Press translations [Japan]. Political Series 0181, 1946-01-14.
Date14 January, 1946
translation numberpolitical-0756
call numberDS801 .S85
Persistent Identifier
POLITICAL SERIES: 181
ITEM 1 Mass Meeting of Agricultural Ministry Employees - Asahi Shimbun 13 Jan 46. Translator: S. Kawasaki.
Full Translation:
The Staff Association of the Ministry of agriculture and Forestry, which is demanding
democratization of governmental offices,
will stage a mass meeting at the Central Agriculture Building at 1230 on 15 January.
The Association will submit a plan to
establish four organs, such as the Personnel Affairs Control Committee, the Treatment
Improvement Committee, the Food Problem
Research Committee and the Government Office Representatives' Conference. In case
of the forthcoming administrative
readjustment, at the general meeting the attitude and policy which will be adopted
by the Personnel Affairs Control Committee
will be decided. In the future, specific personnel affairs will be dealt with.
The Treatment Improvement Committee will investigate household economic affairs of
the officials. In addition to demanding
increased salaries computed on a scientific basis, a co-operative welfare society
is to be established.
The Food-stuff Problem Research Committee is to be established in order that the
staffs of the Ministry of agriculture and
Forestry can study a policy hinged on the development of the food supply situation,
and put that policy to practical use.
Furthermore, concerning the combination of various Governmental Offices, on 11 January,
the representatives of Ministries of
Justice, Commerce and Industry. Transportation, the Board of Communication, and TOKYO
Metropolitan Office, gathered at the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and held a conference.
As a result, the Governmental Office Representative Conference, was established on
15 January. Hereafter, with this Conference
as its center, the democratization Campaign of various governmental offices will be
promoted; and various offices will proceed
toward the accomplishment of their aims.
ITEM 2 Successors to fill the Vacancies [illegible]Created By Outgoing State Ministers In Purged Cabinet - Asahi Shimbun - 13 Jan 46. Translator: H. Kate.
Summary:
Privy Councillor MITSUJI, Chuzo, 76 year old native of KAGAWA-Ken, was unoffically
chosen to be the Home Minister and
Transportation Minister. He has unexpectedly come back after the scandal of the TEIKOKU
Rayon Company Incident. Being a
hardworking veteran in politics, he may be a pillar of the reorganized SHIDEHARA Cabinet.
His career since 1913 is as follows:
A member of the House of Representatives 10 times, a State Minister four times, in
the Education, Finance, Communication and
Railway
POLITICAL SERIES: 181 (Continued)
ITEM 2 (Continued)
Ministries respectively, he was specially granted the privileges of his former post
in 1943 and was Privy Councillor in 1945
as a senior member in the political world.
Director of the First High School ABE, Yoshinori, excellent disciple of the eminent
Japanese author NATSUME, Sosek[illegible]was informally appointed to be the Education Minister. He went to [illegible]European countries to study philosophy and the history of philosophy in 1929, After
that time he was a profoss[illegible]at KE[illegible]O [illegible]University for about 16 years till he
succeeded the former [illegible]Education Minister HASHIDA, Kunihiko[illegible], as a
director of the First High School. He is a fine philosopher standing aloof from the
[illegible]owd[illegible]and his writings "The Times and Culture[illegible]was suppressed for promoting
individualistic trends in the dras[illegible]proh[illegible]of liberalistic and
individualistic publication in 1941. He was nominated as member of the House of Peers
by the Emperor last year.
SOEJIMA, Senhachi, is expected to be Agriculture and Forestry Minister, He, a native
of SAGA-Ken and was a classmate of
HATOYAMA, President of the Liberal Party. His career is as follows. Director of the
Provisions Board of the Agriculture and
Commerce Ministry (later the Rice Board) in 1921; Vice-President of the YAWATA Iron
Foundry in 1922, Director of the Commerce
Board in 1924, Managing Director of the SHOWA Steel Manufacturing Company in 1929,
Chief Director of the OSAKA Stock Exchange
from 1932 to 1936, Head Official of the International Exhibition (BANKOKU HAKURANKAI)
in 1937, Chief Director of the TOKYO
Stock Exchange in 1939, Vice-President of the NIPPON Bill Exchange in 1943. He is
not an utter stranger to the rice problem
with the foregoing careers and in the pressing food and other problems great hopes
are entained of him.
Director of the Cabinet Board: of Legislation, NARAHASHI, Wataru, 75 years old, is
expected to be Chief Cabinet Secretary and
Minister without Portfolio. He is a self-educated lawyer who enjoyed successful fame
in the TOKYO FRANCE Debt Case. As for his
political career he was a member of the House of Representatives from his native FUKUOKA
and then became Director of the
Cabinet Board of Legislation. It is because Prime Minister SH[illegible]IARA was aware of his talent that he
was nominated as the [illegible]net Chief Secretary in place of TSUGITA.
ISHIGURO, Takeshige, was unofficially chosen to be Director of the C[illegible]abinet Board of Legislation.
His career is as follows: Head of the Economic Revival Section of the Agriculture
and Forestry Ministry and Governor of
YAMAGATA-Ken in 1939: Director of the Fiber Board of the Commerce and Industry Ministry
and Director of the Trade Board in
1940, Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in 1941, Chariman of the Commodities
Price Committee and President of the
Greengrocer Supply Control Company in 1942 and Chief Secretary of the Privy Council
in 1945. Being a clever and versatile
official, he will enter a new phase of his career as one of the brains of the SHIDEHARA
Cabinet.
ITEM 3 True Circumstances at Time of Surrender (Pare 1) - Asahi Shimbun - 13 Jan 46. Translator: J. Weiller.
Summary:
Now the whole nation perfectly understands that the war was lost, but when it suddenly
heard the news of the end of war and of
defeat in the [illegible]t of frantic orders for decisive battles on the mainland
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POLITICAL SERIES: 181 (Continued)
ITEM 3 (Continued)
the nation, as a matter of fact, was struck dumb. We asked Mr. SEKO[illegible]IZU, Tsunehisa, Chief
Secretary of the Cabinet in the SUZUKI Cabinet which accomplished the great task of
ending the war to publish the intricacies
of the then prevailing situation to which he consented. He contributed the following
memoirs:
"The SUZUKI Cabinet was formed in April, 1945. I do not know whether or not the Premier
had a plan in for the end of war at
the time of formation of his cabinet but from the fact that immediately after inauguration
he ordered a thorough study of
d[illegible]capacity for carrying on the war. I presume his determination was not solely for continuing
the war.
"An old American friend of mine is now here as a captain of the occupying forces.
According to him, when he found my among the
personnel in the news of the formation of the SUZUK[illegible]Cabinet, after putting that fact together with
the Premier's personality, he predicted to his friends in AMERIC that the war would
come to an end within six months. So it
seems that abroad, too, the SUZUKI Cabinet was not regarded as a mere wartime Government.
"According to the Premier's orders, minute studies were made, based on detailed statistics
and forecasts regarding the
munition industries, food and trends of public feelings, by military, naval and other
related authorities with the
Investigation Bureau of the Cabinet as the center. While making an estimate of changes
in our national strength, s[illegible]nles were also being pushed regarding other countries' attitudes toward us. The conclusion
was arrived
at in the middle of May, and it became evident that unless some miraculous methods
were worked out, the prevailing internal
situation could not stand the war any more.
"If was judged that, following the collapse of GERMANY, the other Powers' attitudes
toward us would become all the more
uncompromising and that we would have to expect a declaration of war by the SOVIET
UNION about the end of September. Under
such a forecast our conclusion was that with the termination of war at the end of
July or August, at the latest, as an
objective, we must establish complete mobilization and complete use of equipment;
otherwise it would not only become difficult
to hold OKINAWA but the decisive battles on the mainland would [illegible]by no means be easy matters.
"It was considered, however, very difficult to realize these objectives. Since the
beginning of May, frequent meetings were
held by the Premier, the Foreign, War, and Navy Ministers, and Chiefs of [illegible]the Army and Navy
General Staffs. The contents of those meetings were kept strictly secret from me and
also from the lower organization of the
Army and Navy but the result was the so-called HIROTA - MALICK private interviews.
The objectives of the interviews were,
first, to improve JAPAN-SOVIET relations in order to make the SOVIET UNION clarify
her neutral stand. (The SOVIET UNION
announced the abrogation of the Non-Agression Pact at the beginning of April), and
further, if possible, to end the war with
the SOVIET UNION as an intermediary. At the beginning the situation was thought hopeful.
"In fact, an attempt was made by the KOISO Cabinet to end the war by means of the
SOVIET'S intervention, but before it
materialized the question was dropped. Subsequently when the battle for OKINAWA began
to look bad for us the necessity for
deciding on the fundamental principle for the future guidance of war was felt, and
as a result, a conference in the Emperor's
presence was held on 9 June.
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POLITICAL SERIES: 181 (Continued)
ITEM 3 (Continued)
At this conference discussions were put[illegible]forward based on the above mentioned estimate of national
strength and judgment of the international situation, and the conclusion reached was
that ending the war without sacrificing
the national polity and the Imperial land was desirable. The expression of this conclusion
contained profound meaning. It
meant that so long as the national polity was upheld and the Imperial land was preserved,
the war would be regarded as over,
but on account of the surrounding situation the phrase completion of the war was ostensibly
adopted.
"On the heels of this conference an extraordinary Session the Diet was convened at
which the epoch-making Law of Emergency
Wartime Measures was submitted. Many members asked the Government why the Extraordinary
Imperial Prerogative, according to
Article 31 of the Constitution, was not put into action. They argued that the introduction
of such a law showed the
Government's cowardly attitue in putting responsibility on the Diet. The aim of the
introduction of this law was to help
execute the war by a wholesale revision of the various controlling regulations which
were hindrances to the manipulation of
total national strength. The reason why the Premier specially chose the form of law
instead of an Extraordinary Imperial Order
based on Article 31 was that he feared unnecessarily involving the Emperor by the
latter method. Therefore, he preferred
constitutional measures like the former procedure. Witnessing debates in the Diet,
I secretly regretted the attitude of the
legislature. As a result of the passage of this bill the Government[illegible]t once set about eliminating
certain obstacles.
"In the meantime the situation on OKINAWA was fast growing worse and in spite of
strenuous co-operation of the Army and Navy
it reached the last stage. Public opinion was aroused and loud voices were heard attacking
the lack of harmony between the two
fighting forces.
"This friction was often pointed out since the beginning of the war, and on the formation
of the SUZUKI Cabinet, the unity of
the forces having become a question, the Premier had interviews with both Army and
Navy leaders and tried to accelerate mutual
co-operation between the two. However, as far as the OKINAWA Campaign was concerned
the tactical co-operation between the two
forces was regarded as satisfactory, but nothing could be done to compensate for the
shortage of materials. For example, the
fleet under Admiral ITO had to use unsatisfactory oil due to the shortage of crude
oil. It is also regrettable that the
weather did net favor the attack by air torpedo fleet(GIRETSU). OKINAWA was lost in
this way, plunging the whole nation into
uneasiness. On 22 June the Prime Minister, the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign
Affairs and the Chief of the Military and
Navy General Staffs, were unexpectedly summoned to the palace and were instructed
by the Emperor to consider means to end the
war as speedily as possible.
"The Premier, after returning to the Official residence, told me, without revealing
the particulars, that the Emperor frankly
indicated to him what he could dare not tell to the others, After the Imperial summons
the six leaders had repeated
conferences and as a result decided to send a special mission to the SOVIET UNION
with a view of discussing adjustment of the
relations between the two countries and to request intervention in connection with
the end of the war. As special envoy,
Prince KONOYE was chosen by His Majesty's gracious will."
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