formation, concerning self-love or narcissism, with its concomitant aggressiveness against others, “the whole of this intolerance vanishes, temporarily or permanently” (“Group Psychology” 131). Despite Schopenhauer’s analogy of the freezing porcupines, according to which too close a proximity to others is something to be dreaded, individuals in groups behave as if they were one. Narcissism, Freud
observes, “knows only one barrier—love for others, love for objects” (132). These limitations to self-love are not operative outside the group of which one is a member; thus Freud takes it as evidence that “the essence of group formation consists in new kinds of libidinal ties among the members of the group.” Yet these libidinal ties cannot be of a sexual nature; they belong to a different set of emotional relations, to the class of what Freud terms “identifications” (ibid.). Ultimately, the “formula for the libidinal constitution of groups” (147)—at least of such groups “that have a leader and have not been able by means of too much ‘organization’ to acquire secondarily the characteristics of an individual”—is as follows: “A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego” (ibid.). Winthrop’s love of Christ and among the members of the group is the libidinal ligament providing cohesiveness for the Puritan community. Such an introjection promises to stabilize the individual, and in fact ultimately constitutes it as a desiring subject. As Lacan puts it: “The object takes the place . . . of what the subject is—symbolically—deprived of” (“Desire” 15).

As both a specular and a symbolic identification, it would be more apt to say that it is not only the ego ideal, but also the ideal ego that is at stake here, a primarily intrasubjective conception of an ideal of narcissistic [and imaginary] omnipotence. Although Freud does not always explicitly distinguish the terms ideal ego and ego ideal, he uses them in a variety of contexts. In contrast to the ideal ego, Freud identifies the ego ideal as [or at least as a modality of] the super-ego [Über-Ich]. It denotes an ideal model to which the subject strives to adjust itself qua symbolic identification. Thus, the term identification itself requires a closer analysis. With regard to the Oedipus complex, Freud writes that identification is first of all “the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person . . . A little boy will exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him, and take his place everywhere” (“Group Psychology” 134). Yet at the same time, in addition to this early idealization of identification with the father, the little boy also forms a libidinal tie with his mother. The little boy “exhibits . . . two psychologically distinct ties: a straightforward sexual object-cathexis towards his mother and an identification with his father which takes him as his model” (147). In yet another step, seeing his father as a rival, the subject’s “identification with his father then takes on a hostile colouring and becomes identical with the wish to replace his father in regard to his mother as well” (ibid.). In addition to the fact that, as Freud has noted, the former type of identification is friendly, while the latter is aggressive, this latter type is ultimately of a completely different kind than the former, in-
volving the awareness of the male child that he is not the father. Identification proper, then, the realm of the \textit{ideal ego}, is a speculative, imaginary process. The latter type of identification, which is more closely related to the \textit{ego ideal}, is more like a kind of future promise \textit{and} a prohibition, situated at the nodal point where the imaginary folds into the symbolic. Speculative identification—as an omnipotent fantasy of already being what one hopefully will aspire to [the dialectics of the mirror stage]—is replaced by a symbolic contract that creates the difference of subject and object in the first place as a set of differences. Because of the \textit{ego ideal}'s complicity with the \textit{super-ego} [the law of the father], the function of the father here is necessary twofold: it both represents the no \textit{[nom]} of paternal authority and interdiction, and the subject's ideal figure of identification, the name \textit{[nom]} that it adopts and that introduces it into the symbolic.

Likewise, Winthrop’s Body|Politic is inextricably related to a contract, a political, legal and religious symbolic register operating via a third agent: the \textit{ego ideal}, Christ, or God the father. The community—and each individual—is “written into existence” (Bercovitch, “Model”) by the paternal law, instigated by God. According to Lacan, each body—individual and communal—is subjected to this law of the signifier from the beginning: “The Law is there \textit{ab origine}” (Seminar III 83). The name of the father gives coherence and unity to bodies both social and real, a name that is also a no to disorder and dissent, hence a yes to order and authority. In the Puritans’ religious version of the Oedipus complex, the subject accepts the name and law of God. The consequences of that acceptance for the individual and communal subject can best be described by referring to Lacan’s notions of the law and the symbolic register. Submission to the law of the signifier [and the name of the father is the preeminent signifier] is the prerequisite for the coming-into-being of the subject: “The subject is born in so far as the signifier emerges in the field of the Other. But, by this very fact, this subject—which, was previously nothing if not a subject coming into being—solidifies into a signifier” (\textit{Four Fundamental Concepts} 199), so that the subject is inscribed into a system of differences, of sexual, social, and other binaries. The intrusion of the signifier separates once and for all an original, natural ‘state of innocence’ [being] from ‘culture’ [meaning]. In fact, it is the paradoxical notion of an ‘originary signifier’ that necessarily takes the position of ‘origin.’ As a consequence, this “signifier ‘One’ is not just any old signifier. It is the signifying order” (Seminar XX 143)—the structure of language as such. Taking one signifier out of a “swarm” (ibid.) of signifiers as a representative of truth, the subject’s \textit{ego ideal} is formed by an identificatory process. This representative of truth has to be identified with the symbolic father, because it is “in the \textit{name of the father} [i.e., the symbolic father] that we must recognize the
support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history, has identified his person with the figure of the law” (Écrits 67, emphasis in the original). In Lacanian terminology, the name of the father, the unary signifier $S^1$ and the phallus are different registers of one and the same function. The law that the father is seen to represent is the law of the signifier. The name that the child learns to speak properly and to take as his own through the negotiation of the Oedipal conflicts is precisely this name of the father. This cultural significance of paternity has nothing to do with biological origins. It is the child’s acceptance of a particular signifier that confers upon him an identity, and this identity is essentially a “function of symbolic identification” (ibid.). The name of the father places the subject in a relation to other subjects—the symbolic thus being a bond connecting each subject to the father and the members of the family, as well society as a whole, with the imaginary aspect of mutual love always underlying the connections.

The Puritan civil Body|Politic—as a combined body—does not start from some quasinatural unity, though it has to be admitted that this very unity is nevertheless something to be achieved, to be fought for. By using the analogy of the human body ‘made whole’ by its inscription into a contract, a network of rules and regulations, the Puritans’ attempt can be read as following the vicissitudes of the ‘real body’ and its entry into the symbolic as outlined by Lacan. According to Lacan, as a consequence of the fact that the real is what cannot be represented [what is imaginary or symbolic] the real ‘provides’ signifiers that structure human relations. The real body is “first of all that which can carry the mark, suitable to inscribe it into a chain of signifiers” (“Radiophonie” 61). The symbolic is a structure that “carves up [the] body, a structure that has nothing to do with anatomy” (“Television” 6), but with an imaginary anatomy Lacan mentioned with respect to hysterics. Commenting on hysterical symptoms, Lacan shows that they are structured according to “a certain imaginary Anatomy which has typical forms of its own . . . I would emphasize that the imaginary anatomy referred to here varies with the ideas (clear or confused) about bodily functions which are prevalent in a given culture” (“Some Reflections” 13). Thus, the “imaginary anatomy” is first of all an image of the meaning that the body has for the subject, a meaning that is regulated by the subject’s social world or culture—in Lacanian terms, the symbolic order that subsumes both individual and collective phantasms of the body. The body is the “hysterical nucleus of the neurosis in which the hysterical symptom reveals the structure of a language, and is deciphered like an inscription” (Écrits 50). In a curious temporal reversion, then, for the speaking subject, the symbolic body produces the real body: “The first body produces the second one, by incorporating itself in it” (“Radiophonie” 61). The symbolic, the name of the father, “corpsifie[s]”
(ibid.) the real body—that is, it castrates the real body, but by the very fact of this dismemberment projects a symbolic identity on it. When the Puritan community found that it could not depend only on an exegesis of God’s commandments but needed a more detailed set of rules, the Massachusetts government created the Body of Liberties, a ‘second skin,’ the adherence to which safeguarded the functioning of the Body Politic. The Body of Liberties was still inextricably tied to God’s laws and the accorded places of the individual bodies within the community’s structure, as outlined in Winthrop’s “A Modell of Christian Charity.” In that sermon, moreover, the body is rendered perfect only within Christ’s love—that is, in the desire of the Other—and by answering his demands, obeying his word. The set of necessary [social] differences that, according to Winthrop, both require and can be regulated by love also points to the paradox of the symbolic. Before [the cohesive force of] the law, the body consisted of disparate bodies, part objects, body parts; yet, the law itself, although creating a unity-effect, creates fragmentation and differences within that body in the first place. With regard to the individual body, it is precisely language—not any biological given—that isolates the distinct parts of the body.

The body of the believer is a hysterical body in the Lacanian sense. It also has to be read as a signified body, because of the operation that “places in the position of a signifier . . . [the] body itself” (Écrits 301). The typical question of the hysteric—What does the Other want from me?—ultimately is the basic component of [symbolic] subjectivity. Hysteria is a matter of existential questioning, and both the questions and their answers write themselves onto the body in hysterical symptoms. For the Puritans, as much in Winthrop’s own time as in the century to follow, there was, as Jonathan Edwards put it, “no question whatsoever, that is of greater importance to mankind, and that it more concerns every individual person to be well resolved in, than this, what are the distinguishing qualifications of those that are in favor with God, and entitled to his eternal rewards? . . . and wherein do lie the distinguishing notes of that virtue and holiness, that is acceptable in the sight of God?” (Religious Affections 84)—the ultimate question being: Can my body provide me with an unambiguous answer? According to Edwards, the fact “that religious affections are very great, or raised very high” (127) is no sign, nor is the fact “that they have great effects on the body” (131). Yet because of the union of body and soul, “there never is in any case whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or inclination of the soul, without some effect upon the body” (98). However, due to “the same laws of the union of the soul and body, the constitution of the body, and the motion of its fluids, may promote the exercise of the affections.” Equating mind and soul as concepts contrary to the body proper,
Edwards claims that it is “not the body, but the mind only, that is the proper seat of the affections. The body of man is no more capable of being really the subject of love or hatred, joy or sorrow, fear or hope, than the body of a tree, or than the same body of man is capable of thinking and understanding. As it is the soul only that has ideas, so it is the soul only that is pleased or displeased with its ideas. As it is the soul only that thinks, so it is the soul only that loves or hates, rejoices or is grieved at what it thinks of.” As a consequence, “an unbodied spirit may be as capable of love and hatred, joy or sorrow, hope or fear, or other affections, as one that is united to a body,” just as an unspirited body would be incapable of such affections. Like the unbodied spirit, however, a spirited body—a body animated with Christ’s love—can provide answers: the body, despite all its baseness, was the primary site of knowledge for the Puritans, who were extremely concerned with interpreting the meaning of individuals’ bodies within their community. In addition, ‘experience’ is ultimately inscribed in the intersubjective realm of communication, on the covenant between God and his believers. Thus, the capacity of the body to mean, to literally embody experience, depends on the body’s representational status, on its function as a blank page.

In the best-case scenario, then, the Puritan’s body was a “Mystic Writing Pad” for—in Edwards’s words—“divine things” (240), a material analogue to spiritual facts, the inscriptive surface for signs of grace. The body bears the marks of the Puritan symbolic, and it was God the father who—as the ultimate subject-supposed-to-know—was to provide the answers to these burning questions. This is a paradigmatic example of Lacan’s thesis that the Discourse of the Hysteric produces the Discourse of the Master, which in the case of religion consists of the codification of God’s will into God’s law. It comes as no surprise that Winthrop held that “liberty is maintained & exercised in a waye of subjection to Authoritye” (Journal 588). To a modern reader, the use of the word liberty in a context that seems to suggest more the repressive aspects of the law might seem cynical or at least surprising, yet in the seventeenth century, as the Puritans themselves had experienced, the liberty—for example—to do good according to their religious principles could be suppressed by an evil civil [and even religious, in the case of Archbishop Laud] power. For the Puritans, then, to worship in their own manner was a privilege to be wrestled from sinful authorities, and to be secured and safeguarded by their own government. Thus, a ‘benign’ and ‘good’ authority—religious, clerical and political—was not to be questioned. In fact this answers the pressing questions of the Puritan hysteric and shows the right way into liberty which, as liberty from the bondage of sin, is to be understood as the free will for submission to his kingdom comewith all the gendered implications of this phrase included: “The womans owne
choise makes such a man her husband, yet beinge so chosen he is her Lord” (ibid.).

It is the acceptance of obedience to the name of the father and the inscription in his desire that renders both the communal and individual body whole, “without spott or wrinkle” (Winthrop, “Modell” 40), modeled on the perfect body of Christ. The examples of the Puritan Body Politic presented so far all focus on the image of the ‘whole’ body: the correspondences between the political body and the physical body depend on the condition of bodily integrity, corporeal unity, the smooth functioning of the members in their respective places, situated within a precisely framed whole. Each member is only a part of the whole body, and therefore less than the whole, but the whole can exist only as the totality of its members. The image of the ideal state parallels an equally idealized image of the human body. With reference to Barthes, the underlying body-phantasm here is one of homogeneous wholeness, with a discrete inside and outside, and without deformities, disabilities, or missing parts. Within the economy of the body as a whole, it is the human face that occupies a particular prominent place—the face has the power to overcode the whole body. It is in fact the face that makes the head seem separate from the body, as an independent—and controlling—agent, apt to figure prominently in the metaphor of the Body Politic. According to Deleuze-Guattari, “the face is Christ . . . Jesus Christ Superstar: he invented the facialization of the entire body and transmitted it everywhere” (Thousand Plateaus 176). In his notebook, John Saffin, a Boston merchant and—like Winthrop—a trained lawyer, wrote down a vision of Christ’s body as a model for imitation, in particular pointing out the perfection of Christ’s face:

A Man of stature some what tall and Comely, with A very Reverend Countenance such as the beholders may both Love and feare his haire of the Col-lour of a Philbird full Ripe and plaine allmost downe to his Eares from his Eares Downward somewhat Curled & more greyant of Colavour waveing about his shoulders in the middest of his head goeth a seame or partition of his haire After the maner of Nazarits his forehead very plaine and smooth, his face without Spott, or wrinkle beautified with Red. His Nose & mouth so formed as Nothing could be Reprehended . . . ; in speaking very temperate modest and wise A Man for his Singular Beauty surpassing the Children of Men. (12–13)

In a similar vein, Edward Taylor, apart from praising “His Glorious Body” in general, creates a whole blazon of Christ’s body, yet zooms in on his face, describing in detail Christ’s eyes, cheeks, lips, teeth, locks, etc. In both Saffin and Taylor, Christ’s face is the divine face which reflects God’s absolute
gaze, the word|glance made flesh. A countenance to be both loved and feared, reflecting both Christ’s modesty and wisdom [and corresponding religious values and affections such as humility, pity, and concern] it ‘subjects’ its beholders because it signifies power, knowledge, and domination, and because Christ provides a [nonetheless unattainable] model for imitation, creating a space in which the subject can ‘find itself.’

As Georg Simmel observed in “The Aesthetic Significance of the Face,” it is in the face “that the soul finds its clearest expression” (276). For Simmel, the face can be said to be overcoding the body since the face, “of all the parts of the human body, . . . has the highest degree of this kind of inner unity” that defines the organism as a whole—“the intimate relation of its parts and the involvement of the parts in the unity of the life process” (ibid.). The face not only reflects the unity and symmetry of the whole body, but also a perfect Body|Politic, “the ideal of human co-operation . . . that completely individualized elements grow into the closest unity which, though composed of these elements, transcends each of them” (277). The symmetry of the face in general—and of Christ’s perfect face in particular—perfectly embodies Winthrop’s contention that “the care of the publique must oversway all private respects, by which, not only conscience, but meare civill policy, dothe binde us. For it is a true rule that particular Estates cannot subsist in the ruin of the publique” (“Modell” 45). The face—like the whole, perfect body, as well as the Body|Politic—is successful in mirroring the soul in that it reflects “the absolute encompassment of each detail by the power of the central ego” (Simmel 277), in the Puritan case based on the mirror identification with Christ’s ideal ego. In contrast, if the overcoding power of the face loses its grip, the effect is a “centrifugal movement” which Simmel equates to a process of despiritualization, a weakening of “the perceivable domination of the mind [or central ego] over the circumference of our being,” the ultimate outcome of which for Simmel takes a form similar to Lacan’s imagos of the corps morcelé: “baroque figures, whose limbs appear to be in danger of breaking off” (Simmel 277). The face reflects the perfection, symmetry, and unity that for Simmel is a sign of the body’s pervasion by the mind or central ego.

Winthrop had invoked Christ’s body as a model of the “perfection of partes” (“Modell” 40), of a “glorious body”—and the love of and for Christ [imitatio Christi] as the way to approach perfection in oneself. In fact, the concept of perfection—or perfectibility—runs like a red thread through Puritan thinking. In its application to the well-knit Body|Politic, it provides a fitting example of Mary Douglas’s contention that, since consideration of the form of the human body always implies social and political dimensions as well, “bodily perfection can symbolize an ideal theocracy” (Purity and
Danger 4). Cotton Mather talks of the “pristine Perfection” to which men’s “Spirits and . . . their Bodies” (The Angel of Bethesda 10) should be restored. In fact, identity—at least Christian identity—does not exist without a mirroring identification with the ideal ego of Christ: for Mather, “without the Imitation of Christ, all thy Christianity as a meer Nonentity” (Christianity to the Life 17), and the imitation of Christ comes close to an imitation of the perfection and beauty of that ideal ego. Jonathan Edwards described beauty in the following terms:

All beauty consists in similarness, or identity of relation. In identity of relation consists all likeness, and all identity between two consists identity of relation. Thus, when the distance between two is exactly equal, their distance is their relation one to another, the distance is the same, the bodies are two; wherefore this is their correspondency and beauty. So bodies exactly of the same figure, the bodies are two, the relation between the parts of the extremities is the same, and this is their agreement with them. But if there are two bodies of different shapes, having no similarness of relation between the parts of the extremities; this, considered by itself, is a deformity, because it disagrees with being . . . And so in every case, what is called Correspondency, Symmetry, Regularity, and the like, may be resolved into Equalities . . . all the natural motions, and tendencies and figures of bodies in the Universe are done according to proportion, and therein is their beauty. (“The Mind” 695)

Although Edwards might be thinking here along the lines of pleasant proportions such as the golden section, his description also parallels the implicit fractality in the frontispiece to Hobbes’s Leviathan, valuing sameness and homogeneity over difference and heterogeneity.

However, a distinction has to be made between things of importance and mere trivialities, and the human body and the church share a prominent status, even in their material composition—according to Edwards, the body’s symmetrical harmony “affects the mind more than the beauty of a flower . . . And the proportions of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the same proportions in some slight compositions, made to please children” (“A Dissertation” 274). In fact, a distinctive marker “wherein those affections that are truly gracious and holy, differ from those that are false, is beautiful symmetry and proportion” (Religious Affections 365), and it is but an iteration—on a smaller, individual scale—of the symmetry of the Body|Politic: “There is a beauty of order in society, besides what consists in benevolence, or can be referred to it, which is of the secondary kind. As, when the different members of society have all their appointed office, place and station, according to their several capacities and talents, and everyone keeps his place and continues in his proper business. In this, there is a beauty,
not of a different kind from the regularity of a beautiful building, or piece of skilful architecture, where the strong pillars are set in their proper place” (“A Dissertation” 275). Ultimately, the intelligible order of society is formed from the outside, its symmetry being an effect of a planning instance, and the traditional image of society as an organism ‘naturalizes’ the harmony and control that the ‘architects’ of that society sought when they employed law and authority to ensure the orderly structuring of ‘the Many’ into ‘One.’ That closely echoes the narrative of oedipalization, of channeling the multiplicity of desires into a single, fixed, individual: “the agreement of a variety in one common design, of the parts of a building, or complicated machine, is one instance of that regularity . . . consisting in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to one general purpose” (ibid., my emphasis). Through authority and law, the regularity is upheld: “Right is secured; Injuries are suppressed; Offenders are punished; the Obedient are Rewarded; The Good Order and Peace designed is preserved, and the General Weal promoted” (Saltonstall 18). As Marcel Mauss, Norbert Elias, and in particular Michel Foucault have shown, such regulatory practices produce subjects and inscribe discipline into the very materiality of their bodies. Beyond any metaphoricity, the attempted imitation of Christ—the sinful body facing its ideal ego—and the inscription of God’s law produce a certain type of body: obedient, doing good, a body continuously watching and observing itself for signs of grace or damnation, and producing a subject in Foucault’s double sense of the word: to be “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to” (“The Subject and Power” 331).

However, as Lacan has shown in his work on the mirror stage, the celebrated image of the phallic, whole, and well-proportioned body—the embodiment of Freud’s ideal ego, the Ideal-Ich (Écrits 7, note 1)—is always concomitant with the spectral possibility of its own dismemberment; what has to be accounted for is the notion of two [however related] phantasms of the human body. For Lacan, these two body-images are tied to each other insofar as the fragmented body is created belatedly from within the symbolic and is, in fact, an effect of the identification with the ideal ego, and further, the ego ideal. The aggressivity and fear revealed in the images of fragmentation and corporeal dislocation are the “correlative tendency of a mode of identification that we call narcissistic, and which determines the formal structure of man’s ego and of the register of entities characteristic of his world” (16). On the level of the dream as well as on the level of [artistic] representation, as Lacan’s allusion to Bosch’s paintings suggest, the image
of the fragmented body symbolizes castration anxiety, the fear of fragment-
tation, as well as of loss of control. It is important to note that for Lacan,
the body-image is not merely a projection of a prior, ‘real’ body, but the
condition through which the body must be experienced in the first place.
Where, then, is the point of conjunction between imagined communities
and the imaginary anatomy of the bodily ego? The dynamic interplay between
the whole and the fragmented body can be translated into ‘political terms’
by way of Mary Douglas’s contention that the physical body symbolically
reproduces the anxieties of the social body and, I argue, vice versa. Douglas
notes: “The human body is always treated as an image of society and . . . there
can be no natural way of considering the body that does not involve at the
same time a social dimension” (Natural Symbols 70). For her, “the body is
a model that can stand for any bounded system. Its boundaries can repre-
sent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious” (Purity and Dan-
ger 116). The body-image becomes a model for narratives, individual and
communal, and is in turn also narrativized. Reading Douglas with Lacan,
however, the body as a system is inescapably and inherently fragmented, just
as the unity of the whole, communal body is both constituted and threat-
ened by the diversity of its members, the very diversity which is necessary to
form an ‘organ-ized’ body in the first place. It is only possible to resolve the
diversity in the overall scheme of wholeness, by claiming that in this meta-
phor’s “most obvious kind of unity in diversity . . . the parts of both are
found to correspond isomorphically to each other” (Fletcher 71). If the un-
derlying structure of the analogy between individual and state is an allego-
rization of the internal relations of the parts of a whole, an individual or
communal body, then the diversity of the human body, particularly when its
different organs and members parallel different aspects of the communal
body, creates a body-image always in danger of being torn apart—the ‘unity
in diversity’ is also a ‘diversity in unity’—metaphor [promise of wholeness
identity] is always already subverted by metonymy [part offor the whole].
In the traditional heuristic of the king’s two bodies, dismemberment of the
Body|Politic had been thought of primarily as a separation of the head from
the body, not so much a fragmentation of the body itself. Wholeness of the
commonwealth meant the head’s government of and control over the
body—any violence against the Body|Politic by the body of the people would
eventually result in disturbing the head’s control over that body, and had
to be prevented or, as Foucault has shown, rigorously and spectacularly re-
established. A body without a head is not likely to survive: “What state the
body can be in if the head . . . be cut off, I leave to the reader’s judgement”
(James 65). The inviolable and God-given hierarchy of the head over what
Bakhtin calls the “lower stratum,” of the king over his subjects, is the necessary condition on which the survival of both the individual body and the state depend (Bakhtin 368).

Winthrop’s sermon, by translating the fragmentation produced by the ‘cutting agency’ of the symbolic upon the real body into the imaginary anatomy of social differences [differences that are God-given and ultimately, like the ‘corpsification’ of the real body, produce a unified body], reveals the threat of fragmentation as something that might occur to the body as such—not just a separation between head and body, but something concomitant to the promise of corporeal and communal unity. By depicting the body as an organism inherently structured, rather than stressing [in theory at least] the head’s control over the body, this body in question had to be whole and healthy. In the Puritans’ rewriting of the Body|Politic, the whole must indeed be [or, at least, be pronounced to be] prior to its parts if both the body and its individual members are to survive, hence Winthrop’s insistence that “wee must be knitt together, in this worke, as one man. Wee must entertaine each other in brotherly affection. Wee must be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, for the supply of other’s necessities. Wee must uphold a familiar commerce together in all meekeness, gentlenes, patience and liberality. Wee must delight in eache other; make other’s conditions our oune; rejoice together, mourne together, labour and suffer together, allways haueving before our eyes our commission and community in the worke, as members of the same body” (“Modell” 46–47, my emphasis). This almost desperate insistence, however, nonetheless acknowledges the possibility of dismemberment. In fact, Winthrop relates this scenario to a time before the intervention of Christ’s love and ligament: “The several partes of this body considered a parte before they were united, were as disproportionate and as much disordering as soe many contrary quallities or elements” (40). This state of bodily disorder and fragmentation was undone and healed “when Christ comes, and by his spirit and loue knitts all these partes to himselfe and each to other”—bodily unity and cohesion is guaranteed only via a third agent, Christ. However, there is always the danger of backsliding, of regressing to that state of disintegration and disorganization, both on the level of the individual body—in the bodily fragmentation caused by sin—and on that of the Body|Politic. As for the members as a whole, it might always be the case that “Sin has . . . Invaded them, Marr’d the Rectitude of their Faculty’s, and subjected them to the Empire of Lust and Passion . . . And from hence (as the proper Fountain) all the Disorder & Confusion in the World takes its rise. Hence tis that the Good Order, Beauty and Tranquility of Society’s is so often defac’d and disturbed” (Bulkley 40).
The New England Puritan theocracy had to face insurgents, dissenters, and disturbers of society during its first century of existence, and it was confirmed in its view that the only alternative to strong and righteous government was chaos and anarchy, which was to be prevented by all means: “Irreligion and Profaneness, Unrighteousness, and Oppression, Disorder, and Confusion . . . invade a People, when the Rod of Dominion is broken, the Bands of Authority dissolved, and every man is his own King” (Saltonstall 7). Thus, there is good “reason to reckon Government in the prime Rank of God’s Mercies.” It is only by following God’s will and God’s law, then, and by being infused with Christ’s spirit and love, that a general bodily disorder might be prevented and that the New England community might aspire to becoming an ego ideal in itself to be identified with by “succeeding plantations” hoping “the Lord make it likely that of New England.’ For wee must consider that wee shall be as a citty upon a hill. The eies of all people are uppon us” (“Modell” 47), attempting to establish similar versions on a larger scale of their own “formula for the libidinal constitution of groups.”

The love that knits a community together proceeds into that very community by faith, by the labor in God’s name, by the desire to obey his words. In accordance with Romans 4:5—“but to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness”—the old covenant of works was supplanted by the covenant of grace. As a consequence, not good deeds but only the experience of conversion, the unconditional turn from a life of sin to repentance and a life dedicated to following God’s will could ultimately inspire an authentic relationship to God. The Reformation theology of Martin Luther started from the thesis that the necessary turn from the false righteousness of good works to a justifying faith had been dismissed by the Roman Catholic Church. Only the grace of faith could regenerate the convert and free him or her from the enslavement of sin. The concept of conversion was closely related to the notion of predestination, a doctrine originating in the teachings of John Calvin, who held that God, in his infinite mercy—despite humanity’s original depravity and sinfulness—would spare a small number of the elect from eternal damnation. These ‘saints’ would know about their salvation by a profound sense of inner assurance that they possessed God’s ‘saving grace.’ This utopian hope was at the heart of the experience of conversion, which might come upon individuals suddenly or gradually, in their earliest youth or even just moments before death. Thus, God decided before the beginning of history who would be saved or damned; this decision could not be affected by human behavior. Edwards, in his sermon “Justification by Faith
Alone,” a long commentary on Romans 4:5 that can be read as the justification for the doctrine of faith, defines faith quite differently than the simple notion of belief. Rather, faith is a disposition of “unition” with Christ. It is a sign of the relationship that exists between man and God in the flesh: “God don’t give those that believe a union with or an interest in the Savior as a reward for faith, but only because faith is the soul’s active uniting with Christ, or is itself the very act of Unition, on their part. God sees it fit, that in order to a union being established between two intelligent active beings or persons, so as that they should be looked upon as one, there should be the mutual act of both, that each should receive the other, as actively joining themselves one to another” (Discourses 16).

Yet the doctrine of faith and predestination did not make good works and a disciplined life unnecessary—in fact, these aspects of human life were strictly regulated in the Puritan community. Creating a society in accordance with God’s will and living a godly life were seen not so much as a cause, but rather as an effect of salvation: Christ “loues his elect because they are like himselfe” (“Modell” 42). Put another way, by identifying with Christ, the Lacanian ego ideal, the “ideal point . . . placed somewhere in the Other, from which the Other sees me, in the form I like to be seen” (Four Fundamental Concepts 268), the elect subjects [in order to be assured of their salvation] had to be reflected back in a likeable form: whole, pure, without taint or wrinkle. Thus, by “beholding the glory of the Lord in the glass of the Gospel”—i.e., by obeying his law and word—“wee are changed into the same Image” (R. Mather 23). The glass, as Lacan has pointed out, is also a mirror, one of a very particular kind: “Think of the mirror as a plane of glass. You’ll see yourself in the glass and you’ll see the objects beyond it. That’s exactly how it is—it’s a coincidence between certain images and the real” (Seminar I 141). The fact that the transparent glass is always already a mirror results in the paradox of a promised transparency of reflection: “The real objects, which pass via the mirror, and through it, are in the same place with the imaginary object.” What we are dealing with here is “nothing other than the images of the human body, the hominisation of the world, its perception in terms of images linked to the structuration of the body . . . The essence of the image is to be invested by the libido” (141). Christ—the ego ideal—is “the mirror in which God beholds us when he wishes to find us acceptable to himself” (Calvin, Sermons 47), the mirror|glass “wherein we must, and without self-deception may, contemplate our own election” (Calvin, Institutes part 3, chap. 24, para. 5). The glass of the mirror promises fulfillment [and salvation] exactly by making these ‘objective’ qualities seen in the Other ‘subjective,’ by throwing the gaze back onto the spectator: the “unition” proclaimed by Edwards is effected by the saints’ having “the whole
image of Christ upon them: they have ‘put off the old man, and have put on the new man’ entire in all his parts and members” (Religious Affections 365).24 With regard to the body-image reflected in the mirror, the Puritan’s hope was that it showed the “new man,” the precious pureness of Christ’s “Pearle-like” body, as Taylor puts it in a poem fittingly called “The Reflection” (Taylor 14). Much has been written about Puritan self-debasement, and how “the individual affirming his identity by turning against his powers of self-affirmation” ultimately faces the dilemma that “to affirm and to turn against are both aspects of self-involvement” (Bercovitch, Puritan Origins 20).

The Puritans followed St. Augustine, who stated that two different kinds of love are the origin of two different kinds of cities: “self-love in contempt of God unto the earthly; love of God in contempt of one’s self to the heavenly. The first seeketh the glory of man, and the latter desires God only, as the testimony of the conscience, the greatest glory” (City of God book 4, para. 28). Augustine then proceeds to relate this “self-love” to the body, or, to be more precise, to “the flesh”: “In the earthly city the wise men follow either the goods of the body or mind or both, living according to the flesh . . . but in the other, this heavenly city, there is no wisdom of man but only the piety that serveth the true God and expecteth a reward in the society of the holy angels and men, that God may be all in all.” In this respect, Augustine’s comment is an elaboration of 2 Corinthians 5:6: “Whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord.” Ultimately, as Augustine testifies, “the love of God unto the contempt of self builds up the city of God,” or, the ‘City upon a Hill,’ for that matter. Thus, the love of the self always was a love of the body as well. However, from the perspective of Christ, the ‘mirror of election,’ with whom the believer was to identify, the body, the flesh devoid of any spiritual wholeness, was only a corrupt material shape. Yet this was what the Puritan did not want to see. The body-image to be reflected was both the body mirrored in the perfect body of Christ, but also the body perfected by God’s law [the gospel], reflecting both the imaginary relation between ego and ideal ego, and the relation between ego and ego-ideal—which is of a symbolic nature, since it is, as Lacan puts it, “the symbolic relation, which determines the greater or lesser degree of perfection, of completeness, of approximation, of the imaginary. This representation allows us to draw the distinction between the Idealich and the Ichideal, between the ideal ego and the ego-ideal” (Seminar I 141).

This conflation of specular identification [ego] and symbolic identification [subject] referred to earlier with respect to Freud’s “Group Psychology”—the latter supporting “the perspective chosen by the subject in the field of the Other, from which specular identification may be seen in a satisfactory
light” (Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts* 268)—upheld the fiction of a whole body, both individual and communal. What was ultimately required was the ligament of God’s law, his name, so that the body might not fall apart. Edwards rightly stresses the legal aspect of the union of Christ and his believers, and the law’s capacity of creating a single, whole body:

The union of the members of the body with the head, is the ground of their partaking of the life of the head. It is the union of the branches to the stock, which is the ground of their partaking of the sap and life of the stock. It is the relation of the wife to the husband, that is the ground of her joint interest in his estate: they are looked upon, in several respects, as one in law . . . God, in requiring this in order to an union with Christ as one of his people, treats men as reasonable creatures, capable of act and choice, and hence sees it fit that they only who are one with Christ by their own act, should be looked upon as one in law. What is real in the union between Christ and his people, is the foundation of what is legal: that is, it is something really in them, and between them, uniting them, that is the ground of the suitableness of their being accounted as one by the judge. (*Discourses* 14).

Thus, in close connection with this Puritan Body|Politic stands the ‘whole body’ as a utopian promise of the union with God, which, as Edwards’s statement makes clear, finds its ‘natural’ expression in marriage, the relation of wife to the husband. The concept of conversion—the ultimate experience of grace and Christ’s love—is told as a story of marriage, embodying St. Paul’s paradigmatic conversion in gendered terms. As a consequence, Puritan ministers consistently employed female imagery to symbolize the process of conversion and salvation, the way to true sainthood.

It has to be stressed that the experience of conversion draws on the transformation of all saintly souls, both male and female, into clean, feminine slates inscribed by the word of both Christ and God the father, employing a corporeal imagery for the most spiritual aspects and acts. Thus, according to Edwards, “the saints are the jewels of Jesus Christ, the great potentate, who has the possession of the empire of the universe; and these jewels have his image enstamped upon them by his royal signet, which is the Holy Spirit. And this is undoubtedly what the Scripture means by the seal of the Spirit; especially when it is stamped in so fair and clear a manner, as to be plain to the eye of conscience; which is what the Scripture calls our spirit” (*Religious Affections* 233). Calvin, referring to the figural language of scripture, describes salvation through the spirit of Christ as “that sacred marriage, by which we become bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh, and so one with him, (Eph. 5:30,) for it is by the Spirit alone that he unites himself to us. By the same grace and energy of the Spirit we become his members, so that he
keeps us under him, and we in our turn possess him” (*Institutes* part 1, chap. 1, para. 3). In the same spirit, Thomas Shepard states that “the soul hence gives itself, like one espoused to her husband, to the Lord Jesus” (*Works* 2:31). As David Leverenz has succinctly put it, “female imagery provided a transformational vocabulary satisfying desires for dependence while denying ambivalence in fantasies of regressive union” (145). Thus, the Puritan hysteric’s pressing questions about the “distinguishing qualifications of those that are in favor with God” were answered by a double phantasm of self-abandoning dependence. Being transformed into Christ’s brides, the saints were also affirmed as God’s children, a fact that Edwards again relates to the hylomorphic image of inscription, of putting a stamp on the believer:

> When God sets his seal on a man’s heart by his Spirit, there is some holy stamp, some image impressed and left upon the heart by the Spirit, as by the seal upon the wax. And this holy stamp, or impressed image, exhibiting clear evidence to the conscience, that the subject of it is the child of God, is the very thing which in Scripture is called the seal of the Spirit, and the witness, or evidence of the Spirit. And this image enstamped by the Spirit on God’s children’s hearts, is his own image; that is the evidence by which they are known to be God’s children, that they have the image of their Father stamped upon their hearts by the Spirit of adoption. (*Religious Affections* 232)

The metaphor of the sacred marriage favored by Puritan ministers expresses the willful resignation to be ruled, governed, almost owned by God. The paradox involved here was that Puritan men had to subjugate their male qualities—in fact, their qualities as a ‘head’—in order to become female, to become Christ’s bride and body. The regenerate’s marriage to Christ was first of all a marriage of the soul, the heart, as that ‘bodily’ organ through which the husband, Christ, would enter the saint’s body in order to save him/her. Yet it would be mistaken to think that there was an easy opposition between soul-heart and body. In fact, the soul-heart was also described in physical terms. The English Puritan Richard Sibbes, whose writings had a great deal of influence on the New England Puritans, describes the heart first of all as precisely *not* denoting “the inward material and fleshy part of the body,” denying it any physical quality. He goes on to affirm that “all the powers of the soul, the inward man, as Paul calleth it, 2 Cor. iv. 16, is the heart” (quoted in Cohen 37). There seems to be a distinction between two kinds of bodies—the “fleshy” material and what Sibbes calls the “inward man.” On the one hand, this metaphor is yet another example of the symmetrical correspondences that, according to Edwards, reveal true grace, the [hopeful] correspondence of inward and outward man. On the other hand, the more physical aspect of the phrase draws strength
from the idea [championed, e.g., by the anatomist Vesalius] of the female genitalia as “the scrotum and penis of the man inverted” (Guillaume Bouchet, quoted in Laqueur 63)—i.e., the complexity of the metaphor points to the female soul as the introjection of both Christ and sexual pleasure. These two aspects connect in the idea of consummation that was demanded by the idea of the sacred marriage—a consummation, it must be noted, that was always deferred [to ‘Judgment Day’]. Increase Mather concedes that “in this Life Believers are Espoused to Christ. At his Second coming will be the Consummation of the Marriage. Christ will then come as a Bridegroom” (Practical Truths 54).

The metaphor of the marriage between regenerate believers and Christ also denotes the almost ecstatic joy they hope to experience in the consummation of their union with Christ. Winthrop describes this ecstasy: “God brought me by that occasion in to suche a heavenly meditation of the love betweene Christ & me, as ravished my heart wth unspeakable ioye; me-thought my soule had as familiar & sensible society wth him as my wife could have wth the kindest husbande . . . wth made me to recall to my view the love of my earthly marriages, wth the more I thought upon, the more sensible I grewe of the most sweet love of my heavenly husband, Christ Jesus” (Life and Letters 1:105–6).

Remarkably, in Puritan writing, a prevalent stress on the unbodied spirit is belied by a tradition of corporeal imagery of devotion and passion.26 In the sacred marriage, that ultimate communion of the saints in heaven, the ligament that knits the communal body together, is reaffirmed and strengthened—as Taylor puts it, “a curious knot God made in Paradise, /And drew it out inamled neatly Fresh. /It was the True-Love Knot, more sweet than spice/And set with all the flowres of Graces dress./Its Weddens Knot, that ne’re can be unti’d. /No Alexanders Sword can it divide” (468). The heavenly union between Christ and believer, to be consummated in death and salvation, ultimately relied on a constant struggle between two aspects of the Puritan self: the sinful, wicked side and the redeemed, saved side. The paradoxical nature of such a conception of self lies in the fact that the sinful
self is needed in order to attain a glimpse of grace—stressing one’s depravity, showing one’s worthlessness, was the only way to salvation. Anne Bradstreet has illustrated this struggle in her poem “The Flesh and The Spirit” and has significantly rendered it as an ‘internal dialogue’ between two sisters. The one, flesh, “had her eye/On worldly wealth and vanity” (108) and represents the sinful aspect of the Puritan self, whereas the other, Spirit, “did rear/Her thoughts unto a higher sphere” and thus stands for the “unregenerate part” (109). Although they are sisters, even “twins,” “yet deadly feud ‘twixt thee and me;/For from one father are we not./Thou by old Adam wast begot./But my arise is from above,/Whence my dear father I do love.” What is important, however, is the fact that this “deadly feud” cannot be resolved in life: “For I have vow’d (and so will do)/Thee as a foe still to pursue./And combat with thee will and must/Until I see thee laid in th’ dust.” Not attempting to reconcile the struggle, the very continuity of it will finally lead to salvation, to the final triumph in death, and the ascendance to heaven: “The city where I hope to dwell,/There’s none on Earth can parallel;/The stately Walls both high and strong/Are made of precious jasper stone;/The gates of Pearl, both rich and clear,/And Angels are for Porters there;/The streets thereof transparent gold/Such as no eye did e’re behold” (110).

In salvation, the saints “from sickness and infirmity/Forevermore they shall be free;/Nor withering age shall e’re come there,/But beauty shall be bright and clear;/This city pure is not for thee,/For things unclean there shall not be” (ibid. “Things unclean” as referring to the sinful flesh looms large also in Taylor’s poetry: “Unclean, Unclean: My Lord, Undone, all vile/Yea all Defild: What shall thy Servant doe?/Unfit for thee: not fit for holy Soile,/Nor for Communion of Saints below./A bag of botches, Lump of Loathsomeness:/Defild by Touch, by Issue: Leproust flesh” (129). Thus, it looks as if in salvation the soul departs from the body and rises to heaven, leaving its sinful, material shape behind. However, the final consummation of the marriage to Christ, the saints’ ascendance to heaven, was sometimes rendered in very bodily terms. Heaven, ultimately, for Cotton Mather is a “Material City,” albeit of a very purified kind:

Creatures as they cannot live out of the World . . . so, neither can they live out of Matter. The Place for the Communication of God unto us, must be where the most Noble and Sublime Creatures find the Noblest & Purest Matter . . . Tis a City to be inhabited by Bodies . . . But insist upon it if you please, that it be an Ethereal City. And Lett ye Matter be so rich, & so fine, & so splendid that Gold and Gems are little better than Shadows of it . . . Spiritualize the Matter as much as You please; But if you think, a Visible City, of a
Cubical Form is too Corporeal a Thing, yet you must allow, That there will be a Place of Reception for Bodies; and in this Place these Bodies must be so much Together, that they may Converse with one another, and maintain an admirable Order among them. (The Threefold Paradise 244–45)

Paradise, regeneration, salvation, resurrection, eternal life—all these were purified images of the Puritan Body|Politic, of bodies together in an harmonious, “admirable order” and hierarchy. Sharing with Bradstreet a sense for the riches of paradise, Mather lets one suspect that the pure and precious matter of the Heavenly City also refers to the matter of the bodies present. The resurrected bodies had to be clean and symmetrical, whole, approaching the image of Christ’s body—in Taylor’s words: “Thou wilt have all that enter to Thy fold/Pure, clean, and bright, whiter than whitest snow/Better refined than most refined gold” (129). Samuel Sewall also stresses the importance of the body’s wholeness: “Last night at Mr. Thomas’s had Discourse about the Body. Mr. Dudley maintained that the Belly should not be raised, because he knew no use of it. I maintained the Contrary, because Christ saw no Corruption . . . I dare not part with my Belly, Christ has Redeemed it; and there is danger of your breaking in further upon me, and cutting off my Hand or Foot . . . This morning comes to my mind: I can’t believe the blessed womb that bore our Saviour, will always be buried. Her Son, her Father, her God will Redeem it from the prevailing power of the Grave” (Diary 2:747).

It is not only the distinction between body and soul, then, but—due to the ‘law of union’ connecting both inextricably to each other—it is also the difference between what Edwards might have called an unspirited body and a spirited body that plays a crucial role here. In one of Taylor’s poems, these two bodies are seen entangled in a kind of blood transfusion, with Christ being the donor: “Pardon, Lord, my fault: and let thy beams/Of Holiness pierce through this Heart of mine./Ope to thy Blood a passage through my veins./Let thy pure blood my impure blood refine /Then with new blood and spirits I will dub/My tunes upon thy Excellency good” (84). Following Freud’s insight that a sense of self always follows a sense of the body, the dual aspect of the Puritan self ultimately relies on two different concepts of the body, a difference that refers to the dichotomy of sarx and σώμα in Pauline anthropology and biblical thought in general. “As a substantive form,” Charles Lloyd Cohen states in God’s Caress, “the individual consists of sarx, ‘our mortal flesh’ (2 Cor. 4.11) . . . and sarx provides the material with which sin catalyzes human wrongdoing” (31). In contrast, σώμα “portends the person . . . as a godly creation . . . Sōma defines the connection between believers and Christ” (33–34). Thus, σώμα refers to the inward man, sarx to
the outward man. In Lacanian registers, \textit{sōma} can be read as the body inscribed into the symbolic register, the law of the father, whereas \textit{sarx} bears close resemblance to the ‘real body,’ the sinful flesh not animated by grace.

These two kinds of bodies are also juxtaposed in the opposing titles of two Puritan texts, Samuel Willard’s \textit{Compleat Body of Divinity}, and Nehemiah Walter’s \textit{The Body of Death Anatomized}. For Willard, all the members of the body, the body as \textit{sōma}—again, individual and communal—were “to be at the Command and under the Government of the Nobler Part” which is Christ, the head, or His individual and corporeal representative, the soulheart: “Here are the Hands, Organs suited to perform the Devices of the Soul, wherewith many Works are wrought . . . And here are the Feet which carry the Body according to the Direction of the Soul” (123). In contrast, the “body of death” described in Walter’s sermon is \textit{sarx}, is a body of sinfulness, “because it overspreads the whole body of Man. Original Sin eats into the Body, and diffuses it self thro’ every Member thereof, and employs them as instruments to act by . . . ‘tis a Mass of Corruption, a Collection of Lusts . . . ‘Tis called a \textit{Body of death}; Partly, because it makes men \textit{Dead} unto and in Spiritual Duties . . . Original Sin is a \textit{Deadly Principle}” (1–2).

Sin, like a disease, destroys the body from within. Like a cancer, it eats the body from the inside, running “from one joynt to another, from toe to the foote, from foote to the legge, from the legge to the thigh, till it have wasted and destroyed the life of the body: Even so, if we give Sin but an entrance, it will soon overspread the whole man” (Cawdray 695–96). What disease is to \textit{sarx}, sin is to \textit{sōma}. These two kinds of bodies curiously make themselves seen at the moment of death, in that last moment of the believer’s preparation either for damnation or salvation. The first case is described in an anatomist’s language by Cotton Mather, giving a detailed catalog of the flesh’s corruption: “All things intimate that it can’t be long before the Silver Cord of your spinal marrow will be snap’t or before the Golden Bowel of the Membrane that covers your Brain, will be broken; . . . before the pitcher of your Arterious Vein be crackt at the right ventricle of your heart, which is the Fountain from whence it fetches your blood into your Lungs; . . . before the Wheel of your great Artery, be split at the left venticle of your Heart, which is the Cistern whereby ’tis carried into and through that noble Bowel; . . . before the circulation of your Blood be fatally and forever stop’d, and that Liquor of Life corrupt in a total stagnation of it” (quoted in T. Holmes 1:16).

However, salvation, as a promise for wholeness, can also reveal itself directly in the material body. Such a miraculous alternative was reported to John Winthrop Jr. In a letter to Roger Williams, he states that “the Almightye . . . somtymes . . . lets us see His mighty power over nature itselфе
& all His creatures, in giving a reall renovation to some men... There are now living, in these parts 2 who being above 80 yeares have lately had reneved teeth,” and he hastens to relate the report of a regenerate [in the literal sense of the word] minister, who, “in his very old age, (the particular number of his yeares I doe not perfectly remember, but I thinke it was above an hundred),” had his “head ... againe covered with youthfull haire, & he had new teeth, and having vsed for forty yeares before to read with his spectacles, could afterward read the smallest print with his old renewed eyes, without the help of any glasses” (530). In contrast to the cohesive [and sometimes even rejuvenating and reconstructive] force of the name of the father, it is sin that destroys the body. Sin “chop[s] at the tree of life of the outward man, till at last it falls” (Willard, Compleat Body of Divinity 224) and is rendered ‘incompleat.’

The metaphor of the marriage and deferred consummation in heaven clearly owes a lot to the fiction of courtly love. The descriptions of Christ’s body Saffin and Taylor, for example, can be safely placed within the convention of the Petrarchian blazon. Lacan, in his seminar on The Ethics of Psycho-Analysis, has hinted at the two-sided coin of sublimation and abjection involved in the drama of courtly love, one that closely parallels the two opposite bodies involved in the Puritan sense of self. In its common definition, the concept of courtly love is read as an extreme effort of sublimation, of elevating the ‘High Lady’—in the Puritan’s case, Christ—the feminized soul, the inward man—to a purely spiritual realm of religious ecstasy. Lacan hints at the connections that have been drawn “between this apparatus or organization of the forms of courtly love and an intuition that is religious in origin” (Seminar VII 148). Ultimately, he argues, such a perspective is doomed to fail if both courtly love and religious ecstasy are analyzed in terms of sublimation only. He conceded that in courtly love, “the feminine object is emptied of all real substance” (149), parallel to the rendering of Christ’s body in terms of pureness and preciousness. However, by “transform[ing] the person in question into a symbolic function” [that is, into an ego ideal] by means of sublimation, courtly love, poetic creation, and Puritan discourse all posit “an object [one] can only desribe as terrifying, an inhuman partner. The Lady is never characterized for any of her real, concrete virtues, for her wisdom, her prudence, or even her competence... On the contrary, she is as arbitrary as possible in the tests she imposes on her servant” (149). It is this very willfulness and arbitrariness that makes for the undecidability of the Puritan’s burning question with regard to grace and salvation. Yet, as Freud points out, in sublimation—the fantasy sustained by the ego ideal, and in the formation of groups—the fact that drives are “‘inhibited in their aim [zielgebhemmt]’” (“Group Psychology” 142, pa-
(Renathesis added) leads to the idealization of the object that has taken the place of the *ego ideal* and results in the fact that “everything that the object does and asks for is right and blameless” (144). The relentless obedience to this “inhuman partner” is sublimated into an unconditional love for an ideal figure, veiling its traumatic status as “das Ding, as the absolute Other of the subject” (Lacan, *Seminar VII* 52) which is nevertheless an object “that one is supposed to find again.” In Lacanian terms, then, “sublimation . . . raises an object . . . to the dignity of the Thing” (112), the ‘Thing’ being the “beyond-of-the-signified” (54), the forever lost object around which the subject’s desire spirals: the hinge between ‘the real’ and ‘reality,’ insofar as it is simply a ‘hollow,’ always [mis]represented by the symbolic and imaginary objects in the subject’s desire—the “objects o”—that try to occupy that ‘empty place.’ Sublimation [elevating one of these objects to “the dignity of the Thing,” so that in this object the subject might experience the very failure to represent the Thing] implies the subject’s attempt to reenter the real from which language has expelled him. Both courtly love and Puritan theology are fantasies structured around the Janus face of the object o, pointing at the Thing’s status as being of the real—the real containing both the *ideal* and the *material*, the *sublime* and the *abject*.

Ultimately, in Puritan discourse, it is the inward man that is wooed, the spirited body animated by Christ within oneself. Being a ‘corporeal representative’ of the *ego ideal*, it is not difficult to see here a version of the object o that Lacan fittingly addresses as “in you something more than you” (Four *Fundamental Concepts* 268). The paradoxical status of the object o as both object and “cause of desire” (ix) and its connection to the soul is inadvertently revealed in John Cotton’s concept of grace, as he uses it in his sermon *The Way of Life*. Hoping for grace, the believer, immersed in the eternal struggle of “the flesh lusting against the spirit,” “compassed” (6) in this conflict, “wants faith, and a soft heart, an humble spirit, and zeale for Gods glory; now he wants every thing” (7). It is the ambiguity of the term *want* that connects grace, the body infused with Christ’s love, to the object o—the fullness of grace relies on a corrupted, fragmented body in the first place: “we no sooner receive a spirit of Grace, but we find our selves compassed about with a body of death” (6). It is ultimately the fact that even “the best of Men have the *Remainders of Corruption* in them as long as they continue in this world” (Walter 4) that calls for the concept of grace, for “the Voice of one that longs for, that breathes and pants after Deliverance” (3). Paradoxically, the regenerate “desires to be Delivered from the Terrifying Power of Indwelling Sin . . . that . . . fills them with perplexing doubts and fears” (15). However, “if you have not a *Sorrowful* sense of Corruption you will not earnestly Desire Grace . . . how should a man long to be Sanctified that
is unaffected with his Filthiness? ‘Tis sense of Sin which works desires of Grace” (21). Ultimately, “‘tis necessary that you be touched with a feeling of Corruption” (21) to desire and achieve regenerating grace—a corruption, however, that has to be lamented and fought with all strength available.

The desired fullness in God [in the symbolic Name-of-the-Father] has to be paid for with castration [the acceptance of the No-of-the-Father], which, however, works by means of being repressed: the body of death is not seen so much as plenitude but as something seriously deficient—“it tends to and issues in Death” (2). It is exactly this play between absence and presence—lack and fullness—that also points to the price to be paid for sublimation: “Sublime as much as you like; you have to pay for it with something. And this something is called jouissance. I have to pay for that mystical operation with a pound of flesh” (Seminar VII 322). Lacan’s “sublimate as much as you like” echoes Mather’s “Spiritualize thee matter as much as you please”—but whereas in Mather there is the utopian need that there still be matter, or the body, however refined it may be, Lacan argues that sublimation in fact is grounded in the very cancellation and/or abjection of the body, by the fact that the subject has to renounce “jouissance” in favor of lawful desire. Castration—i.e., the inscription into the Name-of-the-Father—“means that jouissance must be refused, so that it can be reached on the inverted ladder (l’échelle renversé) of the Law of desire” (Écrits 324). The tragedy of this strategy, however, involves the fact that when the fantasy structured around the sublime object o [the soul, representing God within the subject] breaks down, the material object representing it [the body itself] turns into “a gift of shit” (Four Fundamental Concepts 268). Taylor stresses this very process in his poem “Our Vile Bodie”: the body derived of God’s spirit is just “a varnisht pot of putrid excrements./And quickly turns to excrements itselfe” (219).33 Slavoj Žižek has stressed the ‘desublimating’ effect apropos of the fantasy of courtly love, which is the concomitant reverse of the object o’s Janus face:34 “She looks beautiful from the proper distance, but the moment the poet or knight serving her approaches her too closely . . . , she turns her other, reverse side towards him, and what was previously the semblance of fascinating beauty is suddenly revealed as putrefied flesh, crawling with worms, the disgusting substance of life” (66). The “proper distance” Žižek is referring to, I argue, also comprises the perspective point Lacan has mentioned, the symbolic vantage point from which ‘I like to be seen.’ Once this distance is violated, once this perspective point loses its focus, anamorphic reality—consisting of the representational registers of the symbolic and the imaginary—is for a moment suspended, and the ugly face of the real shows itself. Since self-love [and abjection, its opposite] is clearly involved here—“the element of idealizing exaltation that is expressly sought in the
ideology of courtly love... is fundamentally narcissistic" (Seminar VII 151), a projection that involves ego, ideal ego, and ego ideal—it is one’s own body that suddenly turns into what Taylor calls “a Flesh and Blood bag” (49). It is ultimately the forgetting or denial of the cohesive force of the Name-of-the-Father that ‘dismembers’ the body. Functioning almost like a symbolic skin—a different version of what Didier Anzieu has aptly called the “skin ego”—the Name-of-the-Father holds together and contains the body. As Jean Laplanche has stated, “words themselves can be used as a skin” (49), should the ego skin be missing or be corrupt, or should there be need of a second, double skin—the symbolic has powers to ‘regenerate’ the containing and supporting capacity of the skin [and the ego, by analogy]. Both the image of the ideal ego [Christ] and the power of the ego ideal [God’s word] function similarly in their capacity to heal the body: “Am I new minted by thy Stamp indeed?/ Mine Eyes are dim: I cannot clearly see/Be thou my Spectacles that I may read/Thine Image, and Inscription stampt on mee./If thy bright Image do upon me stand/I am a Golden Angell in thy hand./Lord, make my Soule thy Plate: thine Image bright/Within the Circle of the same enfoile/And on its brims in golden Letters write/Thy Superscription in an Holy style” (Taylor 16). The structural analogy of word and image, law and imitation, contract and resemblance reveals itself clearly in Winthrop’s rhetoric. Stressing the necessity of abiding by the contract with God, he warns his listeners that “if wee shall neglect the observation of these articles which are the ends wee have propounded, and, dissembling with our God, shall fall to embrace this present world and prosecute our carnall intentions, seeking greate things for ourselves and our posterity, the Lord will surely breake out in wrathe against us” (“Modell” 46, my emphasis). The word dissembling here refers to the act of disguise and treason, of not keeping one’s word. Yet it can also be read as negating or even willfully destroying an originary resemblance: God created man in his own image. It is because of this resemblance [or, better, the remnants of resemblance, since man’s sinfulness has compromised this likeness] that God “loues the creature, soe farre as it hathe any of his Image in it; he loues his elect because they are like himselfe” (42). A willful forgetting or denying of his law, or undoing of the likeness left, comes close to a rejection of his love. It is because of this, as “the onely way to avoyde this shipwracke, and to provide for our posterity,” that the Puritan community must be knit together “as one man” (46), as one body infused with his word and law, and in resemblance to Christ. Thus prepared, the body of “every-One’s that under th’ honor’d Signe / Of Christ his Standard, shal his Name enroule, / With holy Vowes of Body and of Soule”35 was at least capable of wholeness and salvation, whereas sin distracts this promise of fullness and—like a defect or illness—is
able to destroy the Body|Politic: “I am Deform’d, and Uggly all become” (Taylor 208).

In a letter from December 15, 1617, commenting on the readiness of the Separatist Puritans under William Bradford to sail to Virginia, their Leyden pastor John Robinson wrote: “We are knit together as a body in a most strict and sacred bond and covenant of the Lord, the violation whereof we make great conscience, and by virtue whereof we do hold ourselves straitly tied to all care of each other’s good and of the whole, by every one and so mutually” (quoted in Bradford 34), foreshadowing Winthrop’s rhetoric of the body knit together, with his ligament echoing Robinson’s “sacred bond.” More than thirty years later, while rereading his manuscript, Bradford added the following nostalgic note to Robinson’s letter:

O sacred bond, whilst inviolably preserved! How sweet and precious were the fruits that flowed from the same! But when this fidelity decayed, then their ruin approached. O that these ancient members had not died or been dissipated (if it had been the will of God) or else that this holy care and constant faithfulness had still lived, and remained with those that survived, and were in times afterwards added to them. But ( alas ) that subtle serpent hath slyly wound in himself under fair pretence of necessity and the like, to untwist these sacred bonds and tied, and as it were insensibly by degrees to dissolve, or in a great measure to weaken, the same. I have been happy, in my first times, to see, and with much comfort to enjoy, the blessed fruits of this sweet communion, but it is now a part of misery in old age, to find and feel the decay and want thereof (in a great measure) and with grief and sorrow of heart to lament and bewail the same. (34, note 6)

Taking the body of Christ as the [spiritual and corporeal] phallogocentric ideal also provides a model of patriarchal fidelity, a fidelity to both God and the elders or founders of the community, a fidelity that, as Bradford bewails, has “decayed” in following generations. In 1676, Increase Mather, commenting that King Philip’s War was not only the machinations of the devil, in sending the Indians, but a direct outcome of the New England Puritans’ sins, wrote that “nor were our sins ripe for so dreadful a judgment, until the Body of the first Generation was removed, and another Generation risen up which hath not so pursued, as ought to have been, the blessed designs of their Fathers” (“A Brief History” 86). This phrase is remarkable in that it makes a crucial distinction between the body of the fathers’ generation and the subsequent generation, in which the reference to a body is absent, implying the advanced state of sinful dissolution that the community of the sons has already reached. The dismemberment of the Body|Politic is a direct consequence of forgetting or denying the Name-of-the-Father, of not
pursuing God’s “blessed design.” Taylor, in an elegy upon the death of Samuel Hooker, a pastor of Hartford, Connecticut, lamented that “You have a Father lost, and Choice one too. / Weeping for him is honour due from you. / Yet let your Sorrows run in godly wise / As if his Spirits tears fell from your eyes. / Strive for his Spirit: rather Christ’s than His. / To dwell, and act his Flesh, yourselves, to bliss. / Its pitty these in him conjoynd, up grew / Together, should be parted here in you” (484). Yet he also warned the congregation of the dreadful consequences of not striving for the father’s spirit: “Be n’t like such babes as parents brains out pull / To make a Wassill Bowle then of the Skull. / That Pick their Parents eyes out, and the holes / Stuff up with folly, as if no braind Souls. / You are of better form than this sad guise / Yet beare this Caution: Some apostatize.” Forgetting the father’s word and law also implies a dismembering of the father, of the very image of the whole body, the inward man, and ultimately the severing of all that gives coherence also to one’s own body: “And strive your Sires, and Grandisires Life / Through you their Flesh and blood may brightly shine. / Imminde your Father’s Death bed Charge and aime. / You are his Very Flesh, and Blood, and Name” (ibid.).

Once the sacred bond, the ligament is dissolved, ‘untwisted,’ the communal body—as well as the individual body—dissolves, too. Ultimately, sin, the denial of the Name-of-the-Father, is an “Enmity against God [that] can never be reconciled to Him” (Walter 9). The sinner directly opposes God’s word, has become subject to the law of sin, and has wasted every right to corporeal integrity, as Cotton Mather puts it, “because God said of old, Let us make Man in our Image, the Devil is ever saying, Let us pull this man to pieces” (Wonders 47). Giving in to the devil ultimately results in “no less than a dissolution upon the world” (16). In a perverted imitation of Winthrop’s vision of believers as the prolonged extremities of God—“this great king will haue many stewards, Counting himself more honoured in dispensing his gifts to man by man, than if he did it by his owne immediate hands” (“Modell” 33)—Satan abuses those who have fallen under his bondage [the Salem witches, in this case] to reach his aim: the destruction of the bodies of the righteous. In 1692, Mercy Lewis attested in the Salem witchcraft trials that a witch “did tortor me most cruelly . . . and allmost redy” to pull all my bones out of joynt.” However, as a true believer, by “being up held by an Allmoghty hand . . . I induerd his torters that night” (Boyer and Nissenbaum 2:483). The trope of the “bones out of joynt” was a common one employed in the testimonies against the torturers. With regard to the Old Testament’s “eye for an eye,” it seems fitting that one of the prominent ways of executing witches was to press them to death: a heavy board was placed on the convict’s chest, and heavy stones and rocks were piled on that
board—presumably all bones ended up “out of joynt.” Two other methods of punishment also point to the two aspects of the ‘fragmented body’ and the body ‘held together’ by the namelaw of the father. A person convicted of high treason could be drawn and quartered: the criminal was drawn behind a cart to the place of executing, hanged by the neck but cut down before he died, and ritually disemboweled; then the body was cut into four separate pieces [quarters] and buried in widely separated, unconsecrated ground, so that the soul could never rest. Another form of punishment was maiming: slitting the nostrils or cutting off the ears. The ‘fragmentation’ of the sinful body was to be made visible, to be made ‘real.’ In this ritualistic fragmentation of the body, it is important to point out the importance of the several aspects involved: the ‘real body’; the seeing, observing eye; and the presence of the Puritan community. The whole procedure is embedded in a public spectacle, and it has to happen ‘on the body.’ The ‘inner’ bodily fragmentation as a result of sinful living and transgression of the law must necessarily come out into the open, into the realm of the public. It is a spectacle that expects from the body to reveal what has been ‘written’ on it, that gives evidence of its ‘inside,’ that testifies for it in a bloody and corporeal ‘language.’ In an analogy to a kind of ‘economic debt,’ the moral guilt has to be ‘paid for’: the integrity of the Body|Politic, flawed by the sinners’ failure, has to be restored, with the punishment and torture of the sinners as a rightful compensation. The Puritan conception of the body still belongs to the regime of what Foucault has called “the old partners of the spectacle of punishment, the body and the blood” (Discipline and Punish 16). However, criminals were often required to wear on their clothing [or have branded on their bodies] a letter of the law: for instance, A for adultery, B for blasphemy or burglary, C for counterfeiting, D for drunkenness, F for forgery, H for heresy, S for sedition, T for theft—an alphabet of humiliation. As a badge of shame, and with the possibility of repentance, the ‘forgetting of the NamelLaw’ was written on the body so as to keep it whole, but also to remind the subject of the danger of fragmentation.

Right from the beginning, in order to prevent the devil from entering the communal body of devote believer, the elders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony attempted to stabilize the ligaments knitting that body together. In an order issued May 8, 1631, the colony decreed that “no man shall be admitted as a freeman, to the freedom of this body politic, but such as are members of some of the churches within the limits of the same” (Shurtleff 1:87), fortifying the boundaries of the body by some kind of self-referential feedback loop, restricting admission to the community to those who already are both part of the ‘greater body’ of the church and already residing “within the limits of the same.” With this move, the potentially rhizomatic structure of
the growing body of the community transformed itself into a static, centralized Body Politic fully formed, closed off from the outside, and organized according to a top-down structure. The Body Politic’s solidity was being tested during the disturbing events which came to be known as the Antinomian Controversy, to which I will now turn.


A “‘Physics’ of Power”

Phase Transitions and Turbulence in the Antinomian Controversy

From 1636 to 1638, the Massachusetts Bay Colony was shaken by its first substantial crisis. Anne Hutchinson, who was later identified by John Winthrop as the main source of that controversy, had come to America from Boston, England, in 1634. Not a part of Winthrop’s party in the first wave of settlers, she and her husband had nevertheless very early decided to follow John Cotton, who had been the minister in the Hutchinsons’ English parish, and who had been known for his rebelliously Puritan leanings. The Hutchinsons belonged to a group that Cotton described as “some scores of godly persons in Boston in Lincolnshire . . . who entered into a covenant with the Lord and with one another to follow after the Lord in the purity of his worship” (“The Way of the Congregational Churches” 198). In Boston, Massachusetts, the Hutchinsons were admitted as church members—Anne more than a week later than her husband, which was quite an unusual practice for married couples—and built their house opposite the house of the Winthrop family, close to the house of the Cottons.

In the year that the Hutchinsons came to New England, John Winthrop, after four years as governor, had been defeated for reelection. The Massachusetts Bay Colony was anything but stable: different visions and plans conflicted with each other, not only on the civil but also on the ecclesiastical level. Serious controversy started when Anne Hutchinson voiced the opinion that Puritan ministers in the colony were actually preaching two sorts of covenants: the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. The covenant of works was based on the Old Testament contract of God with Adam, in which Adam’s obedience to God’s word was the condition for God’s love. Yet Adam had sinned, failed, and broken that covenant. God then made a new covenant with mankind—the New Testament covenant of grace based on Christ’s sacrifice and mankind’s redemption, which bestowed unconditional grace on the elect. But how could one know that one was elect? According to Puritan theology, only sanctification, the visible act of leading a righteous life [according to the law], could serve as evidence for the elects’
salvation—which for Hutchinson was a clear sign that the Boston Puritans were ultimately preaching a covenant of works, which asserted that only a person’s good deeds could earn him or her a place in heaven. Hutchinson felt that the believers should not be bound by the law set up by the ministers, but instead should rely for salvation on the covenant of grace, on Christ’s gift of free and unconditional grace. Ultimately, even if the Puritan ministers officially held that believers were saved by grace and not by works, it was only through obedience to the law that an individual could gain salvation. For Hutchinson, however, there was no intrinsic connection between the gift of grace and the righteousness of a believer. Quite the contrary, the very fact of striving after signs of grace was for her a proof that grace had not been granted. According to Hutchinson, this covenant of grace was taught only by John Cotton, whose religious doctrine she was following. Hutchinson, known and respected both as the wife of a wealthy merchant and for her knowledge of herbal medicine and her competency as a midwife, soon began to hold weekly meetings in her home to discuss the sermons she heard in Boston, most notably those of the Pastor John Wilson, who also preached a covenant of works. Although this is simplifying things, what was at stake theologically was basically the temporal sequence [and priority] of two important stages on the way to sainthood—justification and sanctification. Justification is that moment in the life of a sinner when he knows that he is redeemed, whereas sanctification is that openly visible, ‘saintly’ behavior displayed by the truly saved. This, then, according to Winthrop, were Hutchinson’s “two dangerous errors: 1. That the person of the Holy Ghost dwells in a justified person. 2. That no sanctification can help to evidence to us our justification.—From these two grew many branches” (Journal 193). Hutchinson condemned the ‘legalist’ preachers such as John Wilson and Thomas Shepard [in fact, the vast majority of Boston ministers] who held that justification was just a first step in the conversion process. Such a doctrine led to the covenant of works, which meant that mankind had to pay back its debt [the fact that Adam had sinned] by following God’s law [which for the Body|Politic meant legal regulations, a ‘pragmatic’ translation of his law into the communal laws]. Instead, Hutchinson held that the covenant of grace was based on the very individual and intimate moment of justification. The gift of free grace and the knowledge of one’s justification in Christ made abiding by the law an unnecessary step in the process of conversion.

Winthrop, in his journal, reports that Cotton claimed that the struggle between the two parties—the Puritan elite and the oppositional party, labeled Antinomian [literally, against the aw] by later historians, and also connected to the Familists1 by their enemies—was basically over “magnifying
the grace of God; one party seeking to advance the grace of God within us, and the other to advance the grace of God towards us, (meaning by the one justification, and by the other sanctification)” (208). Thus, according to the historian Michael Winship, in one of the most recent assessments of the Antinomian controversy, “the core energizing question of the controversy was whether or not you had to know that God loved you before you could trust the signs that you loved him” (228). For Winthrop and his followers, obedience to God’s law was a guarantee that God had offered his grace to the believer, independent of the fact that the believer eventually experienced that grace directly. For Hutchinson and her followers, trusting in these signs was illusionary, to say the least, since it opened the way to hypocrisy. The only trustworthy sign that counted for them was the direct, personal, and immediately felt experience of God’s grace. Hutchinson, in her weekly meetings, which were attended by up to eighty people from all classes of Boston society, not only commented on the Sunday sermons but also interpreted them, pointing out doctrinal errors, and discussed her own way of thinking about these issues. The situation became even more pressing when the Hutchinson party proposed to put John Cotton in John Wilson’s place as pastor, and to let the newly arrived John Wheelwright, Hutchinson’s brother-in-law and a radical Puritan minister, take Cotton’s place as copastor. Winthrop and the elders saw the need to settle these questions and asked Cotton to comment and take sides. When the situation escalated further—Wheelwright preached a vehemently anti-establishment fast-day sermon, and the Hutchinson party refused to take up arms in the Pequot War—Winthrop, who returned to the office of governor in 1637, put leading followers of Hutchinson, and Anne Hutchinson herself, on trial. As a result, some of her followers were fined, disenfranchised, impeached, and disarmed. When she finally claimed that God had communicated her knowledge to her in a direct revelation, Anne Hutchinson was banned and excommunicated in March 1638. She started a new life in Roger Williams’s colony of Rhode Island, and she and her family were eventually killed by Indians on Long Island in 1643.

Later historians have variously seen Anne Hutchinson as a heretic, anarchist, rebel, and protofeminist. Although there are other important players in the Antinomian controversy than just Winthrop and Hutchinson—for example John Cotton, Thomas Shepard, John Wheelwright, and Henry Vane, the governor of Massachusetts in 1636 and Hutchinson’s most prominent follower—Winthrop, in his highly subjective account of the controversy, A Short Story of the Rise, Reign, and Ruine of the Antinomians, Familists & Libertines, set the direction for later histories by focusing on the conflict between the woman Anne Hutchinson and the magistrates, ministers, and elders, all male. Janice Knight has pointed out the retrospective [and retro-
active] strategy of Winthrop and the male Puritan elite of “naturalizing their own authority as inevitable, as ‘orthodox,’ and rewriting opposition as ‘heresy’” (10). In the multiplicity of conflicting visions and dissenting voices within the Massachusetts Bay Colony—apart from Hutchinson, for example, there had also been Roger Williams, who was banished in 1635—Winthrop’s dominated, and his approach came to be identified as the Puritan way. The point might be made that the Antinomian controversy in fact shaped what came to be known as Puritan Orthodoxy.3 Situating the conflict that later historians [following Winthrop] have presented as a [gendered] struggle between Winthrop and Hutchinson in a wider context, I want to follow Knight in her account of two distinct voices emerging within Massachusetts Bay Puritanism that can be traced back to its beginnings in England. Knight identifies two parties—“the ‘Intellectual Fathers’ and the ‘Spiritual Brethren’” (2),4 defying Perry Miller’s monolithic version of Puritan orthodoxy.5 In the first group, we find people such as Thomas Shepard, Thomas Hooker, Peter Bulkeley, and John Winthrop, basing theology, their teachings, and their rhetoric on the work of the English Puritan William Ames. The second group consists of people such as John Cotton, John Wheelwright, and Henry Vane, who followed the English Puritan Richard Sibbes. The “Fathers” stressed humiliation and obedience in preparing the heart for grace and good works as evidence of salvation, picturing God as a sometimes merciless sovereign. The “Brethren,” on the other hand, emphasized the emptiness and passivity of the believer; for them, human effort was neither preparation nor a trust-worthy sign when it comes to grace, because a merciful and benevolent God gives grace freely. The two groups practice different brands of orthodox Calvinism, distinguished in particular in their stances toward grace, justification, and sanctification; both groups were engaged in the struggle for orthodoxy in the Massachusetts Bay Colony.6 The Antinomian problem was not due to an infection from the outside but reflected a schism in the very heart of Puritanism. Amy Schrager Lang proposes to read the conflict in terms of Raymond Williams’s distinction between the dominant and the residual aspects of a given culture, assigning Hutchinson’s understanding of grace the position of the residual—a concept, as Williams describes it, “formed in the past, but . . . still active in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of the present” (122). Lang identifies Hutchinson’s understanding as the residue of an older piety, based on the Geneva bible, an older translation than the King James. Following Williams’s distinction, Lang points out that, “however, the ‘residual’ elements of a culture may contain the ‘oppositional’” (49). While I agree with her on that point, I see the problem as situated at a somewhat deeper level. The point is not so much that Hutchinson’s understanding, as
residual, turns oppositional. From the background I have outlined, it is clear that instead Hutchinson, aligned as she was with Cotton’s teachings and the doctrines of the “Spiritual Brethren,” was involved in a struggle for dominance: that is, both parties somehow carried the seed of the ‘residual’ in them, and the outcome of the controversy would determine which side was going to turn ‘oppositional.’ The Antinomian controversy, then, was not so much about the struggle of the opposition against an established orthodoxy as it was about the construction and emergence of such an orthodoxy, since it “engaged two legitimate heirs of the magisterial reformers, two traditions which might have coexisted as orthodoxies within the commonwealth” (Knight 22–23).

Yet it is simplifying things to claim that the controversy was about religion, politics, or even both—more to the point, it was situated at “the unstable intersection of experience and doctrine, where a broad range of unresolved theological, pastoral, and even geopolitical problems interacted and collided” (Winship 13). The power struggle inherent in the controversy, then, cannot be captured in terms of a bipolar conflict of authority and resistance, but only in a more complex framework. Here I want to refer to Foucault’s analysis and conception of power. According to Foucault, power is not an object that can be possessed by a sovereign or a political institution: “Power in the substantive sense, ‘le’ pouvoir, doesn’t exist.” It operates like “an open, more-or-less coordinated . . . cluster of relations” (“Confession,” Power/Knowledge 199). Power amounts to more than just governmental power or, in general, a system of domination. For Foucault, power is a “multiform production of relations of domination” (“Power and Strategies,” Power/Knowledge 142). The state apparatus is just a solidified ancillary construction: “Power is not possessed . . . power is always a definite form of momentary or constantly reproduced encounters among a definite number of individuals” (“Power and Norm” 59–60). It “functions like a piece of machinery” (Discipline and Punish 177). It emerges from a dynamic process of various force fields, both heterogeneous and local struggles and conflicts and is always relational in its operations, always a field constituted of differences, of various and manifold forces. In his comment on Foucault’s conception of power, Deleuze stresses that it is not just a repressive force, not just violence—it is rather a force that “defines itself by its power to affect other forces (to which it is related) and to be affected by other forces . . . The power to be affected is like a matter of force, and the power to affect is like a function of force” (Foucault 71–72). Thus, power is not only a force operating on objects and other persons, not a one-way ‘executive force,’ not a cause unaltered by its effects, but rather a set of feedback loops within a complex and dynamic system of a multiplicity of constituent elements. As
Foucault claims, “rather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc.” (“Two Lectures,” *Power/Knowledge* 97).

In a move that shows that his project will not be solely concerned with the effects of discourse on bodies, Foucault shifts from the merely discursive to materiality, to an underlying operative force field combining discursive and extradiscursive effects. He ultimately calls for the “introduction, into the very roots of thought, of notions of chance, discontinuity and materiality” (“Discourse on Language” 231). Foucault is not referring to simple randomness here, but to the notion of complexity—as developed, for example, by Michel Serres, who was a colleague of Foucault’s at Clermont-Ferrand and the University of Paris VIII at Vincennes (see Serres and Latour 37); by Deleuze; and by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, whose groundbreaking work inspired both Serres and Deleuze, whose findings and applications Prigogine and Stengers, in turn, acknowledge.

Foucault stresses the event-character of power and of history; he wants to substitute dynamic, complex processes for notions of continuity and teleology. Here the interface of science and history is particularly fruitful, since there has been a mutual fertilization of the disciplines during the last years—following a trend in American history that reaches back at least to Henry Adams’s attempt to read history in terms of physics.9 Prigogine|Stengers state: “We have seen new aspects of time being progressively incorporated into physics, while the ambitions of omniscience inherent in classical science were progressively rejected . . . Indeed, history began by concentrating mainly on human societies, after which attention was given to the temporal dimensions of life and geology. The incorporation of time into physics appears as the last stage of a progressive reinsertion of history into the natural and social sciences” (208). According to De Landa, if we study an open physical system—such as a human being, or a community or society—“we need to know its history to understand its current dynamical state” (*A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History* 14). Likewise, as “much as history has infiltrated physics, we must now allow physics to infiltrate history” (15). It is with regard to this background that I want to expand Foucault’s notion of a “‘physics’ of power” (*Discipline and Punish* 177), which he primarily related to the techniques and technologies of surveillance, and relate it to Serres’s claim that “History is indeed a physics” (*Birth of Physics* 179), and argue for a political physics in the sense of a systemic dynamic underlying history, power, and politics, which conceives of both politics and physics as “the science of relations . . . conventions, assemblies” (123).
In the Antinomian controversy, such a physics is first of all detectable on the metaphorical level, as a struggle almost between two phases in the thermodynamic sense, between two states of matter—the solid and the liquid. The “Intellectual Fathers” such as Winthrop, Shepard, Hooker, following their teacher William Ames, employ a metaphorical language quite different from that of the “Spiritual Brethren”—Cotton, following the rhetoric of Richard Sibbes, and Hutchinson and her followers [though it can be argued that they constitute yet another faction within this group, one more radical and more active in the political sense as well].

The covenant of works proposed by the Intellectual Fathers stresses God’s sovereignty and power. In their rhetoric, images of domination prevail. In a typical example, Ames draws up a taxonomy of God’s faculties—“the proper order for conceiving these things is first, to think of God’s posse, his power, second, his scire, knowledge; third, his velle, will” (92)—an example of a particular Puritan style that, for example, Winthrop’s “A Modell of Christian Charity,” with its dialectical composition of questions, answers, and objections, and the systematic consecutive numbering of points of interest, follows as well. Such a style translates God’s law into rational and logical structures, subdividing it into ‘operational’ closed units. According to Serres, such rational projects are just thinly veiled attempts at control and “construct a real which is a rational one, we construct a real, among many possibilities, which is a rational one, among other possibilities, just as we pour concrete over the ground” (Genesis 25). Winthrop translates this structure onto that of the Body|Politic as well, claiming the God-given necessity of hierarchical organization and differences among the Body|Politic’s members. These necessary differences—and potential flaws in the stability of the Body|Politic—are cemented into a monolithic block by the ligament of love through which all members are “knitt more nearly together in the Bonds of brotherly affection” (“Modell” 34). According to Winthrop, the perfidy of the Antinomians lay in abusing the bonds of affection as channels for indoctrination, for infecting the blood circulating in the Body|Politic: “Being once acquainted with them, they would strangely labour to insinuate themselves into their affections, by loving salutes, humble carriage, kind invitements, friendly visits, and so they would winne upon men, and steale into their bosomes before they were aware . . . and so, having gotten them into their Web, they could easily poison them by degrees” (Hall 204). As this quote shows, Winthrop introduces a new approach to the ‘corporeal rhetorics,’ distinguishing between a healthy and a poisoned body. In the following, I will concentrate on two physical metaphors employed during the Antinomian controversy: the metaphor of the body, in particular in connection with con-
tagion and infection, and the metaphor of different states of matter, of solids and liquids.

As James Schramer and Timothy Sweet have pointed out, “bodily analogies are the controlling metaphors” (6) in the Antinomian controversy. The correspondence of the best-proportioned body and the perfectly knit Body Politic was at once shaken and subsequently reaffirmed when Hutchinson and then one of her close associates, Mary Dyer, gave birth to a malformed, stillborn infant. When Winthrop became aware of Dyer’s “monstrous birth,” as he referred to it, he immediately sensed the opportunity to find evidence for the physical effect of Antinomian tendencies: “Then God himselfe was pleased to step in with his casting voice, and bring in his owne vote and suffrage from heaven . . . in causing the two fomenting women in the time of the height of the Opinions to produce out of their wombs, as before they had out of their braines, such monstrous births as no Chronicle (I thinke) hardly ever recorded the like” (Hall 214). Winthrop ordered that the corpse of Dyer’s infant be exhumed for examination. Upon viewing the corpse, he described it as monstrous and misshapen: “It had a face, but no head, and the ears stood upon the shoulders and were like an ape’s; it had no forehead, but over the eyes four horns, hard and sharp; two of them were above one inch long, the other two shorter; the eyes standing out and the mouth also; the nose hooked upward; all over the breast and back full of sharp pricks and scales, like a thornback; the navel and all the belly, with the distinction of the sex, were where the back should be, and the back and hips before, where the belly should have been; behind the shoulders it had two mouths, and in each of them a piece of red flesh sticking out; it had arms and legs as other children, but instead of toes, it had on each foot three claws, like a young fowl with sharp talons” (281)—the headless child inversing the bodily order based on Christ’s model of a perfect human body. With regard to Anne Hutchinson’s fetus, Winthrop wrote that Hutchinson gave birth not to one but to thirty monsters, several “lumps” of tissue “in the form of a globe, not much unlike the swims of some fish, so confusedly knit together by so many several strings (which I conceive were the beginning of veins and nerves) so that it was impossible either to number the small round pieces in every lump, much less to discern from whence every string did fetch its original, they were so snarled one within the another” (Journal 265, my emphasis). The perfectly knit body is endangered by its dark twin, the “confusedly knit” body. Apart from the inversion of the normal bodily order, what is striking in the description of the monsters is their noncategorizability: horns, scales, and claws make one a monster by its sheer hybridity. Hybrid bodies mock the notion of organic unity and transgress the ontological categories
upon which a comprehensive representation of reality—a political fiction in its own right—can be grounded. In their indecibility, Mary Douglas claims, such hybrid bodies “confound the general scheme of the world” (Purity and Danger 55).

The analogy between the proliferation of monsters and the Antinomians’ “multiplying new Opinions” (Hall 218) was not lost on Winthrop: “And see how the wisdome of God fitted this judgement to her sinne every way, for looke as she had vented misshapen opinions, so she must bring forth deformed monsters, and as about 30 Opinions in number, so many monsters” (214). In order to protect and affirm the well-knit Body|Politic, these elements had to be excluded. The bodily metaphor is used most stringently in Winthrop’s rhetorics of bodily contamination. In his account of the crisis, as well as in the reports and other document relating to Hutchinson’s trial, references to her opinions as a cancerous illness that has “straight infected” (202) and threatens to contaminate Boston’s Body|Politic abound. To those who regarded Hutchinson’s opinions as “poison” (204) and “venome” (207), she herself by analogy became a virus or “Trojan horse” (“Good News” 206), an enemy within. The seemingly fixed borders of the colonial body have proved to be porous, and Winthrop saw it as the paramount task of the magistrates and elders to cure that body and drive out the infection.

It might be fruitful to compare Winthrop’s rhetoric of epidemics and infection, as well as the strategies resulting from it, with accounts of the plague in England during that period. The spiritual infection of the Antinomian controversy occurred close to the cusp between two serious waves of the bubonic plague in England, in 1625 and 1665. In his account of the political implications of epidemics, Foucault distinguishes between two completely different disciplinary strategies, connected to the leper and the plague victim of the late seventeenth century, respectively—and it is interesting to note that Winthrop refers to Hutchinson’s opinions as both “Plague” (Hall 202) and “Leprosie” (373). The leper of the Middle Ages had been met with the strategy of banishment from the community. In order to keep the community pure, Foucault writes, “the leper was caught up in a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure” (Discipline and Punish 198). Boccacio’s Decameron shows that this strategy did not necessary mean the banishment of the infected and their subsequent expulsion out of the city. On the contrary, due to the strict separation of the Body|Politic into the aristocracy and the mass of people, the nobles fled the infected cities in order to gather the “fragments of the elite community into a single social order, self-enclosed and pure” (Armstrong and Tennenhouse 92). Without aristocratic control, the city indulged in what Bakhtin has called the carnivalesque. In a description of the 1625 plague, the Elizabethan dramatist and pamphleteer Thomas Dekker, a Puri-
A “‘Physics’ of Power” 101

tan, describes the effect of the epidemic on those left behind in the infected cities, who “are all merry all iocund; no Plague frights them . . . walking, talking, laughing, in the Streets, blaspheming, selling, buying, swearing. In Tauernes, and Ale-houses, drinking, roaring, and surfetting” (151). Following Foucault, the strategy here is one of “massive, binary division between one set of people and another” (Discipline and Punish 198). Winthrop, in his Short Story, can be seen following that same model, identifying Anne Hutchinson as the Typhoid Mary of the spiritual infection of both individual bodies and the whole Body|Politic in the Massachusetts Bay Colony: “But the last and worst of all, which most suddainly diffused the venom of these opinions into the very veines and vitals of the People in the Country, was Mistris Hutchinsons double weekly lecture, which she kept under a pretence of repeating Sermons” (Hall 207).

Apart from the theological dissent, the result of that infection [Winthrop’s reference to the Familists, a sect believed to indulge in free love between the sexes, points in that direction] was that it “gives way to Libertanisme . . . Licentiousness and sinfull Liberty” (358). John Cotton, in Hutchinson’s trial, even suspected that the “promiscuous and filthie comminge together of men and Woemen without Distinction or Relation of Marriage, will eventually follow” (Hall 372). For the modern reader, he evokes the scenario of the leper’s carnival of Dekker, Bakhtin, and Foucault, of Foucault’s “collective festival, . . . laws transgressed” (Discipline and Punish 198), or, in Winthrop’s words, of a world “turned upside down” (Hall 253).

In Winthrop’s account, Hutchinson and her infectious, dangerous opinions become one, so much that “shee being questioned by some, who marveled that such opinions should spread so fast, shee made answer, that where ever shee came they must and they should spread” (264). By propagating the “Leprosie” and using her victims as multipliers, Hutchinson was able to infect almost the whole Body|Politic—but not quite: “It was a wonder upon what a sudden the whole Church of Boston (some few excepted) were become her new converts, and infected with her opinions” (ibid.). Those “few excepted,” the bedrock of orthodoxy|morality due to God’s providence, were “so many of the Magistrates, and Elders” (265)—the ‘head’ of the community. And this head had to gather together, and take action—and they did, by reelecting Winthrop governor in 1636. Hutchinson’s trial, presided over by Winthrop, resulted in the claim to “cut off like a Gangrene” (387) the infectious part, and ultimately in Hutchinson’s excommunication: “Therefore I command you in the name of Christ Jesus and of this Church as a Leper to withdraw your selfe out of the Congregation” (388). As a cure for the leprous Body|Politic, and true to the traditional organicist conception, the head had to be separated and even safeguarded from the body, in order
to ensure the continuity of the aristocratic bloodline [or, the Puritan elite and orthodox doctrine] and to guarantee the survival of the Body|Politic.

During the ‘real’ plagues, this separation seemingly followed an almost ‘natural topology,’ since the plague more often than not struck the poor—of course, this fact was an effect of the separation and not ‘natural’ at all. Dekker, in typical Puritan fashion equating plague with punishment for sin, puts the outcome of the separation of those who govern from those who are governed in terms of an arithmetical equation. Conjuring up a divine mathematics, he comments on the marks the plague leaves on the bodies of its victims: “God will not have his Strokes hidden: his marks must bee seene . . . His Arithmetick brookes no crossing” (151–52). On the debtors’ side of God’s account book, then, there is only “the people’s mass body” (Bakhtin 255). A calculation completely different from Dekker’s was made after the 1665 plague in England, and this difference parallels Foucault’s analysis of two different strategies: “If it is true that the leper gave rise to rituals of exclusion . . . then the plague gave rise to disciplinary projects” (Discipline and Punish 198). In his tract “Of Lessening of Plagues,” William Petty, by employing a “political arithmetick” (1) that does not match with Dekker’s ‘God’s Arithmetick,’ proposes “nothing less than the presence of a new way of imagining the body politic” (Armstrong and Tennenhause 94). In contrast to the binary division between head and body [the leper strata-gem of exclusion], Petty, in connecting the effects of the plague to an economic calculation,11 rewrites the strategy of quarantine in such a way that the measures of isolation, which had been applied only to safeguard the aristocracy, are now to be applied to the whole body, by “sealing off . . . each family unit as if it were an elite community in its own right” (ibid.). Whereas the separation between head and body, “a mass among which it was useless to differentiate” (Discipline and Punish 198), had led to the uncontrolled spreading of the infection among the population, resulting in the deaths of thousands of people until the virus could find no more hosts, the Body|Politic was now regarded as a differentiated and structured body, composed of individual units. These isolated households, then, prevented the disease from spreading infinitely because contact between the isolated cells was prohibited ceaselessly by the apparatus of bureaucracy that emerged: everything was under the “absolute control of the magistrates” (196): “The plague is met by order; its function is to sort out every possible confusion: that of the disease, which is transmitted when bodies are mixed together” (197). Ultimately, Petty’s argument “rests upon the idea of economic rationality that governs king and subject alike” (Quint 140), and hence it shows the emergence of a new classification system. In doing so, it also exemplifies a disciplinary project that installed “the penetration of regulation into even the
smallest details of everyday life” (*Discipline and Punish* 198), the power to reach, sustain, and control even the farthest members of the BodyPolitic—the subject becomes a numerical figure in the state’s rational invasion of its privacy.

The Antinomian controversy, as I have already pointed out, sits squarely between those two strategies. On the one hand, Winthrop saw the need to exclude the leper from the BodyPolitic; on the other hand, he also employed the disciplinary strategies that Foucault connects to the “political dream of the plague” (*Discipline and Punish* 197–98), the power of classification and analysis for “meticulous tactical partitioning” (198). Winthrop and the elders identify [or construct] Anne Hutchinson as the leader of the factitious party: “*(Dux faemina facti)* a woman had been the breeder and nourisher of all this distressers” (Hall 262). Thus, during the trials of the Antinomian controversy, Winthrop classifies and divides the BodyPolitic along gender lines in his attempt to further produce hierarchically striated segments of control. The Antinomians’ opinions are even more dangerous, he claims, because Hutchinson, in her perfidiousness, had chosen to first work on the weaker sex, and had not only raised “contentions . . . amongst us, both in Church and State,” but also “in families, setting divisions betwixt husband and wife” (209). As a result, “many families are neglected” (269). As one “cure of this sore” (211), this sore that had preached liberty from all laws, Winthrop and the ministers stressed the covenant of works even more and called for absolute obedience. Against one grave error of the Antinomians—“*Error 49.* We are not bound to keep a constant course of Prayer in our Families, or privately, unlesse the Spirit stirre us up thereunto” (232)—preaching and praying is employed to counter those “practices that so much pestered the Countrey,” to “cure those that were diseased already, and to give Antidotes to the rest, to preserve them from infection” (212). Through Anne Hutchinson’s dangerous opinions, “a great damage comes to the Common-wealth . . . , which wee that are betrusted with, as the Fathers of the Common-wealth, are not to suffer” (269). By equating the origin of this damage with a woman, by further identifying one important result of that damage as the separation between husband and wife, Winthrop proposes as an antidote the division of the BodyPolitic into several households, to be controlled by the husbands: “A family is a little common wealth, and a common wealth is a greate family” (“Defence” 71). The word of God [the law of the father, from which communal law derives] is represented by “the Fathers of the Common-wealth,” the obedience to whom is in turn guaranteed by the obedience to the husband, the paterfamilias. Winthrop clearly saw this isomorphic structure when he accused Hutchinson of having broken the fifth commandment and found her guilty of the “dishonouring of parents”
(Hall 313) on all levels. The seed of her dangerous opinions was the fact that her behavior was “not tolerable nor comely in the sight of God nor fitting for your sex” (312). She had clearly overstepped the boundaries of her gender role, as well as her role as part of the community: “You have stept out of your place, you have rather bine a Husband than a Wife and a preacher than a Hearer; and a Magistrate than a Subject” (382–83). It is important to note, though, that these categories—female versus male, individual versus community—can in fact be seen to be created only within that discourse of the trial. In the same way that Foucault sees the shift of strategies dealing with leprosy or plague as instigating modernity [and with it the ‘constitution’ of categories such as subject, individual, and state], the Antinomian controversy—or, better, the struggle between Winthrop and Hutchinson—might in fact be seen as the first instance in Puritan America in which these concepts were being defined in terms of power relations. By identifying Hutchinson [and, by analogy, Antinomianism] as a virus, Winthrop carefully constructs the dangerous opinions as something that has entered the Body|Politic from the outside—he points out that Hutchinson “had learned her skil in England, and had discovered some of her opinions in the Ship” (Hall 263). Such a construction makes it easier to argue against the virus, to push it out again, out of an otherwise stable and healthy body.

Winthrop institutes a kind of scaling of the communal body in terms of patriarchal chains of representation and command—oedipalizing the whole Body|Politic—and prayer [the covenant of works] clearly involved obedience to the ‘Father’ on every level of the scale [God, magistrates, husbands].12 This “mania for a sub-division that is always in complicity with power and control” (Berressem, “Serres Reads Pynchon”) finds its parallel in the paling of towns and in the cutting up of the land into allotments for different use [forests for timber, potential fields, grassy areas, etc.] and size, according to the social rank of the owner—inscribing the orderly and hierarchical system of English society onto the territory (see Cronon 72–73).13 Appropriately, the Antinomian controversy was paralleled by an intensification of what might be called alien exclusion laws: out of fear that the Antinomian party might grow because of the arrival of more followers from England as new settlers in the colonies, it was ordered in 1637 that “no towne or pson shall receive any stranger, resorting hither wth intent to reside in this jurisdiction, nor shall allow any lot or habitation to any, or intertaine any such above three weeks, except such pson shall have allowance vnder the hands of some one of the counsel, or of two other of the magistrates” (Shurtleff 1:196). The Body|Politic had to be closed off against viruses and alien intruders alike, in order to safeguard its stability. It became more and more difficult, however, to sustain the difference between inside and outside, host
and virus. Winthrop drives the point home even more clearly in a comment on an Antinomian dispute in court: “Another occasion of their discontent, and of the rest of that party, was an order, which the court had made, to keep out all such persons as might be dangerous to the commonwealth, by imposing a penalty upon all such as should retain any, etc., above three weeks, which should not be allowed by some of the magistrates” (Journal 219). As a response to that discontent, Winthrop wrote “A Defence of an Order at Court Made in the Year 1637,” where he stressed the court’s decree that “none should be received to inhabit within this jurisdiction but such as should be allowed by some of the magistrates” (79). Again, Winthrop employed the metaphor of the unitary Body Politic to make his point: “The intent of the law is to preserve the welfare of the body; and for this ende to have none received into any fellowship with it who are likely to disturb the same” (81–82). In this attempt to close it off from the inside, and in on itself, the Body Politic is imagined and treated as a solid object, with fixed boundaries—and it is here that the differentiations between well-knit and perfect bodies, on the one hand, and confusedly knit and monstrous bodies, on the other hand, align with physical states such as the solid and the liquid.14

In identifying and giving contours to the Puritan Body Politic, some of the orthodox players involved in the controversy even compare the community to a huge stone building. In his Survey of the Summe of Church Discipline, Thomas Hooker comments on the architecture and static nature of such a building and states that “in the building, if the parts be neither mortised nor braced, as there will be little beauty, so there can be no strength. Its so in setting up the frames of societies among men, when their mindes and hearts are not mortifi ed by mutuall consent of subjection one to another, there is no expectation of any successful proceedings with the advantage to the publike. To this appertains that of the Apostle, Every one submit unto another . . . Hence evry part is subject to the whole, and must be serviceable to the good thereof” (188, my emphasis). In this extraordinary passage, the terms mortise and mortify almost become one—the building of a stable, solid community cannot be thought of without also asking its members to humble and almost deaden their hearts and minds, their individuality and singularity, in order to combine, to mortise, or, to use Winthrop’s favorite term to knit together into a fixed Body Politic, a “good estate” (Hall 303) in the material sense of the term.

Hooker again refers to the metaphor [is it really a metaphor?] of mortifying and humbling when he claims that “the soule must be broken and humbled, before the Lord Jesus Christ can, or will dwell therein, and before faith can be wrought therein” (The Soules Implantation 3). In a similar vein,
Thomas Shepard claims that “the gate [to heaven] is strait, and therefore a man must sweat and strive to enter . . . it is a tough work, a wonderful hard matter, to be saved” (Works 1:64). Not only is it a “hard matter” to be saved, but the believers had to turn themselves into hard matter, by hard work, to be worthy of God’s grace. The ‘solidification’ of community and individuals follows the idea of a ‘practical theology,’ a Calvinist theology of the body conceptualized by William Ames and John Robinson, in which the idea of ‘proper conduct’ or *eupraxia* is closely connected to the idea of the covenant of works in that it stresses obedience to the law, rigorous activity, and visible good deeds as proofs of the believer’s chosenness by God (see Ames 223–26). According to Robinson, man must “labor . . . in dressing the garden; and . . . eat bread by the sweat of his brow” (113). Furthermore, “labor brings strength to the body, and vigour to the mind” (114). Mixing bodily exercise, lawful discipline, and theology, the concept of *eupraxia* aimed at creating not only bodily strength and laboriousness, but also what Lyndal Roper has called the “musculature of morals” (24)—a ‘theological hard body,’ disciplining and controlling its ‘wetware.’ One way to translate this solidification into the Body|Politic was by means of the magistrates’ control. As Shepard warns apropos of the alien exclusion law, “if you would have the *walls of Magistracy* be broken down . . . Let every man then once one day in the year turn Magistrate, and out-face Authority, and profess ’tis his liberty . . . Would you have this state in time to degenerate into Tyranny? . . . Be gentle and open the door to all comers that may cut our throats in time” (Works 2:160). The solidity and permanence is achieved only by complete subjection to the law, to the massivity of authority that Winthrop and the Intellectual Fathers envision the magistracy to be. However, such a stone-like solidity also implies a discreteness of matter, of a society built of self-contained entities, each one ‘vertically controlled’ by authority in the hierarchical scale proposed by Winthrop. Yet, as Serres observes, “men are not stones, no community can be built in this manner” (Genesis 124). In fact, in the context of the various states of matter of the Body|Politic discussed so far, it can be argued that the solid Body|Politic favored by Winthrop, Shepard, and others is not so much something categorically other to Hutchinson’s fluid and monstrous Body|Politic, but rather the effect of differing time scales of the fluid state of matter as such. As De Landa rightly points out, some solids are in fact “‘arrested liquids,’ that is, they retain the amorphous spatial arrangement of molecules that a liquid displays but flow much more slowly” (Intensive Science 90). Such a hydraulic model of physics treats solids as a case of stasis within flux, as opposed to a solid model of physics that treats liquid as a special case of solidity. Thus, Winthrop’s solid Body|Politic appears not so much built of stones as a slowed down and cooled
viscous fluid, such as magma, a liquid that *appears* to be solid because it “does not have a well defined phase transition from the liquid state” (ibid.). Winthrop|Shepard’s scaling and hierarchization as an act of ‘classing’ follows Serres’ definition: “Classing remains a static act: either it is the result of dynamism becoming exhausted or it is the most effective obstruction against a strong flux, to disperse it between baffles, to slow it down, to stop it, to freeze it” (*Genesis* 93). In Winthrop|Shepard’s case, I argue, it is both—the Puritan orthodoxy is the result of the originary dynamism exhausted, and at the same time a means of controlling those tendencies that still partake in this “strong flux.” The fluidity and turbulence are not *external* but *fundamental* to the solid Body|Politic. Thus, as Serres observes, “the solid is the multiple reduced to the unitary” (*Genesis* 108), the solid reduces and slows down the dynamics of the many into the statics of the one. For the unyielding stone walls of authority, Hutchinson trades the fluidity and dynamics of the whole social field.

The combined coercive power of the magistracy and ministers wanted to ensure the Body|Politic’s stability and order by closing it off and putting a stop to excess and proliferation from both outside and inside—be it of dangerous immigrants, dangerous opinions, or the people’s access to [or limitation of] that control. Up to 1634, the General Court had been composed of the magistrates and all the freemen. As the colony expanded and the settlements spread over large distances, this direct gathering of the community became too time-consuming, and the freemen were represented by the deputies, constituting a separate body in the colony’s government. In order to defend their power against the larger number of deputies, the magistrates claimed their right to have the final word—a magisterial veto, or negative vote—in controversies between the magistracy and the deputies. Seeing the danger of the magistracy’s virtually unlimited power and arbitrary government, the deputies protested. In his reply, Winthrop argued that the negative vote was not an infringement of the people’s liberty but a necessity for the welfare of the Body|Politic and its people, a means to “preserve them, if by any occasion they should be in danger: I cannot liken it better to any thinge then to the brake of a windmill: wch hathe no power, to move the runninge worke: but it is of speciall vse, to stoppe any violent motiō, wch in some extraordinary tempest might endanger the wholl fabricke” (*Life and Letters* 2:434). Popular power has to be suppressed and controlled, not because of the possible limits it might set to the magistracy but because it threatens to destroy and fracture the Body|Politic, dismembering it into disordered, chaotic elements. It is a “violent motion” that is particular dangerous to the Body|Politic insofar its “wholl fabricke”—because of its stony solidity—is too static and too slow to deal with these forces.
It is this fear of the elements—of what is chaotic, turbulent, not predictable, not clearly defined—that informs the Intellectual Fathers’ discourse about the Antinomian party. Edward Johnson visualized Hutchinson and her followers as “this flood of errors violently beating against the bankes of Church and civill Government” (133). Shepard denounces their actions as “Balaamitish ravishments, and hypocritical pangs, and land-flood affections” (Works 2:172), illogical and disorderly strategies that aim at God’s grace not “in way of ratiocination (for this was evidence and so a way of works), but . . . by immediate revelation in an absolute promise” (God’s Plot 65). In Winthrop’s account, metaphors of the elements abound—the Antinomian controversy is mentioned in one breath with uncontrollable meteorological events: “After we had escaped . . . the dangers at Sea, . . . our wise God . . . sent a new storme after us” (Hall 201). As Serres has stated, people are “afraid of gases and liquids” (Genesis 108) because of their unpredictability and disorderly behavior. Since “our metaphysics, metaphorically, feels the effects of our physics” (107), our metaphysics, necessarily, are “metaphorics of the solid” (108). Concepts, ratiocination, are the foundation of that solid [meta]physics.16 Winthrop, Shepard, and Hooker not only refer to the Body|Politic as a solid building, based on a necessary solid foundation—they also have to look for and destroy the foundation of the opposite party: “being driven to the foundation and it being found that Mrs. Hutchinson is she that hath depraved all the ministers and hath been the cause of what is fallen out, why we must take away the foundation and the building will fall” (Hall 318). The Antinomian foundation, however—fluid and turbulent as it is—must be “a foundation [built] in water or on the wind” (Genesis 108).17 In fact, one might argue, the ‘orthodox’ magistracy and ministers feared that the Antinomian party would erode their stable building in their attempt “to pull all that building downe, and lay better and safer foundations in Free Grace” (Hall 204).18 The Antinomians’ ultimate aim, in the eyes of Winthrop and the orthodox party, was to cause the “dissolution . . . of Church and Commonwealth” (299) and to wash away its foundation19—“this was ever their method, to drop a little at once into their followers as they were capable, and never would administer their Physicke, till they had first given good preparatives to make it worke, and then stronger & stronger potions, as they found the Patient able to beare” (206)—simultaneously infecting and dissolving the Body|Politick. Anne Hutchinson [not least because of her claim to an “immediate revelation” (337), which rendered magistrates and ministers alike superfluous] was as uncontrollable20 and ungraspable as a liquid, even in her antipropositional logic: “she doth continually say and unsay things” (347). In her focus on turbulence and dynamic, Hutchinson comes close to that “completely other distribution” (Difference and Repetition 36)
that Deleuze mentions, countering Winthrop’s scaling and compartmentalization of the Body Politic—a distribution “which must be called nomadic, a nomad nomos, without property, enclosure or measure. Here, there is no longer a division of that which is distributed but rather a division among those who distribute themselves in an open space” (36)—the nomad nomos, which from the Oedipal perspective can only be an anti-nomos.

If Winthrop and the Intellectual Fathers saw the Antinomian party as a dangerous fluid, the Spiritual Brethren—in particular John Cotton, whose doctrines Hutchinson closely adhered to—equated fluidity with grace. Following the teachings of Richards Sibbes, Cotton reversed Ames’s emphasis on domination and stressed the believers’ passivity in receiving God’s unconditional grace. As Janice Knight points out, Cotton “favored metaphors of God as effulgent, a fountain of goodness overflowing, or an abundant river of graces pouring forth. The Brethren carefully qualified legalist language that might restrict the freeness of this exuberant flow” (109). In fact, flow, fluidity, the elements—all these metaphors reappear in an affirmative version in Sibbes’s and Cotton’s rhetoric. With regard to the receiving of grace, for example, Sibbes claims that “we must open as that flower that opens and shuts as the sun shines on it. So must we as Christ shines on us; and we ebb and flow as he flows upon us.” (4:298). Cotton, in a sermon that sounds almost like a reply to Winthrop’s use of the image of the windmill, employs the same metaphor, but to a completely different end: “Christ gave us our life, and he preserves it, wee cannot better explain it then thus; A wind-mill moves not onely by the wind, but in the wind; so a water-mill hath its motion; not onely from the water, but in the water; so a Christian lives, as having his life from Christ, and in Christ, and further then Christ breathes and assists, he stirs not” (The Way of Life 276). This example indicates that for the Spiritual Brethren, motion—dynamics, time, history, in short, life itself—is not just something related to a first cause. Life is not just set in motion by a ‘prime mover’: life happens in time and therefore is not just temporal continuity; life is change; life is flow. For Cotton, life is infused by grace, all “naturall, vegetative, or sensitive life”21 is motion, change—in fact, it “is growth, for that which lives, grows” (Christ the Fountaine of Life 138). In this sermon, Cotton also contrasts two different kinds of dynamics: “A thing may move in its place, and yet move from some kind of outward respects; as a Watch, or a Clock, it moves, but it is from the weight that lyes and hangs upon it, and so it is rather a violent motion then a naturall” (129). In contrast to Winthrop’s windmill, it is the mechanical devices, the weights, that give a violent, unnatural motion to the machine, so the movement does not originate in the machine itself but is caused from the outside. Whereas Winthrop’s windmill brake was to stop the “violent motion”
of the wind [i.e., the violent disorder of the multitude], Cotton describes this very motion as the “naturall” one that is then hindered and regulated by such devices as weights and brakes. That there is a highly political dimension to it [a dimension Hutchinson no doubt picked up on and elaborated] is shown by the continuation of Cotton’s sermon: “So is it many times with men, the weight of the Law, or weight of the authority of Governours doth so carry them an end in those waies they walke in, that they goe through with it, and yet it is but from an outward principle, from some outward weights that hangs upon them” (ibid.). Another example of Winthrop’s rhetoric also shows where the physics of the Intellectual Fathers and the Spiritual Brethren differ:

Haveing already sett forth the practice of mercy according to the rule of God’s lawe, it will be useful to lay open the groundes of it allsoe, being the other parte of the Commandment and that is the affection from which this exercise of mercy must arise, the Apostle tells us that this love is the fullfi lling of the lawe, not that it is enough to loue our brother and soe noe further; but in regard of the excellency of his partes giueing any motion to the other as the soule to the body and the power it hath to sett all the faculties on worke in the outward exercise of this duty; as when wee bid one make the clocke strike, he doth not lay hand on the hammer, which is the immediate instrument of the sound, but setts on worke the first mouer or maine wheele; knoweing that will certainly produce the sound which he intends. Soe the way to drawe men to the workes of mercy, is not by force of Argument from the goodness or necessity of the worke; for though this cause may enforce, a rationall minde to some present act of mercy, as is frequent in experience, yet it cannot worke such a habit in a soule, as shall make it prompt upon all occasions to produce the same effect, but by frameing these affections of loue in the hearte which will as naturally bring forthe the other, as any cause doth produce the effect. (“Modell” 39–40)22

Thus, Winthrop sets the coordinates for the foundation of a linear physics of direct cause and effect, of an outside ‘prime mover’ that makes the system work. Yet the relation between cause and effect is anything but linear: it is nonlinear, a looped, crooked path. ‘The [linear] cause’ is nothing but the representation of the function of the sovereign in the discourse of [meta] physics. This conception betrays its kinship and affinity with classical physics and classical thermodynamics, and its idea that once all the laws of mechanics and the initial conditions of a system are known, predictions can be made about what will happen and also what has already happened—since in this system, time is both reversible and fixed, timeless. Winthrop reveals himself as being devoted to a conservative system [a physical system isolated
from the surrounding flows of energy and matter, reduced and tailored to follow a linear equation)—he is a solid-state physicist [the term itself points to the political physics involved here].

But do all these physical concepts work only on a metaphorical level? In “The Geology of Morals,” De Landa has convincingly shown that these concepts function on a very literal, or material, level as well. Discussing social structures, he shows that the use of the term social strata is anything but metaphorical, since “the genesis of both geological and social strata involve the same engineering diagram,” the ‘sorting’ of raw material into a more or less homogeneous group and the transformation into something more than the sum of its parts by consolidation, by cementing. Hierarchical order and status positions are the result of a “crystallization of differential evaluation criteria,” and the subsequent consolidation [or solidification] of the different strata by the combination of “an expressly metaphysical or theological evaluation of different groups and roles with some legal or semi-legal definition of major positions and status” (Eisenstadt 71). Reading power and history [the power to make history] with Foucault, Serres, and Deleuze allows for the conceptualization of power not only as a centralized locus of control, but as the effect of a force field, of feedback loops of the connected elements involved. Thus, with Deleuze|Guattari one can distinguish two different kinds of “states, two tendencies of atomic matter,” both “stratified systems or systems of stratification [the hierarchical social strata] . . . , and consistent, self-consistent aggregates” (Thousand Plateaus 335). One we call orderly and solid—a static, closed system; the other is disorderly and fluid—a dynamic, open system.

The theory of phase transitions ultimately shows that there can be no fixed phases [or stages] at all. If a given element [or human society] can exist at different stages [gas, liquid, or solid], then, De Landa claims, there is no ultimate phase transition in the sense of “progressive developmental steps, each better than the previous one, and indeed leaving the previous one behind. On the contrary, . . . each new human phase simply added itself to the other ones, coexisting and interacting with them without leaving them in the past” (A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History 15–16). One of the pioneers of a kind of ‘materialist history,’ of connecting science and history, Arthur Iberall, comes to the conclusion that the theory that is needed to explain history in scientific terms is not classical physics, nor is it classical thermodynamics, which deals with phase transitions and the idealized, infinitely slow interactions of particles—in other words, with quasi-static processes in closed systems of near-equilibrium, systems left ‘undisturbed.’ But those idealized, closed systems are anything but the norm. Static order is just a temporal slowing down of the overarching dynamics that constitute the
world. Therefore, Iberall states, it is not equilibrium phase transitions that can approximate the dynamics involved, but nonequilibrium transitions, such as “a hydrodynamic transition, a transition like the transition from laminar to turbulent flow, and for the same reason, flow convection, a nonlinear dynamic process” (“Birth of Civilizations” 217). This transition from a laminar, orderly flow to a turbulent one occurs spontaneously. Serres, in his Birth of Physics, traces this notion, which lies at the center of hydrodynamics [and nonlinear dynamics as well] back to Lucretius and Epicurus and their materialist concept of the clinamen, the spontaneous microscopic swerve of atoms away from their vertical fall. According to Lucretius, who develops the theory of the clinamen in his scientific poem De Rerum Natura, without that microscopic deviation, there would be no collision of atoms, no impact, and hence no creation of newness. The theory of the clinamen denies divine intervention in favor of the spontaneous creativity of matter itself. In fact, as Deleuze sees it, the clinamen is not an additional characteristic of the moving atoms but coextensive with the complexity of matter itself: “It is not a secondary movement, which would come accidentally to modify a vertical fall . . . The clinamen is the original determination of the direction of the movement of the atoms” (Logic of Sense 269). Further, Deleuze characterizes the clinamen as manifesting “the irreducible plurality of causes or of causal series, and the impossibility of bringing causes together into a whole” (270)—ultimately, the impossibility of a unitary, solid foundation of a closed system. The clinamen creates turbulences in a striated order; it forms vortices and eddies that connect atoms into temporary alliances, dynamic—and unruly—Bodies|Politic. Thus, it does not come as a surprise when Wilson, in the trial of Hutchinson, implicitly connects the Antinomian turbulences with the theory of the clinamen when he claims that “if we deny the Resurrection of the Body than let us turne Epicures. Let us eate and drinke and doe any Thinge, to morrow we shall dye” (Hall 357).24

To return to Winthrop and the Antinomian controversy: in order to create and establish their brand of Puritanism as ‘orthodoxy,’ Winthrop and his supporters desperately attempted to keep order and disorder—the solid and the fluid—clearly demarcated and separated: “Two so opponent parties could not contain in the same body, without apparent ruin of the whole” (Winthrop, Journal 239). Cotton, who during the Hutchinson trials joined the ranks of the Intellectual Fathers, later couched the controversy in terms of the two phase states and also claims that these cannot coexist in the same body, since this would lead to entropy: “Contrary things being divided one against another, make the whole body of short continuance, one wasting another, till all faile . . . Heat against cold, and moisture against drinesse, work continually one against the other, till all be consumed” (“Briefe Expo-
Another commentator on the controversy, however, saw an alternative to entropy as a possible outcome. John Wheelwright, Hutchinson’s brother-in-law, claimed with regard to Winthrop and Shepard that the controversy “would never have advanced so much, had not the *Antiperistasis* of your vehement prosecution forced them into habit” (190). *Antiperistasis* is a term from Aristotelian physics that was highly debated in the late Middle Ages. It is commonly defined as “the supposed increase in the intensity of a quality as a result of being surrounded by its contrary quality, for instance, the sudden heating of a warm body when surrounded by cold” (Clagett 79). The concept of antiperistasis reveals highly nonlinear dynamic, feedback loops in which a cause is affected by its effect. The “irrepressible dynamic”—as Philip Gura calls it (*Glimpse* 274)—of the Antinomian controversy, then, generated not only the ‘radical’ proponents of free grace, but also Puritan ultraconservatives. As Winship has pointed out, “radical orthodoxy could be just as divisive as radical heterodoxy, and even feed the latter” (227–28). Thus, “disorder was a systemic issue in Puritanism” (228) for all parties involved: Hutchinson and the Spiritual Brethren saw it as a new conception of an alternative Body|Politic; Winthrop, Shepard, and others aimed to use it for a final consolidation of rigid order. Yet despite their efforts to seal and impregnate the Body|Politic, to see and treat it as composed of two incompatible states of matter, the Antinomian controversy shows that this body was anything but solid and stable, anything but in equilibrium. Order and disorder do not exist but as ideal states or abstract extremes—all that is, is in between, in turbulence. It is tempting to see the Antinomian controversy as a *clinamen*; as Patrick Collinson has pointed out, orthodox Puritanism “represented the mainstream, ongoing thrust of the Protestant Reformation” (73). And Winship adds that “the free grace controversy demonstrates how little it took to make the currents of that stream extremely turbulent” (232).

Against the rigid hierarchy of the Puritan orthodoxy to be, Cotton [and Hutchinson, in her more political reading of Cotton’s doctrines] pose dynamics, fluidity, growth, and nonhierarchical tendencies—for example, the members of Hutchinson’s party came from all social ranks and both genders, including simple workingmen and midwives as well as a the future governor, Henry Vane. Hutchinson and her party believed that grace was a question of individual, immediate experience, making ‘mediation’ and ‘representation’ [n + 1] through ministers and magistrates superfluous. Even after her excommunication, an exasperated Winthrop wrote, “Mrs. Hutchinson exercised publicly and she and her party . . . would have no magistracy” (*Journal* 286–87). Grace, as Hutchinson understood it, could be seen as conferring an individuality that cannot be reduced to a belonging
to a group or class. As Serres states, “transcendence had previously granted, in its mercy, election to a group; now transcendence gives identity to the singular” (“Ego Credo” 2). Grace, or faith, is reinterpreted as a strategy to live with uncertainty, with “a contingency that combines certainty and doubt” (4)—ultimately, “the contingency of grace . . . replace[s] the necessity of the Law” (6). Solidity is supplemented by fluidity and flow, necessity by chance, being by becoming.

Winthrop somehow seems to have sensed this is well. In his account of the controversy, the most often used words in connection with Hutchinson and the Antinomian party are “disturbance” and “turbulent,” which ultimately refers to the disturbance created by Hutchinson and her followers in a system otherwise visualized as stable. Yet if an event such as the weekly meetings held by Hutchinson can cause such a ‘change in the system,’ that system must have been far from equilibrium in the first place. Such a system at the edge of chaos is a multiple that cannot be reduced to a unitary concept. It is not ‘order’ in the traditional sense of a fixed and immovable hierarchy, nor is it the opposite, disorder. Serres describes it as “a more exquisite order . . . , one our banal stupidity cannot manage, stiff as a board” (Genesis 109, my emphasis). This intermediate stage between the classical concepts of order and disorder—turbulence—“is a multiplicity of local unities and of pure multiplicities” (110). These multiplicities are dynamically interconnected via feedback loops, and such an open interconnectivity is capable of producing self-organization, whereas in a “near-equilibrium state of minimum entropy production . . . no new organization, no new structure, would be formed” (Lepkowski 30). Winthrop’s dream of a society at equilibrium, like Shepard’s dream of a final phase transition from fluid back to an even more rigid solid [or, at least, a phase transition that gets rid once and for all of the last drops of liquids], sees society according to the physics of solids—a physics that sees the world as a closed system, and that takes quasi-static processes at equilibrium as the rule. Neither dream sees [or wants to see] the fact that what they were dealing with are open, dynamic, and complex systems. Thus, applying nonlinear physics and complexity theory to history, society, and questions of power is not just a metaphorical game. What is at stake is not the substitution of ‘cultural laws’ for ‘natural laws’ but the application of ‘systemic laws’ that underlie both culture and nature, and that are all the more relevant, since historical events and the force fields of power are material events in a very physical sense. As complexity theory sees it, social systems and physical systems share similar operational logics: “This is perhaps the fundamental reason we pursue complexity research. Many social interventions are directed toward controlling the interaction
among types of agents. For example, segregation (and integration) . . . ; entry qualifications to religious and social organizations” (Axelrod and Cohen 21).

These two different conceptions of power—the hierarchical, solid conception of sovereign power, and the dynamic power of becoming and growth—can also be related to Spinoza, so that Winthrop can be seen in the Hobbesian and Hutchinson in the Spinozian conception of the Body|Politic. In his Ethics, Spinoza differentiates between two conceptions of power, a differentiation that is largely lost in the English translation. Spinoza distinguishes between potentia [force, strength, creative activity] and potestas [command, authority, ultimately sovereignty]. God’s power [potentia], according to Spinoza, “is his very essence,” and “whatever we conceive to be in the power [potestas] of God necessarily exists” (30). However, this does not just mean that since God is necessarily creative his creation, too, is necessary; it subordinates potestas to the continuing actualization of potentia: God’s sovereignty over the world is, in reality, nothing other than his world making. The political impact of this distinction emerges in Spinoza’s unfinished Political Treatise, where, as Antonio Negri claims, in Spinoza’s “political physics” (The Savage Anomaly 194) the multitude becomes “a productive essence” (195)—the potestas of the sovereign is actually the potentia of the people. Thus, the potestas of the sovereign, Deleuze claims, is not “a third party who gains by the contract made by individuals” (Expressionism 226), a power that is then solidified by the law, but the potentia of the multitude, a dynamics of growing, becoming, and self-organization.
The Angel and the *Animalcula*

If John Winthrop and the first generation of New England Puritans can be regarded as both connecting and being suspended between feudal structures of sovereignty and modern structures of government, then Cotton Mather can be considered a transitional or liminal figure oscillating between the fundamentally religious outlook on life of the Renaissance and the Reformation and the more secular approach of the Age of Reason—a clergyman and engaged lay scientist at the threshold of the Enlightenment. Mather’s struggle to reconcile science and religion, or the natural laws and the law of god, encapsulates the ambiguity of his time. A man given to visions of angels, who defended the outcome of the Salem witch trials, he is considered to be the “the first significant figure in American medicine” (Beall 102). In addition, his “Curiosa Americana”—a series of letters to the Royal Society in London on American natural phenomena that included descriptions of the moose, rattlesnake, and other indigenous animals as well as reports on earthquakes and thunderstorms, and that were published in the Society’s *Philosophical Transactions*—demonstrated his abilities as an accomplished scientist and observer, and in 1713 led to his becoming the first American colonist to be elected a Fellow of this prestigious Society. He also corresponded extensively with leading scientists of his times, such as Robert Boyle.

Seventeenth-century science from Bacon through Newton was quite different from classical science, although seventeenth-century scientists like Boyle and Newton were inspired by their classical predecessors. One of the main differences is that scientists in the seventeenth century took a fundamentally hermeneutical and ultimately scriptural approach to nature, often manifested in frequent references to the Bible and the so-called Book of Nature, a remnant of medieval—and also alchemist—culture that saw the world itself as a book “in which the pages are turned with our feet,” as Paracelsus put it (quoted in Curtius 322). As Mather states in *The Christian Philosopher*, a book that seeks to align religion and the science of Mather’s...
time, “Chrysostom, I remember, mentions a Twofold Book of God; the Book of the Creatures, and the Book of the Scriptures... We will now for a while read the Former of these Books, ’twill help us in reading the Latter: They will admirably assist one another. The Philosopher being asked, What his Books were; answered, Totius Entis Naturalis Universitas. All Men are accomodated with that Publick Library. Reader, walk with me into it, and see what we shall find so legible there, that he that runs may read it” (17).

Countering the traditional Calvinist view of nature as inherently flawed, this much more positive assessment saw nature as a magnificent demonstration of God’s wisdom and creativity. With regard to the “twofold book of God,” it may also be noted that Mather, in his encyclopedic scientific works, reveals an attempt to incorporate “the Book of the Creatures” into his own scriptures.1

The close connection between humanist disciplines such as history, natural philosophy, and scientific studies in the baroque era—many of the leading scientists, like Mather, were also historians and antiquarians—might be considered as part of the background of the search for signs in nature, a privileged Puritan strategy: an interpretation of signs that was mainly founded in the deep faith of most scientists in God as the creator of the universe. The difference between the realm of genuine scientific research and that of religious belief was noticed by scientists like Boyle and Newton, but their separation, was more a programmatic concession than a real practice. Mather’s intellectual influences span a period that touches both post-Renaissance science, which interpreted texts, and Newtonian science [the new science that Mather was so interested in], which observed nature. Despite Mather’s scientific inclinations, he was a man of faith, seeking the meaning of creation. In his ‘baroque science,’2 there is no clear break between the alchemism and hermeneutics of a Paracelsus or van Helmont, the Galenic interpretation of the humors of the body, and the rigorous quantitative and experimental method that characterizes Enlightenment science. Astrology was still a part of astronomy, and alchemy was mixed with chemistry and physics. Studies of nature were strongly inspired by the scriptures. Yet advances in science and technology also made their way into the baroque consciousness. The perfection of the telescope and microscope made possible accurate optical measurements and the discovery of the wonders of the newly visible world, a world infinitely greater than that of the medieval cosmos.

With regard to medicine and science, it has been generally held that the Puritans had no interest in them as autonomous disciplines. As one commentator put it, “what we call natural science, was not something which the Puritans were afraid of... as it was something entirely irrelevant to their interests and problems” (Schneider 42). Yet an oscillation between a
teleological, religious conception of the world and a more naturalistic one can be detected in Mather’s writings. As he saw it, religion and science need not be mutually exclusive; in fact, since both disciplines could be seen to glorify the work of God, in their harmonious coexistence the one could benefit from the other. In fact, Mather was the only Boston clergyman who attempted to adapt Puritan cosmology to a contemporary scientific framework. His interest in medicine, however, followed a hundred-year-old tradition in New England of ministers who were involved in medical matters. Harvard College was the center of knowledge in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and its professors taught the majority of the colony’s physicians and ministers. In the daily practice, these two roles often went hand in hand: many ministers were also physicians, treating both body and soul of their parishioners: “As Jehovah’s chosen ‘ambassadors,’ the ministers served as his special arbitrators, helping both to heal the sick and to avert disease in their communities” (Watson 3). The ministers and lay people of colonial New England were very confident of the link between the spiritual and the physical realm. It was widely believed that God caused disease as punishment for sin, either on a personal or a community level. It was common to send for a minister as well as a doctor when one fell ill, and some people felt the minister was more important. However, as physicians were rare in colonial America, patients often had no choice about who to send for: ministers and pastors often were the only doctors available.

Mather was keenly aware of the role that ministers played in medicine, particularly ministers in Massachusetts. In his Magnalia Christi Americana, Mather praises Thomas Thacher, the Boston pastor and physician who published what is considered the first recorded medical treatise in the American colonies:

The last that I shall mention of the excellencies that signalized this worthy man shall be his claim to the accomplishments of an excellent physician. He that for his lively ministry was justly reckoned among “the angels of the churches,” might for his medical acquaintances, experiences, and performances, be truly called a Raphael. Ever since the days of Luke the evangelist, skill in physick has been frequently professed and practised by persons whose more declared business was the study of divinity . . . our English nation has commonly afforded eminent physicians, who were also ministers of the gospel. But I suppose the greatest frequency of the angelical conjunction has been seen in these parts of America, where they are mostly “the poor to whom the gospel is preached,” by pastors whose compassion to them in their poverty invites them to supply the want of able physicians among them, and such an universally serviceable pastor was our Thatcher. (1:493)
Mather had wavered between becoming a minister or a physician, in part because of a speech defect that might have prevented him from succeeding as a preacher. Although he ultimately opted for the clergy, the “angelical conjunction” of medical matters and ministry remained part of his life.

As both Puritan minister and scientist, Mather was deeply interested in the human body. As Robert Middlekauff points out, “no Puritan of Cotton Mather’s day studied carnality more devotedly than he” (279), always turning to his own body, looking for signs of debasement or sin. Once when he had a toothache, Mather reported in his diary: “About the Middle of this Month, I lost abundance of precious Time, thro’ tormenting Pains in my Teeth and Jawes. . . . In the Pains that were now upon mee, I sett myself, as well as I could for my Pains, to search and try my Ways. I considered, I. Have I not sinned with my Teeth? How? By sinful, graceless excessive Eating. And by evil Speeches, for there are Literae dentales used in them” (Diary 1:24).

The controversy during the 1721–22 smallpox epidemic in Boston provides a good example of Mather’s brand of new science and medicine. From the mid-seventeenth century on, epidemics of smallpox were immensely feared in Europe, since no cure for the disease was known. Macaulay describes the serious threats and ravages of smallpox in his History of England: “That disease, over which science has since achieved a succession of glorious and beneficent victories, was then the most terrible of all the ministers of death. The havoc of the plague had been far more rapid: but the smallpox was always present, filling the churchyards with corpses, tormenting with constant fears all whom it had not yet stricken, leaving on those lives it spared the hideous traces of its power, turning the babe into a changeling at which the mother shuddered, and making the eyes and cheeks of the betrothed maiden objects of horror to the lover. Towards the end of the year 1694, this pestilence was more than usually severe” (4:566–67). Presumably originating in the East, smallpox swept through Europe and was transmitted to America by the colonists. Prior to the introduction of inoculation, there had been six outbreaks of the disease since the arrival of Winthrop’s Arbella. The medical historian James Mumford notes: “When the eighteenth century opened, the population of the English colonies in North America was about three hundred thousand; when it closed, the United States numbered nearly four millions; and at the beginning of that era, of all the foes our ancestors faced,—hardship, famine, pestilence, Indian and foreign wars,—the most dreaded was the small-pox” (41–42).

A major outbreak of smallpox—the third since the beginning of the Massachusetts settlements—occurred in 1689–90, due to the arrival of an
infected ship from Barbados. The first and only issue of Publick Occurences, New England’s first newspaper, reported:

The Small-Pox which has been raging in Boston, after a manner very Extraordinary, is now very much abated. It is thought that far more have been sick of it than were visited with it, when it raged so much twelve years ago, nevertheless it has not been so Mortal. The number of them that have dyed in Boston by this last Visitation is perhaps not half as many as fell by the former. The time of its being most General, was in the Months June, July and August then ’twas that sometimes in some one Congregation on a Lords-day there would be Bills desiring prayers for above an hundred Sick. It seized upon all sorts of people that came in the way of it, it infected even Children in the bellies of Mothers that had themselves undergone the Disease many years ago; for some such were now born full of the Distemper. ’Tis not easy to translate the Trouble and Sorrow that poor Boston has felt by this Epidemical Contagion. But we hope that it will be pretty well extinguished by that time twelve months since it first began to Spread. It now unhappily spreads in several other places, among which our Garrisons in the East are to be reckoned some of the greatest Sufferers. (quoted in Monaghan)

Boston suffered twice from epidemics of smallpox in the first quarter of the eighteenth century: in 1702–3, when scarlet fever was also present and about 300 people died, and in 1721–22. There was also a measles epidemic in 1713. In between the two smallpox epidemics, Mather’s approach to illness changed considerably. In an essay written during the 1702–3 epidemic, completely in line with the Calvinistic view of illness as a result of sinful living, Mather declared that the “Sickness of any one in the family is by the Providence the Great God has bro’t upon them. Tis Atheism in us . . . if we see not the Providence of God in it, when Sickness threatens to lay any of us or of ours, in the Ground” (Wholesome Words 2). Sin, according to this line of argument from orthodox Puritanism to which also Mather adhered, was the first and only cause of sickness: “When Health is taken away from any of us, tis by the Hand of Him, who is, The God of our Health. It was the Creation of God, which put our Body’s in their good Order at the first: If Sickness put our Body’s out of Order, there is the Providence of God, ordering of it” (3). This Calvinistic doctrine owes much to the Platonic concept of the ‘original’ idea and the ‘degraded’ simulacrum [deficient copy, or copy of a copy], according to which, as Deleuze puts it, “God made man in his image and resemblance. Through sin, however, man lost the resemblance while maintaining the image. We have become simulacra” (Logic of Sense 257). In sickness—the visible sign of sin—the image itself is being corrupted as a consequence of the loss of resemblance: “Are we Sick? We must Esteem
ourselves to be *Stricken and Smitten of God, and Afflicted* . . . The Pale, the Swollen, the Wasted, & perhaps the Spotted Faces of the Sick in the Family, are such as our Heavenly Father has been spitting upon: Shall *He Spit in our Faces, and shall we not be Ashamed*?” (Mather, *Wholesome Words* 3–4). As a consequence, “a *Sick Person* should be more Desirous to be Delivered from *Sin*, than from *Sickness*. Be more *Sick of Sin*, O *Sick Man*, than of any *Sickness*” (18) since purging oneself of sin is ultimately intended to restore one to some resemblance to God.

Ten years later, during the Boston measles epidemic of 1713, Mather wrote a tract containing medical advice. Here his voice is much more compassionate, much more sympathetic with the suffering of the infected. He worried that the medical profession in Boston might oppose his views, but the very want of doctors in Boston justified and called for charitable action: “I *know* not (and . . . , I may add, I *Care* not,) what *Censures* this Action may meet withal. I am sure, nothing but a pure *Act of Charity to the Poor*, where *Physicians* are wanting, is now intended; nor any thing offered, but what a Number of our most Eminent *Physicians* have approved of, with their Charitable Wishes to have it Communicated” (Letter about a Good Management 4). Although in *Wholesome Words*, God appears as a hard and merciless punisher of the sinful, here he is referred to as “the Glorious *god*, who is, *The Lord our Healer*” (Letter about a Good Management 1). As Maxine Van de Wetering has convincingly argued, Mather reveals a decisive shift in his approach to the body and illness. In later works such as *The Christian Philosopher* and *The Angel of Bethesda*, he constantly oscillates between these two views of illness—on the one hand, as God’s just punishment; on the other hand, as a state of human suffering to be compassionate about. Still, Mather’s 1713 *Letter about a Good Management* definitely “signals a deemphasis on death-oriented Calvinist orthodoxy in favor of a new beneficence and life-oriented compassion” (Van de Wetering 59), a shift for which the influence of pietism—Mather’s almost obsessive urge to do good—and his interest in both science and medicine were responsible.

On April 22, 1721, a new smallpox epidemic began in Boston. The disease arrived from the West Indies with HMS *Seahorse*. As the disease became increasingly lethal, its control and treatment became an ever more pressing medical problem. On May 8, the Boston Board of Selectmen—the elected city administrators—noted in their minutes that “a *Certain Negro man* is now sick of the Smal pox in the Town, who came from Tertudos in His Majesties Ship *Seahorse*, which renders it likely that distemper may now be on board of that Ship. Therefor for the preservation of the Inhabitants of this Town, Voted that John Clark, Esqre., be Desired to go on board his Majesties Ship *Seahorse* and Report in what State of health or Sickness
the Ship’s Company are in, especially with respect to the Smal Pox or other Contagious Sickness” (Boston Selectmen 81). The minutes also noted that “a Certain negro man Servant to Capt. Wentworth Paxton of Boston is now Sick of the Smalpox at his masters House.” The board posted guards outside houses where the disease was suspected to have taken hold, and a law was passed requiring that “the Streets & Lanes within this Town be forth with Clensed and the Dirt removed to prevent the Small pox spreading” (82).

Whereas the common treatment for smallpox [in addition to isolation and repentant prayer, which Mather also recommended] was bleeding, purging, and vomiting, Mather’s approach to the epidemic was based on a combination of firsthand observations and readings in scientific literature. He was introduced to the method of inoculation by his slave Onesimus, who had been presented to Mather on December 13, 1706, as a gift of his “Flock,” and whom he felt the obligation to turn into “a Servant of Christ” (Diary 1:579). In a letter of July 12, 1716, after reading in the Philosophical Transactions of 1714 an account by Emanuel Timonius about smallpox inoculation as practiced in Constantinople, Mather wrote: “I do assure you, that many months before I mett with any Intimations of treating ye Small-Pox, with ye Method of Inoculation, any where in Europe; I had from a Servant of my own, an Account of its being practised in Africa. Enquiring of my Negro-man Onesimus, who is a pretty Intelligent Fellow, Whether he ever had ye Small-Pox; he answered, both, Yes, and, No; and then told me, that he had undergone an Operation, which had given him something of ye Small-Pox, & would forever praeserve him from it; adding, That it was often used among ye Guaramantese, & whoever had ye Courage to use it, was forever free from ye fear of the Contagion” (quoted in Kittredge 422).

It is not clear if Mather asked Onesimus about the procedure of inoculation in 1706—in a diary entry, he mentions only the acquisition of his new servant—or later, yet Mather’s crusade against smallpox can justly be said to have begun at that moment.

In a later tract that was probably published by the Boston physician Zabdiel Boylston, who had no medical degree but who had been an apprentice to another local physician, Mather states that he confirmed his slave’s account by interviewing other African witnesses. He had asked “a considerable Number of Africans in this Town, who can have no Conspiracy or Combination to cheat us. No body has instructed them to tell their Story . . . And I don’t know why ’tis more unlawful to learn of Africans, how to help against the Poison of the Small-Pox, than it is to learn of our Indians, how to help against the Poison of a Rattle-Snake” (Some Account 9). Basing on these references and personal observations his insistence on the need for testing the procedure of inoculation, Mather announced in his 1716 letter
that “for my own part, if I should live to see y e Small-Pox again enter into or City, I would immediately procure a Consult of o Physicin, to Introduce a Practice, which may be of so very happy a Tendency” (quoted in Kittredge 422). Mather recounted all the incidents [as well as recycled much material from his letters and tracts] in his 1724 work The Angel of Bethesda. This treatise, which is named after a description in John 5:2–4, is an outstanding example of his attempted synthesis of religion and medicine.6

When the 1721 smallpox epidemic began, Mather had been concerned for many years with the practice of inoculation based on the accounts both in the Philosophical Transactions and of the Africans he had interviewed, and he was prepared to take action. On May 26, 1721, he noted in his diary: “The grievous Calamity of the Small-Pox has now entered the Town. The Practice of conveying and suffering the Small-Pox by Inoculation, has never been used in America, nor indeed in our Nation. But how many Lives might be saved by it, if it were practised? I will procure a Consult of our Physicians, and lay the matter before them” (Diary 2:620–21). Zabdiel Boylston, the only physician in Boston whom Mather could convince to try the inoculation procedure, wrote that Mather made a transcription from “the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, the Accounts sent them by Dr. Timonius and Pyllarinus of inoculating the Small-Pox in the Levant, and sent them to the Practitioners of the Town, for their Consideration thereon” (1–2). After a few days of hesitation and a further, personal letter by Mather, Boylston inoculated his two slaves and one of his sons on June 26. In Boston, controversy immediately erupted, but Boylston, observing the success of the inoculation with his first patients and urged on by Mather, went on to inoculate fourteen other people within the next sixweeks, including two more of his own sons and Mather’s son Samuel. Despite the protests of the public and the Boston medical profession, and various actions taken against him by the Selectmen, Boylston continued to inoculate people throughout the smallpox epidemic, backed up by Mather and the Boston ministry. By February 26, 1722, Boylston had inoculated 242 individuals, of whom only six died, and these deaths may have been due to previous infections or to causes other than smallpox (see 50). In Boston altogether, of the approximately 5,800 people infected by smallpox during the epidemic, about 840 had died. Thus, compared to a mortality rate of 2.5 percent among those who were inoculated, there was an overall mortality rate of 15 percent among the people ‘naturally’ infected instead of inoculated. The statistics proved Mather and Boylston right. The inoculation experiment ultimately was a tremendous success.7

The smallpox controversy has generally been interpreted as a struggle between ministers and the medical profession.8 One of the points I want
to make, however, is that this controversy—in addition to a shift in the valorization and metaphoricity of the ‘real body’ that Mather’s medical writings during and after this period reveal—also highlights tensions within, and an attempt to restructure the institutional body of, the medical profession itself. William Douglass, Mather’s chief opponent in the Boston medical profession, attacks the Boston ministry as a whole, those “Praying, Preaching, Scribling” clergymen, who, with at most “third hand” knowledge of “physick,” nevertheless “meddle in Matters not in the least appertaining to them” (Inoculation 4) and interfere with the medical practitioners. Knowing Mather’s preference for scientific literature, but also despising his tendencies toward pomposity and self-righteousness, Douglass in his criticism also aims at one of Mather’s weakest points,—his pride: “What volumes of Physick and Mathematicks he may have swallow’d down without chewing, I cannot say! But I know so much of his constitution, he is naturally troubled with indigestion” (Postscript 3). Considering the traditional role of the clergy, Mather’s opponents also employed religious arguments—is it not a sin to afflict a healthy body with a disease, contrary to God’s plan? Thus, Douglass repeatedly points out Mather’s “Abuse of the Scripture” (Abuses 3). Or was it even a crime, against the law? As early as May 1649, a revised and updated version of the Body of Liberties included an act warning: “Forasmuch as the Law of God allows no man to impeare the Life or Limbs, of any Person, but in a judiciall way. It is therefore Ordered, That no person or persons whatsoever employed at any time, about the bodyes of men, women or children for preservation of life or health, as Chirurgeons, Midwives, Physicians or others, presume to exercise or put forth, any act, contrary to the known approved rules of art . . . nor exercise any force violence or cruelty upon, or towards, the body of any, whether young or old (no not in the most difficult and desperate cases) without the advice and consent of such as are skilfull in the same art” (Book of the General Lavves 18–19). A concise definition of the “known approved rules of art,” however, was missing, and the fact that medical services was most often performed by ministers and laymen as well as practitioners also attests to the abstractness of such a law. Mather himself refuted the unlawfulness of inoculation with regard to the divine law in a letter to James Jurin of the Royal Society, stating: “I always thought the Word of the blessed God had instructed us that for our physic as well as our food, every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused if it be received with thanksgiving” (Selected Letters 363). Nor did Mather believe that the knowledge and the benefit of inoculation should be limited to Boston. True to Winthrop’s vision of the City upon a Hill, Mather wrote: “One would think here was an experiment enough to instruct a country; yea, to instruct a nation” (365). Interestingly, the cure
should spread like the disease itself—proliferation and communication are seen as a means to inoculate the whole body of the nation.

In connection with both the ‘untimely’ knowledge of inoculation and the BodyPolitic, it is important to note that Mather relies on the testimony of his own slave, Onesimus, as well as on the reports of other African slaves in Boston. In *The Angel of Bethesda*, Mather takes pride in his fieldwork with the African slaves. His report also provides one of the earliest instances of a written rendition of Creole English, adding authenticity to the testimony: “I have since mett with a considerable Number of these *Africans*, who all agree in One Story; That in their Countrey *grandy-many* dy of the *Small-Pox*: But now they learn This Way: People take Juice of *Small-Pox*; and *Cutty-skin*, and Putt in a Drop; then by’nd by a little *Sicky, Sicky*; then very few little things like *Small-Pox*; and no body dye of it; and no body have *Small-Pox* any more” (*The Angel of Bethesda* 107). Slaves—if they were regarded as belonging to the BodyPolitic at all—were situated at the outer extremities of that body, mere hands and bodily working power, with no access to knowledge whatsoever. Thus, Mather’s decision to base his arguments on their testimony is particularly noteworthy. Kittredge calls it “one of the most remarkable features of Mather’s advocacy of inoculation” (435), and Beall and Shryock point out that “there entered into the situation what might be termed an African background to American culture” (98). When the Boston pro-inoculation ministers were criticized for adopting knowledge used by African slaves, the Reverend Benjamin Colman responded by saying that white citizens must “be willing to learn from the poorest slave in town” (16), and Mather and Boylston denounced any expression of the view that it would be “unlawful to learn of *Africans*.”

Douglass and the anti-inoculationists regarded Mather’s and other ministers’ credulous reliance on the slaves’ testimony as a monstrous folly. In a letter to his London friend Alexander Stuart, commenting on Mather’s statement that “the more plainly, brokenly, and blunderingly, and like Ideots, they tell their Story, it will be with reasonable men, but the much more credible” (*Some Account* 9), Douglass ridicules Mather’s African sources and his reliance on “half a Dozen or half a Score *Africans*, by others call’d *Negroe Slaves*, who tell us now (tho’ never before) that it is practised in their own Country. The more blundering and *Negroish* they tell their story, it is the more credible says C.M.; a *paradox in Nature*; for all they say true or false is after the same manner. There is not a Race of Men on Earth more *False Lyars*, &c. Their Accounts of what was done in their Country was never depended upon till now for Arguments sake . . . O Rare *Farce!*” (*Inoculation* 6–7). The notion of “farce” is paralleled in Douglass’s rebuttal of a pro-inoculation pamphlet written by Isaac Greenwood. In his *Postscript to
Abuses, &c. Obviated, which he composed as an answer to Greenwood’s satirical text, Douglass defines the genre of burlesque: “Burlesque is a kind of continued Irony representing the lowest abject Persons as Heroes . . . of the Farce” (1). In an isomorphic step, then, Douglass implicitly states that Mather’s credulity regarding the testimony of a race of liars is also a burlesque in which he represents the “lowest abject Persons”—the African slaves—as heroes.

Douglass goes even further in denouncing the black slaves in his comments on what he sees as an undisputable [however ambiguous] advantage of the temporary warding off of smallpox: inoculation “consequently may be of great Use of the Guinea Traders, when the Small Pox gets among their Slaves aboard to inoculate the whole Cargo, and patch them up for a Market; . . . tho’ to the great Damage of the next Purchasers” (Inoculation 20). Also, in an article meant to be ironic, published in The New England Courant in 1721, Douglass suggested using inoculation as a weapon against the Indians. For every native killed by inoculation, there should be a “Gratitude” of five pounds for the inoculators, and a higher reward of ten pounds for any who survived and spread the disease, in addition to “their usual Fees and travelling Charges” (“A Project”). Commenting on Mather’s argument that England was also experimenting with inoculation, Douglass concedes this but also points to a crucial difference between the practice in England and New England: in the mother country, “Tryals were made . . . by Permission of the Government on the Bodies of Persons dead in Law” (Abuses 10). The overall cynical tone of Douglass’s pamphlets gives the impression that the main difference between England and New England is the approval of the government: the status of criminals is comparable to that of slaves.

As he promoted the practice of inoculation, Mather continued to study the question of why this procedure protected the inoculated from future infection with smallpox. In The Angel of Bethesda, he wrote:

Behold, the Enemy at once got into the very Center of the Citadel: And the Invaded Party must be very Strong indeed, if it can struggle with him, and after all Entirely Expel and conquer him. Whereas, the Miasms of the Small-Pox, being admitted in the Way of Inoculation, their Approaches are made only by the Outworks of the Citadel, and at a Considerable Distance from it. The Enemy, ’tis true, gets in so far, as to make Some Spoil, yea, so much as to satisfy him, and to leave no Prey in the Body of the Patient, for him ever afterwards to seize upon; but the Vital Powers are kept so clear from his Assaults, that they can manage the Combat bravely and, tho’ not without a Surrender of those Humours in the Blood, which the Invader makes a Seizure on, they
oblige him to *march out the same Way he came in*, and are sure of never being troubled with him any more. (112)

Mather argues that the different outcomes of cases of smallpox due to inoculation compared with those acquired by natural infection were not a result of the relative weakness of the inoculated material, but of the location of the infection. This coincides with the findings of modern research. Naturally acquired smallpox is an effect of airborne infection, replicating in the mucus membranes of the respiratory system and moving to the lymph nodes. This leads to a high concentration of the virus in the infected person’s blood; the virus moves to other internal organs and finally to the skin to generate the pox. The actual cause of death is the damage done to the internal organs, “the very *Center of the Citadel*.” With inoculation, the virus is introduced directly into the skin, and the viral replication in the respiratory and lymphatic systems and invasion of the blood is prevented. A much weaker and generally milder disease develops, with the pox erupting sooner in inoculated cases: the virus “march[es] out the same Way he came in.” Another point of Mather’s hypothesis worth mentioning is his statement that the virus leaves “no *Prey* in the Body of the Patient, for him ever afterwards to seize upon.” Here Mather is suggesting that some substratum wears away after infection or inoculation, and due to this fact the disease does not develop in the same person for a second time. More than 150 years later, Louis Pasteur reached a very similar conclusion when he stated that it was possible to become resistant to a specific type of infection once the germ dies, due to the absence of its necessary substratum in the patient’s body. Mather is mapping out a germ theory—in his own term, an *animalcular* theory—of infectious disease. Beall summarizes: “The significance of Mather’s knowledge of the animalcular theory becomes clear when it is realized that not until about 1880 was it a generally accepted theory in America and that Mather’s statement antedates by eighty-three years what appears to be the earliest animalcular hypothesis published in America—that of John Crawford of Baltimore . . . in 1807” (113–14).

Mather’s choice of words also oddly foreshadows a claim Emily Martin has recently made, a claim that in turn aptly describes some of the strategies Mather is employing in the way he handles smallpox. “Anthropology and the Cultural Study of Science,” Martin observes that the sciences today curiously present themselves as set apart from their sociohistorical context, as citadels, as “‘a fortress that commands a city, both for control and defense.’ What sets the sciences apart is that they claim to construct reality but not to be themselves constructed” (26). Yet, science in fact is part of a larger reality, and the walls separating science from society are rather permeable, so,
sticking with the metaphor, “it is as if we thought of science as a medieval walled town, and it turns out it is more like a bustling center of nineteenth-century commerce, porous and open in every direction” (29). In order to show how scientific [or medical] knowledge within the citadel is connected to processes, events, and people outside, Martin refers to Deleuze|Guattari’s notion of the rhizome, since it well captures “the kind of discontinuous, fractured and non-linear relationships between science and the rest of culture” (31). Not surprisingly, Martin then chooses research on the immune system as an example of how such rhizomatic knowledge [related to experience, directly connecting thought to life] is applied to the body [which is also understood as a rhizome].

Reading Mather’s account of the citadel, and his stressing of the immense importance of the “outworks” in the healing process, the connection to the actual outworks of the Body|Politic cannot be missed: the folk medicine of slaves, the help of medical practitioners, and traditional healing techniques derided as the wisdom of heathens, madmen, and old women by those deep within the center of the citadel—these are all instances of a knowledge derived from the ‘extremities’ of the Body|Politic, the manual workers, and it is here that “the supreme distinction between the intellectual and the manual, the theoretical and the practical, modelled upon the difference between ‘governors’ and ‘governed’” (Thousand Plateaus 368) that Deleuze|Guattari comment on holds. By his willingness to “learn of Africans” or “from the poorest slave in town,” Mather opens up the citadel to the outworks. Douglass attacks on Mather’s reliance on the testimony of slaves can be seen as part of a wider unwillingness of the medical profession to accept lay knowledge and folk medicine, a refusal to ‘open up’ the citadel of academic knowledge to its outworks. Thus, he writes that inoculation, if it is to be practiced at all, must be “prosecuted by abler hands than Greek old Women, Madmen and Fools” (Inoculation 20). Beall and Shryock point out that in the case of inoculation, “an old folk practice gained access . . . to . . . Western science” (98). As a folk custom, inoculation had been been practiced in Africa, China, India, and other Asian countries for centuries—thus, it was a folk practice that was either nonwhite [the slaves’ reports] or ‘heathen’ [the case histories from the Levant]; accordingly, the anonymous author of the pamphlet A Letter from One in the Country proposes that the procedure of inoculation should be left to the “Turks and Pagans, whence it came” (8). In the case of the Boston smallpox controversy, then, there is a clash of what Deleuze|Guattari see as “two formally different conceptions of science” (Thousand Plateaus 367): [major] “royal science” or “State science” is invaded by [minor] “nomad science” (362). As a consequence, “nomad science is continually ‘barred,’ inhibited, or banned by the demands and conditions
of State science”—witness the attacks on the procedure of inoculation based either on scriptural arguments or medical authority. “State science continually imposes its form of sovereignty on the inventions of nomad science” (362), since the rhizomatic connections between the different loci of the ‘invention’ of smallpox—the folk medicine of the Levant and the West Indies, the various attempts to introduce inoculation into Western Europe [Lady Montague in England, Voltaire in France]—were ultimately bundled and sanctified by academic “royal science.”

This process of appropriation culminated in the accepted theory of vaccination with the cowpox virus, an improved, controlled, and less dangerous form of inoculation introduced by Edward Jenner. Yet even this accepted history of immunology shows the importance of folk practices and the testimony of ‘nonprofessional’ persons. Jenner, who discovered the practice of vaccination in 1796, is said to have been informed by milkmaids who had developed cowpox from contact with cow udders that they were protected from the human form of the disease. Jenner’s subsequent experiments raised their folk wisdom to the status of a scientific fact, indelibly connected to his name. A whole history of experimentation was reduced to the metaphysics of origin that demands one name as a trademark. The model for a nomad science “is one of becoming and heterogeneity, as opposed to the stable, the eternal, the identical, the constant” (Parish 361).

Although these two conceptions of science have “different modes of formalization” (362), they are not inscribed in a hierarchical relation. Rather, they share a “single field of interaction” and are folded into each other alongside a “constantly shifting borderline.” Royal science perpetually appropriates the inventions of nomad science, while nomad science “continually cuts the contents of royal science loose” (367). Royal science follows the “legal or legalist model” (369), looking for absolute laws. In its tendency to control science and the productive forces of the governed, royal science aims at always “taking over management” (368). On a judicial level, the search for absolute laws in science also implies the judgment of what is lawful and what is not in the practical operations of science. Thus, Douglass counters the need for unorthodox action [in the case of how to deal with smallpox] with references to the state and legislation: in England, “the king did descend to allow this [i.e., inoculation] to be tryed on a few condemned Criminals” (Inoculation 10). Thus, without royal consent, the carrying out of inoculation in Boston is “by the penal Laws of England Felony” (13). Inoculation, if to be practiced at all, “must first be allowed of by Acts of the Legislature” (20). State science turns out to be a science both sanctioned by and in service of the state. In addition, Douglass seems to have realized that what was at stake was not only a medical, but also a political, question.
Anticipating the political implications that Mather was to draw from his conflation of medicine [body] and politics [community], Douglass warned: “If a Man may make free with his own Body Natural, because in Conscience he thinks he ought to do so, this not only countenances the old Roman Doctrine of _felo de se_, but is also a considerable step towards the making free with the Body Politick, _v.g._ He foresees something like to be _amiss_ in the _State_, which in _Conscience_ he is obliged to prevent by a _lesser Illness_ or _Commotion_” (12).

One of the examples of nomad science Deleuze|Guattari refer to, as they illustrate their concept in _A Thousand Plateaus_, is the medieval journeymen’s associations, “the nomadic or itinerant bodies of the type formed by masons, carpenters, smiths, etc.” (368), and their approach to the building of the Gothic cathedrals. “Scattering construction sites across the land” (ibid.), these workers and artisans did not have recourse to an architect’s plan, reproducing a theoretical blueprint, in order to deal with the problem of weight distribution in the construction of high vaults. The _conceptual_ difference is pointed out in terms of different _relations_ to the material: “the static relation, form-matter, tends to fade into the background in favor of a dynamic relation, material-forces” (364). The skill of the workers is, in effect, their submission to a dynamic relation, a rhythm of construction defined by the material and its requirements, and not by mathematical and theoretical imperatives imposing the law of a _normalized form_ on obedient matter. Nomad science appears to be a form of production that marks an _excess_ over the disciplinary regulations of royal science.

The Boston smallpox controversy has been widely regarded as an effort on the physicians’ side to defend their authority in questions concerning medicine, and, accordingly, to limit the authority of the clergy “to interfere with and control the life of the community” (Blake, “Inoculation Controversy” 503). This is certainly a very important factor. Yet I would like to shift the dividing line with regard to the distinction between the two conceptions of science discussed so far, and connect it to the rise of the institutional body of the medical societies and their attempt to fix and regulate the more open and decentralized system they encountered in the colonies. In the course of the quarrel—in addition to ridiculing the testimony of slaves and the reliance on medical folk practice—Douglass, the only M.D. in Boston, continuously attacked Zabdiel Boylston, one of his opponents, as being merely an ignorant practitioner, making him part of the group consisting of credulous clergymen, lying and untutored Negro slaves, and old Greek women. Commenting on the medical situation in Boston, Douglass complains: “We abound with Practitioners, but no other graduate than myself” (“Letters from Dr. William Douglass” 164). In a letter published in the _Bos-
ton News-Letter under the pseudonym of W. Philantropos, Douglass de-
rides Boylston’s status as a practitioner, calling him a “certain Cutter for the
Stone” (“Open Letter”) who lacked a medical degree. To that insult, Mather
and four other pro-inoculation ministers—Benjamin Colman, Thomas
Prince, John Webb, and William Cooper-Boylston— replied that Boylston
“has not had the honour and advantages of an Academical Education, and
congruently not the Letters of some Physicians in the Town, yet he ought by
no means to be called Illiterate, ignorant, &c.” (“Reply”). Douglass self-
consciously and thoroughly embraces the perspective of state science that
parallels the dichotomy of major and minor science with the “supreme dis-
tinction between the intellectual and the manual, the theoretical and the
practical” (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 368). An Englishman
who had been educated in Edinburgh, Paris, and Leiden, receiving his M.D.
from the University of Utrecht in 1712, Douglass scorned and harshly
criticized minister physicians such as Mather and the apprentice-trained
doctors such as Boylston. Judging from the often rash and cynical tone of
his letters, Douglass seems to have entertained a professional prejudice
against learning acquired outside university walls. Commenting on the com-
mon practice of employing doctors like Mather or Boylston, he declared
that “frequently there is more Danger from the Physician, than from the
Distemper” (Summary 2:351).

John Williams, a Boston apothecary, articulates his stance in religious
terms, claiming that Mather and other Boston ministers “bring not their
argument from Scripture, but from the History of Places where it was prac-
ticed, and plead the lawfulness of it from the event, which we believe is no
safe way for Christians to argue” (14). Williams’ dichotomy sets scripture
[God’s plan] apart from practice and experiment. As Deleuze|Guattari ob-
serve, “in the nomad sciences, as in the royal sciences, we find the existence
of a ‘plane,’ but not at all in the same way. The ground-level plane of the
Gothic journeyman is opposed to the metric plane of the architect, which is
on paper and off site” (Thousand Plateaus 368). In Williams’s argument,
there is a hint of a transformation from a scriptural to a more materialist
realm. According to the more religiously inclined anti-inoculationists, one
of Mather’s main faults is that he does not resort to a ‘lawfulness’ derived
from holy writ, but to an experiment, to a strategy of bricolage derived from
‘the event’—even history itself is in danger of no longer being seen as a teleo-
logical development according to God’s will. Instead it seems likely to be-
come concentrated inlas an ‘event’ in the Deleuzian sense, closely related to
nomad science, which privileges the geographical over the historical. Masons,
smiths, journeymen—all are characterized by a specific relation to space:
“Nomads have no history; they only have a geography” (393).
Indeed, one of the most distinguishing characteristic of the early American medical practitioners was their mobility. Since medical practitioners [to say nothing physicians with a medical degree] were rare, apprentice-trained men moved across the country to make a living, employing their knowledge where it was needed. Small towns and communities tried to make sure that medical support was within reach. On December 26, 1639, Dr. Giles Firmin, who had a received a grant of land on the condition that he stayed in Ipswich, Massachusetts, complained to Governor John Winthrop on behalf of the nomadic practitioners who “range from place to place on purpose to liue vpon the Country” (210). Before the mid-eighteenth century, there was scarcely any person whose only occupation was medicine. Minister physicians and apprentice-trained doctors relied on both old English folk remedies and Native American healing techniques, revealing a willingness to experiment with new medical approaches. Yet the early transfer of English culture to the colonies certainly did not involve what Daniel Boorstin has called the “attic-full of institutions” (229), referring to the formal medical hierarchy of the English guild system.14 These guilds made strict separations among university-educated physicians, surgeons, apothecaries, nurses, midwives, and so forth. As the elite among medical men, physicians [at least in England] only practiced among the upper class, their peers. Thus, there is also a social reason why the early colonists consulted other practitioners instead of ‘real physicians.’ In addition, only a few physicians immigrated to the colonies, in part because in the colonies—like in the rural parts of England—“there were no opportunities worthy of their prestige” (Shryock 9). But whenever a trained physician with a degree was in town, he showed a profound hostility to the rank and file of other practitioners and their kind of ‘folk empiricism.’ Douglass wrote in The New England Courant: “Let us be thankful that we have skilful Physicians and others, who are capable to minister Advice and Relief to the Sick, and that we are not left to the blind Conduct of Empiricks and Montebanks, whose Knowledge extends to a few ill-pronounce’d hard words, but no further” (“Letter”). Yet, much to the chagrin of the educated medical elite, the uneducated practitioners, and not “graduates of Edinburgh or founders of some medical society, who, for better or worse, formed the bulk of the profession, provided most of the medical care, and gave the profession its prevailing tone” (Bell 498). As Shryock has pointed out, the “ideals of the guild,” as set up mainly in London and Edinburgh, where Douglass was educated, established that at least “theoretically, as gentlemen and scholars, physicians did not work with their hands as did surgeons, nor should they engage in trade as did apothecaries” (3). And even if a case could be made that the strict English guilds’ distinctions and ideals had at least to be modified in
the colonies’ environment and social reality, the claim of superiority of
the physicians over their poorly trained country cousins remained. In an
almanac for 1765, Nathaniel Ames Jr. derides the practitioners as “idle
persons . . . some of them commence Quacks, and call themselves Doctors,
having seen a Man that saw another Man cured of a foul Gunshot by hot
Oil of Turpentine and heard their Grandmother say that Carduus Tea will
vomit” (1). Moreover, over the years, a pattern of general medical practice
had established itself in the colonies that was unacceptable to the physi-
cians, since it basically reflected the standard of what in the English system
was associated with the guild of surgeons and apothecaries, the class of
mere practitioners with which no gentleman would identify. From the first
quarter of the eighteenth century onward, British-trained and university-
educated physicians in, for example, Boston and New York were generally
eager to import the hierarchical and elitist structure of the English medical
profession.

William Douglass was a founding member of the first Boston Medical
Society in 1735. In a letter of February 17 of that year to Cadwallader
Colden in New York, another physician of Scottish descent and reputedly
one of the most learned colonists of the time, Douglass announces an early
step in the formal organization of what would soon become state medical
societies: “We have lately in Boston formed a medical society” (“Letters
from Dr. William Douglass” 188). The fact that Douglass describes it as “a
virtuoso society” shows the high aspirations and pretensions of the group.
Aiming to emulate the strict formality and hierarchy of the English model,
Douglass’s early society “dealt with the question of registration of regular
medical practitioners throughout the province” (Burrage 2). One of their
official announcements presents the group as “a Medical Society in Boston,
New England, with no quackish view of the manner” (quoted in ibid.). An-
other medical society’s inaugurating document said that one of the group’s
objectives was “to get the Profession on a more respectable footing in the
Country by suppressing this Herd of Empiricks who have bro’t such intoler-
able contempt on the Epithet Country Practitioner . . . We don’t know what
Objections there may, there have been such Societies in Boston and where
medical Academies are established & Empiricks are punished by Law there
is not so much need for them.”15 British medical professionals were pushing
forward a movement to bring Massachusetts institutions into conformity
with the English guild structure. Ultimately, this meant not only a repudia-
tion of “the medical practice of locally apprenticed physicians, clergymen,
and laymen all over Massachusetts; it implied a repudiation of . . . an . . .
open, fluid, and decentralized standard [that] had flourished” (Brown 44) in
the Massachusetts Bay Colony.
Whereas state science proceeds from hierarchy and from rational theorems, nomad science is “problematic, rather than theorematic” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus* 362). Such an approach proceeds from the problem itself, finding a solution by using the material at hand, and not a preestablished theoretical framework, concentrating on “the accidents that condition and resolve it” (ibid.) instead. Mather confirmed the experimental character of his approach. Attacked for favoring and pushing forward the procedure of inoculation, he proclaimed himself a pure empiricist on the smallpox issue. As Sacvan Bercovitch has observed with regard to Mather’s affinity for science, he was an “avid dilettante, with an encyclopedic range of interests and a predisposition toward the experimental and pragmatic” (“Cotton Mather” 130). Mather voiced his criticism of a one-sided, theoretical medical logic: “Of what Significancy are most of our Speculations? experience! experience! ’tis to thee that the Matter must be referr’d after all; a few Empirics here, are worth all our Dogmatists” (*An Account* 8).

In what follows, I will position Mather’s understanding and involvement in the testing of inoculation in the wider context of his view of the human body, as he explains it in *The Christian Philosopher* and *The Angel of Bethesda*. Mather’s interest in science and medicine over the years had influenced his attempt at handling the smallpox crisis in a different way, just as this experience in turn informed the writing of those works—his two most detailed scientific writings, which are an amalgam of old and new, blending an alchemist’s [Galenic, Paracelsian] and a vitalist’s [largely Helmontian] views of body and universe with findings of the ‘new science.’ *The Christian Philosopher* [published in 1721] and *The Angel of Bethesda* [finished in 1724, but never published during Mather’s lifetime] were both written during Mather’s early research on inoculation and putting it into effect. The significance of Mather’s scientific and medical writings certainly does not lie in the fact that he created a new and original ‘natural philosophy’—most of the time, his books seem to be mere compendiums of other authors’ scientific findings, generally consisting of long quotations, spiced with an occasional observation with relevance to New England. What is important, however, are the facts that these books expounding the new scientific ideas were written in New England, where these ideas were little known, and that they were written by Cotton Mather, whose Calvinist and first-generation Puritan heritage was particularly at odds with at least some aspects of the worldview he was promoting. In addition, Massachusetts’s “legal and social systems, perceptual frameworks, and social and cultural imperatives were inevitably in large measure British in origin” (Elliott xii), but provincial in nature. Within that framework, Mather tried to create a difference. In many respects, Mather can be seen as reinterpreting the ‘New England way’ as a middle way, steer-
ing its course through various oppositional forces, expressing his “American Sentiments” (Diary 2:625) against the “formality” (Wonders 65) of English high culture, which had invaded and put roots into American culture, in his view. Refusing “to follow unswervingly the intellectual fashions of his English peers, or to conform with their divisions, particularly in the field of medical science” (Breen 340), Mather, in an awakening of regional pride, rather asks what—in terms of science and medicine—can be expected of the colonies, as “our little New England may soon produce them that shall be commanders of the greatest glories that America can pretend unto” (“Way to Prosperity” 137). Thus, Mather carved his own middle way [which he liked to see as representatively American] not only through theology and science, but also through mechanist and vitalist philosophy, iatromechanist and iatrochemical approaches, blending what in England seemed to be unbridgeable, hard-lined, and bitterly antagonistic camps.

Mather’s reservations about the [as he saw it] narrow-minded and one-sided English approach to science and medicine was political not only in tone and intent, I argue, but also as regards content. I am not so much interested in the scientific accuracy of Mather’s writings as in his concept of the body, and the political consequences that might follow from such a concept. The colonies’ negotiations with England about their charters at the end of the seventeenth century had posed a troubling question for New England, in both religious and political terms: was Massachusetts only another British colony, or an independent Body|Politic? To put it in terms of the Puritan project: was New England still an elect nation, engaged in the building of a new Jerusalem? If Puritan influence was declining, that was at least partly because of the unwillingness or inability of the Puritan clergy to synchronize and synthesize heterogeneous intellectual traditions, and to update them according to the times. Jeffrey Jeske has rightly argued that this historical moment, in addition to a spreading confusion, might also result in a variety of voices: “Juxtapositions of Calvinism, Scholasticism, humanism, and seventeenth-century ideas produced strange hybrids, offering multiple personae to the orthodox thinker” (583) to choose from. A more unorthodox thinker, it follows, might even want to make exactly this multiplicity of voices his own, a multiple persona rather than multiple personae. In fact, in his writings, Mather can be seen to adopt “different personae with contradictory philosophical assumptions, depending on situations and audience” (584)—a “polyphonic subjectivity” to back up his discursive strategy of the ‘middle way.’

In one of his letters Mather, one of whose favorite personae was that of the minister physician, explicitly draws the analogy between the individual body and the Body|Politic with regard to medical treatment. Since this
document has until now remained unpublished, it deserves a somewhat longer quotation:

It is a Principle among some Politicians, *If the People will be deceived, let them be so*: And perhaps in one Case it may be admitted; namely, when the People are in a bad State and ugly Frame, then it may be proper to use some methods to impose on them in order to recover them from such a State & Frame, and bring them from a wrong & lustful Way and put them in a right and good One.—For so skilful and prudent Physicians sometimes use their Patients, who are not capable of judging and choosing for themselves: They represent Things in a plausible and striking manner to them, and so lead them to take what they utterly dislike, and thus they gain the mastery of their distempers and happily cure them. And, when such a method as this is allowed with regard to the Natural Body for its Benefit; why may not the same method be indulged for the Advantage of the *Body Politic*? Not that I would recommend the Use of any Arts in this case, which are in Fact *morally Evil*. But yet perhaps in some cases People may be innocently and honestly amused and imposed on, so as to be brought into a safe and comfortable Condition.

But this Principle will not hold good, nor ought it to be allowed, but only in Favor to People and from Regard to their Welfare [illegible] there are to be found Politicians, falsely called so, who, while the Poor People are willing to have it so, are [so?] deceiving them, and that not for their Benefit and Comfort, but to their Loss, Detriment, and Ruine.

And, as I apprehend, this is the Truth with regard to those naughty persons among us, who, when the Government is in a fair Way of being recovered to a sound and healthy State, take Pains to deceive and impose on the honest and wellmeaning People, and endeavor to make them believe that they are in a bad way and that the only method of setting them to rights must infallibly ruine them. ("A Political Letter")

Taking this letter at its word comes close to an invitation and a license to politicize Mather’s writings about the body, and to read his medical and scientific texts in conjunction with his political tracts and sermons, using them all to draw conclusions about his theory of the Body|Politic.

Mather’s writings, then, operate on the interface of medicine and politics, body and community. These discourses clash with and influence each other within the framework of Puritan theology, which, however—because of the impact—is significantly transmogrified in the course of events. If Winthrop started with a theological framework [God’s law], from which certain concepts of the Body|Politic derived, Mather proceeds from scientific|medical knowledge of the body, which suggests different models for the Body|Politic and which also results in a theological framework that stresses the produc-
tivity of the world more than the wrath of God. It is within this context of several attractors that Mather’s forays into both politics and science have to be read, and it is this complexity of approaches that make Mather’s thrust into modernity by advocating inoculation more than just “a lucky shot” (P. Miller, *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province* 348) in the work of an otherwise supposedly antiprogressive and vain, repressed and repressive Puritan bigot, as Perry Miller would have it. It might be fruitful to assume that the strategy of illustrating political issues in medical language also works the other way around. And indeed, a highly political vocabulary informs Mather’s medical treatises and writings on the body, just as in many of his sermons and writings that address question of politics, Mather uses medical terms. The wider political implications of the question of inoculation were also evident to Mather’s opponents. I will therefore take a look at Mather’s medical and scientific writings, examine their sometimes unexpressed and possibly unintentional conclusions, and see what reading them in a political frame of reference might reveal.

*The Christian Philosopher* is much more a general overview of the new sciences of the universe and of man, whereas *The Angel of Bethesda* concentrates mainly on medicine, mixing together a collection of traditional, herbal household remedies and more modern approaches, and culminating in Mather’s formulation of an early germ theory of illness—closely related to his experience with the smallpox epidemic—as well as his notion of the *Nishmath-Chajim*, both of which I will comment on later. In both works, Mather attempts to bridge the gap that separates the scientific view of the world from a theological outlook. In adopting the role of a physico-theologian, Mather tries to span and embrace both discourses. *The Christian Philosopher* is in many ways the mirror image of a large opus that Mather never finished or published, the “Biblia Americana.” While the “Biblia Americana” aimed at presenting a *scientific religion*, *The Christian Philosopher* tackles the problem from the side of a *religious science*, shifting the emphasis very strongly to the scientific part. As the book’s subtitle makes unmistakably clear, *The Christian Philosopher* presents the “Best Discoveries in Nature, with Religious Improvements.” Symptomatically, in its exploration of the findings of the new science, the book takes John Ray’s *Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation* as a model, while its structure closely follows that of the book of Genesis, beginning with an essay called “Of the Light,” moving through essays on the elements, minerals, vegetables, and animals, and culminating in the section “Of Man.”21 “The Body of Man,” Mather writes, is both “a Machine of a most astonishing Workmanship and Contrivance”, as it is “a Temple of God” (*The Christian Philosopher* 237)—Mather is reading findings from the field of anatomy first
of all within a Cartesian framework. However, he soon comes up with reservations against a merely mechanistic view. In the chapter “Of the Four- Footed,” he makes clear where his main difference with and objection to Descartes lie: —“The Opinion of Descartes, and Gassendus, and Willis, and others, That the Soul of Brutes is material, and the whole Animal a meer Machine, is clogg’d with insuperable Difficulties” (226), a point he shares with Leibniz’s critique of the Cartesian mechanics that conceived of nature as a stable structure, where matter was inactive and every force external. And although Mather’s point of departure is somewhat different from Leibniz’s —after all, Leibniz was not so much seeking scientific accuracy as he was developing a philosophical system, whereas Mather was interested in scientific and medical ‘facts,’ and his work provides nothing of the inherent coherence and systematics of a Leibniz, but is more of a heterogeneous compendium—the ultimate conclusions that can be drawn definitely bear traces of convergence with Leibniz’s thought in important respects.

In a famous quotation, William James denounced the times “when Leibnitzes with their heads buried in monstrous wigs could compose Theodicies, and when stalled officials of an established church could prove by the valves in the heart and the round ligament of the hip-joint the existence of a ‘Moral and Intelligent Contriver of the World’” (42). Thus, by analogy to Deleuze’s Leibniz, this chapter will present a similarly philosophically de-wigged Mather. Mather, like Leibniz, as Deleuze states, was situated at “the threshold of the Enlightenment” (The Fold xii), and like Mather, “Leibniz turns his back on Cartesianism. He renews the tradition of Van Helmont and is inspired by Boyle’s experimentation” (7). The most important aspect of Leibniz’s philosophy with regard to my analysis of Mather’s thought is his connection of mechanism and what might be called vitalism, materialism, and metaphysics. In his Monadology [1714], Leibniz speculated that the universe, in both its spiritual and material aspects, was made up of an infinite number of infinitely small ‘force centers’—the monads, which for Leibniz are “the true atoms of nature” (Philosophical Texts 268), indivisible and without windows. Since the monads—which vary in kind, according to their capability of perception [and even apperception]—fill all spaces, everything in the universe is connected. Matter and monads, body and soul, are connected not by influence, but by a preestablished harmony presided over by God, the supreme monad. It is not within the scope of this study to prove that Leibniz influenced Mather. Yet I think it is strange that what Voltaire called the best of all possible worlds these two men never met, intellectually. Despite their differences, these two coevals share many things: both were deeply interested in the material world and its connection to metaphysics; both were Fellows of the Royal Society of London; their work reveals similar
influences; and the theories and concepts of both reveal a fascination with and an indebtedness to the invention of the microscope. As Robert Mulvaney has shown, there has been little scholarly attention to the place of Leibnizian theory in American philosophy. Mulvaney himself cites two nineteenth-century thinkers as early proponents of the reception of Leibniz’s work in the United States, and notes that its influence was mainly on transcendentalist thought. Yet there is reason to suggest that Leibniz’s name was known in Boston society as early as 1704, the time when Mather was working on The Christian Philosopher and his other scientific writings. As a young man, Jonathan Belcher, son of a Boston merchant and governor of Massachusetts from 1730 to 1741, went on the grand tour of Europe in 1704, where he met the Electress Sophie, Leibniz’s friend and correspondent, and mother to the future English King George I—who, as a Protestant, ensured the security of New England congregationalism—a meeting that proved helpful in his later efforts to become governor. In his diary entry for September 11, 1704, Belcher describes his visit to the library of Frederick I, the Prussian king, “where we met with one Mr. Leibnitz, with whom we had an hour or two’s conversation. He is mighty civil and obliging. He is president of the Academy of Sciences, which the King has lately Erected” (quoted in Crockett 82). As Michael Batinski rightly observes, Belcher did not mean to keep this journal for himself. Aimed at showing the aspirations of an ambitious young man, Belcher “wrote with an audience at home in mind. His accounts of Europe’s splendid palaces and lofty cathedrals, the historic sites, religious customs, and social life were intended to provide several evenings of pleasant entertainment and conversation among his family and friends in Boston” (12). It is likely that Mather, who knew Belcher, also came across what I think is the earliest document of contact between the American colonies and Leibniz.

Talking about the body of man, Mather oscillates between descriptions of scientific observations, ranging from anatomy to what we today would call biology, and praise of God, the creator of that “astonishing” machine. As “the Lord of this lower World . . . who is to do the Part of a Priest for the rest of the Creation” (The Christian Philosopher 236), man in this account curiously retains the image of and resembles God on a smaller scale. And in Mather’s anatomical account and praise of the “erect Posture of Man” (238), where “all the parts of the Body [are] so disposed as to poise it! All in a nice Equipoise” (239), it is not so much sin that makes the body crumble into pieces, that is responsible for man’s ‘fall,’ but “Nature’s Law of Equilibration [which] should always be observed”—if instead “it be transgressed or neglected, the Body necessarily and immediately tumbles down.” The “Law of Equilibration,” similar to the general harmonious structure pervading the universe as a whole, is in fact the coordination of the virtual
multiplicity of the body’s forces, its speeds and intensities, synergizing the “great . . . variety of Motions” (239) the body is capable of. In the much earlier chapter “Of Gravity,” Mather introduces the idea of the universe as a vast machine, engineered by God. The “Great GOD not only has the Springs of this immense Machine, and all the several parts of it, in his own Hand, and is the first Mover; but . . . without His continual Influence the whole Movement would soon fall to pieces” (95). If not necessarily common in New England, this trope of the mechanical universe [mainly borrowed from Cartesian mechanics, but with an obviously much greater emphasis on the divine presence in the machine] had been employed by other Puritan ministers as well, to praise the regular and mostly smooth functioning of God’s creation. In 1726, Samuel Willard speaks of the universe as a machine, admiring “the harmony of the whole in all its parts . . . its nature being every way adapted to the place it bears: every wheel in this curious watch moving aright” (Compleat Body of Divinity 38), alluding to the trope of God as the ultimate watchmaker. Mather also seems to be in line with that way of thinking, subscribing to a divinely enhanced but still fairly mechanistic theory that encompasses both man and the universe as a whole. I will show that this is only part of the truth, however: Mather, I argue, goes much further than just repeating this traditional trope.

Mather had already used the trope of the clockwork universe, but he had taken his cue both from a different source, and for a different occasion. In a sermon delivered on April 1689, titled “The Mystery of Providence,” Mather commented on the Glorious Revolution, the news of which had just shortly before reached Boston. Choosing Ezekiel 1:16 for the motto of his sermon—“the fashion of the wheels and their work was like unto a chrysolite: and they four had one form, and their fashion, and their work was as one wheel in another wheel”—Mather’s exegesis can be read as justifying the revolution by being in line with the providence of God who ‘engineers’ the state and fate of human affairs: “The Revolution of the world is ordered by y’e providence of God in a manner very so intricate, but yet very Glorious” (“Sermons 1680–1722,” my emphasis). Ostensibly concerned only with God’s providence in the general machinations of the world, stating that “God is in all things making way for y’e Best Issue & Event that can bee, His glory,” Mather’s suggestive choice of words cannot be a mere coincidence, given the context of the fresh news from England. Since all the wheels and parts of this clockwork mechanism are intricately and inextricably interconnected, the effects of the ‘revolution’ at one end of the world machine has resonances and effects everywhere else: “A wheel makes a Noise in y’e Turning of it. So, when y’e world is turned upside down,—all y’e Earth rings of it.—yea, & y’e Heaven too.” Mather’s image of resonating forces that af-
fect the whole universe expresses in more overtly religious and mechanistic terms a position quite close to Leibniz’s view. Unlike Newton, who believed in a vacuum, a space substantively empty of matter, Leibniz held that “all matter is interlinked. In such a plenum, any movement must have an effect on distant bodies in proportion to their distance. Each body is affected by the bodies which are in contact with it, and in some way or other feels the effect of everything that happens to them” (“Monadology,” Philosophical Texts 276). This ‘resonance effect’ comprises more than just the influence of adjacent bodies: “In addition, by means of those bodies with which it is in direct contact, it also feels the effects of all the bodies which they are in contact with, so that such communication extends indefinitely.” Mather’s “noise” of the turning wheel is Leibniz’s indefinitely extended communication of mutually affecting bodies, like the circles that a stone creates when thrown into water, so that “as a result, every body feels the effects of everything that happens in the universe” (276).

This sounds almost prophetic, given the fact that in the course of the negotiations over the charters, in which Cotton’s father, Increase Mather, was a principal player, Boston revolted against the royal governor of Massachusetts, Sir Edmund Andros. The nullification of Massachusetts’s original charter, granted to John Winthrop, had turned the colony into an administrative dominion of England, governed and controlled by a governor not elected by the people, but by a non-Puritan representative of the Crown—Puritan self-government had been abolished in one quick stroke. In the absence of his father, Increase, who at that time was in London trying to persuade the king to reinstall the old charter, Mather was involved in the revolt in Boston and the overthrow of Andros. Edward Randolph, the deputy auditor of Boston, wrote that “the world may not bee any longer deluded with Lyes and shams: that the Rebellion here is the act of all the poeple where as onely Morton Minister of Charlestown Moode Allen young Mather Willard and Milborne the Anabaptist preacher with some of the principal members of all their churches and some of the Old Magistrates were the chiefe designers of it yet they calld God Almighty into the plott, saying that twas providentially done that all the people rose vnamously” (6:312–13). In addition to being one of the “chief designers” of the upheaval, Mather even seems to have accommodated a ‘revolutionary cell’ in his house. Randolph reported in a letter to William Blathwayt, another royal officer: “I send you a booke putt out by young Mather. The Epistle to Mr. Winthrop showes what great hopes the church men had of his turning Rebel to serue their Turn this Mather had a meeting of Armd men at his house” (6:291).

From the perspective of the royal officers, Mather’s activity must have seemed antimonarchical—which indeed it was. However, it has to be noted
that the ministers’ position was an ambiguous one. Apart from those ‘moderate’ clergymen and merchants who saw the status of dominion governed by England as a way to connect New England more closely to the mother country, both politically and economically, ministers such as the Mathers attempted to prove to the new monarchs that the colony was fit for self-government, and had curious stance in regard to the more rebellious and active forces in New England. On the one hand, it was [in good measure] justified as a means to do away with tyranny; on the other hand, open anarchy and disobedience had to be condemned and suppressed in order to keep the king in good spirits. Thus, when Cotton Mather and others drafted The Declaration, of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of Boston, they were carefully but willfully positioning themselves ‘in between’: this tract can be read as underscoring the colony’s loyalty against being “attaqu’ed by the French” (Declaration 1), but it also openly announces the possibility of seditious tendencies against maltreatment of [the officers of] the crown, for whom “the only difference between them [i.e., New Englanders] and slaves is their not being bought and sold . . . Accordingly we have been treated with multiplied contradictions to Magna Carta” (2). Divine providence, it seems, had chosen Mather to respond to the “noise” that the turning of the wheels in the machine had caused. The idea of the machine provides Mather with two different political ideas: revolution as a stance against tyranny and oppression [this was how Cotton Mather, a loyal son, regarded the deeds of the Puritans of the first generation], and the idea of providence as good government. In the body-as-machine, these ideas merge with Mather’s ‘double articulation’ of the Body|Politic and the questions related to the good government of, and care for, this body.

The Christian Philosopher’s further comments on the “machine” that man is considerably stray from the mechanist image to a more biological and chemical one, an image that became even more prominent in The Angel of Bethesda. Using as a scriptural hook the same quote that John Winthrop had used in “A Modell of Christian Charity” to lay down a model for the workings of the Body|Politic—1 Cor. 12: 14–26: “God hath so tempered the Body together, that the Members should have the same care for another, and if one Member suffer, all the Members suffer with it!” (The Christian Philosopher 244)—Mather enters the realm of the body’s capacity for self-healing, the “Provisions made in the Body of Man to stave of Evils” (241). This is a remarkable step away [or, rather, a revision of and expansion on] the traditional mechanist trope: “How astonishing the Methods and Efforts of Nature to set all things to rights . . . in most Wounds, if kept clean and from the Air, the Flesh will glue together with a native Balm of its own; and . . . broken Bones are cemented with a Callus, which they themselves
help to make” (243). Even diseases in general are far from being “useless, for the Blood in a Fever, if well govern’d, like Wine upon the fret, will discharge itself of all heterogeneous Mixtures” (ibid.). Thus, the body, under ‘good governance,’ is able to heal itself—and it is even more astonishing that in this context, which basically asks for the common association of disease and sin, Mather refrains from making it. Moreover, in the next passages, he even hints at the fact that this ‘government of the body’ need not necessarily be a ‘centralist’ one. As the ‘democratic’ structure of the body according to St. Paul suggests, there is an egalitarian relation between the organs. The management of the body is not [or at least not only] controlled by the head or the heart, but also regulated by ‘sympathies,’ by affinities and almost ‘transversal’ alliances between other organs and parts of the body: “What inexplicable Sympathy which there is between Diseases of the Belly and those of the Skin . . . What a Sympathy between the Feet and the Bowels” (244)—here one can find another example of the importance of the “outworks of the citadel.”

These various subsystems are contained within the envelope provided by the skin: “And what better Covering were it possible for the whole Body to have, than the Skin; whereof the Microscopical Views given by Cowper in his Anatomy, must give a vast Surprize to us!” (241). The particular point about this covering, in the scientifically grounded view of the skin to follow, is that, in contrast to the impermeable skin of the early Puritan Body|Politic, Mather’s account of the skin points to its intricate foldedness and permeability: “The Scarf-skin examin’d with a Microscope, appears made up of Lays of exceeding small Scales, which cover one another more or less, according to the different Thickness of the Scarf-skin in the several Parts of the Body; but in the Lips they only in a manner touch one another” (246). Leeuwenhoek’s microscope—an important reference for Leibniz as well—provides a view of the infinitely porous structure of the skin responsible for one level of interaction of the organism with the outside: “Leuenhoecck reckons that in one cuticular Scale there may be five hundred excretory Channels, and that one Grain of Sand will cover one hundred and twenty-five thousand Orifices, thro which we are daily perspiring. What a prodigious number of Glands must there be now on the Surface of the whole Body!” (246–47). The body for Mather, it seems, is a system of heterogeneous aggregates, and the logic of the montage-like text here clearly mirrors the structure of the body itself: the chapter on the body, “Of Man,” is as heterogeneous as the ‘object’ it attempts to describe. These interacting subsystems that constitute the body are situated within a permeable envelope. This permeability of the skin, no longer signifying [and also not functioning as] a clear boundary between inside and outside, for Mather provides an important
site of a dynamic interaction between body and world, as his foray into the praxis of inoculation has shown.

Yet, amid all those transversal alliances, Mather still identifies a center: the heart. But if he assigns to it the function of the engine of the body-machine, he does so only in terms of its importance for the circulation of the “Vehicle of Life”: “The Divine Workmanship about the heart, who, that has any Heart, can forbear admiring of it, with most sensible Acknowledgements! This is that admirable Bowel, which with its incessant Motion distributes the Blood, the Vehicle of Life, throughout the whole Body. From this Fountain of Life and Heat, there are Conduit-Pipes even to the least, yea, and most remote Parts of the Body. ’Tis the Machine, which receives the Blood from the Veins, and forces it out by the arteries, thro the whole Body” (279). Yet, even this center is not a real one in the sense that of the heart as an organ that depends on no other, but on which all others depend. Mather hastens to add that “the Heart and the Brain do notably enable one another to work” (280). Stressing the importance of the blood, Mather comments on the mutual interdependence of brain and heart, observing that “the Brain cannot live unless it receive continual Supplies of Blood from the Heart, much less can it perform its Functions of preparing and dispensing the Animal Spirits; nor can the Heart afford a Pulse unless it receive Spirits or something descending from the Brain by the Nerves” (ibid.). It seems indeed to be the intricate system of conduits and their structure—visualized by Mather in terms of a tree, but described in a more rhizomatic fashion—that for him is of the utmost importance and most remarkable here: “About the Blood, this is admirable; the Branches which go off at any small distance from the Trunk of an Artery, unite their Channels into one Trunk again, whose Branches likewise communicate with one another, and with others; whence it comes to pass . . . that when any small Artery is obstructed, the Blood is brought by the communicating Branches to the Parts below the Obstruction, which must otherwise have been deprived of their Nourishment. And in the Veins there is the like Provision, that so justly surprizes us in the Arteries” (290).

Although he does not explicitly mention William Harvey and his discovery of the blood’s circulation [Mather does include an almost verbatim quotation from Harvey’s quantitative analysis of the heart capacity], Mather seems to have accepted Harvey’s shift from the importance of the heart to his emphasis on blood and its circulation—an important factor in a ‘politicized’ reading of Mather’s scientific/medical text. As court physician to James I, Harvey had dedicated his seminal study, known as De Motu Cordis, published in 1628, to the king: “Most Gracious King, The heart of creatures is the foundation of life, the Prince of all, the Sun of their Micro-cosm, on which all vegetation does depend, from whence all vigor and
strength does flow” (*The Anatomical Exercises* vii). By analogy, and in perfect accordance with the metaphor of the monarchical BodyPolitic, “likewise the King is the foundation of his Kingdoms, and the sun of his Microcosm, the Heart of his Commonwealth, from whence all power and mercy proceeds” (ibid.). Harvey’s pivotal contention in *De Motu Cordis*, in line with Aristotle’s cardiocentrism, was the primacy and sovereignty of the heart itself, and he drives this point home while referring back to the metaphor established in his dedication: “The heart is the first subsistent . . . the heart, as a sort of internal animal, consists longer, as if Nature by the making of this first, would have the whole animal afterwards to be made, nourish’d, preserve’d, perfected by it, as its own work and dwelling place. The heart is as it were a Prince in the Commonwealth, in whose person is the first and highest government every where; from which as from the original and foundation, all power in the animal is deriv’d, and doth depend” (115). Self-consciously referring to the possible influence of a political reading of the scientific treatise, Harvey also stresses its pedagogical model character: “The knowledge of his own Heart cannot be unprofitable to a King, as being a divine resemblance of his actions (so us’d they small things with great to compare). You may at least, best of Kings, being plac’d in the top of human things, at the same time contemplate the Principle of Man’s Body, and the Image of your Kingly power” (vii–viii).

Yet the influence might also have worked the other way round. Christopher Hill has shown that the framework of absolute monarchy, in which Harvey was developing his ideas, did not allow for drawing the final consequences of his implications in 1628. The cardiocentric position ostensibly held by Harvey has been regarded as evidence for the synchronicity of science’s Copernican turn and, according to Hill, for “the doctrine of absolute sovereignty over a community of equal individual atoms” (“William Harvey” 55)—a view sanctified by Harvey’s dedication. Yet, in his treatise *De Circulatione Sanguinis*, published in 1649, the year of the execution of Charles I and the proclamation of the republican commonwealth, “Harvey explicitly and precisely renounced his earlier opinion: he dethroned the heart” (Hill, “William Harvey” 55). Not only did Harvey now clearly point out the primacy of blood and its circulation with regard to the heart, he also abolished the micro|macrocosm analogy his previous dedication to “the Prince of all, the Sun of their Microcosm” had been based on. The heavenly bodies could not provide any analogy, since our knowledge of them is only “uncertain and conjectural” (*The Anatomical Exercises* 179), and “the example of Astronomie is not to be followed” (168).

Even if the title of Harvey’s treatise does not necessarily indicate it, the idea of the importance of the circulation of the blood is already present in
De Motu Cordis. For him, because of the evidence of his analysis, it “must be of necessity concluded that the blood is driven into a round by circular motion in creatures, and that it moves perpetually; and hence does arise the action and function of the heart, which by pulsation it performs; and lastly, \textit{that the motion and pulsation of the heart is the only cause}” (91, my emphasis). Harvey accurately described how the blood circulates through the body. He recognized that the heart, lungs, liver, veins and arteries made up a single but intricate and interdependent system. The heart was a muscle, and as an effect of its alternating contraction and dilatation, blood circulates through the veins and arteries. The diastole [expansion of the heart] pumps blood into the right atrium, from where it passes into the right ventricle. The contraction of the heart [systole] pumps the blood to the lungs through the pulmonary artery. There the blood picks up oxygen, leaves the lungs again through the pulmonary vein, and moves to the left atrium. From the left ventricle, the blood is pumped into the aorta, from where it moves to the various organs and eventually returns to the right atrium. In \textit{De Circulat\'ione Sanguinis}, however, Harvey uses these observations—which he had made as early as 1618, but which initially remained unpublished—in order to stress the doctrine of the circulation of the blood even more. Whereas in \textit{De Motu Cordis}, despite his insistence on the importance of blood circulation, “the heart is the beginning of life, the Sun of the Microcosm” (59), Harvey later concedes that the heart is neither “the effecter of all things” (186), nor “the framer of the blood” (187): “Nor is the heart . . . the beginning of heat and blood, but rather the blood delivers that heat which it has receiv’d to the heart, as likewise to all the rest of the parts, as being the hottest of all” (ibid.). It is no longer the heart but the blood that is of primary importance, the circulating material on which the heart depends, and to which it ministers by keeping it in motion. As Harvey puts it: “All which is clearer discovered by this, that the heart hath not a pulsation in all animals, not yet at all times; when yet the blood, or something proportionable to blood, is never wanting in any” (\textit{De Generatione} 282). Both Mather and Harvey emphasize the importance of atmospheric pressure, cooperating with the heart to pump blood. Mather writes: “The Heart has no Antagonist Muscle . . . But the weight of the incumbent Atmosphere . . . [is] the true Antagonist for all the Muscles” (\textit{The Christian Philosopher} 277), without which blood circulation and respiration—in other words, life—would not be possible.\textsuperscript{34}

For Hill, the implications of Harvey’s revisions “can only be described as republican—or at best they suggest a monarchy based on popular consent” (“William Harvey” 56). Yet Hill does not put forward the claim that the convinced royalist Harvey was a parliamentarian in disguise. Rather, Hill
shows that a change in the political climate made it possible in the first place to think in terms and structures different from those on which absolutism rested: “If Newton’s physics is the ideological analogue of monarchy limited by law, Harvey’s anatomy is the analogue of monarchy limited by representative assemblies . . . Such analogies do not lead men to create limited monarchies: but they make them seem more reasonable, less shocking, in a world still dominated by analogy, and a world in which such traditional analogies were among the strongest supports of monarchy. To be able to conceive of the possibility of something new was the first step towards introducing it” (67).

In a similar manner, but much more in line with his antimonarchical politics, Mather was writing a scientific work concentrating on “something new,” trying to replace those traditional analogies with new ones that might exert a pedagogical influence similar to Harvey’s work. The combination of an almost acentric center [heart, brain] and the stress on a more transversal communication [belly, feet, skin], reveal the overall importance of the principle of dynamics, of ‘circulation,’ for Mather. And it comes as no surprise that the same concept is also stressed in some of his more overtly political writings. After the revocation of the original charter in 1684, the Massachusetts colony had lost its sovereign powers to mint its own currency and regulate its trade, all of which had been crucial for its economic growth. The overthrow of Governor Andros five years later was followed by new efforts on the part of the Massachusetts authorities to promote economic development, and both Cotton and Increase Mather argued that the colony must have the power to issue and control its own currency.35 In 1691, Cotton Mather attempted to raise support for an economic experiment, the introduction of bills of credit, the new paper currency, and attacked the “great indiscretion of our Country-men who Refuse to accept that, which they call Paper-mony” (Some Considerations 2).36 In this pamphlet, composed on the same issue on which he, in his “Political Letter,” had firmly drawn the connection between the individual body and the Body politic, medicine and politics, Mather asked: “Now what is the Security of your Paper-mony less than the Credit of the whole Country . . . All the Inhabitants of the Land, taken as one Body are the Principals, who Reap the Benefits, and must bear the Burdens, and are the Security in their Publick Bonds” (2). Just like the blood in the human body, “Bills Transmit to Remote Parts, vast sums without the intervention of Silver” (3). The introduction of paper money, Mather hoped, would discourage the condemnable habit of hoarding, simple paper having less appeal than precious metals such as silver and gold, used to make ‘actual money’ [coins]. As a result, Mather envisaged that “the Growth of the Country will be carried off, and that will be no Damage but rather an
Advantage to us” (7). The bills of credit, like the covenant or the social contract between individuals, was built upon a kind of promise, a promise closely connected with the question of economic self-regulation [and, ultimately, self-government]. And like blood in the individual body, paper money was seen as the motor of the Body|Politic’s economy, a sign of the production of value not imposed from the outside, but from within the community itself. The alternative to accepting paper money, according to Mather, is being “reduced to H bs [Hobbes] his state of Nature” (5). Thus, if money marks the transition from the natural state to civilization, paper money marks the transition from a monarchical system to a more self-governed one, backed by the promise and trust of the community, and not by a solid and immutable ‘gold standard.’

For Mather, then, money|circulation is civilization; yet, as usual with Mather [in particular, Mather the physician and diagnostician], it is a question of the right quantum. In his sermon Concio ad Populum, Mather bemoans the state of faction that has perverted Winthrop’s notion that “some must be rich, some poore, some high and eminent in power and dignitie” (“Modell” 33). Commenting on the weak body of a “Languishing, if not a Perishing People” (Concio ad Populum 1), Mather states that “the Blood in the Body Politick is depauperated, and has too Hectick a Circulation” (5). This depletion is the result of the irreverence of ‘good measure’ in the economy that was supposed to hold together and strengthen the communal body: “There seems an Epidemical Resolution in almost all People, who can do so, to cast off all Rules in Buying and Selling, Even the Necessaries of Life, but that Rapacious One, To Extort upon one another as much as ever they can. In the mean time, the Poor must be cruelly Pinched; this Capital city of the Province must lose very many of its Inhabitants; Those who are not capable of Raising the Price of what they have, or of what they do, as their Neighbours can, are ground between the Milstones” (21–22). Paradoxically not only the circulation of dangerous material, but also its speed [too much or too fast circulation] can deprive the blood of its nutritive value and result in a state similar to a state of no circulation—civilization at all—Hobbes’s “state of Nature,” with its war of all against all. In The Christian Philosopher, Mather hints at that ambiguous structure in his discussion of the stomach [the seat of all diseases] and intestinal motion: “There is in Bodies a Principle of Dissolution, which upon the Extinction of their vital and vegetative Faculty, begins to exert itself towards the Destruction of the Subject. This Principle of Corruption is, perhaps, the same that in a State of Circulation and Vegetation was the Principle of Life, but now being denied that Passage which it had before, it makes its way irregularly, and so destroys the Continuity of the Solids, in which it is included, and introduces
that Change in the whole Mass, which is called *Corruption*” (281). The difference between the principle of corruption and the principle of life appears to be not one of kind or substance, but of degree, even of speed. Thus, in accordance with the politicized reading, the question of limited monarchy [Hill uses the term for the political implications of Harvey’s prerogative of the blood] or even self-government crucially depends on the right dose, which provides a thin line of defense against anarchy. If “every Man take all his Measures from his own Self,” things “shall be plainly for the Hurt of the whole” (*Concio ad Populum* 17). The only remedy, according to Mather, is a return to that ‘right quantum’: “Frugality, I say, frugality: A Discrete, a Righteous, a Needful frugality” (10). There is no other cure for the depletion of the blood that keeps the body running but a dietary rule: “Nothing but a Frugality can help us; We Bleed unto Death, until that Sovereign Stipstick be applied unto us. Unless this One Thing be brought into Practice, all our Projectors will be Physicians of no value” (ibid.).

Again, in Mather’s typical conflation of political and medical discourses, a “physician of value,” one who could put an end to the hurt and fragmentation of the body, its bleeding to death, would be one who knows the right quantum to distinguish the poison from the cure. The problem is that it is not always easy to tell the difference—in fact, at least sometimes they are one and the same.39 Earlier in *The Christian Philosopher*, Mather had already commented on this problem: “What tho there are venomous Plants? An excellent Fellow of the College of Physicians makes a just Remark: ‘Aloes has the Property of promoting Haemorrhages; but this Property is good or bad, as it is used; a Medicine or a Poison: And it is very probable that the most dangerous Poisons, skilfully managed, may be made not only innocuous, but of all other Medicines the most effectual”’ (142). Facing this ultimate undecidability—in Derrida’s words, “there is no thing as a harmless remedy. The pharmakon can never be simply beneficial” (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 99)—Mather, true to his advocacy of empiricism and experience, opts for a practical way out of the dilemma, for a decision which accepts the ambiguity of the pharmakon and ultimately calls for assuming responsibility. The strategy of the ‘right quantum’ suggests itself as a way out of this dilemma, a way of mastering the simultaneous ambiguity of the poison|remedy—a strategy that Mather was to develop hands-on in his application of inoculation. The economy of the Body|Politic ultimately depends on ‘good measure,’ on the right quantum [of circulation|what is circulated,40 of democratic liberty], and it functions only within the healthy frame provided by good management|governance—the political analogue to medical knowledge. To Mather, this first of all implies an adherence to congregationalism, and in particular to the moral standards [and political liberties] of the founding
fathers. Commenting on the structure of the body in general, Mather wonders: “How often does the *Ars, Providentia, & Sapientia conditoris* appear to the Pagan Galen upon the Contemplation!” (The Christian Philosopher 243). It may be no coincidence [and it certainly makes sense within a politicized reading of the text] that Mather changed the word *creator* in Galen’s original phrase—“Ars, Proventia & Sapientia Creatoris,” or skill, foresight, and wisdom of the creator—to the [at least in a Puritan American context] much more politically suggestive term *founder* [*conditor*], which suggests a return to the virtual independence from England as well as to the community’s self-government under the founding fathers as a general frame of reference, a reading that Mather’s fight for the restoration of the original charter substantiates.

Comparing Derrida’s analysis of Plato’s *pharmakon* with the incidents and attitudes displayed in the inoculation controversy, it becomes clear that the anti-inoculationists argued according to a decisively Platonic model, stressing the unnaturalness of inoculation—which interferes with the natural, God-given course of life, which attempts to meddle with predestination. Like Plato, the anti-inoculationist party “believes in the natural life and normal development, so to speak, of disease . . . In disturbing the normal and natural progress of the illness, the *pharmakon* is thus the enemy of the living in general, whether healthy or sick” (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 100). It is this final undecidability between smallpox proper [death] and a preventive simulation of the smallpox [staging of death] that William Douglass expresses when he states: “All solid and sound Phylosophy, that is Natural History, is founded on Observations made, and Experiments taken of the various Actions and Influences of Natural Bodys on one another. I was always fond of this kind of Knowledge, especially as it related to Humane Bodies in a Healthy or Morbid State; and if these two dear Characters of a Good Citizen and Good Christian could be dispensed with, I should have been pleased to see some Thousands inoculated” (Inoculation 13). Somehow, the inoculated body occupies a position in between healthy and morbid, life and death. Such a state, defying a clear either-or dichotomy, cannot be accepted, since it obviously transgresses the ontological categories upon which a comprehensive representation of reality can be grounded. Mather argued—against the charge that inoculation tampers with predestination, against “the cry of a multitude that they *can’t see through it* how one can with a good conscience bring a sickness on himself, until it shall please the God of our life to send it upon him” (Selected Letters 362)—“I beseech you, what is there in the Word of the blessed God (which proscribes and limits the whole duty of man) that forbids the use of this medicine any more than an antidote against the plague? It is rather plain that the Sixth Command-
ment requires him to use it” (363). By incorporating what to the hard-core Puritan appears as a deviation from belief in predestination, Mather attempts to complexify the whole concept and transform it from its original model as a kind of linear determination into something more dynamic and flexible. Thus, early in The Christian Philosopher, Mather states that life and movement are “caused by some immaterial power, not having originally impressed a certain Quantity of Motion upon Matter, but perpetually and actually exerting itself every Moment in every Part of the World,” which to Mather “gives a very noble Idea of providence” (92). The important point here is that Mather does not see the world as a watch that, when run down after its first winding, must be rewound from time to time. Life and motion exert themselves every moment, everywhere. Mather’s notion of the world as a machine [and the body as a machine within this other vast machine], of which God controls the springs, differs from the more traditional notion of that trope in that it comes very close to the doctrine of deism [dangerously close, since this also reveals Mather’s defection from Puritan orthodoxy]. In fact Mather has more in common with Leibniz’s notion of the same issue, as he vehemently argued in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In this controversy, Leibniz argued that Newton’s conception of the universe as a machine, and God’s relation to it, renders God an imperfect and incompetent artist:

Sir Isaac Newton, and his followers, have also a very odd opinion concerning the work of God. According to their doctrine, God Almighty wants to wind up his watch from time to time: otherwise it would cease to move. He had not, it seems, sufficient foresight to make it a perpetual motion. Nay, the machine of God’s making, is so imperfect, according to these gentlemen; that he is obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordinary concourse, and even to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work; who must consequently be so much the more unskilful a workman, as he is oftener obliged to mend his work and to set it right According to my opinion, the same force and vigour remains always in the world, and only passes from one part of matter to another, agreeably to the laws of nature, and the beautiful pre-established order. And I hold, that when God works miracles, he does not do it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace. Whoever thinks otherwise, must needs have a very mean notion of the wisdom and the power of God. (The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence 12)

With Mather, Leibniz shares the rejection of the idea that the watch was endowed with only a limited quantity of motion, so that the machine has to be wound up every now and then. When Mather refers to God’s “continual influence,” without which the whole machine “would soon fall into pieces”
(The Christian Philosopher 95), he explicitly equates this influence with an “attractive Faculty” (93), and the “Matter of Fact, that Matter is in possession of that quality.” Clarke responded by pointing out the consequences of Leibniz’s conception of God as an absent watchmaker, and it should come as no surprise that his rhetoric openly announces a fundamentally political level:

The notion of the world’s being a great machine, going on without the interposition of God, as a clock continues to go without the assistance of a clockmaker; is the notion of materialism and fate . . . If a king had a kingdom, wherein all things would continually go on without his government or interposition, or without his attending to and ordering what is done therein; it would be to him, merely a nominal kingdom; nor would he in reality deserve at all the title of king or governor. And as those men, who pretend that in an earthly government things may go on perfectly well without the king himself ordering or disposing of any thing, may reasonably be suspected that they would like very well to set the king aside: so whoever contends, that the course of the world can go on without the continual direction of God, the Supreme Governor; his doctrine does in effect tend to exclude God out of the world. (The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence 14)

Clarke’s reproach points out deism’s ambiguous positioning of God in relation to the universe, but it is ultimately also alert to the political [anti-monarchical] consequences that might arise from that doctrine. Leibniz answers this accusation by showing that he does not want to argue God out of existence, but to show that his influence is immanent to creation—and his arguments neatly parallel Mather’s in defending the use of inoculation: “I do not say, the material world is a machine, or watch, that goes without God’s interposition; and I have sufficiently insisted, that the creation wants to be continually influence’d by its creator. But I maintain it to be a watch, that goes without wanting to be mended by him: otherwise we must say, that God bethinks himself again. No; God has foreseen every thing; he has provided a remedy for every thing before-hand; there is in this world a harmony, a beauty, already pre-established . . . This opinion does not exclude God’s providence, or his government of the world: on the contrary, it makes it perfect. A true providence of God, requires a perfect foresight” (The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence 18–19).

Leibniz here refers to his idea of a “pre-established” harmony, which not only regulates and assures the relation between body and spirit but also produces the best of all possible worlds, which is simply the best because it is the only one actualized out of a virtuality of other possible worlds. Ac-
cording to Deleuze, Leibniz “turns our relative world into the only existing world, a world that rejects all other possible worlds because it is relatively ‘the best’” (The Fold 60). This does not amount to a simple, linear determinism, since within this preestablished harmony, because it consists of “infinite series ruled by convergences and divergences” (61), there is an infinity of virtual possibilities at every moment. In fact, every infinitely small moment is not a single point in time but a multiplicity, which makes life anything but predictable. However, since all that exists is contained within God’s plan, Mather [along with Leibniz, I would argue] insists that there is “no sign of Chance in the whole Structure of our Body” (The Christian Philosopher 240), since what we would call chance is also part of God’s plan. This does not preclude variety and singularity in creation, though. Predetermination is not equal to uniformity. Paralleling Leibniz’s claim that all monads [and, in a wider sense, all beings, not only humans] express the same world-plan, but each from its own perspective—that, although all monads, for Deleuze, are “strangely similar . . . [,] actualization is different for each monad” (The Fold 90)—Mather, commenting on the “remarkable Dissimilitudes between Men” (The Christian Philosopher 244), connects this observation with an aside on the varieties of handwriting: “To no other Cause than the wise Providence of God can be referr’d the no less strange variety of Hand-writings. Common experience shews, that tho Hundreds and Thousands were taught by one Master, and one and the same Form of Writing, yet they all write differently; there is some peculiar in every one’s Writing, which distinguishes it; some indeed can counterfeit another’s Character” (245). Mather here plays on the polyvalent meaning of the signifier character, whose meanings include the combination of qualities or features that distinguishes one person, group, or thing from another; moral or ethical strength; a mark or symbol used in a writing system; and a personal style of writing. In connection with the materiality of the human body, character also foreshadows the genetic meaning, denoting a structure, function, or attribute determined by a gene or group of genes. Yet this passage also echoes the widely established notion of creation as “God’s Handy Worke” (K. Rowe). Thus, it can also be interpreted to mean that God’s handwriting actually is the multitude of “Hundreds and Thousands” of varieties of individuals—all strangely similar, but with “remarkable dissimilitudes,” with something “peculiar in every one.” Life is ‘informed’ by God’s handwriting, a kind of software that programs what Deleuze calls an “intrinsic singularity” (The Fold 15) within each individual, an algorithm according to which that person develops and is actualized.

In his answer to Clarke’s reproach, Leibniz also responds to the addressed political subtext:
The comparison of a king, under whose reign every thing should go on without his interposition, is by no means the present purpose; since God preserves every thing continually, and nothing can subsist without him. His kingdom therefore is not a nominal one. 'Tis just as if one would say, that a king, who should originally have taken care to have his subjects so well educated, and should, by his care in providing for their subsistence, preserve them so well in their fitness for their several stations, and in their good affection toward him, as that he should have no occasion ever to be amending any thing amongst them; would be only a nominal king. (The Leibniz-Claude Correspondence 19–20)\(^45\)

Mather definitely subscribed to this view of things. In wholeheartedly embracing his friend Robert Boyle’s atomism [despite its obvious clash with Puritan doctrine], Mather tacitly shares the [deist] assumption that God has set the universe in motion and has posited a system of physical laws, according to which the world ‘runs,’ and which assures God’s continual influence without his having to actually intervene. In their complexification of the concept of providence, Leibniz and Mather share a similar approach, I argue—the antimonarchical consequences of which did not escape their contemporaries. Clarke and Douglass respectively sensed not only materialist [i.e., atheistic] but also dangerously liberal political tendencies in Leibniz’s and Mather’s ideas.

It is here that both the practice and the semantic history of inoculation become important. Two major lexical fields can be distinguished: the field of horticulture, and the field of medicine. The medical semantic field was opened up, as the *Oxford English Dictionary* shows, by a contribution by Emanuel Timonius to the *Philosophical Transactions* of 1714, to which Mather often referred in his correspondence concerning smallpox, and which can be said to have started Mather’s interest in the subject. In this sense, inoculation refers to what the online *Oxford English Dictionary* calls the “intentional introduction of the virus of small-pox in order to induce a mild and local attack of the disease, and render the subject immune from future contagion.” The horticultural meaning of the word—to “join or unite by insertion (as the scion is inserted into the stock so as to become one with it)”—has been in use since at least 1420.\(^46\) It was in this sense that the words *inoculation* and *inoculate* provided a rich metaphorical background, translating the horticultural practice into a material analogue of spiritual refinement and sublimation.\(^47\) Puritan poets made much use of this metaphor; for example, Edward Taylor wrote: “Wilt thou enoculate within mine Eye/Thy Image bright, My Lord, that bright doth shine/Forth in the Cloudy-Firy Pillar high/Thy Tabernacles Looking-Glass Divine?/What glorious Rooms are
then my Eyeholes made. / Thine Image on my windows Glass portrai’d?” (186). Taylor clearly uses the horticultural metaphor here to signify the process of ennoblement that the Puritan believer hopes for. Drawing on the etymological roots of the term inoculation [from the Latin oculus for both eye and bud], Taylor’s use of this metaphor subtly and neatly links up with the predominant imagery of identification with Christ’s image, so that this [visual] identification inoculates the bud of a godly identity within the believer, who may become one with it. Mather elaborates on and politicizes the second, modern, medical meaning of inoculation. Before he wrote The Christian Philosopher and started to research inoculation, Mather was working on a kind of ‘controlled liberalization’ and secularization of the Puritan doctrinal as well as political tradition. In addition to his involvement with the anti-Andros tract The Declaration, of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of Boston, Mather’s Pietas in Patriam: The Life of His Excellency Sir William Phips, Knt which, according to Philip Gura, “gave to the world what might be termed the first American life” (“Cotton Mather’s Life of Phips” 441). In this laudatory biography of William Phips [the first governor of Massachusetts, who returned to Boston with Increase Mather—who played a crucial role in securing Phips’s appointment by the Crown—bringing a new charter that ended the English ban on colonial self-government], Mather stressed Phips’s secular career. That was a significant step away from the traditional Puritan view, as expressed in Winthrop’s doctrine, that each man should keep his place in the hierarchy that he had been appointed to. As a result of Mather’s exemplary American life, Gura argues, “the good magistrate would thenceforth be evaluated not so much with regard to his position as God-fearing Puritan as by his sense of being as an American Englishman” (“Cotton Mather’s Life of Phips” 455). Thus, according to Gura, Mather’s Life of Phips not only sanctifies the secularization of the colony’s political system, it emphasizes the Mathers’ role in that secularization. On a political level, it parallels what Mather accomplished with his advocacy of inoculation in science and medicine: a balancing act that heralded a departure from the tension between piety and modernity by means of a paradoxical attempt to return to the early Puritan structures under new, secular premises. Commenting on Solomon Stoddard, the Boston pastor who deviated from the traditional Puritan path by pushing congregationalism to the extreme—opening the church to every one, and abandoning the established distinction between the church as a body of saints and the secular community—Gura points out that “Stoddard began to build the idea that the church was a national body to which all people belonged by right” (456, note 37). At the same time as Stoddard’s attempt to ‘inoculate’ Puritan tradition, “Mather was stressing service to a similar
ideal, albeit a more blatantly political one” (ibid.). This signals Mather’s adaptation to the fact that “the old standards of exclusiveness were being replaced by a new community involvement” (456). Mather’s use of the concept of inoculation anticipates the strategy Roland Barthes has analyzed in connection with the bourgeois myth of the mid-twentieth century: “The inoculation. I have already given examples of this very general figure, which consists in admitting the accidental evil of a class-bound institution the better to conceal its principal evil. One immunizes the contents of the collective imagination by means of a small inoculation of acknowledged evil; one thus protects it against the risk of a generalized subversion” (“Myth Today” 150). Such a “liberal treatment,” Barthes argues, “would not have been possible only a hundred years ago.” He puts liberal in ironic italics, since this is only a liberalism of ‘the right quantum,’ where its parameters are ultimately very controlled. And yet, because Mather theorized about it almost 250 years before Barthes’s analysis, in a highly antiliberal historical context in which the social structure “did not compromise with anything, it was quite stiff” (ibid.), the “liberal treatment” of Mather should be a little less italicized. The fact that Mather sees the body as being enveloped by a permeable skin [unlike the hermetically sealed body envisioned by Winthrop] is of significant relevance: the porous and infinitely folded texture of the skin for Mather functions as a ‘meeting site’ of inside and outside. It can be argued, then, that in contrast to the all-encompassing body of God [a pure inside that knows no outside, which is why for Derrida “God has no allergies” (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 101)], the body of man is marked by finitude and mortality, and his relation to the world is constituted by a unilateral topology like that of the Mōbius strip [in contrast to the Euclidian space of a non-allergic God], in which a clear insidelsoutside distinction no longer holds. As with Leibniz’s fold, the texture of the skin shows that man enterlsis in the world as much as the world is enterlses man.

In his discussion of Plato’s pharmakon, Derrida follows the polysemantic possibilities of this signifier, and the chain of associations also leads to the word pharmakos, which means wizard, magician, and poisoner, and which is closely connected to the ritualistic expulsion of the scapegoat: “The expulsion of evil, its exclusion out of the body [and out] of the city—these are the two major senses of the character and of the ritual” (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 130). Thus, the figure of the pharmakos [or smallpox, or even the smallpox victim] repeats the insidelsoutside distinction of the skin [which Mather threatened to undermine] on the level of “intra muros/extra muros”: the “city’s body proper thus reconstitutes its unity, closes around the security of its inner courts . . . by violently excluding from its territory the representative of an external threat or aggression” (133), by putting it into isolation.
and quarantine. Mather’s main opponent, William Douglass, seems to have understood that the walls are not what once were, which explains his fear of Mather’s “mischievous propagating the Infection in the most Publick Trading Places of the Town” (W. Douglass, “Open Letter”), which, like the Boston ports, are a perfect analogue of the Body|Politic’s porous skin|outworks. As Foucault puts it, “a port . . . is—with its circulation of goods, men signed up willingly or by force, sailors embarking and disembarking, diseases and epidemics—a place of desertion, smuggling, contagion: it is a crossroads for dangerous mixtures, a meeting place for forbidden circulations” (Discipline and Punish 144). Foucault goes on to describe the medical supervision in hospitals at the end of the eighteenth century, where, in an attempt to classify and partition off of space—similar to the quarantine techniques of Boston—“an administrative and political space was articulated upon a therapeutic space; it tended to individualize bodies, diseases, symptoms, lives and deaths; it constituted a real table of juxtaposed and carefully distinct singularities” (ibid.). Mather proposes an alternative to the exclusion and isolation described by both Derrida and Foucault: a controlled ‘inclusion’ of the alien outside, via the ‘outworks’ [so to be ‘regulated’ on its way to the ‘inner courts’]. Thus, if Foucault concludes that “out of discipline, a medically useful space was born” (ibid.), it is possible to say that for Mather, out of medical research, a politically useful space was born as well.52 Like the body, cities [the Body|Politic], as De Landa states, are “necessarily parasitic on their . . . surroundings, . . . encompass[ing] more than what is found inside their walls” (A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History 107).53 All this raises the question of how a transversal and open system such as the Body|Politic described|envisioned by Mather is to be regulated. Again, the issue of the smallpox inoculation, in connection with Mather’s theory of the vital force that he calls “Nishmath-Chajim,”54 as he develops it in The Angel of Bethesda, provides some crucial insights. The most important step that Mather takes between The Christian Philosopher and The Angel of Bethesda is to shifts his perspective from a ‘molar’ to a ‘molecular’ level. In a text that comes across as a compendium of folk medicine and homespun remedies, Mather has embedded both a scientific account of the practice of inoculation [which comes close to an early articulation of a germ theory] and his concept of the Nishmath-Chajim, in both of which Mather leaves the molar register of man’s organs and organism and concentrates on the nonsubjective level of the chemical and viral modes of being of microorganisms.

Both Mather and Leibniz are similarly attracted by the notion of infinity, and for both this concept presents an important point of reference. In fact, in the change of Mather’s focus from the old Puritan God of wrath to
creation and its sheer endless production, one might detect a transposition of the Pauline doctrine [all members are part of one body] from the Puritan Body/Politic to the whole cosmos: every human body—in fact, every part of creation—is part of God’s Body; God is the universe, its limitless productivity. Linked to the idea of infinity, Mather again [consciously or not] comes close to a deist/pantheistic position. He muses in *The Christian Philosopher* (and the fact that this paragraph constitutes the only piece of ‘speculation’ in an otherwise ‘factual’ tomel tone adds to its importance and peculiarity):

> We all agree that all *Parts* into which the *Whole* is divided, being taken together are *equal to the Whole*. But it seems any *single Part is equal to the Whole*. It is granted, that in any *Circle a Line* may be drawn from every *Point* of the Circumference to the *Center*. Suppose the Circle to be the *Equator*, and a million lesser Circles are drawn within the *Equator*, about the same *Center*, and then a *right Line* drawn from every *Point* of the *Equator* to the Center of the Globe; every such *right Line* drawn from the *Equator* to the Center, must of necessity cut thro the million *lesser Circles*, about the same *Center*: consequently there must be the same number of points in a Circle a million of times less than the *Equator*, as there is in the *Equator* itself. The *lesser Circles* may be multiplied into as many as there are *Points* in the *Diameters*; and so the *least Circle* imaginable may have as *many Points* as the greatest; that is, be as big as the greatest, as big as one that is millions of times as big as itself. (118)56

And as with Leibniz, Mather’s actual journey into the infinitely small is triggered by a fascination with Leeuwenhoek’s experiments with the microscope. This optical instrument, providing the observer with the possibility of an infinite zoom, prompts Mather to argue against Newton’s denial of a *plenum* or *continuum*: “Every Part of matter is *Peopled*. Every *Green Leaf* swarms with *Inhabitants*. The Surfaces of Animals are covered with other *Animals*” (*The Angel of Bethesda* 43). This is a position quite similar to that of Leibniz: “There is a world of creatures—of living things and animals, entelechies, and souls—in the smallest part of matter” (“Monadology,” *Philosophical Texts* 277). Since both men can be seen to develop a kind of ‘new metaphysics’ that builds on the findings of the microscope and the new science, it is only a small step for them to the conclusion that not only the surfaces of creatures are *covered* with other animals. An even stronger zoom [the logical conclusion of the concept of infinity proposed by Leeuwenhoek’s microscope] might even show that the surfaces of these smaller animals might be covered with even smaller other animals, ad infinitum, which might ultimately result in the speculation that an animal, a body, or, as Mather has it, the world actually *is composed* of infinitely small ‘creatures’: “Yea,
the most Solid Bodies, even Marble itself, have innumerable Cells, which are crowded with imperceptible Inmates. As there are Infinite Numbers of these, which the Microscopes bring to our View, so there are many inconceivable Myriads yet Smaller than these, which no glasses have yet reach’d unto. The Animals that are much more than Thousands of times Less than the finest Grain of Sand, have their Motions; and so, their Muscles, their Tendons, their Fibres, their Blood, and the Eggs wherein their Propagation is carried on” (The Angel of Bethesda 43). It has to be noted that Mather [although he concedes the fact that “Every Part of matter is Peopled”] here concentrates on the animalcula as transmitters of disease, describing them as some kind of alien invaders. Their actual smallness, which might even go beyond microscopic perception, suggests that their “eggs” must be even smaller and so light as to be able to drift through the air: “Diseases are Convey’d from distant Countreys or Climates; By the Animalcula, or their Eggs, deposited in the Bodies or Cloathes or Goods of Travellers” (The Angel of Bethesda 43). Since [as he has already pointed out] the skin is permeable, “the Eggs of these Insects (and why not the living Insects too!) may insinuate themselves by the Air, and with our Ailments, yea, thro’ the Pores of our skin; and soon gett into the Juices of our Bodies” (ibid.).

Although working in different registers—Leibniz on a philosophical and speculative level, Mather on a theological and medical/political one—both men draw on Leeuwenhoek’s observations. And both Mather and Leibniz have a similar impetus in their use of the microscope, drawing on the world of the infinitely small as a way to make up for the “loss of the greater cosmos as an image of divinity and spiritual order” (C. Wilson 181)—this reads almost like an answer to Harvey’s conjectural and [as it were, macroscopic] “example of Astronomie.” In a statement that echoes Mather’s approach, Leibniz argues that “nothing better corroborates the incomparable wisdom of God than the structure of the works of nature, particularly the structure which appears when we study them more closely with a microscope. It is for this reason, as well as because of the great light which could be thrown upon bodies for the use of medicine, food, and mechanical ends, that it should be most necessary to push our knowledge further with the aid of microscopes” (“Reflections” 566). Both Leibniz and Mather see the universe as “composed of an infinite envelopment of organic creatures” (Rutherford 226). As a result, “there is no part of matter that is not endowed with life: Either it is itself the body of an animated creature or it is a collection of such creatures, each of whose bodies is in turn composed of smaller organic creatures” (229). It is possible [and a logical consequence] to “think of matter as endowed with an intrinsic force or power” (237), since, ultimately, “the matter of bodies is constituted from substances that are by nature principles of
Mather, commenting on the atmosphere and the air that we breathe, sees it endowed with an almost “muscular” constitution. In a rhetoric full of political implications, Mather states that “our Air abounds with particles of such a nature, that in case they be bent, or press’d by the Weight of an incumbent part of the Atmosphere, or of any other Body, they endeavour to free themselves from that Pressure, by bearing against the Bodies that keep them under it; and as soon as the Removal of these Bodies gives them way, they expand the whole parcel of Air which they composed” (*The Christian Philosopher* 74). Drawing on Leeuwenhoek, both Mather and Leibniz see the ‘point at infinity’ is [in the] infinitely small [microcosm|immanence], not infinitely large [macrocosm|transcendence], although framed by God’s plan. In addition, it can be argued that between Leeuwenhoek’s *animalcula* and Leibniz’s monads there is more than just a casual similarity. In his monograph on Leeuwenhoek, Clifford Dobell points out that “Leibniz paid attention to [Leeuwenhoek’s] discoveries, which were not without influence upon his own philosophy: indeed the abstract ‘monads’ of the *Monadology* are not altogether unrelated to Leeuwenhoek’s concrete ‘animalcules’” (385). True to the concept of infinity, Leibniz states that the monads, as simple substances, can have “neither extension, nor shape” (“Monadology,” *Philosophical Texts* 268). Yet, as he repeatedly points out, there is no monad without a body assigned to it, which it represents [see in particular 276–77]. Thus, one cannot but think of monads as infinitely small in extension or shape. In comparison with actual insects, Mather observes that the *animalcula* are so infinitely small that, according to “Lieuwenhoek (and other Eyewitnesses) . . . above Eight Million may be found in one drop of Water” (*The Angel of Bethesda* 46). The actual reference in Leeuwenhoek’s account, his “Letter to Oldenburg” published in the *Philosophical Transactions* of the Royal Society, reads: “In the year 1675 . . . I discovered living creatures in rain . . . This observation provoked me to investigate this water narrowly; and especially because these little animals were, to my eye, more than ten thousand times smaller than the animalcule which Swammerdam has portrayed, and called by the name of Water-flea, or Water-louse, which you can see alive and moving in water with the bare eye” (quoted in Dobell 117).

In his *Monadology*, Leibniz elaborates on the implicit infinite fractality of this image: “Every portion of matter can be thought of as a garden full of plants, or as a pond full of fish. But every branch of the plant, every part of the animal, and every drop of its vital fluids, is another such garden, or another such pond. And although the earth and the air between the plants in the garden, and the water in between the fish in the pond, are not themselves plants or fish, they do nevertheless contain others, though usually they are so tiny as to be imperceptible to us” (*Philosophical Texts* 277). In his dis-
cussion of the ‘microworlds’ in relation to diseases, Mather relies on a kind of ‘machinics’ quite different from the prevalent [Cartesian] mechanism. After categorically stating that “the Animal Body is a Machine, and Diseases are nothing else but its Particular Irregularities, Defects, and Disorders,” he claims that “a Blind Man might as well pretend to Regulate a Piece of Clockwork, . . . as a Person ignorant of Mathematicks and Mechanism, to cure Diseases, without understanding the Natural Organization, Structure, and Operations of the Machine, which he undertakes to regulate” (The Angel of Bethesda 47)—and this structure and organization is characterized, as he has just argued, by its infiniteness, its complexity. Leibniz argues similarly in his monadological system. The difference between man-made machines and God’s creation, he claims, ultimately consists in the difference between a finite and an infinite structure: “Every organic body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses any artificial automaton, because a man-made machine is not a machine in every one of its parts. For example, the tooth of a brass cogwheel has parts or fragments which to us are no longer anything artificial, and which no longer have anything which relates them to the use for which the cog was intended, and thereby marks them out as parts of the machine. But nature’s machines—living bodies, that is—are machines even in their smallest parts, right down to infinity. That is what makes the difference between nature and art, that is, between the divine art and our own” (“Monadology,” Philosophical Texts 277). Although man-made machines are built from simple units, structural unities [such as the cogwheel], God starts with a material that in itself is infinitely complex. In contrast to man-made machines, such as Descartes’s clocks or mills, put in motion by the flow of water, God’s machines are much more complex—and this infinite complexity is the ultimate reason why there is life; in fact, it is life itself. Mather and Leibniz argue similarly, not against the notion of creation as a machine, but against the merely mechanistic variation of that notion. The concept of infinity seems to provide them with a notion of the machinic that moves beyond its more metaphorical use in the concepts of the mechanists. The blind man trying to mend a clock is analogous to a mechanic [or even a mechanist philosopher, comparable to Power’s “rude countryfellow”] trying to grasp or even work on God’s complex machinery. The question is not how to abolish the machinic logic, but how to push it further. What both Mather and Leibniz consider a sort of “plastic force” [a term used by both John Ray and Ralph Cudworth, one of the Cambridge Platonists, an important influence on Mather, and the father of Lady Damaris Masham, one of Leibniz’s correspondents] is for Mather not “an universal Soul, animating the vast System of the World, according to Plato; nor any omniscient radical
Heat, according to Hippocrates; nor any plastick Virtue, according to Scaliger, nor any hylarchick Principle, according to More” (The Christian Philosopher 95), but some intelligent force within [or connected to] matter that must “understand and regulate the whole Oeconomy” of organic life. Thus, the force neither comes ‘from without’ [it is not hylarchic] nor can it be explained by mechanism alone: “All Mechanical Accounts are at an end; we step into the glorious GOD Immediately” (18). For Deleuze, the fault of the mechanist approach, then, lies not in “being too artificial to account for living matter, but for not being adequately machined. Our mechanisms are in fact organized into parts that are not in themselves part or piece of the machine . . . Plastic forces are thus more machinelike than they are mechanical” (The Fold 8). As Leibniz puts it in a letter to Lady Masham, “la force plastique est dans la machine” (Die philosophischen Schriften 3:374)—“the plastic force is in the machine”—and I now want to take a further look at how Mather envisions this ‘inner-machinic’ plastic force, and at the political consequences that can be drawn from his conceptions.

In his introduction to the concept of the Nishmath-Chajim [the breath of life, a vital force], Mather extends his frame of reference—disease—and embraces a more general approach. Usually dismissed as a mere “arm-chair theory,” scholars have not analyzed this concept in detail so far, with the notable exception of Margaret Humphreys Warner, who has drawn attention to Mather’s theory as evidence of the declining role of the Boston Puritan clergy. I want to pursue the connections of this “arm-chair theory” to the speculative philosophy of the seventeenth century, in particular Leibniz’s thought, and turn Warner’s perspective inside out. Although she is also concerned with “the social use he [Mather] made of a biomedical concept” (278, note 1), given Mather’s discursive mingling of theology, medicine, and politics, I want to focus not so much on his ‘spiritualization of medicine’ as on the ‘matter-ialization of politics.’ Mather conceives of the Nishmath-Chajim as something between the somatic and the spiritual.6 It is “of a Middle Nature, between the Rational Soul, and the Corporeal Mass; by which they work upon One another. It wonderfully receives also Impressions from Both of them. And perhaps it is the Vital Ty between them” (The Angel of Bethesda 28). The Nishmath is situated at [or indeed is] the interface where matter changes into mind, the material into the immaterial—and vice versa. It comes close to a ‘materialization’ of Leibniz’s fold between soul and matter. If one considers Mather’s general taxonomy of the ‘creation-machine’—“Brutes are more simple Machines” (The Christian Philosopher 224) than man who, as a much more complex organism, is “a Machine composed of so many Parts, as to the right Form, and Order, and
Motion whereof there are such an infinite number of Intentions required” (247–48)—it becomes obvious that he sees all animate nature as pervaded by that ‘life-force.’ On the one hand, this force is quasi-universal [it pertains to all living beings, thus Mather—like Leibniz—defies Descartes’s notion that animals have no soul],69 but on the other hand, it is singular. As Warner rightly observes, the *Nishmath* does not offer itself as “a general formative force . . . Mather’s concept is rather one of individual *nishmath-chajims* for each creature; there is no global *nishmath-chajim*” (285, note 18).70 In contrast to forerunners of a vitalist force such as Cudworth’s plastic nature or van Helmont’s *Archeus*, a self-determining principle in matter that guides its unfolding [whose influence on his concept Mather duly acknowledges], the *Nishmath* is a more local force, operating in each body individually. In his taxonomy, Mather echoes Leibniz’s system of monads, which differentiates among naked monads [possibly modeled on the *animalcula*], animal monads, and the more complex human monads which [in contrast to the animal monads] have not only perception, but also apperception—that is, consciousness.

Mather states” “There are indeed many Things in the Humane Body, that cannot be solved by the Rules of *Mechanism*” (*The Angel of Bethesda* 31). The mechanist [or iatromechanic] view of the body [and the universe] could not account for life or ‘purposeful’ processes [which does not necessarily mean ‘conscious’ processes]. The *Nishmath* was Mather’s attempt to tackle the old problem of how mind and body interact. From within the traditional theological framework, still operating within his thought, Mather tried to scientifically come to terms with the view that “sin sometimes is *Naturally* the Cause of *Sickness,*” from whence it follows that “a *Sickness* in the *Spirit* will *naturally* cause a *Sickness* in the *Body*” (6). There can only be a *natural* connection between body and soul, if both constitute a continuum, or if, in an almost Spinozist move, they constitute one substance. Mather states: “The *Soul* and the *Body* constitute *One Person*” (7). Denying a mere Cartesian dualism, Mather still found it “necessary to continue the analysis in dual terms” (Beall and Shryock 67). Leibniz’s solution to the interaction between soul and body was that there ultimately is none: “The soul follows out its own laws, just as the body too follows its own” (“Monadology,” *Philosophical Texts* 279); any correspondence between the two was ensured by the preestablished harmony, taken in its more specific meaning. Mather now takes this preestablished harmony *into* the body, into a ‘substance’ that infinitely repeats the interaction between soul and body and is both material and immaterial at the same time—a paradox that is also at the heart of Leibniz’s monads. In fact, in *The Christian Philosopher*, Mather places his
contention that “a gross Body and an immaterial Spirit should be so united as to make up one Man” (117) in the context of his discussion of infinity, and the intricate connection of part and whole already mentioned.

Mather goes on to describe the Nishmath-Chajim as consisting of particles that are “finer than those of the Light itself” (The Angel of Bethesda 30). As a consequence of the plurality of even infinitely small beings, each endowed with the Nishmath, Mather envisions the universe as composed of an active and alive ‘substance.’ Again, the concept of the ‘infinitely small’ is of importance here. In his description of the Nishmath particles, Mather seems to be echoing his own account of the bad animalcula—the smallpox germs. There seems to be a difference not in structure, but in kind, an opposition quite similar to the [dynamic] “pPinciple of Life” and the [static] “Principle of Dissolution” he alluded to in The Christian Philosopher. He states that “Sharp, Austere Particles,” much coarser than the fine particles of the Nishmath, cause illness by clogging and “vexing the Fibres” (The Angel of Bethesda 58), slowing down circulation. The task of the Nishmath, then, is to eliminate these disturbances, in which these “Sharp, Austere Particles” line up in “Military Shapes . . . not fitt for an Association with the more Peaceable particles of the Blood” (67). Mather here seems to have reached the logical conclusion that an immune system exists. The bad particles have to be slowed down and weakened on their way through the “outworks of the citadel.” The faster Nishmath particles [the principle of life is defined by ‘circulation’] then can cope with the bad particles, not by doing away with them but by incorporating a small or weaker dose of them, so as to immunize the body|machine against the ‘too much’ of it.

As Mather sees it, the Nishmath is the ‘animating force’ in the development of material bodies. In line with the theory of preformation, he states: “We have sometimes been led by our Microscopes, into some Apprehensions, that our Bodies are Originally folded up, in inconceivably minute Corpusculicumcules, and that Generation is nothing but the Evolution of the Stamina so involved” (30). The Nishmath, then, is held responsible for the ‘purposeful behavior’ that living matter reveals when evolving. It also provides a solution to a dilemma that Leibniz, in an earlier stage of his thought, tackled in a similar manner. The theory of the corpuscles [or corpusculicumcules, as Mather calls them, to stress their minuteness] is derived from Robert Boyle and logically supposes the evolving body|material to be in “a perpetual flux or changing condition” (Boyle 198)—the body as constant becoming. Though Leibniz approved of this theory, he nevertheless saw that there was a need for an ‘active agent,’ since the corpuscular theory explained everything by matter and extension alone. He saw that it was necessary to introduce an agency through which the connection between soul
and body, metaphysics and matter, was maintained. In a comment on Boyle’s text, Leibniz calls this agency the “flower of substance” and claims that “this flower of substance is our body; that the flower of substance now persists perpetually in all changes . . . This flower of substance is diffused through the whole body; somehow comprises the whole form . . . I add something which Boyle seems not to have observed—that the soul is firmly implanted in this flower of substance.” Again, the ultimately small step from an agency|substance in the body|matter to an agency|substance that is the body|matter is taken. Mather seems to imply something similar when he claims that “our Nishmath-Chajim seems to be commensurate unto our Bodies; and our Bodies are conformable to the Shape which God our Maker gives to that plastic Spirit; (if we may call it so)” (The Angel of Bethesda 30). The fact that the Nishmath is distributed everywhere in the body [or is the body] makes Mather worry “how it fares in the case of Amputations on our Bodies; Wether like a Flame violently Struck off, what is so, may not nimbly, as by a sort of Magnetism, Reunite with what it belongs unto: But then, how far it becomes for the present folded up into it: Or, whether it be not entirely lost, but what remains, may have the power to produce a Recruit, when there shall be a Lodging again provided for it; this also is yett unknown to us” (ibid.).

Ultimately, the Nishmath-Chajim is the “Spirit of the Several Parts, Where it has a Residence; and it is the Life by which these Several Parts have their Faculties maintained in Exercise. This tis, that Sees, that Hears, that Feels; and performs the Several Digestions in the Body” (ibid.)—it is the way the body|matter ‘knows,’ a knowledge that is unconscious yet productive. And it is in this knowledge of the body that Mather finally sees how the body is regulated: “It is a thing which who can observe without Astonishment? In Every other Machin, if anything be out of Order, it will remain so till Some Hand from Abroad shall rectify it; It can do nothing for itself. But the Humane Body is a Machin, wherein, if anything be out of Order, presently the Whole Engine, as under an Alarum, is awakened for the helping of what is amiss, and other parts of the Engine Strangely putt themselves out of their Way that they may send in Help unto it. Whence can this proceed but from a Nishmath-Chajim in us” (32). Mather comes to the final conclusion that because of the ‘plastic spirit in the machine,’ because of the Nishmath-Chajim, the machine can regulate and organize itself. It is not a machine in the mechanistic sense [what Deleuze|Guattari would call an “apparatus”], which depends on some outside power source and control, but a machine in the sense of Leibniz [and Deleuze], in that it is ‘infinitely machined.’ Like Leibniz, Mather thinks the human body is what Berressem calls a “natural machine that aligns spirit and materiality” (“Of Metal Ducks” 83). In
Mather’s natural machine, all the “parts of the Engine,” down to the infinitely small level of the finer-than-light particles of the Nishmath, are endowed with the capacity for perception—otherwise they could not respond to any “Alarum.” The microparticles of Mather’s body possess what Deleuze detects as the “microperceptions” (The Fold 86) in Leibniz’s system of monads. These microperceptions are the way matterthe body perceives, the perceptions that constitute the unconscious. In fact, it can be argued that apperception [which would be a ‘macoperception’ above the threshold of cognition] emerges bottom-up from these microperceptions. What perceives in Leibniz’s body are the “monads of heart, liver, knee, eyes, hands” (108). What perceives in Mather’s body is the Nishmath-Chajim which is [in] the body. For Leibniz, Deleuze argues, “there is no cause to ask if matter thinks or perceives” (ibid.) because Leibniz “displaces this question . . . by keeping matter and intelligence simultaneously together and apart” (Berressem, “Of Metal Ducks” 85). For Mather, matter [at least bodily matter] clearly perceives and ‘knows,’ although he somehow bypasses another question by being ambiguous about it: whether the Nishmath ultimately is a substance in the bodymatter, or a substance of which the bodymatter consists, or a faculty of the bodymatter. Yet the last quotation concerning the self-regulating capabilities of the human body quite clearly points toward the latter option. In a way, Mather moves in the direction of the ‘change of metaphors’ suggested by what Francisco Varela and Antonio Coutinho have called “immuknowledge”—the immune system not seen as merely a defense against invaders, but as a “positive assertion of a molecular identity” (237).

The equivalents of the self-regulating capacities of the body are highlighted in Mather’s sermon Concio ad Populum, which was published in 1719, when Mather was slowly finishing The Christian Philosopher. In this sermon, Mather emphasizes communal action and involvement. For a people in distress—New England—there is only one way out: to take matters into one’s own hands: “For Sensible Persons in a Scattered way to discern and bewayl our Distresses, and not Unite in Endeavours that we may all get out of them; This will be but a poor Procedure. For a Sensible Man, to Sit alone and keep Silence, or only complain unto a Neighbour as Unactive as himself, This may do for Lamentations . . . Sirs, You must Get up and be doing; But know, that without United Endeavours, there will be nothing done to any purpose for our Deliverance, Associations of well-disposed Men, have had Mighty Successes, and have done wondrously . . . What may be done, to rescue our Land out of the Distresses coming upon it, and render us an Happy People? . . . Associate your Selves, O ye People, that ye may not be broken in pieces; Take counsel together, that it may not come to nought. If God be with us, you will do so!” (Concio ad Populum 8–9). The
Body|Politic’s analogue of the body’s immune system, for Mather, would be the “Societies for the Relief of the Publick Distresses” (9), a self-regulative factor originating in the Body|Politic itself.

Leibniz, by keeping matter and soul simultaneously together and apart, paradoxically located the ‘plastic force’ both within and without the machine. According to Berressem, Deleuze replaces Leibniz’s transcendentalism “by a logic of immanence” (“Of Metal Ducks” 90): “What if one were to fold God, and thus the divine harmony, from the outside into the innermost fold of matter and then were to call this harmony complexity? . . . The algorithm for this operation would be: replace God as the transcendent ‘point-at-infinity’ with the topological structure of the projective plane” (91). One could subject Mather to a very similar operation, I argue. By clearly situating the ‘active force’ of the soul within matter, Mather [although he is not as consistent in his systematics as Leibniz] moves further than Leibniz in the direction proposed by de La Mettrie, who in 1748 pointed out that “the Leibnizeans . . . have spiritualized matter rather than materialising the soul” (3)—Mather, I argue, tends to go in the direction of materializing the soul. In fact, Mather’s conception comes quite close to de La Mettrie’s notion that the soul is “clearly nothing but that very organisation” (26) of the body. Here, man is a dynamic machine powered by a vital force within matter—a model significantly different from the clockworks of classical mechanist thought. The force|faculty|substance of the Nishmath-Chajim, then, enables Mather to regard the body as a kind of autopoietic machine. His view of the body combines mechanism and vitalism, and Mather acknowledges his debt to both strands of thought by extensively quoting from proponents of the two sides [in the case of vitalism, his key sources are van Helmont and George Cheyne, a significant figure in the transition of medicine from mechanism to vitalism in England]. Mather, pushing forward the Puritan transition into the Enlightenment, is curiously also anticipating the transition of the mechanistic worldview of the Enlightenment—which saw matter as endowed with inertia; only reason could account for movement and change—to a view that saw an active force at work within matter, body, and society.

Concerning the question of how an open and molecular, almost decentralized machine such as the human body could be regulated, Mather [in his deviation from classical mechanist thought] comes up with a surprising answer: as a dynamic system, the body is composed in such a way as to be self-regulating. Whereas Enlightenment thought stressed the importance of active interventions by God [or active interventions by a rational mind from the outside], vitalism suggested an active force within the body that was capable of maintaining itself, without external and hylarchic help. And if [as Margaret Jacobs has argued] mechanistic philosophy can be seen as serving
the interest of absolutism, then vitalism conveys the contrary message of liberalism and self-government. The power of the Body|Politic did not reside in a supreme organ [e.g., the heart or the brain], but in the active force inherent in matter—not in a hierarchical submission to the One, but in a mutual cooperation of the Many. As Otto Mayr correctly points out, this thought was “extremely congenial to a liberal mentality; a system that could balance and regulate itself in full autonomy and independence, without help from a higher authority, would be the foundation of a liberal form of order” (155). Mather, in embracing the vitalist tradition reaching back to van Helmont and Paracelsus and ‘inoculating’ mechanist philosophy with it, repeats a structure that also reveals itself in his political agenda, or vice versa: there seems to be a striking parallel between moving “backwards to the period preceding the triumph of ‘mechanistic natural philosophy’” (Reill 208) and Mather’s urge to return to the political climate of the Puritan founders. In addition, both steps backward are completed by a step forward, by elevating ‘tradition’ to a new level—in science, by fusing the vitalist inheritance with mechanism; in politics, by fusing traditional Puritanism with liberalization and secularization. In Mather’s conception, the body [especially the sinful and, in traditional Puritan terminology, the fragmented body] serves as a touchstone for the actual ‘scientific proof’ of the body’s capability of self-regulation, a capability both possible and revealed under ‘good management’ and the rule of the ‘right quantum.’

It can be argued that, even if he brings to light the autopoietic qualities of the Body|Politic, and even if one leaves aside the immensely complex question of the ultimate position of God in this concept, it is still Mather who inoculates, Mather who gives advice, Mather who propagates the forming of associations, etc. One possible answer might lie in the concept of active power itself. As an ‘invisible’ force, being part of matter itself, it is fluid and dynamic, and “cannot be associated with any solid, static body, or when displaced into political language with any established elite” (Reill 212). Still in the grip of traditional ways of thinking about the Body|Politic and eschewing the ultimate consequences of his foray into the field of self-organization, Mather ultimately returns to equating the body’s microperceptions with a ‘rational force’ with which he comes to identify himself—a kind of “educated intelligentsia, . . . a Stand above the Stände” (ibid.). In line with Mather’s concept of inoculation, the political reading of vitalism emphasized “action and freedom of individual choice, limited, of course, by the imperative to avoid what late Enlightenment thinkers considered the plunge into anarchistic chaos” (ibid.). The rule of the right quantum was Mather’s attempt to inoculate that imperative into the Body|Politic. Consistently thinking through the political implications of vitalism [that is, a vitalism modified by Enlight-
Cotton Mather 169

enment science], he found its liberating power still to be limited, since the active force “was seen to operate within the parameters of polar opposition” (211)—note the complementary movements of systole and diastole, inhalation and exhalation, antigens and antibodies, and so forth. The perfect constitution of the Body|Politic would consist of a harmony between extremes. Yet the harmony then would be not one of unison, but one of antagonistic forces, of dissonances, of differences. As a consequence, Reill continues, “in both the natural and the social world the symbol of a static, preestablished harmonic perfection is transformed into one of a perfection in becoming” (ibid.).81 Mather, with his strategy of ‘inoculation’ and the ‘right dose,’ goes even further. Far from seeing the harmony between extremes as a kind of equilibrium, he locates this antagonism not only on a deeper [that is, a molecular] structure, but his concept also seems to strive not for a closure of that antagonism, but for a way to make that antagonistic force work for the ultimate benefit of the Body|Politic as a semistable yet dynamic system, the perfect balance of what René Thom would call “structural stability and morphogenesis.”82

Christopher Langton, a researcher in complex systems and artificial life, has noted that “biology has traditionally started at the top, viewing a living organism as a complex biochemical machine, and worked analytically downwards from there—through organs, tissues, cells, organelles, membranes, and finally molecules—in its pursuit of the mechanics of life” (2). By concentrating on the self-regulating properties of bodies, antibodies, and the Nishmath, Mather [at least cautiously] moves from bottom to top, which is the only way that new properties—life—can emerge. Mather shows that the machinic body, like “every species of machine, is always at the junction of the finite and infinite, at this point of negotiation between complexity and chaos” (Guattari, Chaosmosis 111), not only functioning according to [cultural] imperatives, but also according to its own systemic laws and material capacities.

I want to conclude with a final image of that structural stability and morphogenesis. In a lecture on man’s mortality, Mather claims that “man is like a Bubble rising on the Top of the Water, and there taking a Dance or two, perhaps with some lesser ones about it. In a moment, it bursts asunder, and immediately the Bubble shrinks into its first Principles” (Short Life 13). And although in the theological framework this image clearly makes sense as a memento mori, it also fits into the referential frame elaborated so far, as an example of the Deleuzian credo that forms and structures are not [only] imposed from an outside, but inherent to the material itself. In De Landa’s description, the perfectly spherical shape of a bubble “emerges out of the interactions among its constituent molecules as these are constrained
energetically to ‘seek’ the point at which surface tension is minimized” (“Deleuze and the Open-ended Becoming”). Like the bubble, the subject is subjected to various attractors that keep it ‘in place.’ It is not a question of an ideal form externally imposed, but of a dynamic and semistable position within a force field of different powers, both cultural and material. In the case of the bubble, “an endogenous topological form (a point in the space of energetic possibilities for this molecular assemblage) governs the collective behavior of the individual . . . molecules, and results in the emergence of a spherical shape” (ibid.). As with the bubble, the permanence of ‘man’ is a matter of process, not of substance. As Hans Jonas—who compares the body with a flame [not a bubble, though I should add that Mather, after the ‘bubble’ example, also compares man to a “young spark” (A Short Life 13)—observes, this permanence of process is one like “in a burning candle, . . . in which at each moment the ‘body’ with its ‘structure’ of inner and outer layers is reconstituted of materials different from the previous and the following ones so the living organism exists as a constant exchange of its own constituents and has its permanence and identity in the continuity of this process” (55).

Mather’s scientific preoccupation with the body and its workings provided him with a plethora of facts that could be read as political analogies and could add up to a preliminary theory of the Body|Politic: the Body|Politic possesses qualities inherent in its own material. In line with his antimonarchism—Governor Joseph Dudley concludes that Mather’s “Actions . . . will Everlastingly be Opposite to Government, even though it were Angelical” (15)—Mather can be seen as arguing for a self-government of the Body|Politic [separation from England], and a self-regulation of that Body|Politic itself, which accepts moderately democratic forces within the general order provided by a return to the principles of the first generation of Puritan settlers. This is not the place to debate whether Mather was trying to prove his theory of the right quantum by the procedure of inoculation, or whether his research into inoculation actually triggered his politics. In either case, inoculation provided Mather with not only a method of treatment, but also a rich political metaphor: under the auspices of a good doctor|good governance, the Body|Politic can be brought to organize and regulate itself, with the ultimate consequence that the self-regulating capacities of the body—its immune system—finally can do without the doctor. Mather can be counted as part of a revolutionary tradition that would reach its culmination in 1776.
"I AM THE POET OF LITTLE THINGS"

Walt Whitman and
Minor Poetics|Politics

whereas the last chapters have dealt primarily with events in American history, this chapter will deal with American literature, at a time when the response to Emerson’s call for a genuine American literature clashed with the threat of destruction of a ‘genuine’ United States of America—the time of the Civil War. I will delineate Deleuze|Guattari’s concept of a minor literature in connection with Tocqueville’s notion of the nexus of American literature and democracy and connect Whitman’s literary style to a ‘political style,’ to see how Whitman derives a concept of a ‘new democracy’ from his experiments with language. Deleuze himself has a deep interest in American literature, an interest as biased as his [and Guattari’s] romantic image of America in general—an interest that results in Deleuze’s famous claim of “the superiority of Anglo-American literature.” In the essay by that name, Deleuze proposes a number of contrasting features that distinguish French and Anglo-American literature. Anglo-American writers are concerned with lines of flight, with them, “everything is departure, becoming, passage, leap, daemon, relationship with the outside. They create a new Earth; but perhaps the movement of the earth is deterritorialization itself. American literature operates according to geographical lines . . . The becoming is geographical. There is no equivalent in France. The French are too human, too historical, too concerned with the future and the past . . . They do not know how to become . . . They do not know how to trace lines, to follow a channel . . . They are too fond of roots, trees, the survey, the points of arborescence, the properties” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 36–37). It must be noted that Deleuze’s collection of Anglo-American writers—“Thomas Hardy, Melville, Stevenson, Virginia Woolf, Thomas Wolfe, Lawrence, Fitzgerald, Miller, Kerouac” (36)—sometimes includes writers such as Kafka, Kleist, Blanchot, “Artaud and half of Beckett” (Negotiations 23), whereas American writers might be found whom Deleuze would designate as “French.” It becomes clear that ‘Anglo-American’ does not denote so much a kind of national character [although Deleuze|Guattari more than once point out the geographical
aspect of Anglo-American literature as compared to the historical aspect of French literature]¹ rather than a style of writing, a style more interested in deterritorialization, in “intensities, flows, machine-books, tool-books, schizo-books” (ibid.), than in the territorializing aspects of a literature that is historical, psychological, and reasonable—a literature that for Deleuze Guattari is epitomized in the “French persona in philosophy . . . The French are like landowners whose source of income is the cogito” (What Is Philosophy? 104). The Anglo-American persona in literature has a close affinity with Deleuze Guattari’s idea of the book as a machinic assemblage—as such, “a book only has itself, in connection with other assemblages . . . A book exists only through the outside and on the outside. A book itself is a little machine; what is the relation . . . of this literary machine to a war machine, love machine, revolutionary machine, etc.?” (Thousand Plateaus 4). In Deleuze Guattari’s ‘taxonomy of books,’ then, French literature embodies the “root-book” (5), whereas Anglo-American literature comes closest to the book as rhizome. In its stress on becoming, Anglo-American literature is inherently political. For Deleuze Guattari, literature [and language in general] is always political. It either replicates and imprints the ‘order word’ of established forms, laws and rules, striations and regulations [the root-book], or it deals with becomings, with possibilities and potentialities [the book as machinic assemblage]. It can either “consist in imagining or projecting an ego” (Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical 3), or “in inventing a people who are missing,” which, for Deleuze, is the true and primary function of literature: “The ultimate aim of literature is to set free . . . this creation of a people, that is, a possibility of life. To write for this people who are missing . . . (‘for’ means less ‘in the place of’ than ‘for the benefit of’)” (4). And in What Is Philosophy? Deleuze Guattari further qualify the preposition ‘for:’ “But what does ‘for’ mean? It is not ‘for their benefit,’ or yet ‘in their place.’ It is ‘before.’ It is a question of becoming” (109).

This difference between American and French literature, and its implications for politics, was not lost on another Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, who visited America in the early nineteenth century. In the 1830s, Tocqueville and his fellow magistrate Gustave de Beaumont traveled the United States on an official mission from the French government to report on the penal system and prisons of the United States. Tocqueville’s main interest, however, was to understand America, that “one country in the world where the great social revolution . . . seems to have nearly reached its natural limits” (Tocqueville 1:13), where the absolute sovereignty of the people—as Tocqueville saw it—might indeed provide a ‘city upon a hill’ for an evolving French democracy. According to Tocqueville, “a new science of politics is needed for a new world” (1:7), and a close observation of American society,
he believed, would reveal the axioms for that science, which would explain the functioning of the new world that was the result of a transformation of the aristocratic age into the democratic age. Tocqueville’s report, which was eventually published as *Democracy in America*, consists of two parts. The first part, published in 1835, contains details about America’s social and political structure that point toward the promise of a democratic model for the future. The second part, published five years later, comprises two volumes that focus on more philosophical attempts to explain both the historical and geographical foundations of American democracy. It is here that the picture of America gets darker, with the threat of either a hopelessly individualistic and egalitarian society or mob rule looming large. Tocqueville, after all, was an aristocrat himself, and so his fascination with the democratic spirit and his fear of what he saw as its excesses were never far apart. In this second part, in a chapter titled “Literary Characteristics of Democratic Times,” Tocqueville comments on what he observed as the close intimacy of politics and aesthetics, and he contrasts two literary styles that bear a close affinity with Deleuze’s distinction between French and Anglo-American literature. In Tocqueville’s account, American literature, by which he means democratic literature, is juxtaposed with aristocratic literature, which he equates with the literature of England and France. As the title of the chapter indicates, however, Tocqueville is more concerned with democratic *times*, with temporal rather than geographical differences—although he does not make this distinction totally clear. As a consequence, there is also an Englishness in certain versions of American literature: Americans “find the literature of England growing on their own soil” (2:55) so that, ultimately, America still produces literary works that are “English in substance and still more so in form. Thus they transport into the midst of democracy the ideas . . . current among the aristocratic nation they have taken for their model” (2:56). On the other hand, the democratic spirit that infuses American literature might also be found in French literature, in moments “when the literary genius of democratic nations coincid[es] with that of aristocratic nations. . . . The French literature of the eighteenth century may serve as an example” (2:60). For Tocqueville as for Deleuze, then, ‘American’ and ‘English|French’ literature serve as extremes denoting more a style than a national literary character. And similar to Deleuze’s distinction, Tocqueville differentiates these styles in terms of fixity and openness, stasis and dynamics. In an aristocratic society, both politics and “intellectual occupations . . . are concentrated in a ruling class” (2:56). The equivalent to strict laws and regulations in the political sphere is the establishment of “precise canons . . . ; their code will be at once strict and traditional” (2:57). In this aristocratic style of literature, then, “everything will be regular and prearranged . . . ; each kind of
writing will have rules of its own, from which it will not be allowed to swerve...; the diction will be polished, measured, and uniform” (ibid.). Such a formulaic literature, because of its aristocratic foundations, “will entirely lose sight of the rest of the world” (2:57–58), and thus of life. In fact, those static rules are equivalent to a complete reterritorialization of the powers of life, which results in a seemingly autonomous realm ‘apart’ from life, of “literature as an art... for its own sake” (2:57)—a hermetically closed system, perfectly functioning, but with no ‘outside.’ As a consequence, “every aristocracy that keeps itself entirely aloof from the people becomes impotent, a fact which is as true in literature as it is in politics” (2:58).

Tocqueville’s following account of democratic [American] literature is for him a matter of speculation, since, strictly speaking, “the inhabitants of the United States have... at present... no literature” (2:56), because Americans are still listening too carefully to what Emerson had called the “courtly muses of Europe” (“American Scholar,” Selected Essays 104). However, as Tocqueville admits, “they will ultimately have one; but its character will be different from that which marks the American literary productions of our time, and that character will be peculiarly its own. Nor is it impossible to trace this character beforehand” (2:56). In the following, Tocqueville “transport[s himself] into the midst of a democracy” (2:58) in order to examine the ‘democratic style’ of American literature, in its juxtaposition to the ‘aristocratic style’ of English and French literary productions. In the absence of fixed hierarchies and absolute central authority, power and knowledge is divided up infinitely, and not concentrated in one ruling class. A democratic society is a “motley multitude” (ibid.); its members have no obvious traditional and hereditary line: “They do not resemble their fathers; nay, they perpetually differ from themselves, for they live in a state of incessant change of place, feelings, and fortunes... each new generation is a new people” (2:58–59). In contrast to the static impotence of aristocratic nations, democracy is marked by potentiality and transformative dynamics—what Deleuze later called “becoming.” Since the authors of| in democracy emerge from such a “heterogeneous and agitated mass,” democratic literature will show “but few of those strict conventional rules” (Tocqueville 2:58) that characterize the aristocratic style. The coming American literature will rather “stir the passions than... charm the taste” (2:59). Thus, the “aspect of order, regularity, science, and art” will never be as dogmatic as in English and French literature—its “style will be fantastic, incorrect, over-burdened, and loose, almost always vehement and bold” (2:59). Among democratic people, then, “literature will not easily be subjected to strict rules, and it is impossible that any such rules should ever be permanent” (ibid.)—and one might add here the same observation that Tocqueville made with respect
to aristocracy, this is “a fact that is as true in literature as it is in politics” (2:58). Ultimately, “the relations that exist between the social and political condition of a people and the genius of its authors are always numerous; whoever knows the one is never completely ignorant of the other” (2:60).

An important reason for the close proximity of a democratic literary style and democratic politics is to be found in “the complex nature of the Constitution of the United States, which consists of two distinct social structures, connected, and, as it were, encased one within the other” (1:59)—the social life and politics of the community, and the ‘politics proper’ of the country. Moreover, “political . . . life is centered in three focuses of action, which may be compared to the different nervous centers that give motion to the human body. The township is the first in order, then the county, and lastly the state” (1:59–60). In this system of ‘nested’ or ‘embedded’ hierarchies, the township is “the only association which is so perfectly natural that, wherever a number of men are collected, it seems to constitute itself” (1:60). The township promises the emergence of a ‘bottom-up’ model of society, not the least because it is not composed of political parties run and presided over by talented individuals: “The township, on the contrary, is composed of coarser materials, which are less easily fashioned by the legislator.” Township politics, then, is not constituted from the outside, but rather “self-produced in the midst of a semi-barbarous state of society” (ibid.). Since in the townships, governors and governed virtually coincide, power here is exercised almost immediately, without go-betweens—in the townships, “the system of representation is not adopted” (1:62). Instead of representing a people, American municipal politics is engaged in the production of new alliances. Tocqueville, completely aware of the danger [and his own fear] of anarchy, asks why, if everybody is his/her own governor, there is still order and ‘obedience,’ and he gives the following answer, which is quite close to the Spinozist [as compared to the Hobbesian] view of human nature and society: the individual “obeys society, not because he is inferior to those who conduct it or because he is less capable than any other of governing himself, but because he acknowledges the utility of an association with his fellow men and he knows that no such association can exist without a regulating force” (1:64). This regulating force, however, is not an outside agency of control, a sovereign whose power is added to that of the multitude. In Tocqueville’s observation, as in Spinoza’s ‘political physics,’ the power of the multitude is in fact the sovereign, so that “although everything moves regularly, the mover can nowhere be discovered. The hand that directs the social machine is invisible” (1:70).

One of the reasons that Tocqueville gives for “the maintenance of the democratic republic in the United States” (1:288), in addition to the laws
176 AN AMERICAN BODYPOLITIC

and the manners and customs of the American people, is the “peculiar and accidental situation in which Providence has placed the Americans” (1:288), by which Tocqueville basically means America’s geographical position. Far from the European monarchies, where state powers such as armies, administrations, and bureaucracies were created, America did not need these institutions and centralizing powers, since “Americans have no neighbors and consequently they have no great wars, or financial crises, or inroads, or conquest, to dread” (1:289). Thus, in the United States, “not only is legislation democratic, but Nature herself favors the cause of the people” (1:291). But not only the larger geographical structure is benevolent to democratic structures: the example of the township has shown that also urban microstructures facilitate and maintain democracy. In townships, like in big meeting houses, the ‘system of representation’ does not take hold because of the literal proximity of the people. Here, not only the distinction between governor-governed collapses, but also that between privatopolitical—which is why Tocqueville saw the American literature of his day as inherently journalistic: “The only authors whom I acknowledge as American are the journalists. They indeed are not great writers, but they speak the language of their country and make themselves heard” (2:56).

It is this very proximity between the private and the political that for Deleuze|Guattari is one of the key characteristics of what they call “minor literature” (Kafka). The function of the term minor derives from its relation to its opposite, major. Deleuze|Guattari employ their concept of the minoritarian|majoritarian in A Thousand Plateaus, where they point out that ‘majoritarian’ does not denote “a greater relative quantity but . . . the determination of a standard in relation to which larger quantities, as well as the smallest, can be said to be minoritarian” (291). If, then, for Deleuze Guattari “man is majoritarian par excellence,” so that there are “many becomings of man, but no becoming-man” (291), “man” represents the standard, or axiom, of majority in a similar way that ‘French literature’ denotes a ‘major literature,’ or ‘Anglo-American literature’ epitomizes a literature of becoming. According to Deleuze, “one does not become Man, insofar as man presents himself as a dominant form of expression that claims to impose itself on all matter . . . The shame of being a man—is there any better reason to write?” (Essays Critical and Clinical 1). Against the major [and also molar] axiom, against a “redundant majority” (Thousand Plateaus 469) [redundant, in that here everything is generated from the same ‘standard formula’ and subsumed under that same ‘standard qualifier’ that reduces all singularities], “minorities are not necessarily defined by the smallness of their numbers but rather by becoming or a line of fluctuation” (ibid.). Minorities are nonaxiomatic—they have their “own compositions, organiza-
tions, even centralizations,” but they proceed “not via the States or the axiomatic process but via a pure becoming” (471). In their bottom-up [rather than top-down] composition, minorities are “nondenumerable and proliferating,” deterritorializing “the very concept of majority, . . . the majority as an axiom” (469).

Taking the work of Kafka as their prime example, Deleuze|Guattari show minor literature’s use of “language affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization” (Kafka 16). They point out the highly creative [and ultimately political] use of Prague German in Kafka’s work. In Kafka’s Prague, German was the official language of government and state institutions, which through its use by Czechs [and Czech Jews] was transformed and deformed into Prague German, which Kafka transformed further. This example reveals minor literature’s inherent relation to a major language: “A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language: it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language” (ibid.). Tocqueville had also observed the “influence which a democratic social condition and democratic institutions may exercise over language itself” (2:64). Whereas “in aristocracies, language must naturally partake of that state of repose in which everything remains, . . . [d]emocratic nations love change for its own sake, and this is seen in their language as much as in their politics” (2:65). One primary reason of the constant linguistic change within the American vocabulary is of course the fact that already in Tocqueville’s time, America was a very heterogeneous, multicultural assemblage. As he noted, “having little knowledge of the dead languages, democratic nations are apt to borrow words from living tongues, for they have constant mutual intercourse, and the inhabitants of different countries imitate each other” (2:66). It is exactly this polyvocality that Deleuze regards as a characteristic of American literature: “American literature has an exceptional power to produce writers who can recount their own memories, but as those of a universal people composed of immigrants from all countries” (Essays Critical and Clinical 4). In addition to commenting on the incorporation of loan words from immigrant people, Tocqueville observes what he regards as the “deplorable consequence of democracy” to ignorantly “double the meaning of a word” (2:67), a tendency that the aristocrat author, despite his fascination with American democracy, ultimately despises: he “had rather that the language should be made hideous with words imported from the Chinese, the Tatars, or the Hurons than that the meaning of a word in our own language should become indeterminate” (ibid.). This ambiguity in language stems from the fact that “it is principally upon their own languages that democratic nations attempt to make innovations. From time to time they resume and restore to use forgotten expressions in their vocabulary, or they borrow from some
particular class of the community a term peculiar to it” (2:66), mostly borrowed from “the mechanical arts, or the language of trade” (2:64). Tocqueville, though immensely sympathetic to democracy [and its minor use of language], ultimately speaks from the position of a major [aristocratic] language, a language that seeks to impose syntactical and grammatical regularities as well as fixed semantic codes on a ‘language material’ that is inherently processual and ‘becoming’—precisely those aristocratic static rules that result in ‘impotence,’ both in literature and in politics.

What characterizes minor literatures, according to Deleuze/Guattari, is that “everything in them is political” (Kafka 17): a minor literature is charged with a sense of ‘praxis’ and functions by the immediate and intimate relation between the private or individual, and the public or political. As with Tocqueville’s ‘aristocratic writers,’ who “are not necessarily engrossed by the cares of daily life” (2:57), major literature is focused on questions of the individual, inscribed in Oedipal structures, so that in major literature, “the individual concern (familial, marital, and so on) joins with other no less individual concerns, the social milieu serving as a mere environment or a background” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 17). The concept of the ‘individual’—the autonomous ego—is, it seems, a luxury of the aristocracy/bourgeoisie and is closely related to topography and spatial configurations. In contrast, minor literature [a democratic literature, although not necessary a literature of democratic societies] “is completely different; its cramped space forces each individual intrigue to connect immediately to politics. The individual concern thus becomes all the more necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it” (ibid.). In a minor literature, everything is expressed in terms of collectivity, is born out of necessity. In the spatial confines of a minor literature, where the private almost by nature resonates within the political, and vice versa, “literature finds itself positively charged with the role and function of collective, and even revolutionary, enunciation. It is literature that produces an active solidarity . . . to express another possible community” (ibid.), it is literature—to again quote Deleuze on “The Superiority of Anglo-American Literature”—that does not represent an existing people, but invent “a people who are missing” (Essays Critical and Clinical 4). A minor literature, then, is ultimately “something other than a literature of masters; what each author says individually already constitutes a common action, and what he or she says or does is necessarily political” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 17).

It is this quality of the minor that Deleuze sees as a working force in ‘Anglo-American’ literature. The people that a minor literature [Deleuzian Anglo-American literature] invents [which at the same time is the people that produces a minor literature] “is not exactly a people called upon to
dominate the world. It is a minor people, eternally minor, taken up in a becoming-revolutionary. Perhaps it exists only in the atoms of the writer, a bastard people, inferior, dominated, always in becoming, always incomplete. Bastard no longer designates a familial state, but the process or drift of the races” (Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical 4). “Bastard” also refers to the insight that because of their minor use of a major language—a minor use, since, as Deleuze|Guattari insist, “‘major’ and ‘minor’ do not qualify two different languages, but rather two usages or functions of language” (Thousand Plateaus 105)—minor writers “are foreigners in their own tongue. If they are bastards . . . , it is due not to a mixing or intermingling of languages but rather to a subtraction and variation of their own language” (106), which is exactly the “deplorable consequence of democracy” that Tocqueville despised. Since it is not the multicultural plurivocality [alone] that makes for a minor, bastard use of language, the “drift of the races” referred to in the above quotation is a pun: in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze|Guattari advocate using “the minor language to send the major language racing” (ibid.). Minor language|literature ‘speeds up’ [varies, destabilizes, liquefies] major language|literature, by pushing it away from representational constants and toward inherent intensities and affects. In its ‘becoming-revolutionary,’ the minor ‘scale’ is inherently and immediately political—Kafka, in contrast to the “‘diabolical powers’ . . . [of] the American technocratic apparatus or the Russian bureaucracy or the machinery of fascism” (Kafka 12) [major|molar axiomatics that threaten to impose themselves on all matter, that control, organize and regulate ‘material’ in the name of a dominant order], takes advantage of the instabilities inherent in language, of the powers of fabulation and proliferation.

In his essay “Literature and Life,” Deleuze draws an explicit connection between Kafka’s minor literature and Anglo-American literature: “Kafka (for Central Europe) and Melville (for America) present literature as the collective enunciation, the communal expression, of a minor people, or of all minor peoples, who find their expression only in and through the writer. Though it always refers to singular agents [agents], literature is a collective assemblage [agencement] of enunciation” (Essays Critical and Clinical 4). For Deleuze, then, the assemblage is the basic ‘unit’ of the social, the “minimum real unit . . . not the word, the idea, the concept or the signifier” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 51). As a consequence, every enunciation is by default produced not by an author|subject but by an assemblage, “which is always collective, which brings into play within us and without us populations, multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events” (ibid.). Such a collective enunciation, however, is only one of the two constituents of what Deleuze|Guattari call “assemblage,” as it constitutes for example a social
field—one of two segments that in addition have to be considered in their relation to stabilizing forces [of reterritorialization] and lines of flight [of detrertorialization]. The ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’ consists “of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies” and is connected to a “machinic assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions; an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another” (Thousand Plateaus 88). It is the complex interplay of these two segments, the dynamics of discursive and symbolic systems in conjunction with physics, that make up the social field, that in fact ‘produces’ semistable subjects in the first place. It is important for a politics if the collective assemblage of enunciation follows the lines of regulation and control [major|molar], or the determinizing powers of becoming [minor|molecular]. A ‘minor politics’ [e.g., a “Kafka politics” (Kafka 7)] is a “politics that is neither imaginary nor symbolic” (ibid.), neither representation nor archetype, neither structural nor phantasmatic, a politics not of form [or substance] but of an unformed material of expression” (6), a political machine for producing effects affects, for inventing “a people who are missing,” a politics of experiment: “Politics is active experimentation, since we do not know in advance which way a line is going to turn” (Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical 137).

‘Anglo-American literature,’ then, can be seen as a placeholder [a conceptual persona] for a minor literature. Deleuze relates his concept of ‘Anglo-American literature’ to a further catalogue of philosophies—another assemblage, consisting of “[British] empiricism,” “Spinoza,” and “the Stoics” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 54, 59, 62), and it is these affinities and resonances that make ‘Anglo-American literature’ a minor literature but that at the same time make it superior to a major literature. In What Is Philosophy? Deleuze|Guattari also draw the connection between Anglo-American literature and Spinoza, pointing out that “many English and American novelists . . . have written the novel of Spinozism” (67). Thus, just as writers are always also ‘half’ philosophers but also much more than philosophers” (ibid.), so “philosophy’s like the novel . . . [e]xcept the characters are concepts, and the settings, the scenes, are space-times” (Deleuze, Negotiations 140–41). However, it is not that writers, novelists, and philosophers alike “produce a synthesis of art and philosophy” (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 67). Rather, it is that as writing, as a practice of the minor, both philosophy and literature are engaged in creating possibilities, in inventing a people who is missing: “One’s always writing to bring something to life, to free life from where it’s trapped, to trace lines of flight” (Deleuze, Negotiations 140–41). In this sense, then, empiricism, and “Hume in particular . . . is like the English novel. It is a case of philosophizing as a novelist, of being a novelist in philosophy” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 54).
In the shadow of the ‘major philosophers’ of empiricism, such as Locke, Berkeley, and later Kant, Hume has always been considered a kind of ‘anomalous philosopher’ [like Spinoza with respect to Hobbes or Descartes]. Deleuze connects with Hume and Spinoza and the other ‘anomalous philosophers’ in his “critique of the negative, the culture of joy, . . . the denunciation of power” (Negotiations 6). In addition, Deleuze finds in Hume’s empiricism “something very strange which completely displaces empiricism, giving it a new power, a theory and the practice of relations, of the and.” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 15). The fundamental proposition of empiricism, according to Deleuze’s reading of Hume, is that “relations are external to ideas” (Empiricism 98) and external to their terms. Hume is an important influence on Deleuze, since his empiricism provides Deleuze with a theory of how a subject emerges from the flow of experience, of the sensible and the given. Philosophy so far has started from the assumption, Hume writes, that “we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our Self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain . . . both of its perfect identity and simplicity” (Human Nature 164). Yet, Hume argues, the self as such cannot be experienced. Only successive and ever-changing impressions are given to experience, all of which are supposed to refer to the self: “Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions . . . that the idea of self is deriv’d” (ibid.). This raises the question of whether the subject of experience [the self] is one or many. If “I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception” (165), then the self ultimately does not exist at the very moment it ceases to experience, to perceive. The self is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (ibid.)—thus, the Humean subject constitutes itself already as a body of forces, a Body|Politic. Experience is not given to the mind, the material with which the mind works—the mind is the heterogeneous collection of perceptions, and the connections between them are not preexistent. The subject emerges as a [necessary] fiction to give coherence to that flux: “We feign the continu’d existence of the perception of our senses, to remove the interruption” (166). The conclusion that Hume draws is that identity does not inhere in the different perceptions, but is an external quality “which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them” (169). The subject is an effect of principles of association, of relations such as similarity, equality, causality, and so forth, which relate perceptions and impressions and order them into habits—“the habit of saying ‘I’” (Empiricism x), writes
Deleuze. For Hume, the human mind is “a system of different perceptions or different existences which are link’d together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other” (Human Nature 170). Since these relations and associations are not inherent to the perceptions, they can be forged anew every time [resisting habit], generating new patterns of cognition and behavior. According to Hume, “equality is a relation, it is not . . . a property in the figures themselves, but arises merely from the comparison, which the mind makes betwixt them” (35).

Habits, as rather stable strategies of coherence, are related to desires and outside pressures [pragmatic requirements] rather than universal principles. In Deleuze’s reading of Hume, the subject is a result of a process, not a transcendental form or being. First there is the flux of experience: the mind’s immediate perception of the given empiricism starts from “an animated succession of distinct perceptions” (Deleuze, Empiricism 87)—that is, an experience of difference. The subject emerges from this experience and transcends it, but is not there a priori. As such, then, identity is never stable but is constantly in flux. In addition, the relations that give a temporal coherence to it are external to their terms, rather than ‘naturally’ inherent in the perceptions/existences. As a consequence, “a multiplicity is never in terms, however many there are, nor in their set or totality. A multiplicity is only in the and, which does not have the same nature as the elements, the sets or even their relations” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 57). These relations have to be produced, forged, and identity, the subject, is an effect of the perpetual flux of the given. Deleuze comments: “Subjectivity is essentially practical. Its definitive unity—that is, the unity of relations and circumstances—will be revealed in the relations between motive and action, means and end” (Empiricism 104). Ultimately, if the subject is constituted in the given but also transcends it, if it is both physics and psyche, evolving from materiality but at the same time distinct from it, follows two different logics at the same time—then “in fact there is only a practical subject” (ibid.).

It quickly becomes clear why Deleuze links Anglo-American literature and its ‘pragmatism’ with Humean empiricism, and why Whitman in particular embodies Hume’s principles in his style. If Hume’s axiom that “relations are external to their terms” (quoted in Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 55) flattens any hierarchical structure of the relation between the subject and the world into “a movement across a surface instead of a rising-up” (Buchanan 85), then Whitman’s paratactic composition principle—as shown in the long lists that make up his poems, connected on an equal level by conjunctions rather than subordinate clauses—presents a perfect ‘literary correlative’ to Hume’s formula of the subject. Whitman and Hume both engage in what Constantin Boundas, in his “Translator’s Introduction” to
Deleuze’s study of Hume, has referred to as the “politics of paratactic discourse” (*Empiricism* 1). It is precisely this paratactic flattening out that relates Hume’s philosophy [and Whitman’s poetry] to a minor politics. State politics, the major axiomatic, deals only with “denumerable sets, even infinite ones, whereas the minorities constitute ‘fuzzy,’ nondenumerable, nonaxiomizable sets, in short, ‘masses,’ multiplicities of escape and flux” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus* 470). In its aiming at control, the major axiomatic relates everything to the standard ‘integral’; it works according to fixed reference points within a system. In contrast, because the fuzzy sets of multiplicities cannot be captured by those taxonomic grids, the minor is always related to nonintegrable processes of becoming, which are always between, in the middle. The productivity of life does not follow a simple either/or logic, an unfolding of a point of origin into further differences; rather, it starts from the fuzzy set of differences, and from these, syntheses [points of relative stability] can emerge. Hume’s subject, which by the “habit of saying I” (Deleuze, *Empiricism*) takes this fiction of identity/continuity for granted, is always in danger of cutting the connection to the multiplicity that ‘founds’ it—and this is exactly what Deleuze is most interested in. Ultimately, “what characterizes the nondenumerable is neither the set nor its elements; rather, it is the connection, the ‘and’ produced between elements, . . . which eludes them and constitutes a line of flight” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus* 470), or constitutes a paratactic [and thus minor] assemblage.

With regard to the paratactic politics of both Hume and Whitman, it should be noted that Hume was writing his *Treatise of Human Nature* during the time of Scotland’s imposed parliamentary unification with England [1707]. Questions of union and fragmentation were still in the air, and the political climate was quite similar to the one in which Whitman started writing his poetry, as the question of the stability of the United States was becoming fundamental. As Susan Manning has convincingly argued, there is “an embedded political analogy within the vocabulary of union and fragmentation which structures the expression of Hume’s ideas about personal identity” (34).11 Thus, Hume firmly links the question of identity with the question of the Body|Politick when he compares the mind “to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity” (*Human Nature* 170).12 In Hume’s *Treatise*, the analogy between the subject
and the Body|Politic [or the mind and the commonwealth] permeates the whole text and, according to Manning, provides a compositional blueprint for later writers such as Emerson, Emily Dickinson, and Whitman. The influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on American politics is manifested in particular in the works of James Madison, who included Hume’s principle of the nation as aggregated fragments in his Federalist papers, where he drew inspiration from Hume’s essay on the “Idea of the Perfect Commonwealth” and other scattered fragments of Hume’s political theory, “and built them into an intellectual and theoretical structure of his own” (Adair 353).

Thus, when Hume discusses spatial and temporal concepts in terms of different ideas of union, he implicitly comments on the alternatives of a union of incorporation [hypotactic, hierarchical] and a ‘federative union’ [paratactic, vertical]:

Suppose two bodies containing no void within their circumference, to approach each other, and to unite in such a manner that the body, which results from their union, is no more extended than either of them; it is this we must mean when we talk of penetration. But it is evident this penetration is nothing but the annihilation of one of these bodies, and the preservation of the other, without our being able to distinguish particularly which is preserved and which annihilated. Before the approach we have the idea of two bodies. After it we have the idea only of one. It is impossible for the mind to preserve any notion of difference betwixt two bodies of the same nature existing in the same place at the same time.

Taking then penetration in this sense, for the annihilation of one body upon its approach to another, I ask any one, if he sees a necessity, that a coloured or tangible point should be annihilated upon the approach of another coloured or tangible point? On the contrary, does he not evidently perceive, that from the union of these points there results an object, which is compounded and divisible, and may be distinguished into two parts, of which each preserves its existence distinct and separate, notwithstanding its contiguity to the other? Let him aid his fancy by conceiving these points to be of different colours, the better to prevent their coalition and confusion. A blue and a red point may surely lie contiguous without any penetration or annihilation. For if they cannot, what possibly can become of them? Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated? Or if these colours unite into one, what new colour will they produce by their union? (Human Nature 32, my emphasis)

With regard to both the subject [mind], and the Body|Politic, then, unity cannot be but paratactic, a matter of relation and connection that leaves the singularity of the different perceptions\members intact. Their “constant union” is a matter of convention and acquaintance, “and ’tis from the con-
stant union the necessity arises” (416) to infer the continuity of identity/unity. However, “that term of unity is merely a fictitious denomination, which the mind may apply to any quantity of objects it collects together” (25). Unity/identity, both of the individual and the Body/Poltic, is not a substance that cements its ‘Many’ [perceptions or members] into ‘One’ [mind or Body/Poltic]; rather, “identity depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce identity” (171). The soul [mind], according to Hume, is a collection of heterogeneous perceptions, like “those of heat and cold, love and anger, thoughts and sensations; all united together, but without any perfect simplicity or identity” (414). Since “everything, that exists, is particular” (ibid.), the unity that the relations/associations produce does not integrate these perceptions into a whole—unity is a paratactic assemblage.

In Deleuze’s list of ‘Anglo-American’ authors [both in the ‘extended’ and in the more ‘geographical’ sense], Walt Whitman is conspicuously missing. Deleuze makes up for this absence by devoting a whole essay to Whitman in his Essays Critical and Clinical, in which he claims American literature to be “the minor literature par excellence” (57)—and by implication allocates the title of minor writer par excellence to Whitman. It is Whitman’s use of fragments [characteristic not only of American literature, but innately “characteristic of America” (56)] that connects him at once to both a minor literature and to Hume’s empiricism, and it is this connection and its implications for a [minor] American politics that I will now focus on. For Whitman—and in Whitman’s America—the fragment is at the same time both a question of literary style and of the Body/Poltic: “Here is not merely a nation but a teeming nation of nations” (Poetry and Prose 5). For Deleuze, since “America itself is made up of federated states and various immigrant peoples (minorities)—everywhere a collection of fragments, haunted by the menace of secession” (Essays Critical and Clinical 57), the experience of the fragment is simultaneously the experience of the American writer and of the American people. As such, Whitman’s fragmentary writing assumes “the immediate value of a collective statement” (ibid.), of a minor literature that directly relates to the political climate from which it emerges. The Kansas-Nebraska Act—introduced by Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois and passed by Congress in 1854—was first of all a reterritorialization of a large amount of land, a vast area to be used for grain cultivation, and a popular site for migrants. Together with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act increased the tensions between the northern southern states. Ultimately linked to geopolitical tendencies in both pro- and antislavery states, this act basically left the decision of whether to allow slavery in a territory up to its inhabitants—a strategy that Douglas called “popular sovereignty.” As Frederick Douglass later remarked, it was “an open invitation to
a fierce and bitter strife” (305). This act overrode the 1820 Missouri Compromise, which explicitly prohibited the extension of slavery north of latitude 36°30’—the “great national wall, erected in the better days of the republic, against the spread of slavery” (304). Violence between slaveholding settlers and antislavery farmers soon broke out—inflamed by supporters of both sides who hastened to settle Kansas so they could vote on whether Kansas would become a slave or a free state. The proslavery president, Franklin Pierce, had federal troops march into Kansas, to take action against the antislavery farmers.13 As Timothy Sweet has observed, Emerson, in his “Speech on Affairs in Kansas” [a speech delivered in Cambridge on the occasion of the riots and their attempted suppression], describes the affair as a clear sign of “the breakdown of all structures of representation” (T. Sweet 1)—both in terms of politics and in terms of language. As Emerson put it, “language has lost its meaning in the universal cant. Representative Government is really misrepresentative” (“Speech” 245).

What was needed, then, was a way out of representation. For Emerson, a political alternative to representative government was a return to the social system of the founding fathers: “Massachusetts, in its heroic day, had no government—was an anarchy,” and the time might be ripe for such a return, since Emerson could observe that “the terror at disunion and anarchy is disappearing” (247)—a terror, however, that was to return only too soon and even more vehemently. As Deleuze has argued, the realms of representation and identity are closely related: “The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation” (Difference and Repetition xix). The ‘other’ of identity—difference—“implies the negative . . . only to the extent that its subordination to the identical is maintained” (ibid.). The alternative to representation, then, is not anarchy, but a politics of difference, a minor politics of experiment [of which anarchy is only the name from the perspective of identity|representation], a politics that for Whitman coincides with a poetic style in line with such a minor politics. As he states in his essay “A Backward Glance o’er Travel’d Roads,” “I consider ‘Leaves of Grass’ and its theory experimental—as, in the deepest sense, I consider our American republic itself to be, with its theory” (Poetry and Prose 657). Whitman regarded Leaves of Grass as an experiment in language, as “an attempt to give the spirit, the body, the man, new words, new potentialities of speech” (Daybooks 3:729), and he leaves no doubt that he saw the experimentation with language as explicitly political. He saw this ‘minor language’—which was to include words from all trades, slang, dialects, and so forth—not in terms of “a polished fossil language, but a broad fluid language of democracy” (quoted in Hollis, “Whitman and the American Idiom” 419), as minor poetry and as active experimentation in the Deleuzian sense, meaning it in-
cludes poetry as a means of minor politics. Thus, poetry becomes “the powerful language of resistance . . . . It is the chosen tongue to express growth, faith, self-esteem, freedom, justice, equality, friendliness, amplitude, prudence, decision, and courage. It is the medium that shall well-nigh express the inexpressible” (Whitman, Poetry and Prose 25).

Whitman and politics has been a much-debated topic in American studies. Various critics have commented on the transition of Whitman, the political journalist, to Whitman, the poet. Mainstream Whitman criticism sees these two personas as completely separate, not even on the same continuum. Insisting on the separation between poetry and politics, some critics have focused on the American poetic tradition and have tried to situate Whitman between Emersonian transcendentalism and modernism, either erasing Whitman’s politics completely, or seeing them as marring his poetic mastery. In contrast, other critics have argued that the political is the only aspect that makes Whitman’s poetry worthwhile, so that “after a few short, creative years of speaking to Americans about the essence of democratic experience, by the outbreak of the Civil War he was virtually worn out as a poet” (Cavitch 44). Still other critics have focused both on the religious and ‘mystical’ aspects of Whitman’s work, and on the [psycho] sexual motivation of his poetry, connecting it with his homosexuality. In Whitman the Political Poet, Betsy Erkkila successfully combines Whitman’s art and his politics but concentrates on the ‘major politics,’ Whitman’s connection with the social and political currents of his times, trying to free him from the “‘New English’ sensibility” (7) and to analyze “the ways that Whitman the poet and America the polis reflect and refract each other” (11). In contrast to Erkkila’s important work, I will be more interested in Whitman’s ‘minor politics,’ a politics that is not so much concerned with the control of the polis in the Aristotelian|Platonic sense—the ruling and governing of the city and its inhabitants. A minor politics is more interested in the self-organization of the Bodily|Politic’s ‘material,’ in its becoming rather than in its being, in the way that the Bodily|Politic’s openness to the world, as an experiment, enacts a more ‘pragmatic’ notion of democracy that is concerned with change, dynamics, newness, lines of flight. This is not a politics of identity and striation but of difference and constant variation; not a static politics [state politics] but a politics as dynamic and complex as life itself. Politics is part of that life; indeed, for Deleuze|Guattari, “politics precedes being” (Thousand Plateaus 203). Whitman is a political poet in that his writing [his style] enacts that very ‘minor politics,’ in that his ‘minor poetry’ creates concepts for such an active democracy, a new composition of the Bodily|Politic’s forces, a “constitution of an earth and a people that are lacking” (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 108). Such a politics by necessity has to be
minor, a ‘minor democracy’: state “democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by its nature that which always eludes the majority” (ibid.).

When Whitman’s *Leaves of Grass* was first published, in 1855, the majority of critics regarded the book as Tocqueville would have expected a ‘new American literature’ to be regarded. As if in response to his prediction that American literature, when it came into existence, would be “fantastic, incorrect, over-burdened, and loose, almost always vehement and bold” in style, critics condemned *Leaves of Grass* as “a mass of stupid filth” (Griswold 32), and “a mass of bombast, egotism, vulgarity, and nonsense” (“An American Echo” 61). In Whitman’s experimental, free-flowing, prose-like verse, his lines did not turn the way readers expected: his poetry was regarded as “a sort of excited prose broken into lines without any attempt at measure or regularity, . . . without any idea of sense or reason” (Norton 24), with “neither wit nor method in this disjointed babbling, . . . raving in pitiable delirium” (“An American Echo” 61). Lines of experiment, in literature as in politics, are for Deleuze always lines of flight, “a sort of delirium. To be delirious (délirer) is exactly to go off the rails (as in déconner—to say absurd things)” (Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues* 40)—to leave the beaten tracks in favor of the open road. That is what Whitman quite self-consciously does, opening up the rigid order of ‘traditional poetry’: “The time has arrived to essentially break down the barriers of form between prose and poetry. I say the latter is henceforth to win and maintain its character regardless of rhyme, and the measurement-rules of iambic, spondee, dactyl, &c. . . . the truest and greatest Poetry . . . can never again, in the English language, be express’d in arbitrary and rhyming meter, any more than the greatest eloquence, or the truest power and passion” (*Prose Works* 2:519). To follow those new, nonpreexistent, uncharted lines is being “a traitor to the world of dominant significations, and to the established order” (Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues* 41). In its resistance to the confinements of ‘good form’ or ‘common sense,’ Whitman’s poetic line has a close affinity with what Deleuze Guattari call the “nomadic line,” a “streaming, spiraling, zigzagging, snaking, feverish line of variation” (*Thousand Plateaus* 499).

In its nonintegrating character, Whitman’s *Leaves of Grass* presents a Humean paratactic assemblage, a rhizome. The title itself evokes a rhizomatic composition that emerges as a solution to the problematics of the *e pluribus unum* of American democracy. Deleuze Guattari refer to *Leaves of Grass* as a prime example of an American, rhizomatic book: “American books are different from European books, even when the Americans set off in their pursuit of trees. The conception of the book is different. *Leaves of Grass*” (*Thousand Plateaus* 19). *Leaves of Grass* is true to the ‘organic’ implications of its title in that it ‘grows.’ The organic metaphor continues
through all the versions, from the first edition of 1855 to the final edition during Whitman's life, published in 1891–92. In the course of that process, poems were revised, other poems were added, some poems received titles, and many of those titles changed. Whitman’s equation of the experiment of *Leaves of Grass* with the experiment of American democracy suggests that a static condition [be it in terms of a ‘finished work’ or of the individual’s unchanging relation to the Body|Politic, or the unchanging constitution of that Body|Politic itself] cannot hold, since this would be contrary to the dynamic processes of life and nature. As Whitman writes in “Song of Myself—” attempting to answer a child’s question, “What is the grass?” (*Poetry and Prose* 31)—“I guess it must be the flag of my disposition, out of hopeful / green stuff woven . . . / Or I guess the grass is itself a child . . . the produced / babe of the vegetation. / Or I guess it is a uniform hieroglyphic, / And it means, Sprouting alike in broad zones and narrow / zones, / Growing among black folks as among white, / Kanuck, Tuckahoe, Congressman, Cuff, I give them the / same, I receive them the same” (31). The rhizomatic structure of grass ensures that although there are individual leaves, they are interconnected in such a way that every leaf is connected with every other leaf, the plant growing in various directions simultaneously. It spreads by interconnected, horizontal underground stems that do not have the central ‘root’ structure of a tree. ‘Grass’ is a true multiplicity, an open, dynamic, decentered agglomeration of different leaves and weeds—it imitates the rhizomatic structure of democracy. Democracy for Deleuze is not *either* many or one, nor is it *many into one*: democracy is a multiplicity, and “every multiplicity grows from the middle, like the blade of grass or the rhizome” (Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues* viii).

“Song of Myself,” in large parts, resists hermeneutic and interpretive unity. But rather than being delirious, disjointed babbling, Whitman’s poem is a heterogeneous ensemble consisting of diverse, paratactically composed fragments. It is open-ended and dynamic, minor in both its poetics and politics. Perhaps the most significant strategy Whitman uses to create this minor poetry|politics is his poetic persona, the “me myself” (*Poetry and Prose* 30) he introduces in “Song of Myself.” Many critics—D. H. Lawrence being one of the first and most prominent—have read this as Whitman’s aggressive attempt to speak for an America, to feel for the slave, the prostitute, and all the minorities with no voice of their own in the American Body|Politic. According to Lawrence, in Whitman’s poetry, “the universe is short, adds up to one. One. I. Which is Walt” (175). Whitman’s “I” here is regarded as a case of what Thomas Weiskel, with reference to Keats, has called the “Egotistical Sublime” (48), a narcissistic identification with a sublime totality which results in an “imaginary identity” (150), in a “totalizing consciousness
whose medium is sense but whose power is transcendent” (50). It is called the egotistical sublime because in it the “sensible ego is aggrandized in place of the self-recognition of the noumenal reason” (49)—the ego posits itself as a transcendental unity. The egotistical sublime becomes the American sublime, a harmonic version of the Kantian negative sublime, as it entered the context of American transcendentalism. The feeling of dissolution in the face of sublime greatness or power is turned into an absorption by/of the individual self of into the pantheistic totality of God’s creation, into an Emersonian “transparent eyeball.” (Emerson, “Nature,” Selected Essays 39). The egotistical impulse figures prominently in the American expansionist politics of the 1840s that spread the country from the Atlantic to the Pacific—thus, the American self was both theologically and politically aggrandized by partaking in the sublime totality. Reading Whitman in this light, he becomes an agent of America’s expansionism, imposing his “imperial self” on the world, incorporating all other selves in a single, ideal, identity or One. This approach ultimately sees Whitman’s “me myself” as an aggressive repudiation of the assumption that any politics is grounded in the individual’s relatedness to others. In contrast, I will not read Whitman’s ‘I’ as an embodiment of a primary narcissism inflated to cosmic proportion but will follow Deleuze’s lead and read Whitman’s ‘identity’ in terms of Humean empiricism.

First of all, it has to be noted that the version of this poem in the first edition of Leaves of Grass did not have a title. Only in the last edition during Whitman’s life [1881–82] was it called “Song of Myself” [it had intermediate titles: “Poem of Walt Whitman, An American” in the 1856 edition, and “Walt Whitman” in subsequent editions]. Thus, the ‘I’ first of all is anonymous, plural, a minor, nondenumerable multiplicity [and Deleuze/Guattari state that the “formula for multiplicities” (Thousand Plateaus 470) and minorities—even if the minority consists of only a single member—would be “becoming-everybody/everything (devenir tout le monde)” (470)]. Thus, most important, Whitman’s ‘I’ is a ‘becoming-America.’ In “Song of Myself,” the writing process itself, the process of poetic creation, is described as far removed from authorial control: “I loafe and invite my soul, / I lean and loafe at my ease . . . observing a spear of summer grass” (Poetry and Prose 27); Whitman exchanges “the posture of hermeneutic attention for the posture of receptivity” (Grossman 194). Whitman’s poetry descends into conversations and leaves them again; it consists of observations, perceptions, and observations of other observers, observing their perceptions. It even invites others to observe and share their perceptions: “Loafe with me on the grass . . . loose the stop from your throat,/Not words, not music or rhyme I want . . . not custom/or lecture, not even the best,/Only the lull I like, the
hum of your valved voice” (Poetry and Prose 30). The ‘I’ then is both indefinite and pre-individual: indefinite in that it cannot be fixed to any specific ‘observer’ [the ‘I’ as shifter, or the ‘I’ as ‘eye’], and pre-individual in that it consists of what Deleuze calls percepts, “packets of sensations and relations that live on independently of whoever experiences them” (Negotiations 137). Even the objects of observations are not independent and isolated unities—Whitman sees them as machinic ensembles that connect with other ensembles, perceptions, and affects, embedded in a dynamics of life|production that escapes any attempt at containment|representation: “My words are words of a questioning, and to indicate reality;/This printed and bound book . . . but the printer and the/printing-office boy?/The marriage estate and settlement . . . but the body and/mind of the bridegroom? also those of the bride?/The panorama of the sea . . . but the sea itself? /The well-taken photographs . . . but your wife or friend close and solid/in your arms?/The fleet of ships of the line and all the modern/Improvements . . . but the craft and pluck of the/admiral?/The dishes and fare and furniture . . . but the host and/hostess, and the look out of their eyes?” (Poetry and Prose 76–77).

Whitman’s poetry of percepts in turn aims to produce affects—affective relations that connect the fragmentary percepts into a machine for producing activity, and new relations: “A great poem is no finish to a man or woman, but rather a beginning . . . The touch of him, like Nature, tells in action” (24). What matters to Whitman is not the capacity for representation, but for affecting; he aims at a reconciliation of representation and production in poetry and politics, writing and activism. In a Spinozist move, Whitman proposes as the ultimate “Test of a poem—How far it can elevate, enlarge, purify, deepen and make happy the attributes of the body and soul of a man” (Notebooks 1:80), how far it can enhance power. His poetry collects percepts, without integrating them into a higher order, and produces affects in order to connect people—again, without integrating them into a higher order. With regard to both ‘poetic identity’ and ‘political identity’ [in other words, with regard to the Body|Politic] Whitman contends that “the spirit receives from the body just as much as it gives to the body” (1:21). Rather than assuming a ‘one-way street’ of control between the mind and the body, Whitman’s minor Body|Politic operates with feedback loops, like the Humean subject that, although transcending the given [the body’s sensual perceptions] never loses touch, never completely integrates. Rather than seeing ‘the mass’ of Americans as one homogeneous block, Whitman endows all the ‘specimens’ of them with a perceptivity, a sensitivity, that he then paratactically composes into his poetry: “Every existence has its idiom . . . every thing has an idiom/and tongue” (130). And even if Whitman goes on to state that it is the poet who “resolves all tongues
into his own, and bestows it upon men” (ibid.), this dialogue between the ‘you’ and the ‘I,’ this exchange of percepts, constitutes a ‘we’ that in addition to its paratactic structure does not cancel out the differences between the two: “Always a knit of identity . . . always distinction” (28). It is a federative union rather than one that ‘incorporates’ or annihilates, just like Hume’s “two parts, of which each preserves its existence distinct and separate, notwithstanding its contiguity to the other.” The ‘we’ [the multitude] is not regarded as an inert, formless mass; its difference|variety is not seen as chaos, disorder, but as a pool of resourcefulness, of potentiality. As Whitman writes in his poem “Faces:”

Sauntering the pavement or riding the country byroad here then are faces,
Faces of friendship, precision, caution, suavity, ideality,
The spiritual-prescient face, the always welcome common benevolent face,
The face of the singing of music, the grand faces of natural lawyers and judges broad at the back-top,
The faces of hunters and fishers bulged at the brows . . .
the shaved blanched faces of orthodox citizens,
The pure, extravagant, yearning, questioning artist’s face,
The welcome ugly face of some beautiful soul . . . the handsome detested or despised face,
The sacred faces of infants . . . the illuminated face of the mother of many children,
The face of an amour . . . the face of veneration,
The face as of a dream . . . the face of an immobile rock,
The face withdrawn of its good and bad . . . a castrated face,
A wild hawk . . . his wings clipped by the clipper,
A stallion that yielded at last to the thongs and knife of the gelder.

Sauntering the pavement or crossing the ceaseless ferry, here then are faces;
I see them and complain not, and am content with all.

Do you suppose I could be content with all if I thought them their own finale? (125)

The multitude is a resource of production that creates ‘its form’ in a continuous act of recomposition, in an infinite emergence of newness. The poet does not order these resources in one final composition—the ‘product’ is as much a process as the poet is part of the multitude: “All others have adhered
to the principle [that] the poet and savan form classes by themselves, above
the people, and more refined than the people; I show that they are just as
great when of the people, partaking of the common idioms, manners, the
earth, the rude visage of animals and trees, and what is vulgar” (Complete
Writings 9:36–37). Whitman here opens up the ‘bundle of percepts’ by in-
cluding nonhuman percepts as well. Poetry, as a “collective enunciation,”
needs its relations with the outside, with geography: “The object of Ameri-
can literature is to establish relations between the most diverse aspects of the
United States’ geography—the Mississippi, the Rockies, the Prairies—as
well as its history, struggles, loves, and evolution,” writes Deleuze (Essays
Critical and Clinical 59). Thus, as Whitman claims in his 1855 “Preface,”
to be an American poet “is to be commensurate with a people . . . His spirit
responds to his country’s spirit . . . he incarnates its geography and natural
life and rivers and lakes” (Poetry and Prose 7). Emerson advised the poet to
“leave the world, and know the muse only. Thou shalt not know any longer
the times, customs, graces, politics, or opinions of men, but shalt take all
from the muse” (“The Poet,” Selected Essays 283), but Whitman connects
with the exact forces that Emerson rejects.

Lawrence’s reproach that Whitman inflates his own self to universal pro-
portions might find a foothold in the fact that in the center of “Song of My-
self,” Whitman refers to himself as “Walt Whitman, an American, one of
the roughs, a kosmos” (Poetry and Prose 50)—kosmos is Greek for orderly
arrangement, which evokes notions of totality and harmony. However, as
Whitman proceeds, his “kosmos” is qualified in ways that do not fit this
connotation: “Disorderly fleshy sensual . . . eating drinking and/breeding”
(ibid.), referring not to the psychic, rational ordering and control of the
world, but to the bodily material that the rational mind aims to hold in
thrall.27 The ‘I’ of Whitman’s poetry is far from a controlling agency, a voice
speaking for a multitude. It is not an ‘imperial self’ that represents, but
an ‘empirical self’ that is produced by perceptions, the Humean self that is
“nothing but a heap of different perceptions, united together by certain rela-
tions” (Human Nature 137).28 Whitman’s “me myself” betrays an even
closer affinity to the Humean subject in that it is both constituted in its frag-
mentary perceptions and transcends them: “Apart from the pulling and
hauling stands what I am, / Stands amused, complacent, compassionating,
idle, unitary, / Looks down, is erect, or bends an arm on an impalpable cer-
tain rest, / Looking with side-curved head curious what will come next, / Both
in and out of the game and watching and wondering at it” (Poetry and
Prose 30).29 Whitman is expressing a position that echoes Deleuze|Guattari’s
description of the perfect “schizo dream”: “I am on the edge of a crowd, at
the periphery; but I belong to it, I am attached to it by one of my extremities,
a hand or foot. I know that the periphery is the only place I can be, that I would die if I let myself be drawn into the center of the fray, but just as certainly if I let go of the crowd . . . A very good schizo dream. To be fully part of the crowd and at the same time completely outside it, removed from it: to be on the edge” (Thousand Plateaus 29)—to be Many and One at the same time. Whitman’s ‘I’ is already a ‘we,’ the ‘we’ that America is; a ‘we’ in contrast, perhaps, to the ‘we’ of the Declaration of Independence, the ‘we, the people’ that by dint of various embedded representations reduces the complexity of America to one homogeneous block. “Song of Myself” becomes a specimen of a minor poetry/politics, a collective enunciation in the Deleuzian sense. Whitman concedes as much when he asks himself if “the 33 years of my current time, 1855–1888, with their aggregate of New World doings and people, have not, indeed, created and formulated the foregoing leaves—forcing their utterance as the pages stand—coming actually from the direct urge and development of those years, and not from any individual epic or lyrical attempts whatever, or from my pen or voice, or any body’s special voice” (Prose Works 2:733).

Whitman’s ‘becoming-we’ ['becoming-America'] constitutes America as the author of these poems, a collective enunciation ofly that “greatest poem” (Poetry and Prose 5) that America actually is—a paratactic poem, a catalog of the simultaneous discreteness and plenitude of ‘America’ that is coextensive with its index in its ‘becoming,’ a dynamic of speed and motion that aims at perceiving and connecting with as many singularities [specimens] as possible. And just like that “greatest poem” America, “first-class literature does not shine by any luminosity of its own; nor do its poems. They grow of circumstances, and are evolutionary” (660). The Body|Politic, that “Nation swarming with nations,” (Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical 57) is—like the individual [Humean] subject—practical and paratactical, a fluctuating, semistable ‘composition’ consisting of this motion of singularities. During the Civil War, when the paradox of unity and secession, the One and the Many, became ever more present, Whitman asked himself: “What is one’s-self (what myself or yours?) / This curious identity”? (“Quicksand Years” 126). An answer to this question can be found in Whitman’s concluding notes to his memoranda notebooks of the war, driving home his notion of the Body|Politic: “What is any Nation, after all—and what is a human being—but a struggle between conflicting, paradoxical, opposing elements—and they themselves and their most violent contests, important parts of that One Identity, and of its development?” (Walt Whitman’s Memoranda 126).

Whitman’s writing, as Deleuze has noted, is marked by the concept of the fragment. Not only does his poetry consist of endless lists and catalogs [of
people, observations, and geographical detail], but his prose writing—in particular his *Memoranda* of the Civil War, a series of diaries kept during his time as a hospital nurse, and *Specimen Days*, the collection of essays resulting from these notebooks—is composed alongside the notion of the fragment. In the first essay of *Specimen Days*, “A Happy Hour’s Command,” Whitman notes with regard to his diaries:

> From the first I kept little note-books for impromptu jottings in pencil to refresh my memory of names and circumstances, and what was specially wanted, & c. . . . Some were scratch’d down from narratives I heard and itemized while watching, or waiting, or tending somebody amid those scenes. I have dozens of such little note-books left, forming a special history of those years, for myself alone, full of associations that attach’d to those soil’d and creas’d livraisons, each composed of a sheet of paper or two, folded small to carry them in the pocket, and fastn’d with a pin. I leave them now just as I threw them by after the war blotch’d here and there with more than one blood-stain, hurriedly written, sometimes at the clinique, not seldom amid the excitement of uncertainty, or defeat, or of action, or getting ready for it, or a march. Most of the pages . . . are verbatim copies of those lurid and blood smutch’d little note-books. (*Poetry and Prose* 713)

Writing is figured as fragmentary and repetitive; in his prose, Whitman also produces percepts, a collection of fragmentary incidents, “hurriedly written, sometimes at the clinique”—specimen days and moments, “a batch of convulsively written reminiscences” (799). For Whitman, these percepts are “but parts of the actual distraction, heat, smoke and excitement of those times. The war itself, with the temper of society preceding it, can indeed be best described by that very word *convulsiveness*” (ibid.). However, in addition to representing the disorder and carnage of war, Whitman’s fragments produce and compose a paratactic ‘fractal unity’ [never to be reached, impossible to attain as a ‘closed system,’ but ‘to be made’ in terms of an ‘open system’]. In this “most wayward, spontaneous, fragmentary book ever printed” (714)—his *Specimen Days*—Whitman does not want to control and unify but to “let the melange’s lackings and wants of connection take care of themselves” (713). In Whitman’s poetry, what Deleuze calls the “spontaneity of the fragmentary” (*Essays Critical and Clinical* 56) coincides with the “spontaneity of relation” and “spontaneity of disposition” (*Empiricism* 97) he sees in Hume, with the way in which percepts/fragments compose a subject simultaneously with that subject’s making connections between these percepts/fragments. “The collection of perceptions, when organized and bound, becomes a system” (98)—yet Whitman lets the percepts “take care of themselves,” not ordering them into a fixed system but letting
them ‘self-organize’ into a ‘becoming,’ into a minor Body|Politic constituted by ever-new relations in constant flux.

The possibility of a poetic ‘minor politic’ as alternative to a state ‘major politic’ had been at the center of Whitman’s writing as early as the first edition of Leaves of Grass. There, Whitman declares that for the democratic people he envisions, “their Presidents shall not be their common referee so much as their poets shall” (Poetry and Prose 8). Countering stifling uniformity, the poet is “the arbiter of the diverse” (ibid.). Whitman seems to be anticipating Deleuze’s contrast between two modes of response to difference: that of the poet and that of the politician. Like Whitman’s poet, Deleuze’s poet “speaks in the name of a creative power, capable of overturning all orders and representations” (Difference and Repetition 53). The poet affirms difference, sings the diverse, and heralds a “state of permanent revolution.” The politician, in contrast, “is above all concerned to deny which ‘differs.’” As a representative of the state’s need to control and create an orderly Body|Politic, the politician fears [or represses] difference; operates according to norms, rules, and regulations that aim at reducing change and dynamics “so as to conserve or prolong an established historical order” (ibid.). However, according to Whitman, creativity and affects are much more fundamental to the Body|Politic than the outside bounding and regulation of laws and the machines of representation: “That which really balances and conserves the social and political world is not so much legislation, police, treaties, and dread of punishment, as the latent eternal intuitional sense, in humanity, of fairness, manliness, decorum, &c. Indeed, this perennial regulation, control, and oversight, by self-suppliance, is sine qua non to democracy; and a highest widest aim of democratic literature may well be to bring forth, cultivate, brace, and strengthen this sense, in individuals and society” (Poetry and Prose 1013). The politician values the law, values order and hierarchy, but ultimately, according to Whitman, “men must be ‘masters unto themselves,’ and not look to Presidents and legislative bodies for aid” (Gathering 1:52). If the poet, according to Deleuze, is a traitor who betrays the world of dominant representation by charting new, nonpreexistent lines of flight, the politician, by contrast, is a trickster who “claims to take possession of fixed properties, or to conquer a territory, or even to introduce a new order . . . The statesman is a trickster” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 41). The poet, the traitor, is a “man of war (not a marshal or a general)” (ibid.). I will work with Deleuze’s contrast of poet and politician to delineate two different rhetorics and conceptions concerning the Body|Politic—that of the poet, Whitman, and that of the politician, Lincoln. Although it sometimes seems as if Whitman’s poetry is just a reflection of Lincoln’s politics [or a continuation of it through other means], I will argue
that Lincoln, ultimately, is not the “Redeemer President of These States” that Whitman was hoping for, a politician who “is not to be exclusive, but inclusive” (Workshop 109). Whitman is evoking solidarity, the sine qua non of democracy, without which the Body Politic would turn into an authoritatively and externally controlled block: “Of all dangers to a nation, as things exist in our day, there can be no greater one than having certain portions of the people set off from the rest by a line drawn” (Poetry and Prose 973). ‘Inclusiveness’ is the mark of the poet, the American bard who shall “delineate no class of persons nor one or two out of the strata of interests nor love most nor truth most nor the soul most nor the body most . . . and not be for the eastern states more than the western or the northern states more than the southern” (15). In the Civil War between the North and the South, the drawing and erasing of lines figured prominently in the two contrasting rhetorics of Lincoln and Whitman with regard to the union of the Body Politic.

For Whitman, neither legislation nor state politics would be able to produce a living democracy, and Abraham Lincoln was both a lawyer and a politician. As a practicing lawyer, self-trained through studying William Blackstone’s Commentaries, Lincoln’s rhetoric is in effect an “amplification of legal grammar . . . adapted to political use” (Grossman 186). With its method of classification and deductive reasoning, Lincoln’s language closely adheres to the binary logic of either/or. Various examples from his speeches and memoranda reveal this logic—which, as Deleuze’s remarks on the politician show, aim to reduce a complexity regarded as frightening, and to take absolute control and enforce order. With regard to the Civil War and the South’s secession, Lincoln argued:

In great contests each party claims to act in accordance with the will of God. Both may be, and one must be wrong. God can not be for, and against the same thing at the same time. In the present civil war it is quite possible that God’s purpose is something different from the purpose of either party—and yet the human instrumentalities, working just as they do, are of the best adaptation to effect His purpose. I am almost ready to say this is probably true—that God wills this contest, and wills that it shall not end yet. By his mere quiet power, on the minds of the now contestants, He could have either saved or destroyed the Union without a human contest. Yet the contest began. And having begun He could give the final victory to either side any day. Yet the contest proceeds. (Collected Works 4:403–4)

Instead of the poet’s growing, zigzagging line that places everything on an equal plane, that admits difference and its potentialities, Lincoln the politician draws a ‘simple line’ between either and or, separating right from wrong.
In his famous “house divided” speech delivered in Springfield, Illinois, on June 16, 1858, Lincoln states that “a house divided against itself cannot stand” (2:461), implying the a priori ‘wholeness’ of the ‘house’ in the first place. He goes on to confess his belief that “this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other” (2:461–62). For Lincoln, there is no question that “the intention of the law-giver is the law” (4:263), as he claims in his first inaugural address in Washington on March 4, 1861, and there is no doubt that this law proceeds by the logic of identity, the logic of noncontradiction. As Grossman has noted, “Whitman found his truth, and the unity of his world, precisely at the crisis of contradiction where Lincoln only found disintegrative instability” (187). Whereas Lincoln’s logical lawgiver [from legislator and politician up to God] cannot be “for, and against the same thing at the same time,” cannot admit and tolerate contradictions [or rather, the infinity of differences which the ‘simpler,’ noncontradictory logic aims to reduce], Whitman can: “Do I contradict myself? / Very well, then . . . I contradict myself; / I am large . . . I contain multitudes” (Poetry and Prose 87). According to Whitman’s differential logic, to contradict means that there are no predetermined relations or oppositions, that each ‘thing’ contains multitudes of potentialities, of possible relations that do not exhaust themselves in a simple binary logic. Accordingly, Whitman’s poetic lawgiver differs decisively from Lincoln’s legislator: “He judges not as the judge judges but as the sun falling around a helpless thing” (9). In contrast to the politician, the poet’s aim, for Deleuze, is precisely “to bring into existence and not to judge” (Essays Critical and Clinical 135). Whitman’s paratactic line, then, as a poetic equivalent to the plane of immanence—the process of becoming which proceeds by differentiating itself [“the great individual, fluid as Nature”] (Poetry and Prose 610)—presents the alternative to Lincoln’s hypotactic logic that starts from unity/being, which is then differentiated further and further by the iterative operation of arborescent logic.

In contrast to Whitman’s [minor] poetry/politics of parataxis, Lincoln’s writings are “masterpiece[s] of subordinate prose” (Manning 225) and of major politics. Simply put, whereas Whitman starts from the Many, Lincoln starts from the One. He starts from the notion of union as already existing, an entity with fixed boundaries, a molar Body|Politic [the nation] in danger of dissolution. Lincoln’s powerful corporeal metaphor of amputation—even more effective since it resonated with the actual practice of amputation, of limbs lost in the Civil War—illustrates his notion of the a priori unity very well: “The paramount idea of the constitution is the preservation of the
Union. It may not be specified in so many words, but that this was the idea of its founders is evident; for, without the Union, the constitution would be worthless. It seems clear, then, that in the last extremity, if any local institution threatened the existence of the Union, the Executive could not hesitate as to his duty. In our case, the moment came when I felt that slavery must die that the nation might live. I sometimes used the illustration in this connection of a man with a diseased limb, and his surgeon. So long as there is a chance of the patient's restoration, the surgeon is solemnly bound to try to save both life and limb; but when the crisis comes, and the limb must be sacrificed as the only chance of saving the life, no honest man will hesitate” (quoted in Carpenter 76–77). Just like the house divided, a body divided won't “stand” either, even if saving the union means ‘cutting off’ a piece, the diseased limb that might spread fever through the whole Body|Politic. After a successful operation, the result will still be “the Union”—minus a “local institution.” With regard to the Body|Politic, both in medicine and politics, “the great surgical controversy of the war was between ‘conservative’ measures, who sought to save the injured limb, and those who believed in prompt amputation” (G. Adams 131). The ‘lesser’ constitutional rights of ‘the part’ [a part of the Many] have to be sacrificed in the interest of the ‘greater’ constitutional power—the continuity of the life of the nation [the One]. Lincoln repeated his point in a letter to the Kentuckian editor Albert G. Hodges, claiming that “by general law life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb” (7:281). Amputation, the continuity of the union by all means, even at the price of its reduction, equals the continuity of order and control, since for Lincoln, “the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy. A majority, held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, . . . is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left” (4:264).

The political rhetoric of bodies and wounds [of the wounded Body|Politic] formed a common language shared by Northern commentators on the Civil War. Lincoln was not alone in his choice of metaphor—in ‘major politics,’ the war was represented as a heroic medical treatment, where an amputation was regarded not so much as the loss of limb but as the saving of a life, presenting slaughter as saving, loss as gain.33 The writer and physician Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. claimed that “the disease of the nation [the Civil War] was organic, and not functional, and the rough chirurgery of war was its only remedy” (Pages 83). For Whitman, in contrast, the wounded and
dismembered soldiers he cared for in the military hospital were rather fragments utterly devoid of the capacity for establishing connections. For him, the dismembered body became a metaphor for America itself. In a letter to Emerson, Whitman writes of “America, already brought to Hospital in her fair youth” (Correspondence 1:69). Amputation and dismembered limbs for Whitman did not signify the union of a Body-Politic ‘reduced.’ In Deleuze’s reading of Whitman, the Civil War instead turns America into a “generalized hospital, . . . the place where brothers are stranger to each other, and where the dying parts, fragments of mutilated men, coexist absolutely solitary and without relation” (Essays Critical and Clinical 59), and it is there that the poet, in caring for these “brothers,” literally establishes the missing connections. The two photographs show the two different perspectives best—amputation as heroic treatment in a photograph of a wounded soldier, and the Civil War surgeon Reed Brockway Bontecou’s 1865 photograph called “Field Day,” which uncannily echoes Whitman’s observation in a letter to his mother: “One of the first things that met my eyes in camp, was a heap of feet, arms, legs, &c. under a tree in front a hospital” (Correspondence 1:59).
Lincoln fashioned a powerful nationalistic argument by figuring the union as an existing, single, a priori body, which cannot be divided. Lincoln’s organic, corporeal metaphors simultaneously encouraged the equation of individual and state [the Many into One] and an affiliation of the living and the dead, ensuring the continuity of tradition [and historical order] started by the founding fathers, keeping alive the “preservation of the Union.” Lincoln’s rhetoric created a moral obligation for living individuals to sustain a collective vision of conserving the union of the Body|Politic as a fixed, timeless entity [both political and physical] on behalf of those patriots who had lost their lives, an obligation based on debt and fear.\textsuperscript{34} Other political commentators such as the physiologist and political thinker John Draper extended the metaphor of the Body|Politic to an argument about its centralization, and supported the vision of a proper regulation of the Body|Politic by appealing to the natural arrangement of body and mind. Draper referred to
neuronal-physiological models of a central brain that coordinated the rest of the body to substantiate his claim for the superiority of the progressive, technological North over the backward, agricultural South, and his support of a centralized nation-state based on the principles of elite authorities and the combined intellect of the scientific age: “A nation may from this grand example trace out its proper course. The body politic, like the body personal, must be ruled by its intellect” (248). If, as Draper argues, “all animated nature displays progress to the domination of a central intelligence,” then “centralization is inevitable in the life of nations”—in order to survive, the Body|Politic must “confer on a predetermined part a dominant control” (313).

Thus, the rhetoric of ‘major politics’ follows the idea of union as incorporation [central government] rather than union of association. As the examples from Lincoln’s speeches show, the oppositional logic underlying a longing for an ‘absolute’ union—without compromise and ambiguity, a strong One, once and for all, the logic of the ‘excluded middle’—did not leave room for alternatives. Lincoln warned: “Let us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied and belabored, contrivances such as groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong, vain as the search for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man” (3:550). As George Forgie has observed, what was most ostentatious in this binary structure of the crisis of the union, with its clear-cut oppositions—the North versus the South, the good versus the bad, slave versus free—was “the diminishing and near-disappearance of the middle ground in the sectional conflict” (159).

Whitman followed an idea of a “middle ground” quite different from the one that Lincoln would have envisaged. Rather than employing “sophistical contrivances” that would see a middle ground as further differentiating the question along the lines of arborescent logic, I will show that Whitman, in his more decidedly political writings, follows the rhizomatic experiment that he also conducted in his poetry. Just like the grass, his is a politics that, in Deleuze’s words, “grows from the middle” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues viii), a Body|Politic that forms and orders itself, with ‘unity’ as neither starting nor end point: “Society waits unform’d, and is for a while between/things ended and things begun” (Whitman, Poetry and Prose 601). Whitman’s idea of ‘unity’ was not so much an a priori unity in danger of fragmentation, but rather a dynamic and open whole of shifting relations, not [only] of logical propositions, but of active, material composition and the production of ever-new relations. Whitman refers to this kind of politics as “the politics of nature.” In a poetic address to President James Buchanan, he claims: “You have not learn’d of Nature—of the politics of Nature/you have not learn’d
the great amplitude, rectitude, impartiality” (*Poetry and Prose* 410). In its amplitude, rectitude, and impartiality, nature does not draw lines, does not classify—it grows and produces. Furthermore, the politics of nature, in contrast to the politics of institutions, is not prone to corruption. Whitman’s experience with political parties and reforms had shown him that corruption and narrow-mindedness were never far away: “We want no reforms, no institutions, no parties—We want a living principle as nature has, under which nothing can go wrong—This must be vital through the United States” (*Notebooks* 1:145). Whitman conducts, it seems, “through the medium of nature, an argument with his society about the kind of society it should be” (M. Thomas 117). For Whitman, democracy and art form a larger machine with nature’s forces of growth and production. The final ‘specimen’ of his *Specimen Days*, called “Nature and Democracy,” makes this clear:

Democracy most of all affiliates with the open air, is sunny and hardy and sane only with Nature—just as much as Art is . . . American Democracy, in its myriad personalities, in factories, work-shops, stores, offices—through the dense streets and houses of cities, and all their manifold sophisticated life—must either be fibred, vitalized, by regular contact with out-door light and air and growths, farm-scenes, animals, fields, trees, birds, sun-warmth and free skies, or it will certainly dwindle and pale. We cannot have grand races of mechanics, work people, and commonality, (the only specific purpose of America,) on any less terms. I conceive of no flourishing and heroic elements of Democracy in the United States, or of Democracy maintaining itself at all, without the Nature-element forming a main part—to be its health-element and beauty-element—to really underlie the whole politics, sanity, religion and art of the New World. (*Poetry and Prose* 949–50)

Whitman draws on a concept for a minor Body|Politic that learns from [and is connected to] nature, a concept which he calls “the aggregate.” In *Democratic Vistas*, the term aggregate [along with its variations, such as aggregation] figures prominently. Published in 1871, *Democratic Vistas* started as an answer to Thomas Carlyle’s essay “Shooting Niagara: And After?,” in which Carlyle called for a heroic and elite leadership to govern the masses, instead of a wishful attempt at democracy, which he called the “swarmery” (5) of mob rule. Against this “swarmery,” Whitman posed the reality of democracy, of “interminable swarms of alert, turbulent, good-natured, independent citizens” (*Poetry and Prose* 978, my emphasis). Democracy does not need a heroic elite ordering an otherwise inert multitude: “Painters have painted their swarming groups, and the centre- /figure of all, /From the head of the centre-figure spreading a nimbus of/gold-color’d light;/But I
paint myriads of heads, but paint no head without its nimbus of gold-color’d light;/From my hand, from the brain of every man and woman it/streams, effulgently flowing forever” (376). The variety and manifoldness of the multitude itself is heroic enough, each singularity worthy of its own nimbus.

As Whitman categorically states in the opening sentence of Democratic Vistas, for him, “the great lessons of Nature . . . are perhaps the lessons of variety and freedom” (Poetry and Prose 953). He immediately draws a connection to America’s present Body|Politic, arguing that “the same present the greatest lessons also in New World politics and progress” (ibid.). What the Body|Politic can learn from the ‘politics of nature’ is the interplay of freedom and variety, a formula that is clearly unlike the rigidity of molar state politics, with its focus on preserving the union. The Civil War, it seems, has transformed Whitman from the bard of a real, existing [minor] democracy into a propagator of poetry as the means by which such a minor Body Politic has to be constituted. As he makes clear in his 1872 preface to “As a Strong Bird on Pinions Free,” Leaves of Grass is, “in its intentions, the song of a great composite democratic individual, male or female. And following on and amplifying the same purpose, I suppose I have in my mind to run through the chants of this volume, (if ever completed,) the thread-voice, more or less audible, of an aggregated, inseparable, unprecedented, vast, composite, electric democratic nationality” (1028–29).

If the earlier versions of Leaves of Grass had primarily focused on the aggregated [Humean] individual, Whitman will now extend this conceptual perspective to the aggregated [Humean] collectivity, to an aggregated Body|Politic that in its very unprecedentedness is a becoming, a process, an experiment with a multiplicity of ever-changing and dynamic relations, a becoming that is “unforeseen and nonpreexistent, singularized out of a population rather than determined in a form” (Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical 1). Later, in his Specimen Days, Whitman will comment on the multicultural population of New York as a prime example of that aggregated nationality: “An appreciative and perceptive study of the current humanity of New York gives the directest proof yet of successful Democracy, and of the solution of that paradox, the eligibility of the free and fully developed individual with the paramount aggregate” (Poetry and Prose 848). If the “me myself” had been the result of a “perceptive study” of American specimens, of singularities, of ‘Ones’ [and the resulting Leaves of Grass an aggregate of percepts], the “perceptive study” of ‘the Many’ reveals similar results in terms of aggregation. Both Many and One are simultaneously ‘in and out of the game,’ both are Many and One at the same time. Just as every democratic individual is both constituted in its fragmentary perceptions but
also transcends it [without losing ‘touch’], a democratic nationality is also aggregated, *is* an aggregate. The aggregate of democracy negotiates between the Many and the One, it is “the compensating balance-wheel of the successful working machinery of aggregate America” (982). The aggregate, the constant dynamic interplay of forces, is the solution that Whitman proposes to avoid both division and anarchy [overdose of individualism] and the leveling tendency of conformity [overdose of collectivism]. As he sees it, only from the Many, from the multitude, and “its proper regulation and potency, comes the other, comes the chance of individualism. The two are contradictory, but our task is to reconcile them” (964–65).

It should be noted that Whitman is explicitly *not* envisioning an over-coding force, a controlling, central agency to ‘properly regulate’ the multitude. Rather, its proper regulation *is* its potency, its *potentia*. In his attacks on any rigid ‘drawing of lines,’ Whitman had always favored disorderliness: “Walt Whitman . . . a kosmos . . . disorderly fleshy sensual.” The fact that Whitman later changed disorderly to turbulent can be attributed to his early interest in atomistic philosophy, especially the works of Epicurus and Lucretius, whose *De Rerum Natura* he read in the early 1850s. The replacement of Lucretian turbulence for disorder stresses the active force inherent in this concept. As Whitman noted early on, “to attack the turbulence and destructiveness of the Democratic spirit, is an old story . . . Why, all that is good and grand in any political organization in the world, is the result of this turbulence and destructiveness; and controlled by the intelligence and common sense of such a people as the Americans, it never has brought harm, and never can” (*Gathering* 1:3). The active turbulence of the ‘democratic experiment’ is neither to be captured by “well-ordered governments” (1:4) such as Russia and Germany, nor by a “polished fossil language.” Representation [neither political nor literary] cannot capture the forces of production; that can be done only by the “broad fluid language of democracy,” which in itself is turbulent and processual, without end. Thus, Whitman demands, “give us turbulence, give us excitement, give us the rage and disputes of hell, all this rather than the lethargy of death that spreads like a vapor of decaying corpses over our land” (*Workshop* 81). In a letter written at the end of the Civil War, Whitman announces his plan to express in a poem [which became *Drum-Taps*] “the pending action of this *Time & Land we swim in, with all their large conflicting fluctuations of despair & hope, the shiftings, masses, & the whirl & deafening din, (yet over all, as by invisible hand, a definite purport & idea)” (*Correspondence* 1:246–47). Whitman’s reference to an “invisible hand” [echoing Adam Smith’s famous phrase and also Tocqueville’s “invisible hand” that “directs the social machine” (1:70) of democracy], I argue, refers to the self-organizing qualities of turbulence, to the
Lucretian clinamen that creates turbulences in a striated order, forms vortices and eddies that connect atoms into temporary alliances, into dynamic and semistable Bodies|Politic—the fragments of which, as Whitman observes, are “in transitional conditions, too rapid, too terrible, too varied and boiling and bubbling with formative processes” (quoted in Hollis, “Whitman and the American Idiom” 419).

As a machinic aggregate [the Body|Politic as a turbulent “struggle between conflicting, paradoxical, opposing elements”] democracy needs two constituents for its ‘machinics’: “1st, a large variety of character—and 2d, full play for human nature to expand itself in numberless and even conflicting directions—(seems to be for general humanity much like the influences that make up, in their limitless field, that perennial health-action of the air we call the weather—an infinite number of currents and forces, and contributions, and temperatures, and cross purposes, whose ceaseless play of counterpart upon counterpart brings constant restoration and vitality” (Poetry and Prose 953). Whitman’s reference to the weather again implies that the politics of the democratic aggregate can learn from natural aggregates, such as the weather. A major politics, which is not willing to learn from nature, strives toward molar aggregates of stratification, striation, and control—but “subjection, aggregation of that sort, is impossible to America” (959). Democracy, as a minor aggregate, should operate like an open and dynamic system, like an assemblage, which Deleuze defines as “a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and reigns—different natures. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is that of co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy.’ It is never filiations which are important, but alliances, alloys; these are not successions, lines of descent, but contagions, epidemics, the wind” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 69).

The democratic aggregate should not unchangeably integrate its elements into a rigid system, but—like the Humean subject—proceed by ever-new inventions of external relations and intensities. Whitman refers to such intensive and affective relations [the affect-correlative of the “invisible hand”] as “adhesiveness” or “sympathy.” If one force into the aggregate is individualism, there is “not that half only, individualism, which isolates. There is another half, which is adhesiveness or love, that fuses, ties and aggregates, making the races comrades, and fraternizing all” (Poetry and Prose 972–73). Pride, or egotism, is one of the forces operating in the aggregate—both the individual and the collective—but the Body|Politic also “has sympathy as measureless as its pride and the one balances the other and neither can stretch too far while it stretches in company with the other” (13). Indeed, comradeship or sympathy is what Whitman hopes for “as the subtlest, stron-
gest future hold of this many-item’d Union” (848); fraternity for him is the open, paratactic line that composes the democratic aggregate, the vertical line that counters the hierarchical, segmenting horizontal of the molar state apparatus, of “well-ordered governments.” “Adhesiveness” is Whitman’s term for the Body|Politic’s perpetual invention of external relations, relations that are unprecedented, always new: “Here is adhesiveness, it is not previously fashion’d, it is/apropos” (301). As a force, adhesiveness operates in the aggregate, in the process of aggregation, coming into existence in between. With regard to the Body|Politic, Whitman refers to the process as “Unionism” (787)—which, as a democratic process, is a minor force in opposition to the attempt at closure, of ‘unity,’ a poetic|political praxis [experiment] rather than a fixed form. The democratic aggregate rests as much on its members [the small aggregates within the larger aggregate] as on the poet: “For we support all, fuse all, / After the rest is done and gone, we remain / There is no final reliance but upon us; / Democracy rests finally upon us (I, my brethren, begin it,) / And our visions sweep through eternity” (194).41

It is the “endless streams of living, pulsating” (1034–35) adhesiveness and unionism, maximized by the poet’s work, by which “the United States of the future, (I cannot too often repeat,) are to be most effectually welded together, intercalated, anneal’d into a living union” (1035). Whitman makes “poems of materials” (178), and his ‘poetry of little things’42 [a minor poetics|politics of fragments, of singularities] sings of a Body|Politic as an aggregate that never adds up to a totalizing whole, a Body|Politic that is constituted by its own forces. As Deleuze reminds us, “the small is an irreducible locus of forces” (Essays Critical and Clinical 133).
Both a grandson and a great-grandson of American presidents, Henry Brooks Adams was a fourth-generation member of what was by far the most important and influential political dynasty in American history. He received the finest formal education available in his time, graduating from Harvard, where he was later appointed a professor of medieval history. During the Civil War, he served as a secretary to his father Charles Francis Adams Sr., who was appointed United States ambassador to England, and he was later the editor of the *North American Review*. Nonetheless, his autobiography *The Education of Henry Adams* shows a deep sense of failure and raises the question of how to cope with the erosion of all certainties and the collapse of the idea of teleological progress. During Adams’s lifetime, the virtues of the American republic, its moral and spiritual basis, were being submerged under the rising tide of capitalism. Industrialization exploded after the Civil War, and with the growth of industry and business came urbanization, the cities being flooded with young farmers and European immigrants. Such developments also led to a new American upper class, consisting of entrepreneurs such as the Carnegies and the Rockefellers who built enormous fortunes by exploiting natural resources and cheap labor. Here Charles Darwin’s [or Herbert Spencer’s] survival of the fittest meant a ruthless selfishness and the striving for profit by any means. A new generation of Americans had to deal with the problems born of capitalism, industrialization, and social and economic change. The old republic, with its party system of Republicans and Federalists, was transformed in a new ‘mass democracy,’ with Democrats and Whigs. The old republic had restricted popular participation in politics by permitting only property owners to vote and through the hierarchical structure of parties, including the provision that only the members of the party elites could nominate candidates. In contrast, the new democratic system relied more on grass-root support and shaped politics according to the people’s will. However, selfish economic individualism also entered democratic politics. Corruption was so much the order of
the day that Whitman, in *Democratic Vistas*, complained that “never was there, perhaps, more hollowness at heart than at present, and here in the United States . . . The official services of America, national, state, and municipal, in all their branches and departments, . . . are saturated in corruption, bribery, falsehood, mal-administration . . . The great cities reek with respectable as much as non-respectable robbery and scoundrelism” (*Poetry and Prose* 961). In short, even in the new mass democracy—with its promise of a government of the people and by the people, where the representers were thought not to be aloof from the represented—the gulf widened continually: “I say that our New World democracy, however great a success in uplifting the masses out of their sloughs, in materialistic development, products, and in a certain highly-deceptive superficial popular intellectuality, is, so far, an almost complete failure” (962).

Adams’s writings, I argue, are important for a discussion of the Body|Politic because he can be regarded as the last republican, situated at a historical point where, after the Civil War, the republic of the founding fathers [in which his ancestors played a fundamental role] was about to be replaced with modern democracy. The republican tradition had embodied the ethos of a Body|Politic rooted in ‘civic virtue,’ the absence of corruption and overly commercial interests, ensured by a system of checks and balances and able leaders. The shift from a politics of virtue to a politics of [self]-interest necessitated a new structure for the Body|Politic in the new era of modernity, in which the world became faster and smaller, and people’s experiences became increasingly fragmented and alienated. It called for a new science as well: sociology. The work of ‘socio-evolutionists’ such as Auguste Comte [who actually coined the word *sociology*] and Spencer developed simultaneously with Darwin’s theory of evolution, and took nineteenth-century biology and physics as its scientific models—exactly the sciences that Adams also turned to in order to make sense of the seismic shift to modernity, a transition he also equates with the trajectory from unity to multiplicity, and from order to chaos [it must be noted, however, that he is ambivalent about at least the concepts of multiplicity and chaos]. In his *Education*, Adams repeatedly focuses on the energy that multiplicity and chaos provide, and the staleness and inertia of order, and connects these musings with political observations. The residual Puritan in him claimed that “anarchy, by definition, must be chaos” (385), but he also concedes that “chaos often breeds life, when order breeds habit” (239). To counter stifling habit, Adams saw the need for reforms, since “the whole government, from top to bottom, was rotten with the senility of what was antiquated and the instability of what was improvised . . . the whole fabric required reconstruction as much as in 1789, for the Constitution had become as antiquated as the Confederation.
Sooner or later a shock must come, the more dangerous the longer postponed. The Civil War had made a new system in fact; the country would have to reorganize the machinery in practice and theory” (ibid.). For Adams, the American nation is deeply indebted to the ‘power of the people.’ His histories of the United States during the administrations of Jefferson and Madison, which cover one of the most important periods in the founding of the American nation, are a hymn to the power of “the people of the United States, . . . [who] were trying an experiment which could succeed only in a world of their own” (*History Jefferson* 1020). Thus, if Adams seems at times to be deeply pessimistic about the development of American democracy, he always saw that its problems were the fault of the corruption of political representatives, and not of the people: “The better test of American character was not political but social, and was to be found not in the government, but in the people” (*History Madison* 1336). Ultimately, for Adams, “after all systems of Government are secondary matter, if you’ve only got your people behind them. I never have as yet felt so proud as now of the great qualities of our race, or so confident of the capacities of men to develop their capacities in the mass” (*Letters* 1:458).

Though Adams is not a political theorist in the narrow sense of the word, and though he does not present a unified and coherent theory of the Body|Politic, his writings contain much of use and value for an assessment of the trajectory of the Body|Politic from the republic of the founding fathers to the modern democracy of the twentieth century.1 For Adams, a historian, “democracy is the only subject for history. I am satisfied that the purely mechanical development of the human mind in society must appear in a great democracy so clearly, for want of disturbing elements, that in another generation psychology, physiology, and history will join in proving man to have as fixed and necessary development as that of a tree; and almost as unconscious” (“Letter to Eliot” 80–81). As Richard Hofstadter has put it, “while it is no doubt true to some degree everywhere that history doubles for political theory . . . it is perhaps more keenly true in the United States” (*Progressive Historians* 4). Adams was a not only a historian but also a man of letters, novelist, and political journalist, and his *Education*, though partly indebted to the discursive strategies of the autobiographical form, is actually an extended meditation on the social, technological, political, and intellectual changes that marked the transition from the nineteenth century to the twentieth. For Adams, the story of the individual provides the story of the nation—the ‘biological evolution’ of the individual body has to be read in conjunction with the ‘democratic evolution’ of the Body|Politic: “American types were especially worth study if they were to represent the greatest democratic evolution the world could know. Readers might judge for themselves
what share the individual possessed in creating or shaping the nation, but
whether it was small or great, the nation could be understood only by study-
ing the individual” (*History Madison* 1335). As both novelist and historian,
Adams made use of the scientific concepts of his times. He did not adhere so
much to their quality as rigorous scientific and [quasi-]objective theories,
but to their usefulness as heuristic and conceptual models. His use of such
concepts “reveal[s] a desperate search for new terms and appropriate meta-
phors for describing twentieth-century forces” (J. Rowe 50). Attacks on the
inaccuracy of Adams’s application of scientific concepts miss the point. As
Melvin Lyon has suggested, their use should be read as the attempt to create
convenient fictions exemplifying Adams’s quest for powerful metaphors.2 In
this chapter, I want to show how some later developments in the human and
natural sciences would have provided a fruitful subtext for Adams’s doubts
and ramifications, developments he sensed but could not conceive of within
the scientific framework of his own time. Adams himself sees the close con-
nection between science and politics in their attempts to come to terms with
the “evidence of growing complexity, and multiplicity, and even contradic-
tion, in life. He could not escape it; politics or science, the lesson was the
same, and at every step it blocked his path whichever way he turned. He
found it in politics; he ran against it in science; he struck it in everyday life,
as though he were still Adam in the Garden of Eden between God who was
unity, and Satan who was complexity, with no means of deciding which was
truth” (*Education* 377). This seemingly simple distinction between the dis-
crete entities of *unity* and *multiplicity* is complicated throughout the whole
text by chiastic claims such as “the greater the unity and the momentum, the
worse became the complexity and the friction . . . the multiplicity of unity
had steadily increased, was increasing” (ibid.). Ultimately, “order and anar-
chy were one, but . . . the unity was chaos” (385). I am not insinuating that
Adams was a complexity theorist *avant la lettre*. However, while contem-
porary [human and natural] scientists have generally regarded Adams as a
brilliant but weirdly erratic figure in American thought, these quotations
show that his interest in the interrelations of chaos and order, multiplicity
and complexity, at least points in the direction of this new discipline. In “A
Letter to American Teachers of History,”3 Adams claimed that the “depart-
ment of history needs to concert with the departments of biology, sociology,
and psychology some common formula or figure to serve their students as
models for the working of physico-chemical and mechanical energies” (*Deg-
radation* 261–62).

To read the “physicist-historian” (310) Adams in the light of current
scientific findings repeats his gesture to ‘make sense’ of the past by the pres-
ent, a gesture that, according to Roland Barthes, is the ultimate gesture of
criticism: “One can say that the critical task . . . is purely formal: not to ‘discover’ in the work or the author something ‘hidden,’ ‘profound,’ ‘secret’ which hitherto passed unnoticed (by what miracle? Are we more perspicacious than our predecessors?), but only to adjust the language his period affords him . . . to the language, i.e., the formal system of logical constraints elaborated by the author according to his own period” (“What Is Criticism?” 258–59). Since Adams himself struggled with Darwinism and the theory of evolution, with genealogy and its vicissitudes, I want to situate his rhetoric of education and its failure, unity and multiplicity, within the contexts of complexity theory and molecular biology—as a neo-Darwinian approach to the question of evolution. Here, I will draw in particular on the texts and theories of Deleuze, Serres, and Stuart Kauffman.

The discourse of genealogy, or the question of heredity and family lines, provides an important structural paradigm for Adams’s text, and it is this discourse that this chapter will mainly focus on. It might even be apt to say that The Education of Henry Adams tells a story of heredity as much as it tells a story of education. Even before the beginning, so to speak, the text of The Education focuses on the question of ‘the self’—both on the relation of the self to history, society, and knowledge, and on the relation of the self to itself. The Education, curiously enough, begins with two prefaces. While the first is composed by a ‘fake editor’ [Adams himself wrote it] and provides a short introduction to the overall topic of the book and the history of its author, the second, ‘real’ preface revolves around the problematics of the ego. Referring to Rousseau’s Confessions, Adams calls this book “a monument of warning against the Ego” (Education 8). Here, the ego is seen as a “manikin on which the toilet of education is draped in order to show the fit or misfit of the clothes.” Adams does not believe in the individual ego as a center for knowledge and language—for him, “the object of study is the garment, not the figure. The tailor adapts the manikin as well as the clothes to his patron’s wants.” The subject of education, however—the ‘real body’ for which the ego-manikin serves as a ‘model,’ the “young man himself,” or Henry Adams—is “a certain form of energy; the object to be gained is economy of his force” (ibid.). In this oscillation between center and energy-economy, Adams’s second preface structurally repeats the tension he refers to in his “Editor’s Preface,” the tension between his study Mont Saint Michel and Chartres [1904] and the Education as a whole. Whereas Adams refers to the first book as “a Study of Thirteenth-century Unity,” he labels The Education “a Study of Twentieth-century Multiplicity” (5).

Educated in a long tradition of conservative Bostonians to which he felt he belonged—“his education was warped beyond recovery in the direction of puritan politics . . . the old Puritan nature rebelled against change” (29)—
Adams felt quite lost when faced with the ‘paradigm shift’ of modernity brought about after the Civil War and the assassination of Lincoln, seeing “before him a world so changed as to be beyond connection with the past” (202). ‘Unity’ had been the main attractor of Adams’s education, in his interest in medieval theology but also in the fact that members of the Adams family had been devout fighters for the cause of unity in the political sense: Adams’s great-grandfather was John Adams, the second president of the United States, the “colossus of independence,” as Thomas Jefferson called him, and a believer in a centralized government with strong checks and balances of popular power. Adams’s education along the paths of ‘unity’ had not prepared him for the ‘multiplicity’ he encountered. Whereas former generations could rely on “old forms of education, that [generation] which had its work to do between 1870 and 1900 needed something quite new” (30), simply because the world as Adams knew it had completely changed: “In 1900 he entered a far vaster universe, where all the old roads ran about in every direction, overrunning, dividing, subdividing, stopping abruptly, vanishing slowly, with side-paths that led nowhere, and sequences that could not be proved” (379). Adams sensed that he had lost what he thought had been a past of fixed and orderly certainties. He stood on the brink of “a new multiverse” (433) of uncertainties, a radically polycentric world of intersecting forces, a new version of the world that once and for all replaced medieval monotheism—“a new world which would not be a unity but a multiple” (ibid.). This multiverse was discontinuous with Adams’s personal past and amounted to a sudden historical break. He was faced with absolute newness; for him, “this new exploration along the shores of Multiplicity and Complexity promised to be the longest” (425). A historian born to a family of politicians, describing himself as a “student of multiplicity” (424), Adams was highly concerned with multiplicities and complexity and their relation to the Body|Politic [and the domain of complexity theory, closely related to the similar interests of Deleuze and Serres] as early as 1907, when these ‘new sciences’ did not yet exist per se. This chapter is not so much concerned with the accuracy of Adams’s explorations as it is with his attempt to conceive of a ‘dynamic theory’ by adapting and mutating the physical sciences of his time.

The first chapter of The Education, following the two prefaces, begins with an impressive and extensive litany of names and places that unmistakably establish the main coordinates of the tradition and cultural background in which Henry Brooks Adams was situated at birth: “Under the shadow of Boston State House, turning its back on the house of John Hancock, the little passage called Hancock Avenue runs, or ran, from Beacon Street, skirting the State House grounds, to Mount Vernon Street, on the summit of
Beacon Hill; and there, in the third house below Mount Vernon Place, February 16, 1838, a child was born, and christened later by his uncle, the minister of the First Church after the tenets of Boston Unitarianism, as Henry Brooks Adams” (9). This safe insertion into a privileged cultural background is immediately paralleled by Adams’s recourse to a bodily, organic metaphor. Commenting on his birth and the ritual of christening, Adams connects this act to an apparently more brutal Jewish ceremony of circumcision: “Had he been born in Jerusalem under the shadow of the temple and circumcised in the Synagogue by his uncle the high priest, under the name of Israel Cohen, he would scarcely have been more distinctly [sic] branded, and not much more heavily handicapped in the races of the coming century” (ibid.). Two chapters later, Adams explicitly draws the connection to the idea of ‘education’ when he states that “the surface was ready to take any form that education should cut into it” (43, my emphasis), and in his reference to education as being “stamped” (ibid.) onto the body. Education, the law of the symbolic register, qua representation cuts into the continuum of the body. From such a perspective, the body is seen as inert, passive matter awaiting conceptual differentiation from the outside, and not as an informed body that differentiates itself—the body is regarded as something that is [man-]made, not something that is alive, that grows. As John Carlos Rowe has observed, in The Education, “education becomes the successive activities of draping, cutting, and fitting the garments and studying their ‘fit or mis-fit’” (30) on the manikin, which also is the result of a primal cut [analogous to circumcision], a cut that introduces the subject to the realm of representation, culture, and tradition. It is indeed this cut that makes the subject come into existence as subject in the first place. The question is, however, to use Adams’s metaphor of the second preface, how closely the Body|Politic’s desire for unity and representation can be linked to the “certain form of energy” that the subject is, without ‘cutting off’ the connection.

Throughout the text, Adams repeatedly builds up an opposition between country and town, summer and winter, closely connected to the respective family lines of the Adams family and the Brooks family. Whereas summer, country, and the Brooks family are associated with freedom and play, winter, town, and the Adams family represent rules and regulations, the law. As Lyon has observed, “by associating Boston and school with winter, [Adams] also creates the first link between his unity-multiplicity dichotomy and the book’s pervasive water symbolism. For winter is rigid unity, a frozen time of ice and snow. This symbolic use leads directly into the snow, ice, and glacier imagery which appears later in the book” (134). However, within this ‘rule of phase,’ so to speak, Adams [as the subject ‘Henry Adams’ within the text
of *The Education*] opts for yet another phase state, an alternative between frozen rigidity and fluid turbulence. In a self-reflective passage in which he comments on the process of writing, Adams states: “The pen works for itself, and acts like a hand, modelling the plastic material over and over again to the form that suits it best. *The form is never arbitrary, but is a sort of growth like crystallization*, as any artist knows too well; for often the pencil or pen runs into side-paths and shapelessness, loses its relations, stops or is bogged. Then it has to return on its trail, and recover, if it can, its line of force” (*Education* 369–70, my emphasis). Still, it is exactly the variety, the deviance of the rigid main lines that Adams repeatedly highlights both in the text of *The Education* and in his account of his own genealogy. The discourse of teleological heredity is repeatedly infected by the discourse of heresy. In the first chapter, Adams states that “the atmosphere of education in which he lived was colonial, revolutionary . . . , as though he were steeped . . . in the odor of political crime. Resistance to something was the law of New England nature” (12). Here, Adams foreshadows that strange chiastic formulation he later uses to express what he sees as a universal formula: “Chaos was the law of nature; Order was the dream of man” (427). In these phrases, lawlessness itself turns into a kind of law. And it comes as no surprise, bearing in mind the opposition of rigidity and fluidity that Adams sets up throughout the first chapters, that later accounts of outlawry should sometimes overlap with Adams’s recourse to water imagery.

In Rome, where he receives “accidental education” (84) on his European tour, Adams discusses the example of the Italian patriot Garibaldi. He retrospectively describes himself as a “young American who had no experience in double natures” (95), in those ambiguities that a character such as Garibaldi presented to him, which “seemed to teach the extreme complexity of extreme simplicity.” Adams’s observations of Garibaldi’s “compound nature of patriot and pirate” (95), are later taken up in his repeated self-characterization as “conservative Christian anarchist” (384, 446). In this earlier chapter, he comments on the fact that his family heritage had once provided two quite similar examples of patriot and adventurer, so that even in his ‘unitary’ tradition, multiplicity|complexity inheres: “Minister Adams remembered how his grandfather had sailed from Mount Wollaston in mid-winter, 1778, on the little frigate ‘Boston,’ taking his eleven-year-old son John Quincy with him, for secretary, on a diplomacy of adventure that had hardly a parallel for success. He remembered how John Quincy, in 1809, had sailed for Russia, with himself, a baby of two years old, to cope with Napoleon and the Czar Alexander single-handed, almost as much of an adventurer as John Adams before him” (111). No wonder, then, that Adams’s
“highest ambition was to be pirated and advertised free of charge, since, in any case, his pay was nothing. Under the excitement of the chase, he was becoming a pirate himself, and liked it” (271).

However, the most striking example of ‘outlawry’ is provided by Adams’s grandmother Louisa, wife of ‘The President,’ John Quincy Adams. Born in London to an Englishwoman and an American merchant from Maryland, she is the personification of an alien element that somehow had ‘intruded’ into the New England line of descent of the Adams genealogy—“the old Puritan nature rebelled against change,” whereas to “outsiders, immigrants, adventurers, it was easy” (29) to rebel against “old forms of education” (30). Louisa was such an ‘outsider, immigrant, adventurer’—not born a New England woman, which “defect was serious” (22). For Adams, this turbulent disturbance of an otherwise seemingly straight line of descent makes him a “half exotic” (24) in a double sense: “As a child of Quincy he was not a true Bostonian, but even as a child of Quincy he inherited a quarter taint of Maryland blood” (24), and it is safe to assume that this constituted the charm of Adams’s beloved ‘Quincy education.’ Louisa’s impact on his education is described by Adams as immense. As a child, he “never dreamed that from her might come some of those self-doubts and self-questionings, those hesitations, those rebellions against law and discipline, which marked more than one of her descendants; but he might even then have felt some vague instinctive suspicion that he was to inherit from her the seeds of the primal sin, the fall from grace, the curse of Abel” (23). However ambiguous this inheritance might have seemed to the child Henry Adams, in the adult’s rhetoric of heredity, as he sets it up from the very first pages of his Education, this inheritance is almost explicitly connected to his version of the Virgin Mary—it might in fact be read as a clue that his outsider position is effected by that “quarter taint of Maryland blood.”

It becomes clear that the Virgin, Adams’s prime example of ‘unity,’ is not ‘orderly’ at all: the Virgin is not a symbol of perfection [indeed, she is anything but], though she has been repeatedly read as such. Unity and multiplicity, order and chaos, are not clearly separated entities. In fact, Adams sees Louisa as clearly connected to those same ‘lawless impulses’ that he had somehow inherited from her, “The Madam” (21). The heretical impact of the Virgin can be found in Adams’s Mont Saint Michel and Chartres—here Adams reveals that “the Virgin embarrassed the Trinity . . . Mary concentrated in herself the whole rebellion of man against fate; the whole protest against divine law; the whole contempt for human law as its outcome; the whole unutterable fury of human nature beating itself against the walls of its prison house, and suddenly seized by a hope that in the Virgin man had found a door of escape. She was above law” (596). In contrast to the cruel
regiment of the law, Mary dwelled in grace and “sympathy with people who suffered under law” (597). As a result, “Mary filled heaven with a sort of persons little to the taste of any respectable middle-class society” (ibid.), those immigrants, outsiders, and adventurers who were little to the taste of twentieth-century Boston bourgeois society either, but who had nevertheless somehow infected the Adams lineage—an infection that Adams himself considered quite benevolent: the “fluid order” (J. 81) of the Virgin resolved the rigidity of the father’s law and represented, in R. P. Blackmur’s words, a “flexibility various enough to receive and react to new impressions” (17).

Adams’s conception of the Virgin has an unmistakably Lucretian ring to it. In his famous chapter on “The Virgin and the Dynamo,” Adams quotes Lucretius’s invocation of Venus—“not one of Adams’s many schools of education had ever drawn his attention to the opening lines of Lucretius, though they were perhaps the finest in all Latin literature, where the poet invoked Venus exactly as Dante invoked the Virgin: “Quae quoniam rerum naturam sola gubernas” (Education 365; “Since you alone govern the nature of things”). Venus was not only, as Adams suggests, a model for Dante’s invocation of the Virgin, but also Adams’s own infatuation—in fact, just as he “translat[ed] rays into faith” (364) by drawing the analogy between the dynamo and the Virgin, Adams—and indeed the whole Christian tradition—translated the heathen goddess of love, Venus/Aphrodite, into the Christian virgin mother of Christ. For Adams, the Virgin [like Lucretius’s Venus] is the very force that creates nature and human culture out of chaos with “her creative touch” (Hamill 11): “She was Goddess because of her force; she was the animated dynamo; she was reproduction—the greatest and most mysterious of all energies” (H. Adams, Education 365). However, as Adams laments, “in America neither Venus nor Virgin ever had value as force” (364); in fact “this energy was unknown to the American mind” (365). In connection with Adams’s discussion of unity and multiplicity, order and chaos [and their interrelation], the reference to Venus/the Virgin genders chaos and multiplicity: forceful disorder is female and is related to sexuality as a scandal, an “unmoral force” (366). Ultimately, sexuality, reproduction, growth, the Many—life—are posed against the logic of the One. No wonder, then, that Adams can spot only some vestiges of that intense force in art: “He could think only of Walt Whitman; Bret Harte, as far as the magazines would let him venture; and one or two painters, for the flesh-tones. All the rest had used sex for sentiment, never for force” (366).

Serres’s reading of Lucretius provides an obvious reference for Adams’s invocation of Venus. Serres has argued that Lucretius’s poem De Rerum Natura did indeed anticipate modern science, in particular modern physics and chaos theory. According to Serres, Lucretius’s idea of the clinamen can
be read as an infinitesimally small deviation that induces a slight turbulence in the eternal fall of the atoms. The impact of the *clinamen* anticipates the sensitive dependence on initial conditions that plays such an important role in chaos theory and complexity theory. As such, this turbulence “interrupts the reign of the same, invents the new reason and the new law . . . gives birth to nature as it really is” (*Hermes* 100). What this “new law” of multiplicity replaces is the logic of unity, which is “repetitive, and the train of thought that comes from it infinitely iterative, is but a science of death” (ibid.). It was such a “science of death” that Adams saw in Darwin’s theory of evolution, a theory that should have made sense of family trees, heredity, and genealogy and its vicissitudes, as Adams experienced them, on a macroscopic and universal level—but which, in Adams’s view, ultimately failed.

When Darwin published his seminal study *On the Origin of Species* in 1859, it had a wide impact not only on the natural sciences, but on society as a whole. The church in particular was offended by a theory that attempted to explain creation by tracing man back not to God, but to a monkey. Above all, Darwin himself was a theologian turned scientist, a fact that made things worse since it branded Darwin as a heretic. However, even if the theory of evolution found wide acceptance, the rigid causal mechanics of his theory was too neat for Adams: “Unbroken Evolution under uniform conditions pleased everyone—except curates and bishops—and it was the very best substitute for religion; a safe, conservative, practical, thoroughly Common-Law deity” (*Education* 217). The emphasis here is on the word *uniform*—for Adams, the very concept of something rigidly linear had something oppressive to it, and resulted in a “science of death” that deserved such a label not only on a metaphorical level. He cynically adds: “Such a working system for the universe suited a young man who had just helped to waste five or ten thousand million dollars and a million of lives, more or less, to enforce unity and uniformity on people who objected to it; the idea was only too seductive in its perfection” (ibid.). Although “steady, uniform, unbroken evolution from lower to higher seemed easy” (218), Adams was deeply dissatisfied with the idea of gradual evolution in Darwin’s theory. Against this all-too-smooth theory of heredity, “Adams hinted his heresies in vain” (219), heresies that were in part influenced by the countertheories of the ‘catastrophists’ and by Louis Agassiz, a key influence on Adams’s attitude toward Darwinism, who is reported to have stated that “the possibilities of existence run so deeply into the extravagant that there is scarcely any conception too extraordinary for Nature to realize” (quoted in Heinrich 42). Unable to detect evolution ‘in life,’ “all [Adams] could prove was change” (*Education* 222), and it was indeed the idea of “change” that “attracted his mind” (223). He “wished to be shown that changes in form
caused evolutions in force” (379), something that Darwinism had failed to prove to him. A quite similar “science of death,” what Serres calls the “stable, unchanging, redundant, . . . recopy[ying of] the same writing in the same atoms-letters” (*Hermes* 100), Adams saw revealed in the principles of [Bostonian] bourgeois education. In line with his metaphor for education [the cut, or stamp, which implies an almost mechanical, assembly-line form of education], Adams repeatedly comments on what he calls “education, but in the type” (*Education* 39). In his chapter “Harvard College,” Adams observes that “the school created a type, not a will,” and as a result, “its graduates could commonly be recognized by the stamp” (57). Even in his childhood, his brothers and sisters were becoming “modes or replicas of the same type, getting the same education” (39). Against this background, Adams preferred to see construct himself as different: whereas “his brothers were the type; he was the variation” (12).6

In his rhetoric of “type” and “variation,” the discourses of heredity and education get intertwined in Adams’s text again and again: as Adams himself states, “his education was chiefly inheritance” (30). The story of education gets mixed up with the story of evolution and longs for a story of mutation. And it is here, I argue, that later developments in Darwinism and genetics might have provided Adams with the powerful metaphor of mutation that is always lurking in the back of his text, but that never is clearly expressed. Later in his book, Adams acknowledges that “any doctrine seemed orthodox . . . A little more, and he would be driven back on the old independence of species” (379) which at least accounted for “variety.” In line with his recurrent emphasis on lawlessness and play, Adams presumably would have embraced the *Mutationstheorie* proposed by the Dutch biologist Hugo de Vries in the early twentieth century. De Vries, rediscovering the Mendelian laws of heredity, had pointed out “the role of ‘sports’ or mutations, sudden and drastic variants in individual organisms, in the process of adaptation” (R. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism* 97). In pointing out the abrupt and often catastrophic character of evolution, de Vries introduced a “strong contrast to the slow, legato, and minuscule variations of Darwin’s evolution” (ibid.). It was up to still later developments in biology and genetics to show that such a mutation is in fact not the accidental exception to the rule, but a coextensive part of it. The reason both de Vries and Adams have a problem with accepting natural selection is that they regard it as ultimately conservative, eliminating only negative mutations and lacking the productive force needed to create entirely new organisms. De Vries came up with a concept that integrated the occurrence of sudden changes—leaps—in the traits of a cell that were not caused by common genetic recombination of traits and that led to new species, to aberrant varieties that
he called “mutations.” This observation changed the understanding of the workings of evolution by emphasizing spontaneous mutation as a creative principle and a source of discontinuity in evolutionary change. In opposition to the prevailing Darwinian idea that species slowly and gradually evolve into new ones, with natural selection steering evolution in the favorable direction of the survival of the fittest, evolution came to be seen as a two-step process of the chance occurrence of a mutation, followed by its persistence or elimination (selection). Even in its variant form, natural selection is still seen as the sole force and agent in evolution—everything in the natural world can ultimately be explained by mutations within the genome and the subsequent selection of the fittest adaptation by the environment, a gradual process that is completely reliant on external conditions.

Yet de Vries’s findings, alongside with his rediscovery of Mendel’s laws, prepared the ground for the development of genetics and molecular biology. In his account of the discoveries of molecular biology, *Chance and Necessity*, Jacques Monod emphasizes the role of chance in evolution. In his study, Monod comments on the fact that Darwinism has been awaiting a “physical theory of heredity” (xi) to counter metaphysical explanations, in order to clarify man’s position in and relationship with the universe [the title of this chapter is a mutation of Monod’s phrase]. The theory of the genetic code provided exactly this: heredity depends on “long messages written with a four-letter alphabet” (Ruelle 6). In this, it does not differ much from the “science of death” that Serres commented on, the endless reproduction of the same “atoms-letters.” However, there is one important twist: “When cells divide, these messages are copied, with a few errors made at random; these errors are called *mutations*” (ibid.).

According to Monod, the “physical theory of heredity” is marked by a kind of heretical aberration from the law, by a few errors made at random. It is exactly the intrusion of chance into necessity [that is, the intrusion of a ‘reading mistake’ of the information that normally ensures the exact duplication of the genetic material] that causes the diversity of the species: “We call these events accidental; we say that they are random occurrences. And since they constitute the only possible source of modifications in the genetic text, itself the sole repository of the organism’s hereditary structures, it necessarily follows that chance alone is at the source of innovation, of all creation in the biosphere. Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution: this central concept of modern biology is no longer one among other possible or even conceivable hypotheses. It is today the sole conceivable hypothesis” (*Chance and Necessity* 112–13). *Chance and Necessity* shares with Adams’s *Education* not only an emphasis on the importance of chance and ‘play’ with regard to the concept of laws.
and rules, but also some key metaphors. Like Adams’s outlaw and pirate, Monod’s subject is “a gypsy, [who] lives on the boundary of an alien world” (172–73), a world marked by the “definitive abandonment of the ‘old covenant’” (171), facing the “necessity of forging a new one” (ibid.). Thus, for Monod, it is absolute randomness, the “side-paths” that introduce a degree of freedom from the rigid deterministic order of natural selection: “The ancient covenant is in pieces; man knows at last that he is alone in the universe’s unfeeling immensity, out of which he emerged only by chance. His destiny is nowhere spelled out, nor is his duty” (180). Such a foregrounding of randomness only, against natural selection only, misses the complex interplay of chaos and order, multiplicity and unity. It still assumes a binary opposition between two extremes and does not focus on the in between, where chaos and order meet. It is here that I suggest a return to Venus.

For Serres, Venus is an important conceptual persona, figuring prominently in both The Birth of Physics and Genesis. She becomes the icon for a new kind of science—the “physics of Venus” [Serres’s name for complexity theory] (Birth of Physics 110), the antidote to what he sees as the physics of Mars, a science for a world without clinamen [and without newness], where “the new is born of the old, the new is just the repetition of the old” (109). The science of Mars sees matter as passive and sees the connection between man and matter—between Adams’s clothed manikin and the “certain form of energy”—as irretrievably broken. In what almost sounds like a direct reply to Monod’s “ancient covenant . . . in pieces,” Serres states that “many . . . sciences are founded . . . on the violation of the contract. Man is a stranger to the world, to the dawn, to the sky, to things . . . His environment is a dangerous enemy to be fought and kept in servitude. Martial neu- roses” (131). However, Lucretius, following Epicurus, sees the world as an ever-changing, open system, in which order arises out of chaos, in which matter is self-organizing because of its complexity. Here “man is in the world, in matter and of matter. He is not a stranger, but a friend, a familiar, a companion and an equal. He maintains an Aphroditean contract with things” (ibid.).

The ultimate reason why for Adams an “American Virgin would never dare command; an American Venus would never dare exist” (Education 365) lies in Serres’s observation that “groupings . . . seem to enjoy a bit of the status of Being only when they are subsumed beneath a unity . . . We want a principle, a system, an integration” (Genesis 2)—exactly what Adams feels has been lost in the America after the Civil War. Ultimately, “the laws of Venus-nature are indecipherable to the children of Mars” (Serres, Birth of Physics 108). However, in order to accept multiplicity, and the intricate interplay of chaos and order, “the physics of Venus [have to be] chosen over
that of Mars,” a physics in which “turbulence . . . troubles the flow of the identical, just as Venus disturbs Mars” (110). Simply because we want a unity, “we always see Venus without the sea; or the sea without Venus” (Genesis 18), whereas in fact Venus and the sea [unity and multiplicity] are intimately linked: “Venus . . . is not transcendent, like the other gods, she is inmanent to this world, she is the being of relation” (Birth of Physics 123)—order is not transcendent to multiplicity, but coextensive with it. Thus, “we turn away from the waves to admire the wave-born” (Genesis 2), when instead we should ask the important question “how is Venus born from the sea . . . ? How are forms born from the formless” (26)?

For Deleuze, Lucretius’s “hymn to Venus-nature” is a hymn to multiplicity, to “Nature as the production of the diverse . . . [to a] sum which does not totalize its own elements” (Logic of Sense 267). Nature—life—according to Venus “is not attributive, but rather conjunctive . . . Harlequin’s cloak, made entirely of solid patches and empty spaces; she is made of plenitude and void, beings and nonbeings,” and not a totalizing “Being, the One and the Whole” (267). For Adams, to believe in a totalizing whole and to dismiss multiplicity were exactly the “faults of the patchwork fitted on [the generation of the] fathers” (Education 8)—the new garment of multiplicity should rather look like Harlequin’s coat [a patchwork of ands] of which even the manikin itself [the former unified and transcendent ego] is a part. As Serres puts it, “le moi est un corps mêlé . . . Voilà que revient le manteau d’Arlequin, cousu d’adjectives, je veux dire de termes placés côte à côte.”8 Order and chaos, side by side—and, not either/or: nature is “a chaotic multiplicity of orderly or unitary multiplicities and chaotic multiplicities” (Serres, Genesis 110). And the individual is part of that turbulence; it is an open, dynamic system as well. For Deleuze, the individual is not a fixed form but “collections of sensations, each is such a collection, a packet, a bloc of variable sensations” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 39–40), or in Adams’s words, “a bundle of disconnected memories” (Education 202). The ego is not so much a transcendent unity as it is “a bicycle-rider, mechanically balancing himself by inhibiting all his inferior personalities”—the individual is regarded as “complex groups, like telephonic centres and systems” (411). The focus on the interplay of order and chaos [ultimately, of order born from chaos] has far-ranging consequences for the theory of evolution as well. If Adams dismisses doctrines of “sudden conversions, due to mere vital force acting on its own lines quite beyond mechanical explanation” (379), it is because he cannot accept suddenness—mere randomness and chance—as a satisfying explanation for evolution. Such a doctrine, as Deleuze points out in a discussion of evolutionism and biology, would “conceive of existence as a brute eruption, a pure act or leap which always occurs behind our
backs and is subject to a law of all or nothing” (*Difference and Repetition* 211). The creativity and productivity of evolution cannot be reduced to the production of identical members of the species, with the occasional random mutation to account for variety—evolution as production cannot be reduced to a negativity, to a simple response to external selection, but must follow a different dynamics. As Deleuze says, it cannot “proceed by elimination or limitation, but must create its own lines of actualization in positive acts” (*Bergsonism* 97). Darwin, Deleuze acknowledges, inaugurated “the thought of individual difference. The leitmotiv of *The Origin of Species* is: we do not know what individual difference is capable of!” (*Difference and Repetition* 248). But natural selection puts a halt to this experimentation and ‘fixes’ certain differences. In contrast to the Darwinist doctrine of differences that are ultimately created externally only, by the pressure of natural selection, Deleuze posits virtualities, ‘internal differences’—that is, he argues that function is the ‘driving force’ of evolution, so that mutations are not accidents that befall evolution but are the result of a multiplicity in matter itself from which order is created by self-differentiation. Every species, even every individual, is a fixation and arresting of that movement of multiplicity, but regarded as an a priori unity—just like the figure-body of Venus without-sea. The question “What is the formula for this ‘evolution’?” (255) becomes important. Deleuze’s answer is that, for a complex system, “the more the difference on which the system depends is interiorized in the phenomenon, . . . the less it depends on external conditions which are supposed to ensure the reproduction of the ‘same’ differences” (256).

Here Deleuze comes close to a conception that complexity theory has brought to modern biology. As the biologist Brian Goodwin has stated, “we could, if we wished, simply replace the term natural selection by dynamic stabilization, the emergence of the stable states in a dynamic system” (51). The theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman goes even further in claiming that order in evolution is not the result of natural selection, as orthodox Darwinism would have it, nor is evolution due to mere accident—order is achieved by the self-organizing dynamics of matter’s internal multiplicity of differences. The emergent properties of self-organization are “so profoundly immanent in complex regulatory networks that selection cannot avoid that order” (*Origins* xvii)—the molecular variants produced by evolution provide “order for free” (*At Home* 71), order emerges immanently. Kauffman aims at a theory of evolution that “incorporates self-organization into the weave of evolutionary theory” (*Origins* vii). For him, natural selection cannot be the only source of order in organisms, but order is also too prevalent to be a result of chance only, as Monod would have it. Thus, Kauffman examined Monod’s ‘chance’ for underlying, ‘orderly’ behavior—and found it. For an
organism to work, Kauffman claims, “there’d have to be an extraordinary amount of selection to get things to behave with reliability and stability. It’s not clear that natural selection could ever have gotten started without some preexisting order. You have to have a certain amount of order to select for improved variants” (“Order for Free” 336). Selection builds on the emergent properties generated by self-organization and stabilizes them. For Kauffman, “selection achieves and maintains complex systems poised on the boundary, or edge, between order and chaos. These systems are best able to coordinate complex tasks and evolve in a complex environment” (Origins xv). The self-organizing dynamics intrinsic to evolution follow a different logic than that of natural selection, but not completely unrelated to it. As a consequence, for Serres, the individual who emerges out of this Venustian physics arises, wave-born, out of a turbulent nature that “is a multiplicity of local unities and of pure multiplicities,” a Harlequin’s coat that is coextensive with the Harlequin-manikin of the individual body—“my body, my corporeal-order, my corporeal-disorder, life and death, perhaps it is after all, too, only a temporary turbulence, linking up smaller turbulences, in a unitary, though ramshackle, fashion” (Genesis 110). Ultimately, then, compared to Monod’s notion of man as a “gypsy . . . on the boundary of an alien world,” because of the fact that evolution is as dependent on chance as on an underlying order, a turbulent order that in fact is born from chaos, Kauffman can see man “at home in the universe” (At Home 189). Adams himself seems to anticipate [or wish for] such an “Aphroditean contract” based on the turbulence in both nature and man. In the final paragraph of The Education of Henry Adams—a paragraph that has puzzled critics because it comes unexpectedly and because its conciliatory character stands in marked contrast to the rest of the text [and to the times that followed], a paragraph that almost is an emergence of newness from within the text—Adams hopes that “perhaps some day—say 1938, their centenary—they [Adams, John Hay, and Clarence King] might be allowed to return together for a holiday, to see the mistakes of their own lives made clear in the light of the mistakes of their successors; and perhaps then, for the first time since man began his education among the carnivores, they would find a world that sensitive and timid natures could regard without a shudder” (Education 476–77). As already noted, Adams’s rhetoric of “type” and “variation” also has to be read with regard to the Body|Politic. In the type’s proliferation of ‘the same,’ such a Body|Politic resembles what Deleuze|Guattari call the “cancerous BwO” (Thousand Plateaus 163) with its “totalitarian and fascist” (165) nature. According to John Protevi, the cancerous BwO is a “runaway self-duplication of stratification. [It] breaks down the stratum on which it lodges by endlessly repeating the selection of homogenized individuals in a runaway process.
of ‘conformity.’ Social cloning. Assembly-line personalities” (“A Problem” 171–72). Adams voices a similar concern when he envisions a pessimistic future of a society “reserved for machine-made, collectivist” (Education 423) individuals—a cancerous Body|Politic. Just like Deleuze|Guattari’s Kafka, Adams sensed the “diabolical powers that are knocking at the door” (Kafka 41), be it the “American technocratic apparatus or the Russian bureaucracy or the machinery of fascism” (12). With regard to the theory of evolution, in which the outcome is never predictable, these “diabolical powers” are not a chance mutation, an accident that befalls an otherwise smooth evolution process, but virtual vectors already at work in the Body|Politic that are actualized only later. The result of such a development, for Adams, is ultimately entropic, since ‘machine-like types’ “brought up together under like conditions have nothing to give each other” (Education 58). The maximum state of entropy in a closed system results in a complete lack of exchange energy, and as a consequence in a lack of care, sympathy, and grace—exactly those virtues the Virgin|Venus [and thus complexity and multiplicity] stand for, and what Adams connects with an ‘ideal democracy’ as a tendency to counter this process of degradation, a strategy that ultimately refers, in the words of Deleuze|Guattari, to a “becoming-democratic that is not the same as what States of law are” (What Is Philosophy? 113).

Kauffman has pointed at the possibilities of complexity theory for “a deep new understanding of the logic of democracy” (At Home 28), a democracy as a politics of self-organization, evolving as a response to problems and conflict—quite similar to Robert Axelrod’s approach, which I outlined in my introductory chapter. Democracy is regarded as an inherently ‘experimental’ politics, played out in the space in between conflicting orientations and opinions of individuals and/or groups—a rhizomatic multiplicity rather than a controlling unity. For Adams, “there are moments in politics when great results can be reached only by small men,—a maxim which, however paradoxical, may easily be verified. Especially in a democracy the people are apt to become impatient of rule, and will at times obstinately refuse to move at the call of a leader, when, if left to themselves, they will blunder through all obstacles, blindly enough, it is true, but effectually” (Life of Gallatin 432). Thus, ultimately, only the force of a becoming-minor can effectuate changes in the Body|Politic. Although Adams simultaneously expresses the convictions of a believer in American democracy and points toward its limitations, for him, the democratic Body|Politic ultimately moves in the direction not of entropic degradation, but toward complexity—the rising action of Adams’s History had focused on the emergence of American democracy in a highly affirmative tone. Adams here is in accord with Spencer, who claims that a Body|Politic changes from a simple structure to a “continually-
increasing complexity of structure” (201). And although Spencer’s social Darwinism [his philosophy of social evolution in fact predated Darwin’s biological evolution] is ultimately responsible for the laissez-faire capitalism that so troubled Adams’s faith in real, existing American democracy, the question of authority and control in the Body|Politic is also at the heart of Adams’s musings. Spencer’s use of the Body|Politic concept differs markedly from its employment by Plato and Hobbes, for example, in that it focuses on coordination versus control; diffused sources of order versus one source of order; and a bottom-up versus a top-down organization. The fundamental problem with the traditional metaphor of the Body|Politic, for Spencer, was that Plato and Hobbes not only likened the Body|Politic “simply to the organization of a living body in general, but to the organization of the human body in particular” (200),11 and that it was “explained on the hypothesis of manufacture, rather than that of growth” (195).12 Spencer’s critics were quick to point out an apparent contradiction in the analogy of the freely growing social organism: the analogy itself implied a central control. The political scientist Ernest Barker sums up the dilemma: “An organism is a unity with a nerve-centre; that nerve centre regulates the whole body; and of a sudden the ‘growing’ organism which should not be regulated becomes a bureaucratic or socialistic state under control of the central brain. Starting with a conception of organic growth intended to justify individualism, Spencer ends with a conception of organic unity which tends to justify socialism” (Political Thought in England 96). Yet Spencer, with the help of modern science, deals with the problem of order and authority as related not to ‘manufactured’ political individualism, but to biological individuality. Ultimately, he asks if an individual’s ‘order’ [or ‘unity’] results from the subordination of its constitutive ‘elements’ [cells, or individuals respectively] to a controlling agency, or rather from the interaction of those very elements. Critics who claim there is a contradiction in Spencer’s work argue from the perspective of an organism regulated by a nervous center that controls the rest of the body. But Spencer sees the sources of ‘nervous authority’ as diffused as he believed the sources of political authority ought to be: “In some of the lowest animals, characterized by the absence of a nervous system, such sensitiveness as exists is possessed by all parts” (205).13 Thus, for Spencer, the Body|Politic has not evolved by divine providence or by the control of ‘central’ lawmakers, and its organizations are “neither supernatural, nor are they determined by the wills of individual men” (196). On the contrary, they are the result of growth, of “general natural causes.” The Body|Politic, a “complex body of mutually dependent” ‘elements,’ has “spontaneously evolved” (ibid.) because of the increasing complexity of its structure.14
The increase of complexity, the tendency of a democratic evolution—of democracy as evolution—is also the topic of Adams’s anonymously published novel *Democracy*. In this novel, Nathan Gore, a Massachusetts historian, is asked if he thinks “democracy the best government” (37), and he replies: “I believe in democracy. I accept it. I will faithfully serve and defend it. I believe in it because it appears to me the inevitable consequence of what has gone before it. Democracy asserts the fact that the masses are now raised to a higher intelligence than formerly. All our civilisation aims at this mark. We want to do what we can to help it. I myself want to see the result. I grant it is an experiment, but it is the only direction society can take that is worth its taking; the only conception of its duty large enough to satisfy its instincts; the only result that is worth an effort or a risk. Every other possible step is backward, and I do not care to repeat the past. I am glad to see society grapple with issues in which no one can afford to be neutral” (36, my emphasis). Kauffman voices a similar hope when he says that “democracy may be far and away the best process to solve the complex problems of a complex evolving society” (*At Home* 28). If democracy is understood as a complex interplay of chaos and order, as a Body|Politic emerging from self-organizing properties, it makes sense that Adams, in his novel, refers to the “slowly eddying dance of democracy” (*Democracy* 43)—in his histories, he sees democracy as a dance of eddies in a “democratic ocean” (*History Madison* 1334), as small islands of stability emerging out of turbulence.

The rise of modern mass democracy went hand in hand with the fall of politics as statecraft in the old sense. Whereas the politics of republican statecraft had been related to virtuous leaders, the new American political character was one of a virtual democracy in the Deleuzian sense of the word, its potentiality related to its underlying multiplicity of forces [individual, economical, institutional, etc.]: “Modern politics is, at bottom, a struggle not of men but of forces. The men become every year more and more creatures of force, massed about central power-houses. The conflict is no longer between the men, but between the motors that drive the men, and the men tend to succumb to their own motive forces” (H. Adams, *Democracy* 400). However, for Adams, the question arises if there is an alternative to either the ‘Old Unity’ [the republic of the founding fathers, irreversibly lost] or the ‘New Multiplicity’ [modern democracy as ultimately disorganized and corrupt]. Kauffman comments on a similar problem in scientific terms when he claims that “eighteenth-century science, following the Newtonian revolution, has been characterized as developing the sciences of organized simplicity, nineteenth-century science, via statistical mechanics, as focusing on disorganized complexity, and twentieth- and twenty-first-century science as
confronting organized complexity. Nowhere is this confrontation so stark as in biology” (Origins 173). This describes Adams’s dilemma perfectly, and Adams was looking for solutions in evolution theory, solutions that Darwinism could not offer, because it was still embedded in that dichotomy between “organized simplicity” and “disorganized complexity,” which Adams could make sense of only as a movement that was blind, but effective.

Adams was hoping for an alternative to the strategy of “running order through chaos, direction through space, discipline through freedom, unity through multiplicity” (Education 17); to external control, “the despotism of artificial order which nature abhorred” (433); and to the fear of multiplicity as mere disorder. Adams senses that the “conservative Christian anarchist [Adams himself] could have no associate, no object, no faith except the nature of nature itself” (386)—and this “larger synthesis” (ibid.) was validated not by Hegel, but by the findings of an emerging new science. It can be argued that Adams’s work at times comes close to accepting a downward determinism: he is concerned with entropy to almost hysterical dimensions, as The Education’s chapter “A Dynamic Theory of History” and essays such as “The Tendency of History” [1894], “The Rule of Phase Applied to History” [1909], and “A Letter to American Teachers of History” [1910] reveal. These essays are Adams’s attempt to come up with a theory of history in congruence with the science of his times. If unity is lost in the new ‘multiverse,’ the only option for Adams seems to have been the acceptance of “disorganized complexity.”18 However, he also senses that taming the multiplicity, which has been the “task of education, as it is the moral of religion, philosophy, science, art, politics, and economy” (Education 17), cuts off the connection to life and production, to that “certain form of energy.” Thus, against the “despotism of artificial order” and the “science of death,” of entropy’s repetition of sameness and identity, Adams posits both a “prudent hopefulness” (Levenson 93) for democracy, as voiced in the comments of Mrs. Madeleine Lee and Nathan Gore in Democracy, and his hope for “another Newton” (Degradation 263) to find a way out of entropic determinism, to open the way for “organized complexity.”

According to Deleuze, the concept of entropy, in its tendency to reduce difference and to unitize differences, expresses “a strange alliance at the end of the nineteenth century between science, good sense and philosophy. Thermodynamics was the powerful furnace of that alloy” (Difference and Repetition 223). The concept of entropy was based on a set of common-sensical definitions, such as “the given as diverse; reason as a process of identification and equalisation tending towards identity; the absurd or irrational as resistance of the diverse to that identificatory reason” (223–24). Against this repetition of sameness, Deleuze posits a repetition of difference, which
amounts to exactly the notion of ‘organized multiplicity’ that Adams was too early in history to be able to appeal to:

When we seek to define energy in general, either we take account of the extensive and qualified factors of extensity—in which case we are reduced to saying ‘there is something which remains constant,’ thereby formulating the great but flat tautology of the Identical—or, on the contrary, we consider pure intensity insofar as it is implicated in that deep region where no quality is developed, or any extensity deployed. In this case, we define energy in terms of the difference buried in this pure intensity and it is the formula of ‘difference of intensity’ which bears the tautology, but this time the beautiful and profound tautology of the Different. Energy in general will not then be confused with a uniform energy at rest, which would render any transformation impossible. Only a particular form of empirical energy, qualified in extensity, can be at rest; one in which the difference in intensity is already cancelled because it is drawn outside itself and distributed among the elements of the system. (240–41)

Like orthodox Darwinism, the concept of thermodynamic entropy allowed nature to become an object of prediction—the second law of thermodynamics “provides a rule according to which . . . different objects tend to equalise themselves and the different Selves tend to become uniform” (226). However, it is inadequate as a concept both because it deals only with closed systems in equilibrium, and because it [mis]takes the conditions of such a system for the intensity itself. Thus, the ‘organized multiplicity’ that counters thermodynamics is in fact a ‘self-organized multiplicity,’ the production of intensity being a result of immanent to [extensive] entropic processes, including the generation of “structural stability and morphogenesis” [René Thom’s phrase] that governs the creation of organisms. Deleuze envisions a physics based on becoming and heterogeneity rather than being [stable identity] and homogeneity. Adams, in his parallelization of biology and politics, biological and democratic evolution, sensed that the “movement from unity into multiplicity . . . would require a new social mind” (Education 470) as well. He sensed the politics needed for a “democratic ocean” (History Madison 1334), but in his account of things, “man could go no further. The atom might move, but the general equilibrium could not change” (1334–35). He could not believe that states far from equilibrium, on the edge of chaos, could not make what Serres calls the shift from turba to turbo, from turbulence to the vortex—“the first is simply disorder and the second is a particular form of movement” (Birth of Physics 28), but, since order may emerge out of chaos, the two are one.19 For Serres, the cone, or the top, a children’s toy, is a perfect illustration for this vertical movement that is both stable and unstable, order and disorder—“the simplicity of complexity, first and
foremost, an additive machine; a synthesis of contradictions” (29). Maybe Adams envisioned something similar when he further described the “new social mind” by claiming that “evidently the new American would need to think in contradictions” (Education 470), in terms of difference and heterogeneity rather than unity and homogeneity.

If ‘the Different’ was more active than ‘the Identical,’ if multiplicity was ‘more fundamental’ than unity, then the represented multitude was more important than the representers, the social more important than the ‘political proper.’ At the beginning of Democracy, the central character with political aspirations, Mrs. Madeleine Lee, a wealthy young widow, wants “to see with her own eyes the action of primary force . . . She was bent upon getting to the heart of the great American mystery of democracy and government” (Democracy 4–5). This “primary force,” this “motive power” (5), is seen as the consequence of a “clash of interests, the interests of forty millions of people and a whole continent, centering at Washington; guided, restrained, controlled, or unrestrained and uncontrollable, by men of ordinary mould; the tremendous forces of government, and the machinery of society, at work” (ibid.). However, Adams was not so sure that this “machinery” was still working. In The Education, he states that “the political dilemma was as clear in 1870 as it was likely to be in 1970. The system of 1789 had broken down, and with it the eighteenth-century fabric of a priori, or moral, principles . . . Nine-tenths of men’s political energies must . . . be wasted on expedients to piece out,—to patch,—or, in vulgar language, to tinker,—the political machine as often as it broke down. Such a system, or want of system, might last centuries, if tempered by an occasional revolution or civil war; but as a machine, it was, or soon would be, the poorest in the world,—the clumsiest,—the most inefficient” (268–69). According to Adams, “the sum of political life was, or should have been, the attainment of a working political system. Society needed to reach it. If moral standards broke down, and machinery stopped working, new morals and machinery of some sort had to be invented” (ibid.). However, to accept corruption—the very absence of morals—as the “new morals” that made the ‘new machinery’ work, was out of the question. In an article written on the occasion of the 1869 gold scandal and Black Friday, Adams pointed out the dangers of emerging capitalism for a democratic system:

For the first time since the creation of these enormous corporate bodies, one of them has shown its power for mischief, and has proved itself able to override and trample on law, custom, decency, and every restraint known to society, without scruple, and as yet without check. The belief is common in America that the day is at hand when corporations far greater than the Erie—swaying
power such as has never in the world’s history been trusted in the hands of private citizens, controlled by single men like Vanderbilt, or by combinations of men like Fisk, Gould, and Lane, after having created a system of quiet but irresistible corruption—will ultimately succeed in directing government itself. Under the American form of society no authority exists capable of effective resistance. The national government, in order to deal with the corporations, must assume powers refused to it by its fundamental law,—and even then is exposed to the chance of forming an absolute central government which sooner or later is likely to fall into the hands it is struggling to escape, and destroy the limits of its power only in order to make corruption omnipotent. Nor is this danger confined to America alone. The corporation is in its nature a threat against the popular institutions spreading so rapidly over the whole world. Wherever a popular and limited government exists this difficulty will be found in its path; and unless some satisfactory solution of the problem can be reached, popular institutions may yet find their existence endangered. (“New York Gold Conspiracy” 365–66)²¹

Maybe, ultimately, the “new morals” that had to be invented were not to be found in the government, but rather in ‘the governed.’ In a move similar to Spinoza’s distinction between potestas [command, authority] and potestas [force, strength, creative activity], Adams’s narratorial voice slightly criticizes Mrs. Lee precisely for confusing “the force of the engine . . . with that of the engineer, the power of the men who wielded it” (Democracy 5)—a criticism that might also be a self-criticism. By concentrating on the ruling elite, the ‘representers’ [e.g., Jefferson and Madison in Adams’s histories], Adams had concentrated on the fittest, the ‘great men’ that were most able to represent ‘the people.’ However, when the representers cut their connection to the multitude on which their ‘survival’ depends, the multitude that already provides autopoietic ‘order for free,’ and when they themselves mistake the potentia of the engine for the potestas of the engineer, this leads to self-interest and corruption, exactly those traits in modern democracy that Adams so vehemently despises. As he puts it quite cynically in his novel, “democracy, rightly understood, is the government of the people, by the people, for the benefit of Senators” (14)—in particular for the benefit of Senator Ratcliffe, the corrupt politician in the novel. Mrs. Lee sees that a return to that potentia is necessary, that her desire for power [potestas] and control is ultimately at war with democracy itself. Like Adams, she has hopes that the potentia of the multiplicity/multitude provides ‘order for free’ from which a more stable order might arise: “Underneath the scum floating on the surface of politics, Madeleine felt that there was a sort of healthy ocean current of honest purpose, which swept the scum before it, and kept
the mass pure” (96). At the end of Democracy, she turns her back to Washington: “She had got to the bottom of this business of democratic government, and found out that it was nothing more than government of any other kind. She might have known it by her own common sense, but now that experience had proved it, she was glad to quit the masquerade” (166). Instead she turns “to the true democracy of life, her paupers and her prisons, her schools and her hospitals” (ibid.), to the self-organizing turbulence out of which order—albeit a different order than that of representation, control, and unity, an order ‘far from equilibrium’—arises.

Writing from the other end of the twentieth century, Gregoire Nicolis and Ilya Prigogine state in Exploring Complexity that “today, wherever we look, we find evolution, diversification, and instabilities. We have long known that we live in a pluralistic world in which we find deterministic as well as stochastic phenomena, reversible as well as irreversible . . . the complex processes we discover in the evolution of life or in the history of human societies” (2–3)—these observations almost sound like a direct reply to Adams’s quest. Ultimately, for Adams, the movement from unity to multiplicity would not only require a “new social mind” but a new Body|Politic as well: a transition from the founders’ republic, with a central authority and checks and balances that held ‘mob rule’ under constraint, to a democracy seen as a government of the people and by the people, a Body|Politic based on self-organization, a semistable order that arises from and does not cut off its relation to chaos, to that “certain form of energy.” The Body|Politic is the very economy of this force, and neither its control nor its representation.
"A SONOROUS PEOPLE"

Techno|Music and the Joyful
Body|Politic

[Treat] a book as you would treat a record you listen to.
—DELEUZE AND PARNET, Dialogues 3

The book is not a root-tree, it is a piece of a rhizome, the plateau of a rhizome for the
reader it suits. The combinations, permutations, utilisations are never internal to the
book, but depend on connections with a particular outside. Yes, take what you want.
—DELEUZE AND GUATTARI, “Rhizome” 68

IN NOISE, JACQUES ATTALI attempts to read music as an indicator [even a
predictor] of social change. Since his intention is “not only to theorize about
music, but to theorize through music” (4), Attali demonstrates that music
can function as the unconscious of the Body|Politic, as an experiment with
new social and political realities. In describing the evolution of the orches-
tra, he sees its stratified hierarchy as a model for an equally stratified Body|
Politic, with the conductor conducting the discrete sections of the orchestra
with the same dictatorial authority that a sovereign would use to command
soldiers and cavalries—“the conductor as a leader of men, simultaneously
entrepreneur and State, a physical representation of power in the economic
order” (67). Just as R. Murray Schafer sees “the traditional sonata form [a]
model for a colonial empire” (59), Attali sees the political economy of the
nineteenth century reflected in the concert tradition of its time, where the
bourgeoisie listened to eighteenth-century music, to a harmonious musical
ensemble that mirrored a similarly harmonious industrial order: “Mozart
and Bach reflect the bourgeoisie’s dream of harmony better than and prior
to the whole of nineteenth-century political theory” (Noise 5–6).

Attali constructs his political economy of music as a “succession of or-
ders . . . done violence by noises . . . that are prophetic because they create
new orders, unstable and changing” (19). He starts with music as sacrifice,
as a ritual based on fear, where the violence of noise is channeled into ac-
ceptable rituals binding the group together—by sacrificing chaos, the very
possibility of a social order upon which power rests is affirmed. The next step, music as *representation*, music as a way to “make people believe in a consensual representation of the world” (46) based on harmony and exchange, begins the deritualization of music and the concomitant establishment of an orderly Body|Politic. *Repetition* regards music as reproduction, which is a view of music very similar to Adorno’s critique of mass culture and popular music, of the commodification of art. Adorno states that in the twentieth century, the culture industry had taken control of art and by endless reproduction turned it into a means of ideological control. Popular music, such as jazz, expresses for him precisely the debasement and conformity that capitalism imposes on the members of the Body|Politic: “I am nothing, I am filth, no matter what they do to me it serves me right” (“Perennial Fashion” 132). Music as repetition establishes a “society of repetition in which nothing will happen anymore” (Attali, Noise 5)—an echo of Adams’s fear of entropic degradation, with no energy exchange possible any more, in a society of ‘assembly-line types.’ Repetition here imposes a code of normality, as the repetition of the same.

This is the state of the political economy of music at the time Attali was writing, in 1977. But he envisioned a following stage, which he curiously calls *composition*—what he actually has in mind is something akin to improvisation and experimentation. Attali quotes Barthes when he claims that *composition* means “to put music into operation, to draw it toward an unknown praxis” (quoted in Noise 135). Attali senses that the era of repetition also “heralds the emergence of a formidable subversion, one leading to a radically new organization never yet theorized, of which self-management is but a distant echo” (5). Composition does not refer to the concept of meticulously planning and arranging a piece that is then ‘executed’ by an orchestra, but rather is similar to Deleuze’s “plan of composition” (Spinosa: Practical Philosophy 128), which Deleuze vehemently opposes to what he calls a “plan of organization.” In the plan of composition, “there is no longer a form, but only relations of velocity between infinitesimal particles of an unformed material. There is no longer a subject, but only individuating affective states of an anonymous force. Here the plan is concerned only with motions and rests, with dynamic affective charges” (ibid.). In the strategy of *composition* [in itself a line of flight within the era of repetition, in that repetition in itself also ‘allows for’ repetition of/as difference, not sameness, and of subversion], emerging “from within repetition, certain deviations announce a radical challenge to it: the proliferating circulation of pirated recordings, the multiplication of illegal radio stations, the diverted usage of monetary signs as a mode of communicating forbidden political messages—all of these things herald the invention of a radical subversion, a new mode
of social structuring” Attali, (Noise 131–32). With this new mode of composition, Attali sees the emergence of “the seeds of a new noise, one exterior to the institutions and customary sites of political conflict . . . It may be the essential element in a strategy for the emergence of a truly new society” (133).

In this chapter, I want to follow Attali’s lead in seeing an intimate connection between music and the Body·Politic, or, more precisely, in seeing music as providing models for a “truly new” Body·Politic. Writing in 1977, Attali could not foresee, although he might have imagined, developments in popular music that took place in the mid-1980s, especially the emergence of the phenomenon of techno. Its ‘origins’ lie in Chicago’s African American gay culture and Detroit’s African American electronic music of the late 1970s|early 1980s. Quite a number of publications have examined techno either from the perspective of the artists involved, or in connection with drug [ab] use. By using a different framing, I want to position the phenomenon of techno within the context of poststructuralist theories and philosophy. As a kind of theoretical background noise, I have sampled different concepts by Deleuze|Guattari, because they—much like techno itself—are concerned with the limits of subject, author, and representation. Thus, drawing from various discourses, this chapter shares techno’s strategy of sampling, of putting heterogeneous elements into a new context.

Following Attali’s lead, I will first of all outline Deleuze|Guattari’s theory of [pop] music and its political implications. In connection with Kafka’s minor literature, Deleuze|Guattari define pop as “an escape for language, for music, for writing. What we call pop—pop music, pop philosophy, pop writing—Worterflucht. To make use of the polylingualism of one’s own language, to make a minor or intensive use of it, to oppose the oppressed quality of this language to its oppressive quality, to find points of nonculture or underdevelopment, linguistic Third World zones by which a language can escape, an animal enters into things, an assemblage comes into play” (Kafka 26–27). What defines pop and minor literature is that both are a form of multiplicity—in fact, for Deleuze|Guattari, “rhizomatics = pop analysis” (Thousand Plateaus 24). This formula is a shorthand for a longer formula, which reads rhizomatics = schizoanalysis = stratoanalysis = pragmatics = micropolitics” (22). The theorizing through music suggested by Deleuze|Guattari invites a reading of pop [analysis] as micropolitics. Pop as a rhizome, then, has to be read against the ‘tree-like’ form of formal classical composition—not only the mode of organization of classical composition itself, but also its system of filiation [and the anxiety of influence] by which composers refer to their predecessors, a line that proceeds in developments of schools and antischools of composition. Relating Deleuze|Guattari’s
approach to Attali’s, what distinguishes the rhizomatic strategy of pop from the [European] tradition of great composers is that instead of focusing on *representation*, pop is more concerned with bricolage, replacing the composer/author with the producer—and it is here that the phenomenon of techno becomes politically relevant. Simon Reynolds has pointed at a connection between Deleuze/Guattari’s concepts, techno, and the Body/Politic. He states that the “rhizome . . . is used by Deleuze and Guattari to evoke a kind of polymorphous perversity of the body politic. ‘Rhizomatic’ music might include the fractal, flow-motion funk of Can and early seventies Miles Davis (based around the ‘nobody solos’ and ‘everybody solos’ principle), dub reggae (with its dismantling of the normal ranking of instruments in the mix), and the cut’n’splice mixology of hip-hop, house and jungle DJs” (*Energy* 388). I will relate the following argument to that notion and also analyze the connections between the sonorous body of techno music and the ‘community of ravers,’ a connection that Deleuze/Guattari hint at in their concept of the “*Dividual,*” which describes “the type of musical relations and the intra- or intergroup passages occurring in group individuation . . . individualized, not according to the persons within it, but according to the affects it experiences” (*Thousand Plateaus* 341). I will constantly oscillate between the analysis of the sonorous body and its implications for a Body/Politic. In this assemblage of music, bodies, and affects, a new Body/Politic spontaneously emerges: “a sonorous . . . People” (342).6

Rock ‘n’ roll culture has always defined itself in terms of phallic sex and/or deviance [in terms of the law, the common sense, and its aesthetics]. The last three decades have witnessed a decisive shift, and I will shortly contrast rock ‘n’ roll with what I consider two of the main components of mainstream music. On the one hand, although the king of rock ‘n’ roll [Elvis Presley] and his smudgy, deviant—but true—heirs [Sid Vicious|Johnny Thunders] have died, the revival of both rock ‘n’ roll and the great rock ‘n’ roll swindle nevertheless goes on. In contrast to the lyrics of ‘traditional rock music’ with its [mostly] Oedipal scenarios [freedom|peace|love&sex], hip-hop and rap start from the fact of ghetto [the tribe], and segregation, a situation that might change for the better, but also might become worse. Nevertheless, although their *music* deterritorializes notions of representation, hip-hop and rap still operate on the discursive level, on the level of the outspoken signified and of lyrics [hopefully ‘explicit’ and labeled with the parental warning]. During the last thirty years, yet another style has evolved: techno, a style associated not with ‘natural’ instruments like guitar, bass, and drums, but with segments of the frequency spectrum on the monitor of the analyzer; not with real time and live performance, but with a step-by-step stratification of rhythms, samples, digital filters, and delay effects—
a style that has its roots in Chicago ‘[Ware]house’ deejay style and Detroit electronic music culture. House music was ‘born’ in Chicago in the mid-late 1970s as a reaction to the mainstream sellout of disco—house is disco ‘going underground.’ The African American gay community in Chicago wanted ‘something harder’ to dance to—harder rhythms and simple bass lines—which led to Frankie Knuckles, a deejay, experimenting with mixing tracks that combined vocal and instrumental fragments of earlier disco and the machinic rhythms of Kraftwerk. The result was a groove that was “more energetic and polyrhythmic” (A. Thomas 25) than that of heterosexual African Americans.

The Chicago sound paved the way for Detroit techno, which emerged as a site-specific phenomenon in Detroit in the early/mid-1980s and is associated in particular with the African American producers Juan Atkins, Kevin Saunderson, and Derrick May. Growing up in the impoverished inner city of Detroit after the area’s economic collapse as the center of the American automobile industry, these musicians explored the possibilities of the newly available [and affordable] electronic instruments such as rhythm machines and sequencers. They fused electronic music [and its long tradition, including influences such as Luigi Russolo, Karlheinz Stockhausen, and Kraftwerk] with the tradition of black funk and soul [Detroit’s Motown label was the first record label owned by an African American, and it featured African American artists]. The black community in Detroit then organized their own clubs and sound systems, below the radar of [official] mainstream culture. In its use of polyrhythmic [sometimes even arhythmic] beats, its use of ‘machines,’ and its futuristic themes, techno seemed to directly engage with the social and political issues of twentieth-century urban industrial America at the end of the cold war. Like house music in Chicago, techno was first primarily a local phenomenon—of minorities [African Americans, gays] who were becoming-minor in their deterritorializing of mainstream trends. Detroit techno, in particular, was an ‘underground’ art—the ‘traxx’ were distributed on tapes first, then ‘home labels’ released very limited numbers of twelve-inch singles. Techno remained a local phenomenon until these records made it to Europe. As a consequence of the immediate incorporation of Detroit techno and Chicago house in the emerging underground rave scene in England, the early pioneers of techno—and techno itself—became ‘bigger’ in Europe than in the United States, so that the ‘second wave’ of techno took place almost exclusively abroad. One of the reasons why techno never became as big in the United States as in Europe might be the fact that rap and hip-hop, which evolved simultaneously, attracted bigger audiences because of their use of lyrics, which made it easier to link it to the ‘representation machine’ of outspoken propositions—and which made it easier to
control. In what follows, I will focus on the political potential of techno music. Although techno ‘originated’ in the United States, I can show what might have been only by examining techno as exported to Europe, where the possibilities that flashed up in techno’s primal scene blazed more intensely and longer—until this ‘temporary zone’ was coopted by ‘the market.’ I am aware that my highly affirmative reading of techno ultimately presents it as a utopian concept: I aim to develop its potential rather than its ‘actuality,’ a potential that sometimes is present only in an infinitely small flicker before its cooptation. As Deleuze|Guattari put it, “to say that revolution is itself utopia of immanence is not to say that it is a dream, something that is not realized . . . it is to posit revolution as . . . infinite movement . . . , relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed” (What Is Philosophy? 100).

American deejays and musicians|producers such as Frankie Knuckles and Juan Atkins took ‘machines’ [records, turntables, synthesizers, samplers] and used them not in the way they were supposed to be used, introducing techniques of deterritorialization [scratching, sampling, microtonal modulation, etc.]—these were creative usages of technology, “nonconformist usages of the rhizome and not the tree type” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 27). For Deleuze|Guattari, the new quality of techno’s machinery and the deterritorialization that focuses on the immanent differences of sound rather than on a composer’s plan[e] of organization is epitomized in the synthesizer, which they describe as “a musical machine of consistency, a sound machine (not a machine for reproducing sounds), which molecularizes and atomizes, ionizes sound matter, and harnesses a cosmic energy. If this machine must have an assemblage, it is the synthesizer. By assembling modules, source elements, and elements for treating sounds (oscillators, generators, and transformers), by arranging microintervals, the synthesizer makes audible the sound process itself, the production of that process, and puts us into contact with still other elements beyond sound matter” (Thousand Plateaus 343). Music is first of all sound matter, and therefore “a deterritorialization of the voice, which becomes less and less tied to a language” (302). In contrast to representation and discursive meaning, Deleuze|Guattari pose the nonsignifying qualities of sound, which might also deterritorialize the voice itself: “Only when the voice is tied to timbre does it reveal a tessitura that renders it heterogeneous to itself and gives it a power of continuous variation: it is then no longer accompanied, but truly ‘machined’” (96). In techno, vocals are used in their sonic quality, and even if they indicate ‘meaning,’ they “write with slogans” (24).

The phenomenon of techno emerged at a time when the ‘grand narratives’ and ideologies no longer applied, when the big institutions of the
state were in decline. In 1990, Deleuze wrote an essay called “Postscript on Societies of Control,” in which he develops Foucault’s views on the disciplinary societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries further into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, a transition that resulted in what Deleuze calls “Control Societies” (Negotiations 178). Deleuze interestingly uses words such as analogical, digital, and modulation (ibid.) to describe this transition—words that also are prominent in techno. Commenting on the idea of the machinic Body|Politic, Deleuze states that “it’s easy to set up a correspondence between any society and some kind of machine, which isn’t to say that their machines determine different kinds of society but that they express the social forms capable of producing them and making use of them . . . control societies function with a third generation of machines, with information technology and computers, where the passive danger is noise, and the active, piracy and viral contamination” (180). Thus, both the phenomenon of techno and control societies are based on information technology, and techno, I argue, deterritorializes this technology, introduces both noise and piracy into its music that in turn proposes an alternative to the controlling Body|Politic.11 In another text from 1990 on control societies, “Control and Becoming,” Deleuze also comments on the modes of resistance particular to that Body|Politic and states that “computer piracy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes and what the nineteenth century called ‘sabotage’ (‘clogging’ the machinery)” (175). Such a resistance, however, “would be nothing to do with minorities speaking out. Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted . . . We’ve got to hijack speech. Creating has always been something different from communicating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control” (ibid.). Techno’s nonsignifying strategy, its deterritorialization of both the voice and representation machines, comes close to such a ‘creative resistance.’ Ultimately, what Deleuze is “interested in are collective creations rather than representations” (169), and techno, in addition to its destratification of representation, as ‘a movement’ is neither negation, nor affirmation of something—rather, it aims at the Utopia of affirming the moment of its becoming and is a demonstration for|of that moment. Hence the paradox that techno parades such as the Love Parades or the MayDays were allowed as political demonstrations, but they did not fit the model of either/or of state versus resistance politics: instead, techno “hollowed out an ever expanding zone of indiscernibility or indetermination” (Essays Critical and Clinical 71).12

Techno was highlighted as a political issue in Great Britain’s CJPO—the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, chapter 33. The English law was the first to provide an ‘official’ definition of dance and techno music,
and to regulate the handling of this kind of music. This act aimed at the ‘deviant behavior’ not only of ravers, but of squatters and travelers—gypsies—as well, people whose lifestyle is not one of conformity/uniformity. The section that criminalizes raves and techno music deserves to be quoted in its entirety:

Powers to remove persons attending or preparing for a rave.

Section 63.—(1) This section applies to a gathering on land in the open air of 100 or more persons (whether or not trespassers) at which amplified music is played during the night (with or without intermissions) and is such as, by reason of its loudness and duration and the time at which it is played, is likely to cause serious distress to the inhabitants of the locality; and for this purpose—
(a) such a gathering continues during intermissions in the music and, where the gathering extends over several days, throughout the period during which amplified music is played at night (with or without intermissions); and (b) “music” includes sounds wholly or predominantly characterised by the emission of a succession of repetitive beats.

The law speaks from the position of those who know that one sleeps at night, who know that loud music makes people aggressive, and who share the mythical belief that music is [or should be] natural. In contrast, this machinic “emission of a succession of repetitive beats” truly deserves to be put in [ironic] quotation marks. A deviator from the routines of normality and an adversary of the law on ‘natural/organic music’ “commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three month or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale” (CJPO 63.6b). The law appears as a molar machine, a castrating agency, as ‘Daddy says no!’ The law has branded techno as machinic noise, as deviant, like a father who disclaims any responsibility for this disobedient, machinic child. It is indeed the very complicity of childishness and a machinic logic that will be a central perspective in my reading of techno.

In the [Lacanian] cultural/representational machine, desire is inevitably dependent upon the symbolic register [and the Oedipus complex and castration/death], even though it is nonetheless exactly what escapes language, what is always left over in articulation: “The moment in which desire becomes human is also that in which the child is born into language” (Écrits 103). The entry into this machine marks the very moment in which the real jouissance [of the body of the drives] is substituted by the culturally acceptable [and castrated] phallic, symbolic jouissance of desire [which Lacan calls jouis-sens]: a desire that is made human by the very act of tying the human subject to the phallic machinic whose Oedipal molar machines function ac-
According to the logic of Western phallogocentrism. Desire is directed to a [however impossible] signified, its metonymic drift propelling forward along the culturally loaded and law-ful chain of signifiers: ‘Daddy says yes!’

Against Lacan’s notion of desire based on lack, Deleuze|Guattari pose their notion of a machinic desire, a desire that does not lack, that is not played out on the theater of representation, but a desire that produces, couples, and connects. The materiality of desire [what Freud and Lacan would call “drive’] for Deleuze|Guattari constitutes a machine quite different from Lacan’s molar and representational machines, running on lack: “Desire is never an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions” (Thousand Plateaus 215).

The Lacanian machine, ultimately, is not ‘machinic enough’ to deal with the complexity and self-organizing forces of the material it aims to represent:

We should bear in mind that there is a machinic essence which will incarnate itself in a technical machine, and equally in the social and cognitive environment connected to this machine—social groups are also machines, the body is a machine, there are scientific, theoretical and information machines. The abstract machine passes through all these heterogeneous components but above all it heterogenises them, beyond any unifying trait and according to a principle of irreversibility, singularity and necessity. In this respect the Lacanian signifier is struck with a double lack: it is too abstract in that it makes heterogeneous, expressive materials translatable, it lacks ontological heterogenesis, it gratuitously uniformises and syntaxises diverse regions of being, and, at the same time, it is not abstract enough because it is incapable of taking into account the specificity of these machinic autopoietic nodes. (Guattari, Chaosmosis 39)

In addition to the representation machine, there is another machine, a noisy machine like the one that underlies the soundtrack of David Lynch’s Eraserhead, machines from which these cultural machines emerge. Jean-Luc Nancy refers to “the world-wide rhythm from jazz to rap and beyond” and affirms that that this “noise: it’s like the verso of thinking, but also like what rumbles in the folds of bodies” (100–101). It is the physical machines of production that underlie the psychic machines of representation. These machines are described by Deleuze|Guattari as “desiring machines, which are of a molecular order . . . : formative machines, whose very misfirings are functional . . . chronogeneous machines engaged in their own assembly (montage), . . . machines in the strict sense, because they proceed by breaks and flows, associated waves and particles, associative flows and partial objects” (Anti-Oedipus 286–87).
For Deleuze-Guattari, then, the machine has first of all connotations that differ from the notion of machine as merely a technical apparatus. Guattari states:

In the history of philosophy the problem of the machine has generally been regarded as secondary to a more general system—that of technè and technique (la technique). I would propose a reversal of this point of view, to the extent that the problem of technique would now only be a subsidiary part of a much wider machine problematic. Since the “machine” is opened out towards its machinic environment and maintains all sorts of relationships with social constituents and individual subjectivities, the concept of technological machine should therefore be broadened to that of machinic agencements. This category encompasses everything that develops as a machine in its different registers and ontological supports. And here, rather than having an opposition between being and the machine, or being and the subject, this new notion of the machine now involves being differentiating itself qualitatively and emerging onto an ontological plurality, which is the very extension of the creativity of machinic vectors. (“On Machines” 9)

Going beyond an evolving teleology that traces the machine as a function in a series starting with simple tools, Deleuze-Guattari’s machine is not solely an instrument of work in which social knowledge is absorbed and enclosed, but one that opens up in different social contexts to different connections and couplings: “There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together” (Anti-Oedipus 2). Deleuze-Guattari do not reduce/restrict the concept of the machine to cultural/cultural representational machines, nor do they use it as metaphor [Lacan, I argue, does both]—they are much more concerned with the question how actual [desire-]machines emerge from heterogeneous elements. In addition to Deleuze—who, through his reading of Leibniz, sees the human body as infinitely machined—Guattari points out to see the machinic aspect of the Body/Politic: “The machine has to be directly conceived in relation to a social body . . . . If such is the case, one cannot regard the machine as a new segment that succeeds that of the tool, along a line that would have its starting point in abstract man. For man and the tool are already components of a machine constituted by a full body acting as an engineering agency, and by men and tools that are engineered [machinés] insofar as they are distributed on his body” (“Balance-Sheet” 142). Technology does not extend man’s life’s power [it is not a prosthesis, as in Freud’s “prosthetic God,”14 not a secondary addition that either enslaves or liberates us]—manlife is inherently machinic insofar as it is the production and proliferation of multiple connections between natural, technical,
genetic, social, and other forces. Deleuze|Guattari’s concept of the machine shifts the focus from the technological machine [apparatus] to the question how a Body|Politic is ‘machined,’ and how from particular machinic assemblages [affective, physical, psychic, technical, and semiotic machines and their respective machinic interactions] a particular Body|Politic emerges. The question they ask with regard to the ‘literary machine’ of the book, I will ask with regard to the ‘sonorous machine’ of techno: “What is the relation of this literary machine to a war machine, love machine, revolutionary machine . . . the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into, must be plugged into in order to work” (Thousand Plateaus 4).

Molar machines, ultimately, are molecular machines under “determinate conditions” (Anti-Oedipus 287), two ‘phase states’ of desire-machines that produce both representation and production. “Determinate conditions,” for Deleuze|Guattari, mean molarity, since “determinate conditions” for them imply “those statistical forms into which the machines enter as so many stable forms, unifying, structuring, and proceeding by means of heavy aggregates; the selective pressures that group the parts retain some of them and exclude others, organizing the crowds. These are therefore the same machines, but not at all the same régime” (287–88). The machine has|is a structure like a Möbius strip, where the ‘two sides’ of production|representation, molecular|molar, rhizomeltree, Body|Politic, and so forth are actually unilaterial. Techno, in its decidedly apolitical stance and in its deterritorialization of technology and traditional notions of music, is more concerned with the first terms in these formulas, with the rhizomatic, molecular production of a Body|Politic. Achim Szepanski, the owner and founder of the labels Force Inc. and Mille Plateaux, has explained that in techno, “you can hear a multitude of noises, shrieks, chirps, creaks, and whizzes. These are all sounds traditionally associated with madness . . . Techno in this sense is schizoid music: it deconstructs certain rules and forms that pop-music has inflicted on sounds, on the other hand it has to invent the rules that subject sounds to operations of consistency” (140–41, my translation).15 For Deleuze|Guattari, these sounds point toward a becoming-animal, toward a molecular deterritorialization of the territorializing refrains of birdsong: “The reign of birds seems to have been replaced by the age of insects, with its much more molecular vibrations, chirring, rustling, buzzing, clicking, scratching, and scraping. Birds are vocal, but insects are instrumental: drums and violins, guitars and cymbals. A becoming-insect has replaced becoming-bird, or forms a block with it. The insect is closer, better able to make audible the truth that all becomings are molecular (cf. Martenot’s waves, electronic music)” (Thousand Plateaus 308).16 By concentrating on the unreasonable resonances beyond meaning, in techno the polymorphous drives act against
repressive, phallic desire—childhood against adulthood. Deleuze|Guattari’s definition of drives sets the tone for how I want the term *childhood* to be understood in what follows: “Drives and part-objects are neither stages on a genetic axis nor propositions in a deep structure; they are political options for problems, they are entryways and exits, impasses the child lives out politically, in other words, with all the force of his or her desire” (13). Instead of the concept of the individual’s development as a trajectory from the polymorphous perversity of bodily drives to their hierarchical ordering by Oedipal relations, Deleuze|Guattari concentrate on the molecular desire-machine’s BwO’s capacity for experimentation, for a maximization of connections between part-objects within the Body|Politic, and with its outside, a strategy that does not integrate its parts into a whole that then in turn molarly over-codes, closes, and hierarchically fixes them.

In its deterritorialization of striated apparatuses, techno reveals a close affinity with what Deleuze|Guattari call “the war machine.” The war machine first of all relates to the nomadic mode of warfare that distinguished nomads from the state war machine—the army, with its general and hierarchic chain of command [n + 1]. The nomadic war machine was an immanently ‘organized’ machinic assemblage of manhorselstirruplbow, operating according to internal logics “no longer tied to a State apparatus . . . [but to] a physics of packs” (496), populating smooth space rather than the striated space of molar organizations. The war machine, then, is a molecular machine opposed to the molar state. This machine, then, is a Body|Politic not structured according to discrete cells, such as the Oedipal family—even though there are nomadic families: “In the war machine, the family is a band vector instead of a fundamental cell” (366), a “band of intensity” (31) rather than one of Oedipal organization.17 War machines are self-organizing multitudes, not orderly formations, but “swarming, teeming . . . races and tribes” (29).18 In contrast to the striated and segmentary structure of the state apparatus, the war machine tends toward permanent exchange and openness. However, Deleuze|Guattari warn against identifying the war machine with making war. First of all, the nomadic war machine is a determination to occupy smooth space. Deleuze opts for a more general “characterization of ‘war machines’ that’s nothing to do with war but to do with a particular way of occupying, taking up, space-time, or inventing new space-times: revolutionary movements . . . , but artistic movements too, are war-machines in this sense” (*Negotiations* 172). However, when striation stands in the way of nomadic free movement, ‘war’ is the result. The “infernal . . . desiring-machine” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 83) of techno fosters a rage against the machine not from the [however illusory] position of an nonmachinic other,19 but a rage of the war-machine against the [Oedipal]
State-machine, a rage of the “machine against the apparatus” (Thousand Plateaus 352), or, in Kristeva’s words, a “rage against the Symbolic” (Powers 178). The bricoleurs of affects joyfully combat what Foucault in his preface to Anti-Oedipus calls the “poor technicians of desire—psychoanalysts and semiologists of every sign and symptom—who would subjugate the multiplicity of desire to the twofold law of structure and lack” (xii-iii). Against the apparatus’s law of organization, control, and representation, the nomos of the nomadic war machine follows a completely different, immanent operational logic of experimentation, the “nomadism of those who only assemble” (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 24).

The war machine, I argue, can also be equated with an experimentation with the ‘political options’ of the child and its desire-machines. The close relationship between techno and the desiring machines of childhood is, I think, effectively staged in the ‘fashion image’ of the average raver: comfortable shoes with bouncy soles, oversized shirts, and baggy trousers are a kind of uniform for an active raver. As a result, the wearer looks like a full-grown toddler, promoting an image that seems to indicate a refusal to grow up and accept the rational-restrictive world of adults. This Utopia of childhood revisited is expressed for example in the techno remake, by the deejay Marusha, of “Somewhere Over the Rainbow.” I think it is important to stress the fact that this is a techno remake, which means that what is at stake is not a childhood in terms of a digital version of an ‘analog paradise regained’—rather, the track reveals paradise as an effect of a machinic assemblage of heterogeneous elements not yet overcoded by an Oedipal apparatus. The original song was featured in the movie The Wizard of Oz, a movie that itself relates the reality of the childish dream world to the functioning of a machine: the big, steaming, illusion machine of the [fake] wizard. Techno adds a crucial ingredient: the pre-Oedipal is already machinic, the machine is the limit, but the machine is creative, open, dynamic—limitless. It seems only natural that an individual piece of techno music is never final, is a machine that inspires new offshoots, drifts from remix to remix. Techno shows “what the conjunction and is, neither a union, nor a juxtaposition, but the birth of a stammering, the outline of a broken line which always sets off at right angles, a sort of active and creative line of flight . . . and . . . and . . . and . . .” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 9–10). This stammering is the combined effect of “loops of infinity” and the terrifying power of breaks and break beats: “Music has always sent out lines of flight, like so many ‘transformational multiplicities,’ even overturning the very codes that structure or arborify it; that is why musical form, right down to its ruptures and proliferations, is comparable to a weed, a rhizome” (Thousand Plateaus 11–12). Techno is not designed to form an oeuvre, and the producers and
deejays of techno music definitely and consciously belong to the postauthor [composer/conductor] era, not only due to the much-hailed democratization of the artistic process via affordable prices of instruments [which narrows the gap between artist and audience], but also a result of the open character of techno music itself: a techno chart buster [as a final authentic mix] is something of a paradox. As a producer [rather than an author], Deleuze stresses, “you are like a conspiracy of criminals. You are no longer an author, you are a production studio” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 9)—individual ‘authorship’ is replaced by collective enunciation. Techno deterritorializes traditional notions of intention and control [authorship], blurring and destabilizing the distinctions between composers, performers, producers, and audiences. Being more serial than serious, techno is able to proliferate endlessly and, as Jean-Jacques Lecercle has convincingly argued with respect to the work of Deleuze, “proliferation is always a threat to order” (95).

The realm of childhood also poses a serious threat to the restrictions and laws of society. Georges Bataille, in an essay on Literature and Evil—and on literature as evil—comments on the contrast between these two worlds: “Society contrasts the free play of innocence with reason, reason based on the calculation of interest. Society is governed by its will to survive. It could not survive if these childish instincts . . . were allowed to triumph. Social constraint would have required the young savages to give up their innocent sovereignty; it would have required them to comply with those reasonable adult conventions which are advantageous to the community” (18). Thus, anything that is, in the words of the English law, “likely to cause serious distress to the inhabitants of the locality”—that is, to the community—is a force operating against the Good. By equating benefit with profit, the Good with reason, Bataille can say that what is at stake is a “revolt of Evil against Good. Formally it is irrational. What does the kingdom of childhood . . . signify if not the impossible and ultimate death . . . ?” (19–20). Bataille, however, is a “very French author” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 47) [which Deleuze equates with the terms Oedipal, tree-like, and priestly], and he cannot but equate childhood with death. For Deleuze, the child’s creation of rhizomatics is an affirmation of life, a life that deterritorializes the axiomatics of the Oedipal register: “It is wrong to think that children are limited before all else to their parents . . . The father and mother are not the coordinates of everything that is invested by the unconscious. There is never a moment when children are not already plunged into an actual milieu in which they are moving about, and in which the parents as persons simply play the role of openers or closers of doors, guardians of thresholds, connectors or disconnectors of zones” (Essays Critical and Clinical 62). What Bataille calls “evil” are ultimately the creative and deterritorializing tenden-
cies of the child. According to Deleuze, “people always think of a majoritarian future (when I am grown up, when I have power)” (Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues* 5). A *becoming-minor*, in contrast, is not equal to a mimicry of “the child, the madman, the woman, the animal, the stammerer or the foreigner, but becoming all these, in order to invent new forces or new weapons” (ibid.). In techno, then, the deterritorializing strategies of child, animal, and war machine coincide.

Whereas the concepts of cyberspace and virtual reality celebrate a sovereignty of childhood without the body23 [the death of the body is in fact the price one must pay to revisit paradise], techno celebrates judgment night’ as the resurrection of the body, putting the body back into its place24—a place determined not by merely *organic* [essentialist] or *representation* [cultural|linguistic constructivism] parameters, but by *machinic* parameters that go beyond the Lacanian definition of the subject as an effect of the signifier, so that the signifier “represents the subject for another signifier” (*Écrits* 316).

In analogy to Guattari’s redefinition of the Lacanian object a as a “object machine petit ‘a’” (*Molecular Revolution* 115), the subject is constituted in “a pure signifying space where the machine would represent the subject for another machine” (117–18). The Lacanian object a is a fragment of the real [body], that ‘phantom limb’ exchanged for the signifier, but in a techno rave the body as a whole is [not replaced, but] affected by the machinic: techno transforms the whole body into the “object machine petit ‘a.’” In this “final corporate colonization of the unconscious”25 [that unconscious that “engineers, is machinic” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 53)], body and machine become one, the body is ‘machined.’ In connection with the ravers’ use of a drug called ecstasy or E, all these references merge in the notion of the Dionysian mode of the festive, where techno [what Attali might call a “noise of Festival and Freedom” (*Noise* 133)] is a strategy to let a temporary and festive Body|Politic emerge. “E’ makes the skin sensitive to textures” (Rietveld 54) and reduces social inhibitions and the need for private space. Thus, if “in Freudian terms, ‘E’ made the user return to a pre-Oedipal stage, where libidinous pleasure is not centred in the genitals, but where sexuality is polymorphous and where sensuality engages the entire body” (ibid.), in Deleuzian|Guattarian terms this means a deterritorializing of the Oedipal axiomatic toward a machinic experimentation with what a body can do, a move toward the BwO, opening the body to more [and different] levels of perceptions. For Deleuze, “what we seek in states of intoxication—drinks, drugs, ecstasies—is an antidote to . . . judgment” (*Essays Critical and Clinical* 126).26

Techno produces what Hakim Bey has called a “Temporary Autonomous Zone,” perhaps better thought of as a temporary festive zone, with “the
emergence of a festal culture removed and even hidden from the would-be managers of our leisure” (105), the event managers of the commodity-spectacle. Festive and nonrepresentational practices such as drinking, singing, or dancing combine people into a temporal and affective Body|Politic. Peter Sloterdijk has argued in *Der Starke Grund zusammen zu sein* (the strong reason for being together) that with the breakdown of the strict ideologies and totalizing systems in late capitalism, individuals can no longer be lured into permanent collectives grand narratives. Whereas nations were previously constructed in a variety of textual discourses, with the concept of the state in decline, modern societies can only be constructed and held together with appropriate doses of excitation. Modern Bodies|Politic are no longer integrated and constructed by a network of discourses; they are increasingly based on the ability to affect and be affected, and to stimulate participation. Now that the Body|Politic is a “psycho-political body of suggestion . . . of a radically autoplastic nature” (Sloterdijk 45), representation has been replaced by excitation—and although for Sloterdijk, a sense of coherence and belonging can no longer be the result of a normative myth|narrative, he still sees mainly “powerful fictive narratives” (ibid.) at work. However, he also refers to the Body|Politic as an effect of “psycho-acoustic productions which in fact makes grow together what ‘listens itself together,’ ‘reads itself together,’ what ‘televies itself together,’ what ‘informs itself together’” (27). The new sense of coherence—the strong reason for being together—would be the tree-like integration of these [cognitive] affectations. What techno adds is the rhizomatic structure of nonsignifying affects that does not totalize or integrate, that keeps the system open and dynamic. It is an embodiment of Nietzsche’s Dionysian mode, of pure affirmation: for Deleuze, Dionysus is he who is “able to do what the higher man cannot: to laugh, to play, and dance, in other words to affirm” (*Essays Critical and Clinical* 102)—techno as the “becoming-active” (103) of the Body|Politic.

A techno rave is an event where thousands of people dance all night, most often as a deterritorialization of public places, such as a warehouse or a factory. Jean Baudrillard has argued that the modern factory is no longer “a site for the production and realisation of commodities” (77); it has become “a site of the sign’s execution” (119). Thus, it might be no coincidence that just at the moment the factory as such disappears, techno usurps the empty places with its own machinics, with a production that ‘just’ produces production. In contrast to the notion of dance as being either narcissistic autistic or ‘representative’ [of ‘natural (self-)expression], in techno the dancing body moves beyond the pose and the object of the female gaze. In techno, dance is embedded into the ritual of the festive and relates the body
in its material, nonsignifying dimension to the machinic. Here, the subject emerges from into the crowd of ravers. Techno’s fascination is grounded in its promise that although experiences cannot be shared [since every individual has an individual experience], these experiences can be celebrated and lived through in a group event that consists of the composition of such affects in the first place (see Böpple and Knüfer 179). The raving Body|Politic exists only in the actuality of the dancing bodies; it is a becoming-Body|Politic not based on an a priori community. It is an ‘event’—not in the banal sense that ‘something happens,’ but in the Deleuzian sense of an haecceity [it-ness],27 in that it brings a multiplicity of heterogeneous forces and elements into experimental relation with each other, both on the level of the music, and of the level of the collective Body|Politic. Haecceities are composed of “nomadic essences, vague yet riotous; continuums of intensities or continuous variations . . . ; becomings, which have neither culmination nor subject . . . ; smooth spaces; composed from within striated space” (Thousand Plateaus 507). However, the openness [both of the sonic ‘product’—the mix—and of the dance movements of the crowd] is not to be mistaken as a ‘subjective’ expression of a spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings; it is ‘machined’ in the sense that this ‘event’ only exists in the assembly of heterogeneous elements, as a composition of feedback loops between sound, volume, bodies, light, drugs, intensities, affects, and so forth: “Desire has nothing to do with a natural or spontaneous determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled desire. The rationality, the efficiency, of an assembly does not exist without the passions the assembly brings into play, without the desires which constitute it as much as it constitutes them” (399). Ultimately, in the connection of machinic|machined body and machinic|machined sound, the raving Body|Politic, like the BwO, is “full of gaiety, ecstasy, and dance” (150).

In addition to the notion of pre-Oedipal childhood and the pleasure of the body of the polymorphously perverse drives, which is experienced most directly in gabba and hardcore techno, there is also the experience of trance and ecstasy prevalent in goa|ambient techno [which is not to say that gabba does not have its spiritual merits]. The intensity of speed and repetitive beats of Kristeva’s abject—“a blasting of sight and sound” (Powers 155)—as a border between the human and the purely physical, connects with the Zen-like experience of trance, the border between the human and the spiritual. Both point toward what Lacan calls a “jouissance beyond the phallus” (Seminar XX 81): mysticism.28 The state of trance links techno to the tradition of minimal music.29 Jean-François Lyotard has pointed at the affinity between the sublime and “Minimal Art. Avant-gardism is thus present in germ in the Kantian sublime” (Inhuman 98). The sublime, the mystic experience,
minimal art, and techno have the following aim in common: they try to convey a fullness that cannot possibly be put into words [at least not into the words of phallic discourse]—it can only be experienced in its intensity. Minimal music reveals in that kind of mystic experience of multiplicity that results in trance, where, according to Deleuze, “the subject loses its texture in favor of an infinitely proliferating patchwork” (Essays Critical and Clinical 77). Minimal music produces such patchworks in its exploration of repetitive structures and non-Western rituals. Steve Reich, La Monte Young, Terry Riley, and Philip Glass all indulged in marathon trance grooves, rippling with complex sonic currents, often stretching beyond the limits of endurance, producing ecstatic release through repetition. With regard to Reich, Deleuze comments on the speeds and slownesses that constitute minimal music [and techno as well]: “Is it by chance that music only knows lines and not points? It is not possible to produce a point in music. It’s nothing but becoming without future or past. Music is an anti-memory. It is full of becomings: animal-becoming, child-becoming, molecular-becoming. Steve Reich wants everything to be perceived in act in music, wants the process to be completely understood: therefore this music is the slowest, but because it makes us perceive all the differential speeds” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 33). The complexity of the differential speeds here is the sonic equivalent of the interplay of affects and faculties in Deleuze’s reading of the Kantian sublime, which “brings the various faculties into play in such a manner that they struggle against each other” (Essays Critical and Clinical 34), pushing each other to [and beyond] their limits, producing the sublime feeling as “the most remote harmonics in each other, so that they form essentially dissonant accords” (35). The affective dissonance of the sublime does not link “the Self to the I” (34) in a logical temporal sequence—it is “a pathos beyond all logic” (ibid.).

In the Body|Politic of ravers, the subject operates not according to the logic of autonomous identity but as part of an open system, part of the [war] machine. This Body|Politic is not structured by a molar attractor, by God or a Führer. It has been pointed out that the rhythmic structure of techno shares certain similarities with fascist Marschmusik. Parades, ceremonies, and spectacles have always played a central role in the construction of national identities and of a strictly hierarchical [and military], ordered view of society. Parades have played a seminal role in the nationalization of the masses, bringing politics and aesthetics close together. Such mobilization of the masses operated through festivals that integrated individuals into a historical community and continuity, commemorating the glory of the forefathers, especially military parades held in public places charged with national memory. However, in techno parades [such as the love parade], what
is happening is the breakdown of traditional discursively inscribed notions of demonstrations as oppositional events, in which state power is challenged by the people and both the authorities and the demonstrators operate on the basis of clearly defined positions. Contrary to the ideological investments of social movements of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Body|Politic of the ravers has upset the traditional organization and representation of public space through a new type of transgression that mocks the character of traditional political demonstrations. Replacing radical, militant, and often violent political protest with peaceful carnival celebration, the love parade brought into public space a new notion of resistance beyond totalizing oppositions, simultaneously challenging traditional representations of the state apparatus and the protest of resistance politics.

What's the relation between “the authorities” and “the people” when the people occupy public streets, squares, plazas, and buildings? Do carnivals encourage giddy, drunken, sexy feelings and behavior—or does the very action of taking spaces, of liberating them, make people giddy? Is it accidental that official displays consist of neat rectangles, countable cohorts, marching past and under the fixed gaze of the reviewing stand, while unofficial mass gatherings are vortexed, whirling, full of shifting ups and downs, multi-focused events generating tension between large scale actions and many local dramas? And why is it that unofficial gatherings elicit, permit, or celebrate the erotic, while official displays are often associated with the military? Can a single dramaturgy explain political demonstrations, Mardi Gras, and similar kinds of carnivals, Spring Break Weekends, and ritual dramas? (Schechner 45–46)

Differences are present in the representational aspects, in what these masses are against, in ‘what they signify.’ From a purely materialistic angle, there are only differences in the masses’ intensity and their degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity. It is exactly in this being “vortexed, whirling” where self-organization occurs. As a war machine, techno is a becoming-revolutionary in so far as it forms new alliances, in which a ‘symbolic’ belonging to state, nation or ideology, race, class, or gender gives way to a multiplicity of elective [and also affective] communities not based on the representation of One-ness, but on “the investment by desire of the social field” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 61). It is a liberatory revolutionary force, and not ‘just’ a fashion|youth culture. The contrast between the war machine and the state army is also captured in Deleuze’s conceptualization of ‘combat’ versus ‘war.’ War is a “combat-against” (Essays Critical and Clinical 133) that destroys and enforces ‘judgment’ [as a containment and fixation of force], whereas combat is a ‘combat-between,’ a dynamic interchange of forces, “the process through which a force enriches itself by seizing hold
of other forces and joining itself to them in a new ensemble” (132). The war machine—the combat—is a becoming, and it is only through this becoming [becoming-child, becoming-animal, becoming-madman] “that the combatant can lash out ’against’ his enemy, in league with all the allies this other combat has given to him” (ibid.). This joining of forces for Deleuze creates a power that consists of one mode’s encountering “other existing modes that agree with it and bring[ing] their relation into composition with its relation” (Spinoza: Practical Philosophy 100). It depends on the ability to affect and be affected: power, in the Spinozist sense, is based on joy. Joy ‘composes’ a more powerful individual, and music can increase that power:

I put on music that I like, there, my whole body, and my soul—it goes without saying—composes its relations with the resonant relations. This is what is meant by the music that I like: my power is increased. So for Spinoza, what interests me therein is that, in the experience of joy, there is never the same thing as in sadness, there is not at all an investment—and we’ll see why—there is not at all an investment of one hardened part which would mean that a certain quantity of power (puissance) is subtracted from my power (pouvoir). There is not, why? Because when the relations are composed, the two things of which the relations are composed, form a superior individual, a third individual which encompasses and takes them as parts. In other words, with regard to the music that I like, everything happens as if the direct composition of relations (you see that we are always in the criteria of the direct) a direct composition of relations is made, in such a way that a third individual is constituted, individual of which me, or the music, are no more than a part. I would say, from now on, that my power (puissance) is in expansion, or that it increases. (Deleuze, “Seminar on Spinoza 2001 1981”)

And Deleuze drives home his point in the Abécédaire, a series of interviews with Claire Parnet, in the entry “J as in Joy”: “Spinoza turned joy into a concept of resistance and life: let us avoid sad passions, let us live with joy in order to be at the maximum of our force.” Thus, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “it may be that the sound molecules of pop music are at this very moment implanting here and there a people of a new type, singularly indifferent to the orders of the radio, to computer safeguards, to the threat of the atomic bomb” (Thousand Plateaus 346).
At the end of the twentieth [and the beginning of the twenty-first] century, the [traditional metaphor of the] Body\l Politic seems to have lost its currency—as the political theorist Carl Schmitt observed, the idea and the “epoch of the State is coming to its end” (19), and with it a whole system of concepts developed in four centuries of [state] political thought. In the times of the decline of ‘grand narratives’ and ideologies, the idea of a unity called Body\l Politic does not hold anymore: “The State as the model of political unity, . . . this sparkling gem of European form and occidental rationalism, is being dethroned” (ibid.). The Body\l Politic in its traditional sense has lost its appeal—it has become a dead metaphor. In his study of the Elizabethan Body\l Politic, David Hale concludes that for the twentieth century, “the imagery of the body politic no longer delights and instructs, no longer holds up the mirror to nature. To lament this change is futile; to recognize it, imperative” (137). What has to be noted, however, is that what is at an end is the notion of the Body\l Politic as a “mirror,” a representative figure—a figure of representation only, that is. The idea of the traditional Body\l Politic—with its concept of hierarchical order, the regulation and control of the multitudel mass [the body] by an ‘aloof’ sovereign, and the government as guide of the people or its consciousness [mind], with its corresponding philosophical conception of an inert material needing to be [in]formed—is no longer valid. In fact, as the various examples in my study have shown, the hegemonic position of such an idea has always been challenged by alternative constructions, by the ‘invention\l vision’ of Bodies\l Politic that do not so much debate the legal foundations of its hierarchical structure, that do not operate on the level of the justification of the Body\l Politic as a discursive construction of laws and regulations, but that concentrate on the very materiality on\l from which that Body\l Politic is constructed, and on its capacity for self-organization.

One reason for the decline of the [traditional] idea of the Body\l Politic might be found in its connection to totalitarian [or fascist] politics, the idea of a machine-like, uniform Body\l Politic, with its ‘double’ identity of ‘one
people’ and ‘one leader.’ As Claude Lefort observes, “at the foundation of totalitarianism lies the representation of the People-as-One” (Political Forms 297). The ‘bodilessness’ of democracy—the fact that in democracy the traditional idea of the Body|Politic, with the body of the multitude being represented in the figure of the sovereign—leads to the paradox that although the individual seems to count more in a modern democracy, “the identity of the body politic disappears. The modern democratic revolution is best recognized in this mutation: there is no power linked to a body” (303). As long as power, as the agency of identity and legitimacy, “appears detached from the prince, as long as it presents itself as the power of no one, as long as it seems to move towards a latent focus—namely, the people—it runs the risk of having its symbolic function cancelled out” (305). For Lefort, democracy carries the seeds of totalitarianism within its structure. The concept of ‘equality’ results in an erosion of all markers of difference, and at the same time it implies an internal division as a result of iterated individualism [the danger that Tocqueville observed with regard to American democracy], in such a way that democracy “inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be said to be sovereign, of course, but whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will remain latent” (303–4). The simultaneous dissolution of an ‘organic unity’ of the Body|Politic, the increasing absence of markers of difference [which, at the same time, were “markers of certainty” (Lefort, Democracy 19)], and the increasing stress on individualism leads to the apocalyptic image of society as a ‘gray soup,’ a regression to a disembodied Many [Hobbes’s Behemoth]—the traditional Body|Politic succumbs to its inherent entropy. Totalitarianism, according to Lefort, can be seen as an answer to the uncertainty of democracy, providing a solution to its problematics. In the totalitarian image of the Body|Politic, internal division is denied [although the ‘new head’ effectively sets itself off from the body], while at the same time this Body|Politic claims a new territory which operates along a clear-cut division of inside|outside, where “the enemy of the people is regarded as a parasite or waste product” (Lefort, Political Forms 298). Totalitarianism might after all be the unwanted effect of [too much] democracy, and the new Body|Politic that arises from that, Lefort argues, “is the image of the people, which . . . remains indeterminate, but which nevertheless is susceptible of being determined, of being actualized on the level of phantasy as an image of the People-as-One” (304), of an even more rigid reorganization of the Body|Politic than ever.

What Lefort is arguing, then, is that the totalitarian image of the Body|Politic is a return to the premodern image of the Body|Politic, a return that develops ‘through’ the cancellation of that concept in modern democracies.
and is in fact an effect of it. In contrast, my study has argued that this image of the ‘organic unity’ of the Body|Politic has been always present in the idea of the representational Body|Politic, even in its democratic phase—the concept of the enemy of the Body|Politic as parasite [or virus] had been a prominent metaphor in the Antinomian controversy, and Cotton Mather’s reading of smallpox in contrast derives a concept of a self-organizing Body|Politic from the concept of the virus. What is at stake are not so much different qualitative stages in the development from premodern monarchies via democracies into totalitarian regimes, but rather a development in terms of quantitative notions of rigidity, different ‘phases’ of Bodies|Politic that exist simultaneously. It has to be noted that representative democracy as a state institution is by definition undemocratic. When James Madison stated that the voice of the people’s representatives [the parties and politicians] is “more consonant to the good of people than if pronounced by the people themselves” (47), he only testified to the undemocratic nature of representative democracy. The opinions and desires are passed “through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country” (46–47). Representation does not by any means equal ‘government by the people’—representative democracy is ultimately a deeply aristocratic concept. For that reason, Deleuze|Guattari’s minor politics is directed against the totalizing tendency of representation—against speaking for. Deleuze|Guattari’s minor Body|Politic is not so much concerned with cultural|linguistic constructivism’s approach to deconstructing the juridical tradition [and, ultimately, the legislative justification] of politics, but with trying to think a materialist and nontranscendent ‘ontology’ of the Body|Politic, to think the material nature of political becoming. In Deleuze|Guattari’s approach, the Body|Politic’s ‘material’ is not inert, disorderly and passive—as in the traditional perspective on the Body|Politic in need of a controlling agency, a head [of state]—but a productive set of dynamic forces and connections, capable of self-organization. ‘Order’ and ‘agency’ are not external qualities that the Body|Politic is infused with ‘from the top,’ but intrinsic to the bodys|matter itself. Deleuze|Guattari’s minor Body|Politic amounts as much to a rethinking of the matter|form dichotomy as to the notion of the Body|Politic, or the concept of ‘politics’ on a more general level.

The difference between the two approaches to the Body|Politic—on the one hand, a Body|Politic that is regarded as a stable ‘represented’ unity that has to be controlled by its ‘representational head’ [“an omnipotent, omniscient power” (Lefort, Political Forms 299), king, party leader, Egocrat or Führer; on the other hand, a Body|Politic as a multiplicity of members|forces that organizes itself—can be best shown by contrasting Foucault’s notion of a “micro-physics of power” (Discipline and Punish 26) and Deleuze|Guattari’s
notion of minor politics. Foucault’s discussion of these microphysics analyzes the development of a system of power directed at the body in order to produce self-imposed techniques of discipline and self-monitoring, a power that cannot be located in a particular state apparatus as such. These strategies of [self-]discipline and surveillance were employed not only by institutions such as the school and prison systems and military schools, but pervaded everyday life by setting up timetables, by breaking down operations and action sequences into minute segments for their most efficient reorganization and control. The microphysics of power, then, is a system of “the penetration of regulation into even the smallest details of everyday life through the mediation of the complete hierarchy that assured the capillary functioning of power” (Discipline and Punish 198), the power to reach, sustain, and control even the farthest and smallest areas of the Body-Politic.

For Foucault, the ‘capillaries’ are “the fine meshes of the web of power” (“Truth,” Power/Knowledge 116) by which the state apparatus invades and overcodes the Body-Politic. While Foucault is concerned with “the systems of micro-power . . . that we call the disciplines” (Discipline and Punish 222), Deleuze-Guattari’s concept of minor politics, I argue, works from the opposite direction. Rather than trying to work out the microphysics of power, the way that state power diffuses itself into a preexisting Body-Politic, the unity of which is ‘preserved’ by the very workings of that micropower, Deleuze-Guattari are concerned with a ‘political physics’ of force, of the self-organizing potential of the multitude rather than the organizing efficiency of the state apparatus—a microphysics of potential rather than one of potestas, a micropower of emergence rather than one of control, a bottom-up aggregate rather than a top-down organization. Deleuze-Guattari’s minor politics aims to invent a ‘people that is missing,’ a Body-Politic in its revolutionary becoming, in its capacity for production being produced, not a ‘People-as-One’—a Body-Politic cutting off its relation to the outside forces, creating a fixed, stable, bounded territory and shape—but a Body-Politic as process, producing ever-shifting relations.

The fear of the dissolution of the stable territory of the Body-Politic [and the concomitant specter of a wish for a ‘People-as-One’] figures prominently in The Disuniting of America, by Arthur Schlesinger, the American social critic and historian. In these “reflections on a multicultural society,” Schlesinger—an opponent of multiculturalism—argues that the e pluribus unum has always been America’s “brilliant solution for the inherent fragility . . . of a multiethnic society: the creation of a brand-new national identity by individuals who, in forsaking old loyalties and joining to make new lives, melted away ethnic differences” (17). What Schlesinger seems to forget is that this melting away of differences does not create a national identity that
changes with every new member, but that ultimately means the growing conformity with a major standard of Americanness—the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant heterosexual male. Far from a national identity as a collective assemblage that constantly transforms the nature of its members and of its ‘unity’ in feedback loops,1 what Schlesinger refers to [and constructs] is an a priori identity that subjugates its members to the major|molar axiom|mold. According to Schlesinger, the “multiethnic dogma abandons historic purposes, replacing assimilation by fragmentation, integration by separatism” (21). Ultimately, “it belittles unum and glorifies pluribus” (21). *E pluribus unum* is a promise of a stable unity, and at the same time a threat to difference, multiplicity, becoming.

*E pluribus unum* has always been the paradigmatic motto for the American Body|Politic. How this ‘One’ should be envisioned has been ‘embodied’ by two different versions of the Body|Politic: one that starts from a One already given, as an a priori given that needs to be preserved by the [major] politics of *representation*; and one that starts from the Many, from the self-organizing forces inherent in the multitudemultiplicity, one that “no longer believe[s] in a primordial totality that once existed, or in a final totality that awaits us at some future date” (Deleuze|Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 42). Such a Body|Politic does not mean anarchy—it is ‘structured’ according to its immanent logic. But it is not a ‘totality’—no ‘People-as-One’—either. The *pluribus* does not add up to an *unum*—“it is a whole of these particular parts but does not totalize them; it is a unity of all these particular parts but does not unify them” (42). Deleuze proposes another motto: *omnis in unum*, by which he means a ‘circular’ movement in such a way that the One, as “always a unity of the multiple, in the objective sense, . . . must also have a multiplicity of one and a unity of the multiple, but now in a subjective sense” (*The Fold* 126). Difference, according to Deleuze, has always been regarded in terms of a negativity, as the negative term within a binary opposition: “Consider the great negative notions such as the many in relation to the One, disorder in relation to order” (*Difference and Repetition* 202). For Deleuze, however, difference is positive, productive, and creative—it does not refer to an undifferentiated mattermultitude that is then differentiated and ordered by language|representation.

Mattermultitude consists of ‘real’ differences and becomings smaller [or greater] than the differences that language operates with. If Deleuze repeatedly claims that a minor politics has to invent ‘a people that is missing,’ it is not in the way that Derrida sees the people as missing in the Declaration of Independence—not existing before the signing of the declaration, which constitutes the ‘We’ in the act of representation and hence the retroactive logic of the signifier in which the signature invents the signer. A molar
representative Body|Politic, grounded in either individual or political identity, unity and following the binary logic of either/or, operates according to “a simple concept, under which are subsumed either all the infinite degrees of an identical representation or the infinite opposition of two contrary representations” (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 203). In contrast, it is the concept of a minor politics and its “notion of multiplicity which denounces simultaneously the One and the many, the limitation of the One by the many and the opposition of the many to the One” (ibid.). Political theory practice [and the philosophy behind it] is split by a an imperative to speak for the Many and also to be defined by the orderly hierarchy of the One, and order usually gets the upper hand in this oppositional conflict, coming out on top [where it ‘rightfully’ belongs] to counter the anarchy that necessarily arises when the multitudelmatter is left to itself. DeleuzeGuattari’s Body|Politic, on the other hand, does not choose between those [false] alternatives; in DeleuzeGuattari’s concept of a minor Body|Politic, multitudelmatter and order do not contradict each other, with multitudelmatter capable of self-organization, of the production of an immanent order that can do without representation, laws, and regulations imposed from the outside to inform it. Real politics, ultimately, emerges in the force field constituted by the torsion between both major politics [state apparatus] and minor politics, the “democratic politics of becoming by which new events, identities, faiths, and conditions are ushered into being” (Connolly 173). DeleuzeGuattari are not interested in preserving the Body|Politic as a discrete entity, but in the interplay of forces that produce such ‘entities’ as dynamic and fluctuating systems. Ultimately, “it is not enough to say, ‘Long live the multiple,’ . . . The multiple must be made, not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways, by dint of sobriety . . . always n−1” (Thousand Plateaus 6). This is the only way the unum belongs to the Pluribus, “the only way the one belongs to the multiple: always subtracted” (ibid.). Thus, the minor Body|Politic of DeleuzeGuattari is precisely the [‘People-as-One’−1], the people that is missing.2

The minor politics of DeleuzeGuattari are of a different order than that of the major politics of representation. Thus, a minor politics does not operate as a counterforce [or resistance] within the realm of representation. Rather, by linking itself to the level of production and materiality, and to the forces of self-organization inherent there, DeleuzeGuattari’s minor politics is concerned with experimentation and the invention of new forms of political life, new forms of political subjectivity—the invention of a new Body|Politic.
NOTES

Introduction

1. See also Le Goff, “Head or Heart?”
2. See also Sawday, The Body Emblazoned, and J. Harris, Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic.
4. More than twenty years later, in December 1775, Franklin, under the pseudonym An American Guesser, wrote a letter to the editor of the Pennsylvania Journal that was published with the headline “The Rattle-Snake as a Symbol of America.” In this letter, Franklin pointed out the rattlesnake’s “vigilance . . . magnanimity and true courage,” properties that made it a symbol of the “temper and conduct of America” (Writings 744–46).
5. See Sommer, “Emblem and Device.”
6. Fittingly, Thomas Jefferson called Adams “the colossus of independence” (quoted in McCullough, John Adams 163).
7. See Laclau, Emancipation(s) and The Making of Political Identities; Mouffe, Deconstruction and The Return of the Political; and Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony.
8. See, for example, Bercaw, Gender; Berry, Postcommunism; Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments; Cherniavski, Incorporations; Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body; Henley, Body Politics; Hess, Reconstituting the Body Politic; Holland, The Body Politic; Hunt, Eroticism; L. Johnson, Death; Kaminsky, Reading the Body Politic; J. Sweet, Bodies Politic; and Weitz, The Politics of Women’s Bodies.
9. In a conversation with Michel Foucault, Deleuze claimed that “a theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to do with the signifier. It must be useful. It must function” (Deleuze and Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power” 208).
10. I am borrowing the phrase “unlikely alliance” from Judith Butler, who uses it to express her critical stance toward the adaptation of Deleuzian thought by feminism or ecocriticism: “Indeed, some have argued that a rethinking of ‘nature’ as a set of dynamic interrelations suits both feminism and ecological aims (and has for some produced an otherwise unlikely alliance with the work of Gilles Deleuze)” (Bodies That Matter 4). These “dynamic interrelations” not only within nature, but also between nature and culture, will be a focal point of my study.
Chapter 0. Body/Theory/Polit: Body/Theory


2. Deleuze would undoubtedly dispute the idea that the body is a metaphor: for him, the body not only is located in time and space, the body first of all produces time and space. Time and space are not preexisting linearities through which a body passes, and there is no neutral medium of time and space in which movement takes place; rather, time and space are constituted by the interplay of the body’s movements and nonhuman forces.

3. It might be argued—as the neurobiologist Steven Rose does—that in the course of the semioticization of the body and materiality, postmodern theorists and natural scientists alike “use the name given to the science, biology, to replace its field of study—life itself and the processes which sustain it . . . So ‘biological’ becomes the antonym not for ‘sociological’ but for ‘social’” (*Lifelines* 5).

4. I am borrowing the term “intelligent materialism” from Hanjo Berressem. In his essay “Matter that Bodies,” he develops an ‘intelligent materialism/realism’ with Deleuze, and against Butler.

5. See, for example, Serres, *The Birth of Physics* and *Genesis*; Prigogine and Stengers, *Order out of Chaos*; and Maturana and Varela, *The Tree of Knowledge*.

6. In Butler’s *Bodies That Matter*, Plato seems to be the archenemy, the source of the misogynist tradition of Western phallogocentrism—see Butler’s discussion of the Platonic *chora* (35–48). Caroline Bynum has pointed out the tendency of much of postmodern Body/Theory to “sweep . . . two thousand years of history into what can only be called a vast essentialization . . . —ostensibly in the name of antiessentialism” (“Why All the Fuss” 6). Not only is the Platonic and Cartesian dualism not the whole of Western philosophy, but in his chapter on the simulacrum in *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze has pointed out the seeds of a “reverse Platonism” in Plato himself, and Gordon Baker and Katherine Morris question the Cartesian legend and the accuracy of attributing to Descartes the rigid kind of dualism that Anglo-American philosophy bases its refusal on, since they have “a large investment in the truth of the Cartesian legend” (*Descartes’ Dualism* 3).

7. See Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, for a concise analysis of the importance of Deleuzian thought for poststructuralist political thought.

8. For a detailed assessment of Deleuze’s engagement with contemporary science, see De Landa, *Intensive Science*. 
9. Quoted in Villani, 130: “Je me sens bergsonien, quand Bergson dit que la science moderne n’a pas trouvé sa métaphysique, la métaphysique dont elle aurait besoin. C’est cette métaphysique qui m’intéresse. . . . Je me sens pur métaphysicien” (my translation).

10. In a footnote referring the reader to James Gleick’s *Chaos: Making a New Science*, they add: “Science feels the need not only to order chaos but to see it, touch it, and produce it” (*What Is Philosophy?* 229, note 14).

11. Deleuze’s concept of the machine which is not restricted to the symbolic is thus yet another instance in which they stray from Lacan, and in which their work constitutes a critique of [Lacanian] psychoanalysis.

12. It is statements like these that effectively counter readings of Deleuze (and Guattari) as mere apostles of chaos and anarchy. They are not against systematics, but against the suffocating effects of static hierarchy and outside control.

13. Deleuze and Guattari refer to Simondon’s attempt to explain individuation—the genesis of an individual—as a self-organizing process of preindividual singularities and differences. According to Deleuze, what Simondon describes is “a whole ontology, according to which Being is never One” (“On Gilbert Simondon” 89)—note the remarkable affinity with Deleuze’s own ontology. Simondon addresses the political implications of the hylomorphic model when he states that “form corresponds to what the man in command has thought to himself, and must express in a positive manner when he gives orders” (quoted in *Thousand Plateaus* 555, note 33).

14. As Deleuze points out, “Spinoza, on the whole, is a disciple of Hobbes . . . on two general but fundamental points, he entirely follows the Hobbesian revolution, and I believe that Spinoza’s political philosophy would have been impossible without the kind of intervention that Hobbes had introduced to political philosophy” (“Seminar on Spinoza 12/12/1980”). The two points in question are, first, Hobbes’s break with the Aristotelian and Ciceroonian tradition that equates the state of nature with a good way of living and state of being, the state that conforms to the essence in a good society—the *eudaemonia* of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*—and, second, the substitution of “the idea of a pact of consent as the foundation of the civil state for the relation of competence such as it was in traditional philosophy, from Plato to Saint Thomas” (ibid.).

15. The legal tradition also constitutes the Bodily/Politic as a legal person—the definition of which in English law resonates nicely with Deleuze and Guattari’s formula for a transcendent system: “if n men unite themselves in an organized body, jurisprudence, unless it wishes to pulverise the group, must see n + 1 persons” (Maitland, “Moral Personality and Legal Personality” 316).

16. In *Multitude*, Hardt and Negri explicitly refer to the swarm as yet another variant of the multitude. They do not, however, directly link the emergence of such a kind of knowledge to Spinoza’s concept of the common notions (see 91–93).


18. Maybe one should also translate *virtuellement* as “on the level of the virtual or virtuality.”

19. Likewise, “Children, Fool, and Mad-men, that have no use of reason, may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors . . . of any action done by them” (*Leviathan* 219)—thus they are not authorized to enter into a contract.
20. Spinoza claims: “I start from the natural rights of the individual, which are co-extensive with his desires and power, and from the fact that no one is bound to live as another pleases, but is the guardian of his own liberty. I show that these rights can only be transferred to those whom we depute to defend us, who acquire with the duties of defence the power of ordering our lives, and I thence infer that rulers possess rights only limited by their power, that they are the sole guardians of justice and liberty, and that their subjects should act in all things as they dictate: nevertheless, since no one can so utterly abdicate his own power of self-defence as to cease to be a man, I conclude that no one can be deprived of his natural rights absolutely, but that subjects, either by tacit agreement, or by social contract, retain a certain number, which cannot be taken from them without great danger to the state” (Theologico-Political Treatise 10).

21. Indeed, Spinoza insists that “the right of the supreme authorities is nothing else than simple natural right, limited, indeed, by the power, not of every individual, but of the multitude, which is guided, as it were, by one mind—that is, as each individual in the state of nature, so the body and the mind of a dominion have as much right as they have power” (Theologico-Political Treatise 301).

22. In Hobbes’s Leviathan, the sovereign is exactly that “additional dimension”: “he which is made Sovraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand . . .; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible, because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Sovraignty are voyd, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular” (230). The retroactive logic of the whole concept is quite apparent here.

23. For Deleuze, though, this plane of immanence is not simply given: because of the constant flux of the forces and relations of which it is composed, “it has to be constructed” (Spinoza: Practical Philosophy 128).

24. Tucker conceived the famous prisoner’s dilemma in a memo at Stanford in 1950. This memo was later published by Dresher and Flood under the title “On Jargon: The Prisoner’s Dilemma.”

25. There have been attempts to read Hobbes’s state of nature in terms of the prisoner’s dilemma, out of which cooperation arises. However, these readings, I argue, tend to overlook the fact that this cooperation is enforced [by fear] and has to be transformed by a contract into a stablestatic organization that in turn mutes [or at least controls] self-organization (see, e.g., Grim, Mar, and St. Denis, Philosophical Computer).

26. Patton’s remark that the hierarchical organization of society as “Hobbes’s solution to the problem posed by [the] universal drive to increase power at the expense of others follows the . . . model of simple linear increase” (“Politics and the Concept of Power” 150) shows that the logics of the zero-sum game are involved here.

27. “Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature . . ., if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men” (Leviathan 223–24).

28. For a religious person who believes in an afterlife, not even death signals the final round.
29. All of these traits are ‘forces’ in the Deleuzian sense—forces that, according to
Deleuze, have “the power to affect (others) and be affected (by others again)” (Foucault
71). They belong to the “variables expressing a relation between forces or power rela-
tions . . . To incite, provoke and produce . . . constitute active affects” (70–71).
30. Thus, ultimately, the difference between power and knowledge—knowledge as
savoir—is “stratified, archivized, and endowed with a relatively rigid segmentarity. Power,
on the other hand, is diagrammatic: it mobilizes non-stratified matter and functions, and
unfolds with a very flexible segmentarity” (Deleuze, Foucault 73). In Hobbes, this ‘instru-
mental reason’ creates a contract—a first law—which is then iterated in the “Artifi-
ciall man,” the Leviathan, as “Equity and Lawes, an artifi ciall Reason and Will” (Leviathan
81). What we find here is thus a proliferation of molar laws.
31. See Damasio, Descartes’ Error, for a neuroscientist’s take on the Cartesian notion
“I think, therefore I am.”
32. See Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (124–25), where Deleuze comments on Jakob
von Uexküll’s analysis of the tick in terms of a set of affects.
33. Using a virtual environment, Axelrod had shown that “the idea that ‘good guys
finish last’ (i.e., that the most rational strategy is to betray one’s partner) [which] had
become entrenched in academic (and think tank) circles” (De Landa, “Virtual Environ-
ments”)—or, in Hobbesian terminology, that in the absence of a central authority, men
are inclined to solve problems by violence—was simply one alternative.
34. Carlyle also is already anticipating the claim that White was to make almost 150
years later: “For as all Action is, by its nature, to be figured as extended in breath and
in depth, as well as in length . . . so all Narrative is, by its nature, of only one dimen-
sion; only travels towards one, or towards successive points: Narrative is linear, Action is
solid. Alas for our ‘chains,’ or chainlets, of ‘causes and effects,’ which we so assiduously
track through certain hand-breaths of years and square miles, when the whole is a
broad, deep Immensity, and each atom is ‘chained’ and complected with all” (“On His-
tory” 95).
35. See De Landa’s A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History for such a project inspired
by DeleuzeGuattari and complexity theory. See also Herbst, “Entkoppelte Gewalt” and
Komplexität und Chaos, and Reisch, “Chaos, History, and Narrative.”
36. This is precisely how the dates that provide the titles for the various chapters of
DeleuzeGuattari’s A Thousand Plateaus function—as proper names for force fields.

Chapter 1. The Puritans’ Two Bodies

1. As we will see later, John Winthrop commented on the fact that in a common-
wealth, “no man hath lawful power over another, but by birth or consent” (“Defence”
67)—clearly opting for the second alternative in the case of New England. Hobbes said:
“Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest” (Leviathan 140).
2. Albeit hierarchical, static, and in its ultimate consequences conservative.
3. Here it is quite revealing that the Massachusetts Bay Company was a company of
shareholders.
4. See Hill, Change and Continuity in 17th Century England, Puritanism and Revolu-
tion, and The World Turned Upside Down.
5. In the original German, Freud uses the word *Bindemittel*, which comes even closer to the word *ligament* in Winthrop’s sermon.

6. However, Freud also mentions the lethal, authoritarian underside of that “democratic strain”: “But even during the kingdom of Christ those people who do not belong to the community of believers, who do not love him, and whom he does not love, stand outside this tie. Therefore a religion, even if it calls itself the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it. Fundamentally every religion is in this same way a religion of love for all those whom it embraces; while cruelty and intolerance towards those who do not belong to it are natural to every religion” (“Group Psychology” 128).

7. Freud also says: “There is no doubt that the tie which unites each individual with Christ is also the cause of the tie which unites them with one another” (“Group Psychology” 123).

8. Of course, this love is as illusory in the Freudian sense as it is imaginary in the Lacanian sense of the word, also with regard to the aggression and exclusionary quality inherent in love.

9. However, self-love comes in again through the back door since, as Freud later shows, the love for the leader-as-ego-ideal is in fact love for a part of the selfego. Winthrop concedes as much when he states that “the ground of loue is an apprehension of some resemblance in the things . . . Thus it is betwene the members of Christ; eache discernes, by the worke of the Spirit, his oune Image and resemblance in another, and therefore cannot but loue him as he loues himself” (“Modell” 42).

10. Freud concedes that in religious groups, both types of identification are at play simultaneously: “Every Christian loves Christ as his ideal and feels himself united with all other Christians by the tie of identification. But the Church requires more of him. He also has to identify himself with Christ and love all other Christians as Christ loved them. At both points, then, the Church requires that the position of the libido which is given by group formation should be supplemented” (“Group Psychology” 167–68).

11. Freud writes: “Its [the super-ego’s] relation to the ego is not exhausted by the precept: ‘You ought to be like this (like your father).’ It also comprises the prohibition: ‘You may not be like this (like your father)—that is, you may not do all that he does; some things are his prerogative’” (“The Ego and the Id” 374). Prohibition and ideal thus are the two modes of the symbolic *ego ideal*.

12. Through God, the name of the father, sociopolitical and moral order was founded and literally embodied through his son. In fact, the Puritans tended to see God as the point of origin of America—for example, in their reading of lives and events as biblical *types*, and in the work of Puritan historians, such as Prince, *Chronological History of New-England*, which traces American history back to the sixth day of creation, the day God created human beings. For America’s obsession with origins, see also T. Martin, *Parables of Possibility*.

13. Thus, in the symbolic, the subject is presented not only with wholeness, but also with the possibility of dismemberment—a structure analogous to the tragedy inherent in the mirror stage.


15. In a work called “A Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad,’” Freud compared the psyche to a waxy surface—the Mystic Writing-Pad was a children’s toy—that retains permanent traces plus the eternal capacity for new inscriptions.
16. I am referring here to Lacan’s notion of the four discourses that structure symbolic action and intercourse. See Berressem’s analysis of this discursive machine in *Pynchon’s Poetics*, 207–15.

17. Winthrop is a proto-Hobbesian here—Hobbes claimed, in *Leviathan*, that a “family if it be not part of some Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the Father or Master is the Soveraign” (*Leviathan* 143).


20. In the Puritan frame, Foucault’s two notions of the term *subject* are related in such a manner that the ultimate impossibility to know oneself [or one’s place in God’s plan, one’s grace] makes it even more necessary to obey. Being tied to one’s identity, trying but ultimately failing to know, subjects this subject even more strongly to God’s law—self-knowledge [Am I saved?] is finally revealed by being written onto one’s body.

21. Freud also notes this fact when he refers to a dissolution of a “body of troops” (”Group Psychology” 126) in case of panic as a consequence of the break of libidinous ties holding that body together.

22. See, for example, I. Mather, *Returning unto God* 11; and Edwards, *Religious Affections* 274 and following.

23. Within a few years, Winthrop’s ligaments of love had sedimented into “Bands of Authority.”

24. St. Paul wrote: “For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ” (Galatians 3:27–28).

25. Shepard, for instance, wrote: “the soul, therefore, is the subject of faith, called ‘the heart’” (Works 1:199).

26. See, for example, Bynum, *Holy Feast and Fragmentation and Redemption*.

27. Jonathan Edwards stated that “the saints are the jewels” (*Religious Affections* 233).

28. A comparison might be drawn between the *sarx* / *σῶμα* dichotomy and the somewhat analogous distinction in the Puritan images of New England’s nature as both wilderness and garden.

29. However, it has to be noted that the “Compleat Body of Divinity” and the “Body of Death” somehow correspond to each other. Walter states: “There are as many Lusts in Indwelling Sin, as there are Laws in the Word of God: To every Law there is an opposite Lust . . . Indwelling Sin is an Entire Body of Lusts, which is contrary to the Entire Body of Divine Laws” (8). Corresponding to the divine law of the father, there is also a “Law of Sin” (1 and 8).

30. Winthrop’s religious rapture, described in *Life and Letters* (1:105–6), and Taylor’s metaphors of an almost bodily union with Christ are good examples, which also show the conflation of the bodily and the spiritual.

31. In fact, Freud calls such an extreme idealization “bondage” (”Group Psychology” 144), thus putting the idealization of Christ and the inward man in close proximity to
“the bondage of . . . the inward man” (Willard, *Compleat Body of Divinity* 229) exerted by Satan.

32. According to Lacan, the object o is the symbolic-imaginary reconstitution of the forever lost object, which, since it is defined precisely by its absence, is “in fact simply the presence of a hollow, a void, which can be occupied . . . by any object” (*Four Fundamental Concepts* 180).

33. In one poem, Taylor uses these images for the human body: “ball of dirt,” “my poore wither’d stump,” “lump of clay,” and “tumberill” (75).

34. Lacan, in “Television,” refers to “the abject [abjet] that I have come to call my object petit a” (21); a footnote points out the homology with petit tas, little pile, thus also excrement. Here is the origin of Kristeva’s concept of the abject.


36. In this way, Hawthorne’s *A—The Scarlet Letter*—can be read as Lacan’s Big Other [Autre = A], language/culture inscribed onto the body.

37. It should be noted that the legalistic version of the term ligament denotes a third party, a go-between between the members of the community and God’s Word—the theological ‘pincer’ of transcendence: everything acquires value only via its relation to God (or his representatives on earth).

Chapter 2. “A ‘Physics’ of Power”: 
*Phase Transitions and Turbulence in the Antinomian Controversy*

1. The Familists were a religious group that preached direct communication between God and mankind, both male and female. Because of this, they were often accused by their enemies [the ‘Orthodoxy’] of advocating free love and sexual promiscuity.

2. This account, probably written in 1638, was published anonymously and edited by Winthrop’s friend [and ardent anti-Hutchinsonian] Thomas Weld, who also wrote a 20-page preface.

3. In addition to Knight, see, for example, Erikson, *Wayward Puritans*; and Hall, *The Antinomian Controversy*. This invaluable collection gathers together the most important surviving documents of the ‘Hutchinson case,’ such as Winthrop’s *Short Story*, and the reports of Hutchinson’s examination and trial.

4. Knight here is closely following the terminology of William Haller, who distinguished between the spiritual brotherhood of dissenting Puritans and the “intellectual fathers of independency” (78).

5. Miller [in]famously declared: “I have taken the liberty of treating the whole literature as though it were the product of a single intelligence” (*The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* vii), equating this “single intelligence” with an essential unity and orthodoxy of the Puritan elite following the lead of William Ames—mainly the vision of Winthrop.

6. The names “Fathers” and “Brethren” show the difference in structure of these two parties—the one more vertical/hierarchical, the other more vertical/egalitarian. This grouping also permits the inclusion of John Cotton and Thomas Shepard in the discussion. Both men were highly important figures in the controversy—so important that some historians,
including Hall, have moved them to the fore, replacing Hutchinson and Winthrop. These two choices of protagonists need not be mutually exclusive, though.

7. Foucault noted: “And, although it is true that its pyramidal organization gives it a ‘head,’ it is the apparatus as a whole that produces ‘power’ and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous filed” (*Discipline and Punish* 177).

8. According to Deleuze, “power in Foucault . . . isn’t just violence, isn’t just the relation of a force to a being or an object, but corresponds to the relation of a force to the other forces it affects, or even to forces that affect it (inciting, exciting, inducing, seducing, and so on, are affects) . . . There’s the relation between forces and form: any form is a combination of forces . . . human forces aren’t on their own enough to establish a dominant form in which man can install himself. Human forces (having an understanding, a will, an imagination, and so on) have to combine with other forces: an overall form arises from this combination, but everything depends on the nature of the other forces with which the human forces become linked” (*Negotiations* 117).

9. See chapter 5 of this book.

10. The University Press of New England’s anonymous reader pointed out to me that Jim Egan has made a similar claim in *Authorizing Experience*.

11. An increase of dead bodies equals a decrease of economic working power.

12. This theory of family government, as David Flaherty notes, “charged the head of the household with the duty of surveillance over the behavior of everyone . . . The family was the immediate agent of social control in seventeenth-century New England” (56). Cotton Mather stated that “families are the Nurseries of all Societies; and the First Combinations of Mankind. Well-ordered Families naturally produce Good Order in other Societies” (*A Family Well-Ordered* 3–4).

13. This division of the land was “conducted formally and was intended to be a permanent one, the land passing forever into private hands” (Cronon 73). The 1635 anonymous “Essay on the Ordering of Towns” demanded that each individual should be given the amount of land which was “his due proportion, more or less according unto his present or apparent future occasion of Imployment,” and based on how many servants and cattle he had to “improve” the land (183).

14. See Serres’s comment on Descartes’ *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* [1628–29] in “Festes, Flüssiges, Flammen.” Serres shows that Descartes basically treats the liquid and the disjunctive as similar cases of nonsolidity, of the nondefined.

15. De Landa is drawing on Arthur Iberall’s ideas, as put forward in *Towards a General Theory* (122–26).

16. Concepts are seen as the immutable Hegelian *Begriff*, which is derived from the German *begreifen*, to grasp, which again refers to a solid object.

17. The Antinomian foundation becomes fluid kind: Hutchinson is marked as “the fountaine . . . of all our distempers” (Hall 275). In addition, Hutchinson builds her doctrine on “bottomlesse revelations, as either came without any word, or without the sense of the word” (274), in contrast to the “solid arguments” (289) of the magistracy, the “well-grounded Christians” (276).

18. The building that Winthrop refers to in this quotation is further specified by another architectural metaphor as the “legall way of evidencing their good estate by Sanctification” (Hall 204)—the covenant of works.
19. In a pun on Deleuze|Guattari’s concept of “minor science” [science mineur], Hutchinson’s doctrines were also a science mineur in the sense of a ‘miner science,’ undermining the foundations of the orthodox Puritan elite, as well as in the sense of an almost terrorist attack of someone laying a mine on these very foundations.

20. “For they being above reason and Scripture, they are not subject to control” (Hall 274).

21. This sermon can be dated to the middle or late 1620s, when Cotton was the minister at Hutchinson’s English parish.

22. Winthrop, much more moderate than his allies Hooker and Shepard, uses the euphemism of framing the affections, whereas Hooker claims that “the soule must be broken and humbled, before the Lord Jesus Christ can, or will dwell therein, and before faith can be wrought therein” (The Soules Implantation 3).

23. A better name for equilibrium thermodynamics would have been thermostatics.

24. In the trial, John Cotton speaks of the dangerous consequences of Antinomianism, which sets “an open Doore to all Epicurisme and Libertinisme; if this be soe than come let us eate and drinke for to morrow we shall dye” (Hall 372). For someone who believes that the world is created by the clinamen [by chance, turbulence, and accident—ultimately, by grace] and that it will perish again likewise, Epicurism [or hedonism] is not excess; it only appears that way to those who believe that there is an intentionality or final cause of|in life, and that you can ‘direct’ this intentionality by doing good deeds.

25. It seems only appropriate that after Hutchinson’s death, a river was named after her.

Chapter 3. Cotton Mather: The Angel and the Animalcula

1. Foucault commented on the epistemic rupture and historical discontinuity between the baroque and the classical worldview, and on the significance of the book metaphor: “The great metaphor of the book that opens, that one pores over and reads in order to know nature, is merely the reverse and visible side of another transference, and a much deeper one, which forces language to reside in the world, among the plants, the herbs, the stones, and the animals” (Order of Things 35).

2. Of course, one cannot actually speak of a ‘New England baroque,’ since the baroque is inextricably tied to Catholicism. Yet, given the era’s position at the threshold to the Enlightenment, the term baroque might be used to characterize Mather’s approach to science.

3. For detailed accounts of the Boston epidemic and the ensuing controversy, see Fitz, “Zabdiel Boylston”; Blake, “Inoculation Controversy”; P. Miller. The New England Mind: From Colony to Province 345–66; and Stearns, Science in the British Colonies of America. I have drawn on the wealth of information provided in these texts.

4. See Fenn, Pox Americana, for a history of the smallpox epidemics in America. See also McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, for an analysis of social and cultural life as deeply connected to its ecological environment, which also includes the impact of epidemics and microorganisms.

5. Kittredge convincingly argues that Boylston published this tract, but that Mather wrote it. Despite Mather’s positive account of the knowledge of blacks, this can be seen as an example of what Sander Gilman calls the “nexus of blackness and madness” (131).
6. John 5:2–4: “Now there is at Jerusalem by the sheep [market] a pool, which is called in the Hebrew tongue Bethesda, having five porches. In these lay a great multitude of impotent folk, of blind, halt, withered, waiting for the moving of the water. For an angel went down at a certain season into the pool, and troubled the water: whosoever then first after the troubling of the water stepped in was made whole of whatsoever disease he had.”

7. For statistics, see Stearns, who reports an overall number of 5,889 cases of smallpox, with 844 deaths (Science in the British Colonies of America 421). Blake refers to 5,759 infected persons, of whom 842 died (Public Health 61).

8. See, for example, Middlekauff, The Mathers; and P. Miller, The New England Mind: From Colony to Province.

9. Douglass later embraced the procedure of inoculation, and even as early as May 1, 1721, he acknowledged in a private letter to Cadwallader Colden: “But to speak candidly for the present it [smallpox] seems to be somewhat more favourably received by inoculation than received in the natural way” (“Letters from Dr. William Douglass” 170).

10. The phrase dead in law uncannily foreshadows the Lacanian distinction between the symbolic body and the real body, with the logical priority of the former.

11. Mather himself is a case in point—as a Fellow of the Royal Society, it is ultimately his name that is associated with the introduction of smallpox inoculation in the colonies.

12. For a short biography of Douglass, see Stearns, Science in the British Colonies of America 477–84.

13. See also Shryock for an account of a general tendency to friction in the colonies between ‘learned’ and ‘unlearned’ medical men (Medicine and Society in America especially 1–43).

14. For a detailed analysis of the English medical hierarchy in use in the early eighteenth century, see Pelling and Webster, “Medical Practitioners.” See also Estes, Cash, and Christianson, Medicine in Colonial Massachusetts.

15. From the anonymously published “Graph. Iatroon Letter” of 1765, announcing the formation of a medical society composed of college-graduate MDs, which sixteen years later became the Massachusetts Medical Society (quoted in Burrage, A History 3–4).

16. Paracelsian medicine differed from Galenic medicine in almost every aspect, and Paracelsian theory, with its religiously motivated medical philosophy, provided a viable alternative to the views of the ‘heathen’ Galen. Yet most medical practitioners managed to reconcile the [mostly theoretical] differences, practicing alchemic [Paracelsian] medicine within a humoral [Galenic] framework. See Debus, Chemical Philosophy; and Rattansi, “Paracelsus.” See also Debus (Man and Nature) for a redefinition of the role of Paracelsian and iatromechanical thought as central in the scientific revolution.

17. The term is Félix Guattari’s, following Bakhtin (see Guattari, Chaosmosis 16).

18. This, I argue, is the way Mather should be read—as a polyvocal writer, and not simply as a lopsided bigot. See also his claim in Magnalia Christi Americana of being an impartial historian, not because of some obscure objectivity or sticking to facts, but because he endeavors, “with all good Conscience, to decline this writing merely for a Party” (1:113).

19. This letter has neither date nor addressee; its content, however, suggests that it was written sometime around 1690, on the occasion of the issuance of the first bills of credit—paper currency—in Boston, which Cotton Mather supported.
20. Mather’s books are textual machines—consisting of a bricolage of fragments of different discourses such as theology, medicine, and science [and different scientific schools, such as alchemy, iatromechanism, and iatrophysics]—dealing with the universe the body as a machine. If these two machines are brought into conjunction—if one lets the one engineer the other, and vice versa—various crossreadings, crossbreedings are possible.

21. First published in 1691, this is a book written not “by a clergyman with scientific interests,” but by “a scientist with a theological veneer” (Jeske 587). Ray’s Wisdom of God is regarded as the founding text of modern zoology and—via William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802), which merely restates Ray’s theses—as the direct ancestor of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species. Mather is clearly taking sides by modeling his book—and, I argue, also his persona or voice in The Christian Philosopher—on “the Industrious Mr. Ray” (The Christian Philosopher 10).

22. According to Cartesian dualism, the body is a machine under the control of a rational soul (mind). Since animals lack reason, they are merely soulless organic machines. Leibniz states that “this is also what made those same Cartesians think that only minds are monads, that there are no souls of animals, and still less any other principles of life. The Cartesians offended too much against people’s ordinary beliefs by refusing all feeling to animals” (“Principles,” Philosophical Texts 260).

23. Mather’s objective is to “offer up to God the Praises which are owing from and for [creation]” (The Christian Philosopher 236), one of the main characteristics and functions of Man, whereas it has to be argued to what degree God’s presence in Leibniz’s system is a concession to the conventions of his times. Yet the rapturous praises to God that pop up constantly in Mather’s text, when he binds scientific facts [and more often than not facts that go against the grain of Puritan tradition] back into the safety of God’s plan, can be seen as an instant of what Guattari—trying to think, with Bakhtin, in a polyphonic subjectivity—calls “the refrain”: “Like Bakhtin, I would say that the refrain is not based on elements of form, material or ordinary signification, but on the detachment of an existential ‘motif’ (or leitmotif) which installs itself like an ‘attractor’ within a sensible and significationa...l chaos. The different components conserve their heterogeneity, but are nevertheless captured by the refrain which couples them to the existential Territory of my self” (Chaosmosis 17).

24. Deleuze uncovers surprisingly modern conceptions of the world and the body in Leibniz’s work. For a detailed discussion of the Leibnizian-Deleuzian conception of the machine [albeit in the context of artificial life], see Berressem, “Of Metal Ducks.”

25. Compare Deleuze’s heuristic visions of a “philosophically bearded Hegel, a philosophically clean-shaven Marx” (Difference and Repetition xxii).

26. See also Belcher, “Journal.” Two days later, Belcher had lunch with Leibniz and Queen Sophia Charlotte.

27. Kenneth Silverman dates this sermon April 14, 1689, immediately after the news of the Glorious Revolution reached Boston (Life and Times 69).

28. He also wrote: “In nature, everything is full . . . Because of the plenitude of the world everything is linked, and every body acts to a greater or lesser extent on every other in proportion to distance, and is affected by it in return” (“Principles,” Philosophical Texts 259).

29. “C’est ainsi que, jettant en même temps plusieurs pierres dans une eau dormant, nous voyons que chacune fait des cercles sur la surface de l’eau” (“Leibniz an die Khurfürstin Sophie,” Die philosophischen Schriften 566).
30. Randolph had been sent to the colonies by Charles II, to investigate violations of England’s colonial laws, and the state of affairs on site. Randolph was also chiefly responsible for the plan to consolidate all American colonies into an English dominion, and he served on Governor Andros’s council.

31. This document, attributed to Cotton Mather, Increase Mather, and Simon Bradstreet, attempts to justify the arrest of Governor Andros and the members of his council, also listing the accusations they were charged with.

32. On the concept of good government in the political sense, see, for example, the election sermon of Samuel Willard (Character), stressing the idea of the proper use of authority.

33. Mather does not mention Harvey, yet he takes over Harvey’s quantitative determination of the capacity of the heart almost verbatim: compare The Christian Philosopher 280 with The Anatomical Exercises 62–63.

34. The air that we breathe also has this ‘muscular’ constitution. Following Boyle, Mather sees the air as consisting of “Corpuscles” (The Christian Philosopher 73) of different kinds. He stresses a particular sort of particles as “being the distinguishing Parts of the Air, taken in the stricter sense of the Term. These Particles have an Elasticity in them; are springy; resemble the Spring of a Watch. Elasticity is an essential property of the Air” (74).

35. See, for example, Increase Mather, New-England Vindicated.

36. See also Jennifer Jordan Baker, “Cotton Mather’s Theology of Finance.”

37. Mather also wrote: “Indeed where the Use of Money has not been introduced, Men are brutish and savage, and nothing that is good has been cultivated” (The Christian Philosopher 127). In Leviathan, Hobbes himself draws the connection between blood and economy, seeing “mony [as] the Bloud of a Common-wealth” (300).

38. This issue parallels the course of events in Freud’s myth of the primal horde. It is thus fitting that a pro-gold tract on the post–Civil War discussion of the introduction of the greenback dollar—an issue anticipated by the bills of credit—by David Wells is titled The Silver Question: The Dollar of the Fathers versus the Dollar of the Sons. On the issue of the gold standard, see Walter Benn Michaels, The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism, in particular chapter 5.

39. See Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy.” For another discussion of the Derridean implications of Mather’s advocacy of inoculation, see Breitwieser, “Pharmaceutical Innovation.”

40. See, for example, how Mather, in his discussion of smallpox and inoculation, can be seen to almost equate the circulation of the smallpox virus and the circulation of the practice of inoculation: “There are two towns contiguous to Boston. The smallpox entered the town to the northward, where the people were poisoned with outcries against the inoculation. There they died by scores; they died in shoals; the place was Aceldama. The smallpox entered the town to the southward, and of the first fourteen or fifteen men that were taken with it, about eleven died. But the supervisors, after the example of their wiser pastors, coming at once into the inoculation, there died not one man after it. One would think here was an experiment enough to instruct a country; yea, to instruct a nation” (Selected Letters 365).

41. For Mather and his affinity to deism, see Riley, American Thought, in particular chapter 3. Riley sees Mather as cautiously instrumental in the “change from a gloomy theology to a cheering theodicy” (57).
42. Clarke was an English theologian and a disciple of Newton, and The Leibniz-
Clarke Correspondence was actually a discussion of God’s relation to the world, in which
Clarke defended Newton’s conception against Leibniz. In a letter to Gurdon Saltonstall,
Mather singled Clarke out as one of the “two grand satanic tools” of what he regarded
as the “Arian heresy” in England (Selected Letters 289). Newton was also under suspi-
cion of Arianism, a doctrine that denied the divinity of Jesus Christ. Mather and Leibniz
thus could be seen joining the same side, since Leibniz also warned that “Natural religion
itself, seems to decay (in England) very much” (Leibniz-Clarke 11).

43. Given the shared Protestant background, Leibniz’s preestablished harmony, I
argue, can be seen as the philosophical and complexified version of the traditional theo-
logical concept of providence and predestination.

44. If it were not for the preestablished harmony|Providence|God’s plan, the universe
would be devoid of metaphysics, blindly unfolding, the effect of mere chance, which is
inconceivable.

45. As an aside, the situation that Leibniz evokes bears more than a slight similarity to
the political situation of the American colonies.

46. Breitwieser rightly argues that there is a point in saying that “Cotton Mather in-
oculated the Mather tradition insofar as he was a scion who became one with it—that is,
insofar as he suppressed his transformative impulses” (“Pharmaceutical Innovation” 120).
I would also add that Mather’s ‘baroque’ and encyclopedic style in The Christian Philo-
sopher and The Angel of Bethesda is a kind of montage writing in the sense of Derrida’s
“citational grafting” (see “Signature, Event, Context” 320).

47. For example, Shakespeare writes in Hamlet: “virtue cannot/ so inoculate our old
stock but we shall relish of/ it” [Hamlet, edited by Horace Howard Furness (6th ed.,
London: J. B. Lippincott, 1877, act 3, scene 1, lines 117–18)].

48. In a similar manner, this metaphor also echoes the recurrent image of printing
Christ’s|God’s emblem or signature onto the believer’s soul.

49. This explains why Mather takes pains to fashion Phips as a kind of new Winthrop,
an attempt that costs him four times as much writing space as he needed for writing Win-
throp’s biography. For Gura, this displays a desperate avoidance of the fact “that the days
of John Winthrop could not be restored” (“Cotton Mather’s Life of Phips” 449).

50. The fact that Barthes sees the origin of this bourgeois myth in the “bourgeoisie as
a joint-stock company” (“Myth Today” 137) recommends it even more strongly for its
application to the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Regarding its origins as a kind of share-
holder company, “the bourgeoisie no longer hesitates to acknowledge some localized
subversions: the avant-garde, the irrational in childhood, etc. It now lives in a balanced
economy: as in any sound joint-stock company, the smaller shares—in law but not in
fact—compensate the big ones” (150–51).

51. This parallels the topology of the projective plane in Deleuze, the infinite tor-
sion that constitutes the world. In connection with the baroque figure of the fold, so dear
to Leibniz and Deleuze, see Mather’s adherence to the theory of preformation, which
“conceiv[es] the organism as a fold” (Deleuze, The Fold 10): for Mather, the “True Seed
lies in so Little Room, that it is not visible to the Naked Eye . . . But in that Little Room,
there lies the whole plant, in all the True parts of it; which is afterwards evolved and ex-
tended” (quoted in Levin, “Giants in the Earth” 768).
52. With regard to the analogy between skin and ports—the site where inside and outside meet, and also the site where the sea enters the land, where not only honest sailors, but also pirates hover and invade the Body Politic—it is interesting to see that Mather scorns the pirates because they have overstepped the limit and taken too high a quantum of that dangerous liberty. As a result, he tries to inoculate them with an equally high dose of order—hence the myriad of Mather’s ‘execution sermons,’ such as *The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea: A Remarkable Relation of Certain Pirates Brought unto a Tragical and Untimely End: Some Conferences with Them* (1726), which recounts his attempts at last-minute conversions of the pirates.

53. Mather himself is not blind to the fact that the parasitic relationship between host and virus—depending on its status as endemic or epidemic—is anything but linear when he points out the curious fact of the “perpetual (and sometimes strangely periodical) visits which this destructive malady is ever making” (*Selected Letters* 360, my emphasis).

54. Mather takes the name of his concept from Genesis 2:7, where it denotes the breath of life with which God animates Adam. The ‘*Nishmath-Chajim*’-Chapter was published in 1722 as a pamphlet called *Angel of Bethesda*—thus indicating its relevance and importance in Mather’s view.

55. I would argue it is almost a Spinozist position; see Spinoza’s *amor intellectualis dei*—which he defines as the “love for a thing which is eternal and infinite”—God. The fact that Spinoza had worked for a long time grinding lenses for microscopes might not be without relevance here. It is also interesting to note that Spinoza arrives at this love from a traumatic situation, which he compares with a “fatal disease,” where one is “compelled to seek with all [one’s] powers a remedy” (*Ethics* 225).

56. Mather’s example—in particular his observation that, as in a fractal, “it seems any single Part is equal to the Whole”—faintly echoes Leibniz’s notion of the monad, which, although singular, encompasses the whole universe within it.

57. Note that Mather envisions the infinitely small animals—the *animalcula*—to have all the parts and functions of actual visible animals; here he follows Leeuwenhoek, who “‘often fancied’ that he could detect the parts of the foetus in it, viz., head, shoulders, and thighs” (Cole 9).

58. Leibniz goes on to claim that “there are scarcely ten men in the world who are carefully at work on this, and if there were a hundred thousand, there would not be too many to discover the important wonders of this new world which makes up the interior of ours and which is capable of making our knowledge a hundred thousand times greater than it is . . . A man in Delft [i.e., Leeuwenhoek] has accomplished wonders at it, and if there were many others like him, our knowledge of physics would be advanced far beyond its present state” (566).

59. In a similar vein, Henry Power, an English physician and natural philosopher who lived from 1623 to 1688, comments on the minute “anatomical engines” revealed by the microscope. He hypothesizes a “rude countryfellow,” who does not know anything about “the internal fabric” of a machine, and who just “perchance hears the clock and alarum strike in it.” Yet only the microscope “will give a satisfactory account of the phenomena” (quoted in Laudan, “The Clock Metaphor and Probabilism” 101).

60. In *The Christian Philosopher*, Mather says of breathing that it is “A Faculty of such importance to Life, that . . . Breath and Life are so concomitant, as to be equivalent”
Later in this chapter, I will comment on Mather’s concept of the *Nishmath-Chajim*, the breath of life, which is “the Strength of Every Part in our Body, and that gives Motion to it. Here perhaps the Origin of Muscular Motion may be a little accounted for” (*The Angel of Bethesda* 33).

61. On the one hand Leibniz distinguishes between ‘two floors’ and two logics—that of the monad [spiritual] and that of the body [physical]—which have no connection if it not were for the preestablished harmony between them. On the other hand, he constantly puts matter into the monad, and anchors the monad in matter.

62. Leibniz wrote: “Imagine there were a machine which by its structure produced thought, feeling, and perception; we can imagine it as being enlarged while maintaining the same relative proportions, to the point where we could go inside it, as we would go into a mill. But if that were so, when we went in we would find nothing but pieces which push one against another, and never find anything to account for a perception” (“Monadology,” *Philosophical Texts* 270).


64. See Gordon W. Jones’s introduction to Mather’s *The Angel of Bethesda* (xvii).

65. It was also a way for Mather to bridge the apparent paradox of holding both sin and the animalcula responsible for illness—working on the body on two different fronts, as it were.

66. See also Mather’s diary entry for November 16, 1705: “The Oracles of God, make a distribution of Man, into three Parts, the *Spirit*, the *Soul*, and the *Body*. The *Anatomy* is admirable; the Consideration of the Distribution would be of no little consequence. The *Spirit* is the rational mind; created and infused, by an immediate Operation of God. The *Soul*, is a vital Flame, convey’d from our Parents; the next Seat of our Passions; of so fine a Temper that it can strike the *Spirit*, and yet of so gross a Temper, that it can also move the *Body*; tis the *Soul* by which all meer *Animals* are actuated. The *Body*, is the obvious Receptacle and Habitation of these wonderful Agents” (*1:526*). In the politicized context developed so far, it might be of no little consequence that the middle realm of the soul—which turns out to be the *Nishmath*—is “convey’d from our Parents,” or, the founding generation of Puritans.

67. It has been pointed out that Mather’s conception also allows for the idea of what we would today call psychosomatic illnesses and their treatment. See Mather’s *Diary* (1:526–27) for his idea about how such psychosomatic interactions could work.

68. Deleuze writes: “For Leibniz, the two floors are and will remain inseparable; they are really distinct and yet inseparable by dint of a presence of the upper in the lower . . . Is it not in this zone, in this depth of the material fabric between the two levels, that the upper is folded over the lower, such that we can no longer tell where one ends and the other begins, or where the sensible ends and the intelligible begins?” (*The Fold* 119).

69. However, they lack a *rational soul*, and therefore it might be argued that in animals, the *Nishmath* in fact takes the place of that rational soul [or mind or consciousness]—it is “the *Soul* by which all meer *Animals* are actuated,” (Mather, *Diary* 1:526); indeed, the “*Nishmath-Chajim* is much like the *Soul* which animates the *Brutal World*” (*The Angel of Bethesda* 32).

70. Likewise, Mather’s allegory of the variety of handwritings sees them as singular, but universally so.
71. On the ever refined matter, Martial Gueroult wrote about Leibniz’s views: “Comment, en effet, concevoir ‘le ressort’ si l’on ne suppose pas que le corps est compose, qu’aïnci il peut se contracter en chassant de ses pores le particules de matière subtile qui le pénètrent, et qu’à son tour cette matière plus subtile doit pouvoir expulser de ses pores une autre matière encore plus subtile, etc. à l’infini” (32). Deleuze’s *The Fold* (143, note 14) gives an English translation: “How can we conceive of the *motivating force* if we fail to suppose that the body is composite, and that thus it can be shrunk in flushing out of its pores the subtle particles of matter that penetrate it, and that in turn this more refined matter must be capable of expulsing from its pores another, even more refined matter, etc., ad infinitum.”

72. One can almost distill a theory of speeds here: fast is good, but too fast—like too slow—is bad. In political terms, Mather aims at a [semi]-stable, yet dynamic, system.

73. This differentiation—again—repeats the structure of the *pharmakon*. In Mather’s proto-account of the immune system, the *Nishmath* performs the task of the antibodies, while the virus is the antigen. What further complicates the issue is the fact that, at a particular level, they both can be one and the same: when the antibodies become auto-antibodies—that is, antibodies directed against themselves—in what is known as auto-toxic autoimmune diseases.


75. Leibniz, quoted in Loemker, “Boyle and Leibniz,” 43. The “flower of substance” might thus be regarded as a more ‘material’ preliminary stage of the monad, which, according to Leibniz, is only abstract-spiritual but is nevertheless always assigned to a body.

76. Mather might also be worrying about the mechanical philosophers who assume that the body—as a mechanic automaton—was built solely from units of inert matter, from which it could be followed that the units—like the parts of a clock—could be dismembered and reassembled again without loss. Yet what gets lost is the *Nishmath*, ‘life,’ without which the body would in fact be just a finitely complex ‘man-made’ machine.

77. According to Aram Vartanian’s introductory monograph, it was indeed de La Mettrie’s “primary task . . . to *vitalize* the Cartesian ‘dead mechanism’ approach to biology . . . La Mettrie had first to show that purposive motion could only be a property of organized matter as such, or, put differently, that the man-machine was automatic in a manner that no man-made machine, requiring direction from without, could truly duplicate” (19). Thus, de La Mettrie had more in common with vitalist thought than the title of his treatise supposes.

78. The “great mechanical philosophers of the seventeenth century . . . lent their support . . . to the maintenance of established monarchical authority” (Jacobs 31).

79. Reill sees this as part of a double movement, completed by a resurrection of elements—alchemy and hermetic thought—that were kept alive in popular culture, for example in the guises of household remedies.

80. This is a move quite typical of a whole tradition in American history/literature: the utopian future bears a remarkable resemblance to myths of the past. See Herzogenrath, “Looking Forward/Looking Back” and “Adam in the Rear-View Mirror” on this point.

81. In his more ‘traditional’ readings of Leibniz’s concept of preestablished harmony, Reill puts it in the category of a mere harmony of concord, yet Deleuze has uncovered
exactly this harmony of diverging series in Leibniz. Mather’s complexification of pro-
ducence tends in the same direction, I argue.

82. This is the title of Thom’s influential book, in which he develops his catastrophe
theory.

Chapter 4. “I Am the Poet of Little Things”:
Walt Whitman and Minor Poetics|Politics

1. It bears a close affinity to DeleuzelGuattari’s concept of geophilosophy—Anglo-
American literature thus is to French literature what geophilosophy is to ‘traditional
metaphysics,’ or geohistory to ‘traditional history.’ On the concept of geophilosophy, see
What Is Philosophy? (in particular chapter 4), and Bonta and Protevi, Deleuze and Geo-
philosophy. See also Surin, “‘A Question.’”

2. In a way, this describes Derrida’s mantra “There is nothing outside of the text [there
is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors-texte]” (Of Grammatology 158). In marked con-
trast, for Deleuze, it is precisely literature’s “relationship with the outside” (Deleuze and
Parnet, Dialogues 36) that matters.

3. As Deleuze notes, “The founding act of the American novel . . . was to take the novel
far from the order of reasons, and to give birth to characters who exist in nothingness,
survive only in the void, defy logic and psychology and keep their mystery until the end”
(Essays Critical and Clinical 81).

4. It must be noted that this seeming dualism between major|minor and majoritarian|
minoritarian is subverted by DeleuzelGuattari in their insistence that “we must distin-
guish between: the majoritarian as a constant and homogeneous system; minorities as
subsystems; and the minoritarian as a potential, creative and created, becoming” (Thou-
sand Plateaus 106).

5. Tocqueville’s observation that in an aristocratic literature, literary and political ac-
tivity condense in a ruling class that “keeps itself entirely aloof from the people” coincides
with Kafka’s remark that in a minor literature, “literature is less a concern of literary his-
tory, than of the people” (193).

6. The respective powers of the major and the minor are of different orders—similar
to Spinoza’s distinction between potestas and potentia, the “powers (puissances) of be-
coming . . . belong to a different realm from that of Power (Pouvoir) and Domination”
(Thousand Plateaus 106).

7. Thus DeleuzelGuattari’s concept of the ‘minor writer’ is the complete antithesis of
Foucault’s and Barthes’s ‘author-function.’

8. DeleuzelGuattari do not explicitly use this term, but they refer to “the conditions of
minor literature and politics” (Kafka 86).

9. Deleuze writes: “Oh, the poverty of the imaginary and the symbolic, the real always
being put off until tomorrow” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues 51). For cultural|linguistic
constructivism [Lacan’s psychoanalysis is based on that concept], the imaginary and the
symbolic, images and words, dreams and the talking cure are the pillars on which they are
based: systems of representation are always founded on the exclusion of the real. Deleuze,
however, wants to ‘get through’ to this enigmatic real, this ‘outside,’ and touch literature
[and politics] in its relation to that outside.
10. Deleuze stresses the fundamentality and centrality of this proposition when he claims that “we will call ‘nonempiricist’ every theory according to which . . . relations are derived from the nature of things” (Empiricism 109).

11. Manning admits having read Deleuze’s writings on Hume and American literature only after her own book was written, and although she sees similarities between her approach and Deleuze’s, she ultimately dismisses Deleuze’s reading as historically insensitive, one that finds only its “own [postmodern] image in the writing of the past” (18). While this is highly debatable, Manning’s difficulties with Deleuze seem to be an example of a general underlying [and unresolved] tension between the historian’s contextualization and the philosophical approach.

12. Vice versa, Hume sees a nation as “nothing but a collection of individuals” which comes into being by means of “sympathy or contagion of manners” (Essays 20).

13. As a result of the riots and election frauds, Kansas’s admission to the union as a state was rejected by Congress. As a final irony, however, as antislavery settlers outnumbered proslavery ones, Kansas was eventually admitted on January 29, 1861, just before the start of the Civil War—as a free state.

14. See, for example, Loving, Emerson, Whitman, and the American Muse; Shephard, Walt Whitman’s Prose; and Trachtenberg, “Walt Whitman.”

15. See also Hollis, Language and Style; Larson, Whitman’s Drama of Consensus; and Dougherty, Walt Whitman and the Citizen’s Eye.

16. See Allen, Solitary Singer; E. Miller, Walt Whitman’s Poetry; Black, Whitman’s Journey into Chaos; Killingsworth, Whitman’s Poetry of the Body; and Moon, Dissemi-nating Whitman.

17. That can be read as yet another way of saying that difference precedes [and escapes] identity, becoming precedes [and escapes] being, etc.

18. Eric Wilson has pointed out that Leaves of Grass can be read as Whitman’s “manifesto of nomadic thought” (119), as a rhizomatic, perpetually branching and bifurcating text, but he relates it to Whitman’s [and Deleuze’s] reading of Lucretius rather than connecting it to the assemblage Anglo-American literature/Humean empiricism proposed by Deleuze.

19. Allen points out that the title Leaves of Grass refers not to a single book, but to “the whole corpus of Walt Whitman’s verse published between 1855 and 1892” (Whitman Handbook 104).

20. DeleuzeGuattari quote Henry Miller: “Grass is the only way out . . . It grows between, among other things . . . the weed is rank growth . . . it points a moral” (Thou-sand Plateaus 19).

21. Every single leaf of grass is itself a rhizome that connects with the larger dynamics of life. Echoing atomist philosophy, and also Leibniz, Whitman states that “different objects which decay, and by the chemistry of nature, their bodies are into spears of grass” (Notebooks 1:57).

22. As Emerson explicitly states, “the Idealism of the present day acquired the name of Transcendental, from the use of that term by Immanuel Kant, of Konigsberg” (“The Transcendentalist,” Selected Essays 246).


24. Nor did the book itself have any information about its author.

25. According to Deleuze, “the great English and American novelists often write in percepts” (Negotiations 137).
26. In particular, “the attitude of great poets is to cheer up slaves and horrify despots” (Poetry and Prose 17).

27. Deleuze and Guattari write: “It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks” (Anti-Oedipus 1)—the body as a site of production.

28. In his preface to the 1855 edition, Whitman hints at the fact that he structures his “kosmos” with rhizomatic alliances rather than hierarchical orders: “There will soon be no more priests. Their work is done . . . A superior breed shall take their place . . . the gangs of kosmos and prophets en masse shall take their place. A new order shall arise” (Poetry and Prose 4–5).

29. What Whitman describes is similar to the position of the minor poet in Deleuze Guattari’s Kafka: “If the writer is in the margins or completely outside his or her fragile community, this situation allows the writer all the more the possibility to express another possible community” (17).

30. The Whitman item, a second draft of “Quicksand Years That Whirl Me I Know Not Whitner,” was written 1861–62.

31. The Gathering of Forces collects the editorials, essays, reviews, etc. that Whitman wrote as the editor of the Brooklyn Daily Eagle in 1846–47.

32. The idea of an elective affinity between Whitman and Lincoln is based on the fact that Whitman wrote elegies on Lincoln’s death. Whitman had planned to write a kind of ‘poetic advice primer’ for President Lincoln, as an entry in his notebooks shows: “Brochure.—Two characters as of a dialogue between A. L _____ n and Walt Whitman.—as in ? a dream—or better? Lessons for a President elect—Dialogue between W.W. and ‘President Elect’” (“Brochure” 174). See also Epstein, Lincoln and Whitman.

33. For a literary analysis of war rhetoric, the ways in which bodily injury and mutilation are rewritten as gain, see Scarry, The Body in Pain (especially chapters 2 and 3).

34. In contrast to this negative view, Hakim Bey wrote: “Ours is no art of mutilation, but of excess, superabundance, amazement” (37). And although “truly fearful things exist” in the world, “some of these things can be overcome—on the condition that we build an aesthetic on the overcoming rather than the fear” (78)—exactly what Whitman’s minor poetics/politics is attempting to do.

35. Whitman also wrote: “The political class is too slippery for me—even its best examples: I seem to be reaching for a new politics—for a new economy: I don’t know quite what, but for something” (quoted in Traubel 1:101).

36. Whitman wrote: “I have attempted to construct a poem on the open principles of nature . . . every page of my book emanates Democracy . . . and the sense of the New World in its future, a thoroughly revolutionary formation to be exhibited less in politics and more in theology, literature and manners” (The Complete Writings 9:34).

37. On Whitman’s notion of “the aggregate,” see also Berressem, “Serres Reads Pynchon.”

38. In this essay, Carlyle was attacking Benjamin Disraeli’s proposal to extend the franchise to the working classes, but included “the American War, with Settlement of the Nigger Question” (5), as a prime example of such swarmery.

40. See also De Landa: “a complex assemblage of a large number of heterogeneous components: diverse reproductive communities of animals, plants and micro-organisms, a geographical site characterized by diverse topographical and geological features, and the ever diverse and changing weather patterns” (Intensive Science 64).

41. Taken from the 1860 edition of Leaves of Grass, this last stanza is missing in subsequent editions.

42. Whitman also wrote: “I am the poet of little things and of babes” (Notebooks 1:70).

Chapter 5. A Physical Theory of Heredity\Heresy: The Education of Henry Adams

1. Among those studies of political theorists\historians that do read Adams for his ‘politics’ are Hanson and Merriman, “Henry Adams”; Shklar, Redeeming American Political Thought; and Young, Henry Adams, which shows that Adams may have been disappointed by the corrupt democracy of the late twentieth century, but he was a fervent believer in democratic ideals as such. After all, Adams’s political views, in his self-assessment, “tend to democracy and radicalism” (Letters 2:301).

2. On Adams and science, see also Jordy, Henry Adams; and Wasser, Scientific Thought.

3. Together with “The Tendency of History” and “The Rule of Phase Applied to History,” this essay was posthumously published by Adams’s brother Brooks Adams under the misleading title The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma.

4. In Chaos Bound, N. Katherine Hayles has provided an insightful reading of The Education of Henry Adams in the light of chaos and complexity theory. However, she is much more interested in the discursive complexity of Adams’s text than in his development of concepts of complexity—in fact, for Hayles, chaos theory seems to be another name for poststructuralism.

5. Within The Education, the same structure is repeated in the much-anthologized chapter 25, “The Dynamo and the Virgin.”

6. Adams also gives a political ring to the notion of variation\variety, which connects it with American democracy: “The American in his political character, was a new variety of man” (History Madison 1332).

7. Serres writes: “The [old] law is the plague. Reason is the fall. The reiterated cause is death. Repetition is redundancy. And identity is death” (Birth of Physics 109).

8. “The ego is a composite body . . . It resembles the Harlequin’s coat, adjectives sewn together, that is, terms placed side by side” (Tiers-Instruit 221, my translation).


10. Adams also wrote: “The inertia of several hundred million people, all formed in a similar social mould, was as likely to stifle energy as to stimulate evolution” (History Madison 1345).

11. According to Spencer, “there is no warrant whatever for assuming this” (200).

12. This is a position, I argue, that is repeated today in cultural\linguistic constructivism.
13. Deleuze|Guattari write: “Not every organism has a brain, and not all life is organic, but everywhere there are forces that constitute microbrains, or an inorganic life of things” (*What Is Philosophy?* 213).

14. That the decrease of state control, as envisaged by Spencer, led to the social Darwinism of laissez-faire capitalism nicely parallels the position of capitalism in Deleuze Guattari’s thought. While capitalism on the one hand has liberating effects, since it operates by a rigorous deterritorialization and decoding of free flows, on the other hand it rigorously reterritorializes and ‘overcodes’ these flows again into commodities and monetary equivalences, so that real freedom is impossible.

15. This novel was first published anonymously in 1880; only after 1925 was Adams listed as the author.

16. And complexity theory might be an effective way to deal with the dilemma of democracy.

17. One of the main physical forces of history, according to Adams, is inertia, the “property of matter, by which matter tends, when at rest, to remain so, and, when in motion, to move on a straight line” (*Education* 417). As Adams states in a 1883 letter to Samuel Tilden, “my own conclusion is that history is simply social development along the lines of weakest resistance, and that in most cases the line of weakest resistance is found as unconsciously by society as by water” (*Letters* 2:491). Such inertialstifling order leads to linearity and ultimately entropy; newnessmutations emerge out of the [nonlinear] “side-paths.”

18. That is also in line with Adams’s ‘residual Puritanism’—the second law of thermodynamics can be read as the scientific variant of the Puritan jeremiad.

19. For Serres, the shift from *turba* to * turbo* has a political connotation, since it also denotes the shift from a disordered “multitude, a large population, confusion and tumult” (*Birth of Physics* 28) to a self-organized [vertical] social movement.

20. The importance of the multitude is also revealed in Adams’s momentous flirtations with socialism and Marxism: “Not that I love Socialism any better than I do Capitalism, or any other Ism, but I know only of one law of political or historical morality, and that is that the form of Society which survives is always in the Right; and therefore a statesman is obliged to follow it, unless he leads . . . One need not love Socialism in order to point out the logical necessity for Society to march that way; and the wisdom of doing it intelligently if it is to do it at all.” (“Henry Adams to Brooks Adams, May 7, 1898,” in *Letters* 4:586–87). He also wrote: “By rights, he should have been also a Marxist but some narrow trait of the New England nature seemed to blight socialism, and he tried in vain to make himself a convert. He did the next best thing; he became a Comteist, within the limits of evolution” (*Education* 217).

21. It was the publication of this article in the *Westminster Review* in England that made Adams feel like “a pirate” (*Education* 271).

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Chapter 6. “A Sonorous People”:
*Techno*|*Music and the Joyful Body*|*Politic*

1. The quote is from Barthes, “Musica Practica” 153. In Heath’s translation, the passage reads: “to operate his music, to draw it (it is willing to be drawn) into an unknown praxis.”
2. Techno is far from being a ‘monolithic style.’ I will use the word here as a term that includes techno’s various subsets and coextensive styles, such as electronic [dance] music, house, jungle, breakbeat, trance, and gabba.

3. In fact, according to Frankie Knuckles, a deejay, in 1977, the year Attali’s book was published, house music was ‘born’ in the Warehouse in Chicago (see Anz and Meyer, “Die Geschichte von Techno,” 17).

4. See, for example, coverage of the topic in magazines such as i-D and Spex, and books like Reynolds, Energy Flash and Generation Ecstasy; Redhead, Rave Off; Collin and Godfrey, Altered States; Saunders and Dooblin, Saunders; and Eisner, Ecstasy.

5. I also heed Deleuze|Guattari’s advice in the French 1976 edition of Rhizome, as expressed in one of this chapter’s epigraphs, to find passages in books that suit the project: “Yes, take what you want” (68). This different version of the “Rhizome” chapter of A Thousand Plateaus appeared in an English translation by Foss and Patton.

6. There have been four CDs that explicitly acknowledge the relation between techno and the work of Deleuze: Modulation and Transformation and In Memoriam Gilles Deleuze [both on Achim Szepanski’s Mille Plateaux Label], and Folds and Rhizomes for Gilles Deleuze and Double Articulations > Another Plateau [on Guy Marc Hinant’s label Sub Rosa]. See also Buchanan and Swiboda, Deleuze and Music, in particular Murphy, “What I Hear Is Thinking Too.”

7. Deleuze|Guattari point out that even the most revolutionary ‘bards’|songs can “also bring about the most Oedipal of reterritorializations, oh mama, oh my native land, my cabin, olé, olé” (Kafka 24).

8. In Spectacular Vernaculars, Potter understands hip-hop as a political practice—a “signifyin(g)” practice, as Henry Louis Gates would have it—with its Black English as a vernacular of deterritorialization [becoming-minor] of the ‘major’ language.

9. This is a point where the two different strands of music momentarily touch, since even punk and heavy metal use distorted sounds—sounds in which the effect of [formerly unwanted] noise was in fact taken as a definition of rock music.

10. See Lyotard: “The grand narrative has lost its credibility” (Postmodern 37).

11. Note that artists such as Scanner [Robin Rimbaud], or Negativland’s Weatherman [David Wills] use surveillance technology [scanners] in order to create sonic landscapes by creating tracks from ‘scanned’ telephone conversations, in which the voices become sonorous, and the sonic—rather than the representational—aspect of the voice is made use of.

12. In its precarious position of being neither representational affirmation nor representational negation, techno occupies a position similar to Bartleby’s formula: “I prefer not to.”

13. “Une mondialité rythmique, de jazz en rap et au-delà . . . Oui, du bruit: c’est comme le revers d’une pensée, mais c’est aussi comme ce qui gronde dans les replies des corps” [my translation].

14. Freud wrote: “Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble at times” (“Civilization” 280).

15. Kristeva links the semiotic to Deleuze|Guattari’s notion of the ‘schizophrenic flow’ qua modern literature, “in which the ‘flow’ itself exists only through language, appropriating and displacing the signifier to practice within it the heterogeneous generating of the ‘desiring machine’” (Revolution 17).
16. Deleuze|Guattari point out that “a musician requires a first type of refrain, a territorial or assemblage refrain, in order to transform it from within, deterritorialized, producing a refrain of the second type as the final end of music: the cosmic refrain of a sound machine” (*Thousand Plateaus* 349).

17. Elias Canetti wrote: “In the changing constellations of the pack, in its dances and expeditions, he [the member of the pack] will again and again find himself at its edge. He may be in the center, and then, immediately, at the edge again; at the edge and then back in the center” (93).

18. With respect to techno, there have been a multitude of references to tribalism, modern primitivism, and voodoo magic. In techno music, such connections are made clear in ‘sub-genres’ such as tribal dance or jungle. Thus, hackers, cyberpunks, techno artists, and other deterritorializers of computer technology are the new magicians of the digital age, the shamans and voodoo priests of technology.

19. See the 1992 CD of the American crossover band Rage Against the Machine, which prides itself on explicitly stating in the liner notes that “no samples, no keyboards or synthesizers were used in the making of this recording.”

20. The duplicity of techno and modernist music with respect to childhood is alluded to in Else Kolliner’s analysis of Igor Stravinsky’s ‘infantilism.’ She states that Stravinsky’s music creates a “new realm of fantasy . . . which every individual once in his childhood enters with closed eyes.” Stravinsky’s techniques of “continual change of beat, the stubborn repetition of individual motives—as well as the disassembling and totally new re-composition of their elements . . . are instrumentally accurate translations of child-like gestures of play into music” (quoted in Adorno, *Philosophy* 162–63).

21. Since I have related techno to Kristeva’s concept of the semiotic earlier, I would like to add her warning not to confuse the semiotic with the analog: “This heterogeneity between the semiotic and the symbolic cannot be reduced to computer theory’s well-known distinction between ‘analog’ and ‘digital’” (Revolution 66).

22. The title of a track by the techno artist Cosmic Baby.

23. The promise of a return to the pre-Oedipal and uncastrated realm of childhood also lies at the heart of Jaron Lanier’s manifesto for virtual reality: “All of us suffered a terrible trauma as children that we’ve forgotten, where we had to accept the fact that we are physical beings and yet in the physical world where we have to do things, we are very limited. The thing that I think is so exciting about virtual reality is that it gives us this freedom again. It gives us this sense to be who we are without limitation” (quoted in Wooley, *Virtual Worlds* 14).

24. Judgment Night is the name of a series of big techno raves in the 1980s|1990s. Judgment Day refers to notions such as doomsday, God’s final judgment, at which point humans have to pay for their sins. Judgment thus implies a deeply negative view of life, desire related to lack and debt. Nietzsche, Artaud—and techno’s judgment night—reveal a desire “to have done with judgment” (Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical* 126), to affirm life. The BwO is a way to do away with judgment, with the organism as “the judgment of God” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus* 158)—it a mode of production rather than of containment.

25. This is the title of a 1993 Ambient|Trance CD by Drome.

26. Deleuze|Guattari comment on the use of drugs in order to make yourself a body without organs, but they also warn that this experimentation might result in the complete
deterritorialization of the ‘empty BwO.’ However, they ask, “could what the drug user . . .
obtains also be obtained in a different fashion in the conditions of the plane, so it would
even be possible to use drugs without using drugs, to get soused on pure water” (Thou-
sand Plateaus 166)—or sound?

27. Borrowing the term from Duns Scotus, Deleuze|Guattari describe haecceity as “a
mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance.
We reserve the name haecceity [it-ness] for it. A season, a winter, a summer, an hour,
a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is dif-
ferent from that of a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they con-
sist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capaci-
ties to affect and to be affected” (Thousand Plateaus 261). See also Jordan, “Collective
Bodies.”

28. An obvious liaison between techno and mysticism can be observed in the trend of
merging Gregorian chants or Hildegard von Bingen’s “Canticles of Ecstasy” with techno
beats. For another example, watch the video of Scubadevil’s “Celestial Symphony,”
which features film sequences of religious rituals and fade-ins of possible combinations of
0 and 1. As an expanded metaphor of the information superhighway and in analogy with
rock ’n’ roll culture as an extended metaphor of the street, the two variants of techno—
the abject and the sublime—can be read as the information superhighway to hell and the
information superstairway to heaven.

29. In Ocean of Sound, David Toop has traced the development of the early-twentieth-
century avant-garde and its use of religious rituals [e.g., gamelan music] through the
American minimalists to present-day electronic music.

30. On La Monte Young and his microtonal variations, Deleuze|Guattari comment:
“It is clear that what is necessary to make sound travel, and to travel around sound, is
very pure and simple sound, an emission or wave without harmonics (La Monte Young
has been successful at this)” (Thousand Plateaus 344). It is no coincidence that Reich
and Glass are valued by the intelligent techno ommunity as important ancestors. Two
projects cement this indebtedness and influence: Aphex Twin’s collaboration with Glass,
and the Steve Reich Remixed Project, presenting interpretations of Reich’s minimal music
by distinguished techno artists such as DJ Spooky The Subliminal Kid, Cold Cut, and Ken
Ishi.

31. Deleuze blames Kant for finally returning to an ultimate harmony in reason,
where the faculty of reason harmonizes the breakdown of representation in the sublime
experience.

32. In fact, related to speeds and slownesses, there is no ‘subject’ in the first place,
since they “produce individuations without a ‘subject’” (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues
33).

33. The love parade originated in Berlin in 1989, but it has spread all over the world,
to places such as Tel Aviv, Mexico City, Seattle, and San Francisco.

Conclusion

1. Deleuze and Guattari wrote: “An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimen-
sions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections”
Regarded from this perspective, ‘Americanness’ can only denote a *becoming-American*.

2. Note again the ambiguity of the word *missing*: missing in the sense that it *has yet to be made*, and in that the people [just like the ‘self’ in self-organization] is ultimately missing—there is no such thing as a permanent unity called self or people.


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Bibliography


INDEX

Adams, Henry, 11, 97, 208–34, 259n6, 279n1–4, 279n6, 279n9, 279n10, 280n15–21
aggregates, 32–33, 51–58, 111, 143, 184, 194–207, 243, 256, 278n37
anarchy, 6–15, 35–38, 49–59, 75, 94, 168, 175, 186, 199–258, 261n12
Andros, Sir Edmund, 141, 147, 155, 271n30–31
Antinomians, 94, 98, 100, 103, 108, 267n17, 268n24
Aristotle, 2–3, 27, 35, 113, 145, 187, 261n14
Artaud, Antonin, 31–32, 40, 171, 282n24
assemblage, 24–45, 170–88, 206, 235–57, 275n76, 277n18, 279n40, 282n16, 282n20, 283n1
Attali, Jacques, 233–36, 247, 281n3
autopoiesis | autopoietic, 25, 26, 34, 51, 167–68, 231, 241. See also self-organization
Axelrod, Robert, 43–44, 47–48, 115, 225, 263n33
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 74, 100–102, 269n17, 270n23
Bataille, Georges, 246
Beall, Otho T., Jr., 116, 125, 127–28, 163
belatedness, 11, 13, 14, 22, 30, 31
Belcher, Jonathan, 139, 270n26
Bercovitch, Sacvan, 54, 65, 77, 134, 266n35
Berressem, Hanjo, 104, 165–67, 260n4, 265n16, 270n24, 278n37
Bhabha, Homi K., 13
Boyle, Robert, 116–17, 138, 154, 164–65, 271n34, 275n75
Boylston, Zabdiel, 122–23, 125, 130–31, 268n3, 268n5
bricolage, 131, 236, 270n20
Butler, Judith, 13, 15, 20–24, 27, 29, 260n4, 260n6

Carlyle, Thomas, 50, 203, 263n34, 278n38
clinamen, 112, 113, 206, 217, 218, 221, 286n24
complexity, 14–51, 80, 97, 112–37, 161–97, 211–41, 250, 263n35, 279n4, 280n16
constructivism, 13–15, 20–28, 49, 247, 255, 276n9
contagion, 120, 122, 154, 157, 206, 277n12

Darwin, Charles, 208–9, 218, 223, 226, 270n21
Darwinism, 212, 218–20, 223, 226, 228–29, 280n14
De Landa, Manuel, 48, 97, 106, 111, 157–69, 260n8, 263n33, 263n35, 267n15, 279n40
Deejay-Culture, 237–38, 245–46, 281n3
Dekker, Thomas, 100–102
Deleuze, Gilles: and becoming | becomings, 28–75, 107–29, 164–204, 225–58, 276n6, 277n17, 281n8, 284n11; and BwO [Body without Organs], 31–41, 224–49, 282n24, 283n26; and deterritorialization, 16–55, 171–80, 236–48, 280n14, 281n8, 282n16, 282n18, 283n26; and immanence | immanence, 17–55, 160–98, 222–58, 262n23; and the minor, 18, 128–258, 268n19, 276n4–8, 278n29, 278n34, 281n8; and the Möbius Strip, 32, 243; and the molar, 32–45, 157–257, 263n30; and the molecular, 25–34, 157–250; and multiplicity | multiplicities, 7, 24–72, 95–190, 204–58, 283n11; and reterritorialization, 10, 17, 55, 174, 185, 281n7; and rhizomatic | rhizome, 17–19, 52–90, 128–248, 277n18, 277n21, 278n28, 281n5, 281n6
democracy, 11–13, 55, 171–255, 278n36, 279n1, 279n6, 280n16
Derrida, Jacques: and the Möbius Strip, 21, 32, 156; and the pharmakon, 149–50, 156, 275n73
Descartes, René, 20, 138, 161, 163, 181, 260n6, 263n31, 263n14
Douglass, Frederick, 185
Douglass, William, 124–26, 132–33, 150, 154, 157, 185, 269n9, 269n12
dualism, 17, 20, 163, 260n6, 270n22, 276n4
Eagleton, Terry, 20
Edwards, Jonathan, 61, 67–68, 71, 75–76, 78–79, 82, 265n22, 265n27
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 171, 174, 184, 186, 187, 190, 193, 200, 277n14, 277n22
empiricism, 25, 132, 149, 180, 180–83, 185, 190, 195, 277n10, 277n18
Epicurus, 112, 205, 221, 278n39
E Pluribus Unum, 8, 11, 188, 256, 257–58
essentialism, 13–15, 18, 20–21, 23–26, 39, 50, 247, 260n6
evolution, 24–47, 164–256, 261n14, 279n10, 280n20
force | forces, 15–115, 124–70, 175–258, 260n2, 262n23, 263n29, 267n8, 268n1, 278n31, 280n13
Foucault, Michel, and power, 23–24, 55, 72, 96–97
Franklin, Benjamin, 7–10, 186, 259n4
Freud, Sigmund, 23, 61–84, 241–47, 264n5–11, 264n15, 265n21, 265n31, 271n38, 281n14
Guattari, Félix, 169, 241, 242, 247, 269n17, 270n23
Gura, Philip F., 113, 155, 272n49
Haecceity | haecceities, 25, 249, 283n27
Hardt, Michael, 34–36, 53–54, 261n16
Harvey, William, 144–47, 149, 159, 271n33
Hofstadter, Douglas R., 48, 219
Hofstadter, Richard, 210
Hooker, Thomas, 89, 95, 98, 105, 108, 268n22
Hume, David, 26, 180–85, 188, 190–95, 204, 277n11, 277n12, 277n18
Hutchinson, Anne, 92–115, 266n2, 266n6, 267n17, 268n19, 268n19, 268n21, 268n25
Iberall, Arthur, 111–12, 267n15
inoculation, 122–37, 144–57, 168–70, 268n3, 269n9, 269n11, 271n39, 271n40, 272n47, 273n52
Jefferson, Thomas, 10, 210, 213, 231, 259n6
jouissance, 86, 240, 249
Serres, Michel, 15, 26, 53, 97–114, 212–29, 260n5, 267n14, 279n7, 280n19
Shepard, Thomas, 79, 93–95, 98, 106, 108, 113–14, 265n25, 266n6, 268n22
Shryock, Richard H., 125, 128, 132, 163, 269n16
Sibbes, Richard, 79, 95, 98, 109
Simmel, Georg, 70
Simondon, Gilbert, 35, 261n13
singularity | singularities, 25, 33, 153, 157, 184, 194, 204, 207, 241, 261n13
Sloterdijk, Peter, 248
sōma, 82–83, 265n28
Spinoza, Baruch, 15, 26, 33–53, 115, 175–81, 252, 261n14, 261n16, 262n20, 273n5; and potentia, 115, 231; and potestas, 115, 231, 276n6
Stengers, Isabelle, 97, 260n5
Stivale, Charles, 16
striation, 15, 35, 103, 112, 172, 206, 244, 249
sublimation, 84–86
swarm | swarms, 49, 65, 158, 194, 203, 244, 261n16
swarm intelligence, 37, 48
Taylor, Edward, 69, 77, 80–82, 84, 86–89, 154–55, 265n18, 265n30, 266n33
techno, 235–40, 243–51, 281n2, 281n12, 282n18, 282n20–22, 282n24, 283n28, 283n30
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 171–78, 188, 205, 254, 274n5
turbulence | turbulences, 50, 107–8, 112–14, 205–6, 215, 218, 222, 224, 227, 232, 268n24
turbulent, 51, 108, 112–14, 203, 205–6, 224
Van Helmont, Jan Baptist, 163, 167
virus | viral, 34, 100–105, 127–54, 239, 255, 271n40, 273n53, 275n73
vitalism, 26, 134–35, 138, 163, 167–68, 275n77
Vries, Hugo de, 219
Wheelwright, John, 94–95, 113
Whitman, Walt, 171–207, 209, 217, 277n14–16, 277n18, 277n19, 277n21, 278n28–32, 278n34–37
Willard, Samuel, 83, 140–41, 271n32
Williams, Roger, 83, 94–95
Winship, Michael P., 94, 113
Winthrop, John, 54–80, 93–156, 263n1, 264n5, 265n17, 265n23, 266n3, 267n18, 268n22, 272n49
Winthrop, John, Jr., 83, 87