Press translations [Japan]. Editorial Series 0253, 1946-01-17.
Date17 January, 1946
RepositoryRauner Special Collections Library, Dartmouth College.
Call Numbereditorial-0800
Call NumberDS801 .S82
Persistent Identifier
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EDITORIAL SERIES: 253
ITEM 1 Democratization of the Food Distribution System - Yomiuri-Hochi - 15 Jan 46.
Translator: H.
Furukawa.
Full Translation:
The food problem and inflation hold the key to the ecomomic reconstruction of our
country which is now in a paralyzed
condition. When the matter is considered fundamentally, however, uneasy feelings about
the food shortage are the source of all
the social confusion. Public feeling, which is now growing more uneasy, restless,
and disorderly, intensifies the people's
shameful conduct, stricken as they are by malnutrition. More than 80 per cent of the
street venders, who overflow into the
street and play some part in the development of inflation, are probably merchants
engaging in black marketeering. Laborors
cannot concentrate on their jobs because of the waste of their brain, energy, and
time in the acquisition of food. The general
commodity prices and the increase of inflation are also due to the lack of equilibrium
between food and currency. As in all
other policies, at a certain step in the ecomomic policy there is one point on which
our whole energy must be concentrated in
order to advance to the next step. At present the policy on food is the very point
which holds the key to al l the other
economic policies.
As is widely known, the food shortage at present is classified into two sections,
absolute shortage and relative shortage.
Absolute food shortage cannot be relieved except by importing from the Allied Powers.
Relative shortage of food is due to the
delay of rice delivery by farmers, the defects of the distribution system, and the
concealment or unequal holding of food.
These defects can be adjusted by Government policy. If the Nation doesn't show sincerity,
will, and initiative in eliminating
the relative shortage of food by itself, the Allied Powers will not permit, importation.
This was made clear by the
announcement of a spokesman of the Public Relation Office. Therefore, the solution
of food shortages due to the "relative”
cause is the key to the food problem.
Since its assumption of office, the SHIDEHARA Cabinet has been regarding the import
of food as the only means for the solution
of the food problem and made every effort to get a grant for it. When it was pointed
out by the Allied Powers, however, the
Cabinet recognized that a supplement for the relative shortage will be required before
importing. So the Cabinet, before its
reshuffle, decided to expedite the rice delivery, which is the main cause of shortages,
with ex-Minister of Agriculture
MATSUMURA as the central figure. The Cabinet is reported to have come to the conclusion
that the compulsory delivery of
allotments and an official inspection of concealed rice stocks must be carried out.
By the reshuffle of the Cabinet, Mr. SOEJIMA, Sempachi had the post of agriculture
minister. Judging from his ability and
previous career, he is likely to follow the policy adopted so far. So it can be expected
that strong measures to expedite the
rice delivery will be taken. What turns the minds of the farmers from offering rice
is their deep antipathy to the present
rulers. During wartime the farmers strove for increased production and for delivery
under the leadership of the Government.
Then,
EDITORIAL SERIES: 253 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
what consideration did they receive when the war ended in defeat? The unreasonably
cheap price of rice and wheat, difficulty
in obtaining agricultural implements, and the unjust and oppressive attitude of the
Agricultural Association are almost all
that was offered them.
On 15 February the discontent of the farmers with these facts manifested itself in
a certain village in GU[illegible]A-Ken. The farmers in that village undertook the democratization of the village agricultural
association and the control of rice by themselves thereby attracting the attention
of others. Similar events occurred in
[illegible]OOHIGU-Ken and TOYAMA-Ken. A democratic movement began in the Agricultural Ministry,
which is
likely to respond to the demands of the farmers and also demand the democratization
of the delivery and distribution
system.
The members [illegible]the JAPAN Agricultural Association support it too. The Agricultural Association
failed to satisfy the farmers in its management of delivery and distribution. At the
same time it is widely known that the
food corporation and other organizations for distribution in cities are bu[illegible]in their nature. The
farmers, now becoming aware of this fa[illegible]demand the democratization system both in cities and
villages, and [illegible]the stocks kept by the rich or high officials, or the rice st[illegible]the military which were carried away at the end of the war, should [illegible]traced
and confiscated. They also insist that the practical distribution of agricultural
implements and fertilizers, as well as the
above measure are necessary before requiring the farmers to deliver their rice. Those
who inspected the actual conditions of
farming dis[illegible]emphatically support this opinion prevailing among the farmers.
Under such circumstances the strong measures planned by the Government will be most
insufficient and dangerous of the
democratization of the delivery and distribution system and village construction,
as well as co-operation between the
sectional organizations of the farmers, cannot be carried out by them. The delivery
of rice and the distribution of implements
fertilizer, and land should be controlled by the working farmers themselves. In the
cities the distribution of food should be
put under the management of labor unions or a controlling commission organized by
the citizens. By these radical measures as
well as by the confiscation of stocks of food kept by illegal means the delivery will
naturally be increased, and the amount
of distribution may be allowed to reach three go.
Because the feeling of unrest about the food shortage would be dispelled by a distribution
of three go, it would be possible
to carry out economic circulation normally. Of course an absolute food shortage cannot
be relieved by these measures. We
believe, however, that the Allied Powers will show their good intentions to us if
the Government and the people are sincere
enough to appeal for the above-mentioned measures. In conclusion the food policy as
well as all the other policies must, of
necessity, be radical in its trend, and be democratized in the interests of farmers
and laborers by abandoning the oppressive
measures taken by the bureaucrats and ruling classes in the past.
ITEM 2 1. Demobilized Soldiers. 2. Amount of Rice they Delivered and Sent Secretly
- Mainichi Shimbun -
15 Jan 46. Translator: K. Nobunaga.
Full Translation:
Demobilized soldier s recently have received a disproportionate amount of publicity
in the newspapers. All wrong-doing is
either attributed to them or closely connected with them. The word "demobilized soldiers”
has become a synonym for criminals
or old offenders.
Most demobilized soldiers are those who did not willingly become soldiers. They are
now civilians, and since our army does not
exist now, the term
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EDITORIAL SERIES: 253 (Continued)
ITEM 2 (Continued)
"demobilized soldiers" may well be abolished. After demobilization, every soldier
should become an ordinary civilian. The use
of the term in a derogatory sense may result in making even the good citizens turn
bad, as in the case of ex-convicts in
former times. The public should remove such an unsuitable name from its vocabulary.
(A letter from a person named
OKAYAMA.)
I am one of the demobilized soldiers and am now a civilian like you. It is unpleasant
for me to hear and see in the newspapers
that the word "demobilized soldiers" is being used as synonym, for the word "scoundrels".
Most of them are good and honest by
nature, except the former professional soldiers, but some of them have become rascals
after demobilization.
Why should we be called demobilized soldiers even after we have returned home? How
many years will elapse before this name
disappears in the new democratic JAPAN? (A letter from-DEGAWA, Akio)
The poor delivery of rice is now notorious and widespread in every district of JAPAN.
I wonder whether there is a difference
between the actual amount delivered by farmers and the Government's announcement.
Recently, in our district 10 or 20 bales of rice at a time have been secretly taken
from our villege warehouses on trucks or
on autotricycles. Such rice is sure to be sent secretly to a certain place in TOKYO,
instead of being received as the
Government's rice ration. Such secretly sent rice is increasing more and more, because
men of property are devoting themselves
to exchanging their money for goods with the purpose of evading the tax. The misappropriated
rice is neither registered as the
Government's rice, nor as private property, but as a delivery of rice is, nevertheless,
forced from farmers. In other words,
it is the rice allotted to the town or village authorities from the farmers which
is the sum of the allotted amount of rice
from the Government, or at least some percentage of it.
Such unfair rice distribution is being made illegally by the town or village officials.
Not only the town or village
authorities, but also the Government authorities have done as they pleased with such
black market rice, as if it were surplus
rice. They also have done with sake, cooking oil, and other foods just as they have
done with rice. This is why they have
consumed a considerable amount of food besides the distributed quota.
Farmers have perceived such injustice, but they have been obliged to do nothing about
it. Therefore, they feel that it is
absurd to deliver rice. (From an idealist in IBARAGI-Ken)
ITEM 3 Reconstruction of the State - Mainichi Shimbun - 15 Jan 46. Translator: J.
Wada.
Full Translation:
Recently, Allied Headquarters, which is now the motive power in the democratization
of JAPAN, issued a directive ordering the
Government to present weekly statistics on some important items, which the Headquarters
will use in formulating appropriate
measures for the rapid revival, and reconversion of Japanese economy. The items are
price levels, wages, cost of living,
consumption of electric power, index number of industrial production, housing, food,
bank deposits, transportation, number of
unemployed, amusements, strikes, etc.
- 3 -
EDITORIAL SERIES: 253 (Continued)
ITEM 3 (Continued)
They believe that a thorough knowledge of conditions is a prerequisite for the formulation
of policies. We feel that by this
directive we were shown a phase of democracy toward which Allied Headquarters directs
the Japanese Nation to progress. It is
true that democracy is government-directed, through public opinion, but democracy
is a rational government which deals with
all social phenomena sympathetically and scientifically. I t was as much due to the
divergence between the policies and
actualities, as to the lack of knowledge of democracy on the part of the Nation, that
permitted our Government to fall into
the arbitrary hands of the militaristic, bureaucratic, and financial cliques.
For the future development of democratic JAPAN a scientific study of the fundamental
structure of all fields of national
activity is necessary. All Government policies, and all civil activities, should be
founded on this principle. The necessity
is most keenly felt in the fields covering [illegible]ina[illegible]e, industry,
transportation, living conditions, labor, and so on. We have had official investigations
and statistics. However, they have,
been of little use, except to demonstrate bureaucratic dexterity. On the other hand
the ZAIBATSU and other large enterprises
have made private investigations which have functioned only to render service to the
er[illegible]in pursuit
of profit.
We believe that for economic democratization, an investigation of the economic potentialities
of JAPAN is indispensable. How
much data has been gathered with regard to the food problem, the coal problem and
other important problems? It must be
discouragingly small. From a political point of view, a reliable survey of public
opinion will greatly help parliamentary
politics. What are the popular feelings about the Emperor system or Constitutional
reform? How much value does public opinion
possess at this moment?
The special police, which was abolished because of its secret character, aimed to
obtain political information as one of its
principal functions. We should, eliminate despotism founded on police information.
However, the examination of public opinion
by a democratic method will do much toward the establishment of democracy. This is
the reason why we earnestly advocate
establishing an organization which will determine the facts about public opinion.
Of course, its main mission would be the
scientific investigation and study of problems covering all fields of politics, economy,
society and culture. We believe that
we shall be allowed to publish books and hold lecture meetings for the enlightenment
of the masses. This organization should
be of a purely popular character, independent of political parties, financial and
industrial circles, and all other bodies and
societies.
However, it is absolutely necessary for the same organization to be complete in its
functions. If this organization is
authorized to accept an inquiry from the Government, the value inquiry organization
will be even greater.
The Government should establish, as soon as possible, agriculture foundation with
the remainder of the money which had been
donated for national defense. Moreover, the many inquiry organs which are connected
with the Government should be assigned to
this new organization. It would be most useful if the valuable books and the able
experts, which those old organs possess,
could become useful in creating a new JAPAN.
ITEM 4 The New Cabinet and The Popular Front - Yomiuri-Hochi - 15 Jan 46. Translator:
K. Arai.
Full Translation:
The remedial measures of the Government, which have been caught in the cyclomic political
directive, resulted in the Imperial
investiture of
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EDITORIAL SERIES: 253 (Continued)
ITEM 4 (Continued)
the three new Ministers in the SHIDEHARA Cabinet on the night of 13 January. Very
few may be satisfied with this reshuffle of
personnel.
Thinking of the administrators' lack of political ability, as well as old Prime Minister
SHIDEHARA, we are anxious about the
future of JAPAN. Probably the reorganization of the SHIDEHARA Cabinet may be based
on the idea that it is merely an
intermediate Cabinet formed prior to the forth coming general election.
The first aim in the establishment of democracy in JAPAN is to let the people live.
The present Cabinet is too incompetent to
tide over the current economic crises and to relieve the people from hunger and cold.
It is quite presumptuous for such an
incapable Cabinet to dare to try to carry the general election.
None of the people who have retired can be counted as a loss to this country. The
people do not feel grateful for their
efforts, but feel as if obstacle have been removed. However, we must not expect too
much of the new Minister.
Though Home Minister MIISUCHI must be a veteran in the political world, he is [illegible]vative
party-politician and he as Privy Councillar, did nothing during the time when the
GUMBATSU was abusing its authority.
ABE, the new Education Minister, may be regarded as a real liberal but we wonder
if [illegible]e has enough
political capacity to clean up the feudalism among educational officials.
As for the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, SOEJIMA, we know nothing of him.
We are overcome with apprehension as to how
he will face the present food crisis.
We heard that NARAHASHI, the new Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, insisted on the
wholesale resignation of the SHIDEHARA
Cabinet. We wish him to ac[illegible]according to his convictions because he is a promising man.
The people are greatly disappointed in the Government. With NOZAKA's arrival in TOKYO,
things lave taken a rapid turn
favorable to the Communists and other parties which intend to form a people's front.
DISTRIBUTION "X"
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