Press translations [Japan]. Political Series 0183, 1946-01-15.
Date15 January, 1946
translation numberpolitical-0766
call numberDS801 .S85
Persistent Identifier
POLITICAL SERIES: 183
ITEM 1 Inside Tips on the Political WorId by "BOKUTO, Sanjin": Magazine; Shinsei Nippon (Semi-Monthly) - 1 Jan 46 Issue. Translator: Echigo, Nakamura and Hasegawa.
Full Translation:
The True Nature of Splits and Coalitions Among the Various Political Parties
The Failure and Purge of the Diet.
As an inevitable consequence of her defeat, JAPAN faces a political revolution. Thus
far, however, this revolution, or
democratization, has not progressed very rapidly. For this lack of progress, there
are two main reasons: first, the main body
of the administration remains in the hands of a bureaucratic Cabinet, which hasn't
the ability to carry out a complete
democratic revolution in all its political spheres; second, this government does not
have the basic political attitude
necessary for the achievement of a democratic revolution. When we analyze these two
reasons, we see that they may, in fact, be
reduced to one basic reason - namely, neither the administration nor politics in general
has any real roots among the people.
Though it has been entrusted with the task of carrying out great revolutionary reforms,
the organization of the Diet remains
essentially unchanged. As such, it cannot possibly form the nucleus of a new political
system.
It is true, of course, that new political parties are being formed. For the most
part, however, their "newness" is only a
surface change; the old parliamentary influences were broken up only to be revived
again. To what extent, for instance, are
any of the three major parties - the Social-Democrats, the Liberals, and the Progressives,
prepared to assume their
responsibility for the war, and where among them can we distinguish anything genuinely
original? Basically their weakness lies
in their unwillingness to assume their share of war responsibility and then failure
to purge the Diet.
With the termination of the war, Diet members who were obliged to remain silent during
the war began to discuss purges in the
Diet. HATOYAMA, Ichiro and ASHIDA, Hitoshi, together with SAITO, Takae, KAWASAKI,
Katsu, ICHIMIYA, Fusajiro, and others of
MINSEITO extraction, began to carry on discussions with parliamentarians who had no
special affiliations with the TOJO Cabinet
during the war. Their object was the establishment of a new party and providing the
motivation for a Diet purge. Going one
step further, ASHIDA proposed to cooperate with KATAYAMA, Totsu, HARA and others of
the Social-Democratic Party. Moreover, he
invited liberal scholars to assist in the formation of a progressive new party. However,
when the new party was at last
organized, all of them betrayed their old parliamentary characteristics.
POLITICAL SERIES: 183 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
During the war, KATAYAMA and HARA had frequently held meetings at ASHIDA's home in
Kamakura and had been on friendly terms
with him. When the Social Mass Party was restored, however, they could not agree on
the formation of a new party with HATOYAMA
and ASHIDA. They said that they were willing to cooperate politically as individuals,
but that they felt they must draw a line
between public and private affairs, and so declined ASHIDA's proposal.
Soon the newly organized party of HATOYAMA and ASHIDA, augmented by ANDO, Masazumi,
MATSUNO, Tsuruhei; and KONO, Ichiro
indicated its intention to form a new cabinet with HATOYAMA as its head. At this point,
SAITO, KAWASAKI, ICHIMIYA and others
of the MINSEITO, who had been keeping in step with the rest, decided to break off
relations. Their pride as old party men made
the thought of becoming followers of HATOYAMA distasteful, and they said they could
not serve under him. Furthermore, HATOYAMA
himself, flattered by KONO and his followers, began to fancy himself as the one hope
for building a new Japan and thus lost
his leadership as a motivating power to purge the Diet. For this reason, the self
imposed purge of the Diet was not carried
out.
After this failure when, both at home and abroad, the investigation of war criminals
reached its height, a move to clarify the
question of war responsibility took shape in the special Diet session. Due to the
fact that among the three political parties,
however, not one was convinced that it shared in war guilt, the Diet's attitude could
not have been other than
non-committal.
Internal Condition of the Social-Democratic Party.
In the process of the development of militaristic government, the proletarian parties
were the ones that suffered most severe
suppression. Not only the militarists but the reactionary cabinets, as well, were
antagonistic, and persecuted them
mercilessly. As a result, left wing proletarian parties tinged with socialistic principles
had no alternative but to continue
their activities underground. The only lawful proletarian party, the Social Mass Party,
which managed to survive until the
dissolution of political parties following the founding of KONOE's new political movement,
remained an advocate of a very
diluted form of Socialism.
As a result of the defeat and the influence of the SCAP directives, the proletarian
parties had the opportunity to resume
their activities without any fear of suppression. Although they have been able to
come forward freely and independently, they
have been confronted with serious difficulties. The old proletarian parties based
on workers and farmers were entirely
destroyed, and the new groups had no alternative but to organize a single party through
the unification of all proletarian
influences. However, now that this party has been organized, it is certain that farm
and labor unions will be organized during
the coming general election, and that this will inevitably result in differences of
opinion within the party.
In the past, we know that proletarian parties held sharply divergent views, and that
internal disagreements frequently arose.
In addition, parties were dissolved from time to time to revise their organization.
Already, the Japanese Social Democratic
Party reveals signs of dissension: the fact that the party was made up of a union
of old parties became apparent in the
process of organization.
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POLITICAL SERIES: 183 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
In this unification of old proletarian parties, it is said that three principal powers
are united. The first of these groups
is made up of NISHIO, Suehiro, KATAYAMA, Tetsu, MATSUOKA, Komakichi, MATSUMOTO, Juichiro,
MIZUTANI, Chozaburo, and HIRANO,
Rikizo, all of whom came from the old Social Mass Party. The second group consists
of KONO, Mitsu, KAWAKAMI, Iyotaro, and
others from the Japanese Labor Party. The third group is made up of KATO, Kanju and
SUZUKI, Mozaburo.
The first disagreement which arose in the new party conceived (l) the presidency
of the party; and (2) the admission of ARIMA,
Rainei to membership. MIYAKE, KONO, and KAWAKAMI, who had come from the Japanese Labor
Party, attempted at first to make ARIMA
their president; in the face of opposition from those who had come from the Social
Mass Party, however, they were forced to
give up the project as impossible. They thereupon changed their strategy and proposed
a compromise upon which all groups might
agree. Namely, the party be run by a committee made up of four members - the three
elders ABE; KAGAWA; and TAKANO with ARIMA
as the fourth member.
At the meeting at which this proposal was discussed, MIYAKE is reported to have said,
"I am under an obligation to ARIMA and
FUNADA, and therefore would like to have these two men admitted to the party." Generally
speaking, ARIMA and FUNADA cannot be
regarded as socialists; consequently, those who had come from the Social Mass Party,
basing their objections on purely
theoretical grounds, opposed the above-mentioned proposal. The fact is that ARIMA
and his followers seemed to have assumed
that the party they were creating was not a socialist party, but a workers' party,
to be organized on the same pattern as that
of the Industrial Association and the Industrial Patriotic Association. When this
intention became apparent, both those who
had come from the Social Mass Party and the group composed of KATO and SUZUKI opposed
ARIMA so strongly that he, as well as
MIYAKE and his colleagues, had to abandon the idea of joining the new party. In the
end, then, the Social-Democratic Party
organization consisted only of members from the old proletarian parties. The problem
of ARIMA's admission to the party,
however, revealed the limited scope of the Social-Democrats' political consciousness.
The proletarian parties are characterized mainly by the clarity of their ideas and
theories. In its platform, of course, the
Social Democratic Party states: "We propose to abolish capitalism, to carry out socialism,
and to improve the welfare and
livelihood of the people." In the light of the limited political consciousness indicated
above, however, we may question the
party's ability to appeal to the working masses. NISHIO, in his interpellation at
the special session of the Lower House, was
unable to show any concrete socialistic policies. Nevertheless, the platform of the
Social-Democrats is the only one
advocating socialism. If the party is to insure our national livelihood by coping
with the problems of food and unemployment,
it must boldly advocate a socialistic system and a planned economy. If it fails to
do so, its platform is only a superficial
one.
The uncertain attitude taken by the Social-Democratic Party about the relationship
between the Emperor System and politics, a
relationship upon which the evolution of Japan into a democratic nation so heavily
depends, will remain the weak point of the
proletarian groups. Theoretically, they advocate putting the sovereignty into the
hands of the people. Practically, they
advocate the maintenance of the Emperor System. In this case, evidently, they must
discover a political theory by which the
two systems may be harmonized. They
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POLITICAL SERIES: 183 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
must also take up the problem of revising the Constitution. It seems, however, that
the Social Democrats are having
considerable difficulty in finding a solution. If they were to put this problem aside,
their party would be criticized by the
Communists, who advocate the abolition of the Emperor System. Furthermore, if the
many Japanese Communists who are in Yenan,
China and Soviet Russia return to Japan, they will violently critize and attack the
Social-Democrats. If it is to secure any
stability as a socialist party, it is evident that the Japanese Social-Democratic
Party must undergo drastic changes.
The Weakness of the Liberal Party
It appeared at first that the formation of the Liberal Party was progressing smoothly,
and that men of similar opinions were
gathering around President HATOYAMA., Ichiro. Indeed, one of the Liberal Party's strong
points is that its members share a
strong hope of forcing a HATOYAMA Cabinet; in reality, however, the party is a mixture
of men of all different sorts. As for
HATOYAMA, his purpose is to collect men of talent from all strata of society. He frequently
declared that the number of his
members who returned to the Diet vas not his concern, but that he wanted only new
members with democratic views. HATOYAMA,
himself, has not proved to be a very popular person. Many members gave up the idea
of joining the Liberal Party, because
HATOYAMA was to be their leader. OZAKI, the veteran politician, though an old member,
refused to be enlisted in the party
because political ambitions involved in the presidency of HATOYAMA were abhorrent
to him.
When HATOYAMA came to organize his party, in spite of his repeated declarations to
the contrary, the number of members had an
irresistible attraction for him. Finally he lay aside his long-cherished ideal altogether,
and threw open the door to all who
wished to join. By so doing, he managed to rake together 45 members of the Diet. Now,
however, his party necessarily included
war crime suspects, and so it came to lose much of the originality and genuineness
which he had prized so highly. This fact
more than anything else constitutes the weakness of his party.
From the viewpoint of their policies and characteristics, there is little to choose
between the Liberal and the Progressive
Party. The only difference lies in the fact that the former is headed by HATOYAMA,
who kept his silence and remained an
observer during the war. Therefore, the character of the Liberal Party means, in fact,
the character of HATOYAMA himself. His
character as a statesman has something in common with that of KONOE in that both of
them are blessed with the perspicacity
peculiar to men of noble birth. However, he is cursed with the naivete, and gullibility
of putting, faith in those who fawn on
him and talk mellifluently of the "HATOYAMA Cabinet". His perspicacity is evident
in his speeches.
The interpellation speech HATOYAMA delivered extemporaneously in the last special
session of the Diet was worthy of a man of
presidential caliber. And yet his speech indicated but abstractly a pacifistic world
outlook and the direction in which a
democratic Japan is to march. More than perspicacity and oratory are expected of a
statesman. The man who leads our democratic
revolution must have statesmanship to decide the course of the revolution. The lack
of statesmanship constitutes a serious
drawback in the Liberal Party as well as in HATOYAMA himself. For example, he contrived
to appoint his close friend KONO,
Ichiro to the post of the chief secretary - a stop which greatly disturbed MATSUNO,
Tsuruhei; NAROZAKI, Wataru; and others. If
this tendency to choose just his friends continues, it
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POLITICAL SERIES: 183 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
will not only stir up discontent, but will seriously hinder the growth of the Liberal
Party. At the present time such
apprehensions are becoming increasingly apparent. What is of paramount importance
is that HATOYAMA should have the faith and
courage to shake off his political ambitions and his egotism, and devote himself to
the cause of our democratic
revolution.
The Deception of the Progressive Party.
There is no party so incongruously named and so politically deceiving as the Japanese
Progressive Party. It is a new party in
name only. In reality, the Progressives have acted the chameleon by simply changing
their name from the "Imperial Rule
Assistance Association" to the "Japanese Progressive Party". When we look at the facts,
we see that leaders of the Imperial
Rule Assistance Association, which became the Japan Political Society, carried on
intensive underhanded activities and, in the
end, succeeded in establishing this "new" party.
If we go into detail, we see that ASHIDA and others of the Liberal Party, together
with SAITO; KALASAKI; and ICHIMIYA of the
MINSEITO, aimed at establishing a new party; failing in this, they started a move
to purge the MINSEITO, and persuaded
NAKAJIMA and his faction of the SEIYUKAI to form, for the time being, a new party
consisting of parliamentarians who were not
tinged with war-guilt. OASA, Tadao and his faction were the target of the purge in
the MINSEITO. They were opposed primarily
because of the fact that, during the transformation of the Imperial Rule Assistance
Party into the Japan Political Society,
OASA co-operated with the TOJO military clique, and despotically monopolized the choice
of administrative officials, the
management of the Diet and the like.
Those conducting the purge reasoned something like this: "We should like to reject
OASA and MIYOSHI, Hideyuki. However,
certain of their followers - NODA, Takeo; NAKAMURA, Umekichi; and ITO, Goro - are
outstanding figures, and should be left
alone." Seeing this, OASA called on MACHIDA, Chuji and pleaded not to be excluded.
When the question of a president for the
new party was discussed among the members of the former MINSEITO who advocated this
reform, IKEDA, Hideo suggested General
UGAKI, KAWASAKI, Katsu explained that UGAKI already had his own faction and had intentions
of running for president himself.
Thus, began the movement for putting UGAKI into the presidency. However, because of
his having been affiliated with the
military clique, he could not gain the support of all members and the effort terminated
without further discussion.
On the other hand, "Group A" of the New Japan Reconstruction Investigation Committee,
composed of representatives who had not
been elected more than three times, attempted to organize a new party with former
members of the Japan Political Society. OASA
and others who had formerly held leading positions in the Japan Political Society
attempted to take part in this movement.
MAEDA, Yonezo, however, consscious of his war-responsibility, seemed inclined to withdraw
from political circles and remained
completely out of the picture in so far as organizing this new party was concerned.
The new party, organized with former members of the Japan Political Society as its
new cleus, could not materialize until it
could achieve some kind of unity. Consequently, SHIMADA, Toshio, the Chairman, took
the lead and, through the good offices of
MACHIDA and NAKAJIMA, the Progressive Party was at last organized.
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POLITICAL SERIES: 183 (Continued)
ITEM 1 (Continued)
As a natural result of the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, even this new party
is obligated to take up the task of
establishing a democratic political system in Japan. In order to do so, it must sweep
away the old governing classes that
directed the militaristic policies of the past, and must make clear the question of
political war responsibility. From this
point of view, if we look back upon the wartime period dominated by the Imperial Assistance
Rule Association, MAEDA; YAMAZAKI;
KAMAMITSU; MIYOSHI; TSUGUMO; TAKEJIMA; and others who had been closely affiliated
with the TOJO Cabinet, and who favored on
the military clique, and those who tried to defend the TOJO government, must share
the war responsibility with the TOJO
Cabinet. At any rate, it seems proper that they should decline membership in the new
party. Nevertheless, we find that among
members of the Progressive Party, OASA; YAMAZAKI; KANAMITSU; and MIYOSHI are prominent
figures. NAKAJIMA, Chikuhei, because of
the fact that he had co-operated with the financial and military cliques, recognized
his war responsibility, refrained from
joining the Progressive Party, and seemed inclined to give up the idea of running
as a candidate.
The Progressive Party has been organized with both the former MINSEITO group and
the former SEIYUKAI1s NAKAJIMA faction as its
basic elements. The representative of the NAKAJIMA group is TANABE, Shichiroku. The
MINSEITO faction was led by SAITO;
ICHINOMIYA; KAWASAKI; and TSURUMI; those who must bear war responsibilities formally
withdrew as leaders. Actually, however,
those who head this party are little more than puppets. The old leaders remain in
the background, but continue to hold great
influence in the management of this party. In a word, then, the Progressive Party
is a completely camouflaged party. If this
party is able to command a majority after the general election, the democratic revolution
in Japan cannot even begin. The fact
is that the Progressive Party was unified only for the coming general election; later,
it will very likely be split because of
the differences over the presidency of the party.
In conclusion, not one of the new parties has either the definite policies nor the
spirit necessary to take the lead in the
democratization of Japan. The essential fact about many of the new parties is that
they consist mainly of old members of the
Diet, who have repeatedly broken up their groupings and reorganized them in attempts
to form new parties, but who have had no
real support from the majority of the people. Consequently, the direction these new
parties take will be determined largely by
the extent to which they are able to gain the support of the people during the coming
general election. In any event, these
parties must be basically revolutionized under the strict political criticism of the
people. Only in this way can the road to
the democratization of Japan be opened.
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