Press translations [Japan]. Political Series 0098, 1945-12-21.
Date21 December, 1945
translation numberpolitical-0434
call numberDS801 .S85
Persistent Identifier
POLITICAL SERIES: 98
ITEM 1 The Labor Union Law not Worth a Slice of Potato Provincial Newspaper Chugoku SHIMBUN (HIROSHIMA) 15 Dec 45 Translator: WEILLER J.
Summary:
The labor Union Law is shortly to be enacted, bat are the workers in general rejoicing?
No! As far as we can determine, the
bill is not particularly appealing to working classes. Some of them even declare that
a slice of sweet potato is preferable to
the law. It is no wonder, in view of the fact, that they have experience various labor
movementsm the past decade or so all of
which were poor ones, demanding only worker's sacrifices.
Workers had to be of constant service to the capitalists, ostensibly for the ske
of the country, but on termination of the war
they have been turned out into the street where some of them have become loafers while
others are in the black market, having
lost the will to work.
The law is going to he hurled at the workers in such an atmosphere, so that even
if it is accepted among the wage earners it
may end in being utilized for the mere protection of their lives, rather than being
applied to the reconstruction of JAPAN'S
Economy.
A representative of HIROSHIMA Branch of the JAPAN Social Democrat Party, while being
pleased with the coming enactment of the
law, admits the deplorable cultural level of our average workers, and keenly feels
the necessity for their enlightment. He
points out, however, that education must net be a mere spiritual one, as hitherto
advocated, but one which can at once be pat
into practice in daily life. He goes on to say that the law must not be utilized merely
for the protection of the individual's
life but for the reconstruction of JAPAN'S industry.
ITEM 2 KONOYE'S Diaries ASAHI 18 Dec 45 Translator: PAASCHE
Full Translation:
Desiring to redeem himself in the eyes of the world, Prince KONOYE bequeathed two
diaries, one of which he turned over to his
son [illegible]Michitara shortly before poisoning himself. The diaries are titled "Ministers of the
UNITED
STATES-JAPAN Negotiations during the 2nd and 3rd KONOYE Cabinets", and "The Tri-Parties
Pact". These diaries represent the
views of Prince KONOYE. The chapters dealing with the council in the presence of the
Emperor, and Japanese-American
negotiations shed light on The Stand then Taken by the Military clique and The Government,
and Therefore constitute valuable
material. The following are notes made by Prince KONOYE.
A. Antagonism between Government and Army.
POLITICAL SERIES 98 (Continued)
ITEM 2 (Continued)
1. Imperial Council Decisions: On 6 September the Imperial Council adoped decisions
on .important matters relating to the
Execution of policies of the Empire. According to paragraph three (Diplomatic Negotiations),
was against the USA, GREAT
BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS would he inevitable if the realization of our aspirations
by negotiation weemed hopeless by 15
OCTOBER. On that date the Army took the position that nothing will come of negotiations
with the USA. Accordingly, they
demanded an opening of hostilities about mid-October, stating such was the logical
outcome of Imperial Council decisions. The
Government, however, maintained that negotiations were not entirely hopeless, and
that, quite to the contrary, the content of
American letters and other information supported the belief that the Americans showed
considerable promise of reaching an
understanding. The situation some what complicated by certain misapprehensions and
doubts, the interference of third nations,
and the European war situation. The gradual reinforcing, since the beginning of October,
of the small Japanese force in FRENOH
INDO-CHINA, though permitted by treaty, had an adverse effect on negotiations. Owing
to the activity of a strong anti-Japanese
faction within the Far Eastern Section of the US State Department, the policies of
the President and Secretary of State HULL
were frequently frustrated. An agreement over a period of time is certainly not beyond
expectations, even on the basis of
conditions transmitted today. I believe an agreement can be reached today if the Army
would reconsider its stand. This would
amount to a withdrawal of troops. The Army wants the matter settled not later than
the end of October, since a further delay
in the opening of hostilities would result in great strategical disadvantage. The
latter part of October, therefore, must be
closely observed.
2. Difficulties in negotiations with the USA., especially with reference to withdrawal
of troops. Negotiations with the USA is
still in progress. I do not believe the Americans have laid all their cards on the
table so far, so we are still in the dark
about American intentions. The problems presenting the greatest difficulty are:
a. Withdrawal of troops in CHINA and elsewhere; JAPAN'S position in the Tri-Partite
agreement; Equal commercial rights in the
PACIFIC.
All these problems are closely related to that of troop withdrawal which, by that
token, becomes the only difficulty in
negotiations.
In reference to the problem of occupation, the Army insists that peace terms offered
CHINA are very generous since neither
territories nor indemities are asked for. But the interior of CHINA is infested with
Communist and other revolutionary
movements which threaten the security of CHINA and JAPAN alike. The welfare, economic
development and security of both nations
requires the garrisoning of troops in certain areas for a period of time. Other troops
would be withdrawn in the course of
settlement of the incident. Obviously, then, garrisoning of troops is a condition
sine qua now in the eyes of the Army.
Occupation is considered by them of first importance, being the only possible solution
to the CHINA incident. Consequently,
withdrawal from CHINA without leaving an occupation force is unlikely to meet the
approval of the Army. Such a solution would
moreover, serve the propagation of defeatism in the army, seriously affecting the
maintenance of a high morale.
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POLITICAL SERIES: 98 (Continued)
ITEM 2 (Continued)
American objectives on this issue are not yet clear; hence, final acceptance of our
conditions is not impossible. AMERICA
maintains that JAPAN should agree to withdrawal in principle, thereby placing in a
secondary position the question of an
occupation force. At this picture it is by no means clear whether an occupation force
will be acceptable to AMERICA, but
negotiations seem to indicate it is not impossible.
AMERICA farther desires to informed of JAPAN'S true intentions in occupation. At
a 13 October conference between Japanese
Minister to the USA, MAKASUGI, and under secretary of State Sumner WELLES, the latter
started that every thing depended upon
JAPAN'S sincerity; that if JAPAN was sincere in agreeing to withdraw troops, discussions
on execution of the withdrawal could
be resumed. The Government believes negotiation on withdrawal should be continued
for some time. The necessity for stationing
troops will, of course, be emphasized as a matter of principle. But should the outcome
of negotiations at some time hinge on
this issue, it may prove advisable to adopt a realistic attitude and accept the principle
of withdrawal in order to get on
with occupation.
3. Views concerning the opening of hostilities: The Army took the position that since
the enforcement of British, American,
and other freezing orders, it became virtually impossible to import raw materials
for military use, especially oil. If this
situation persisted, JAPAN would inevitably be crippled. Then if AMERICA chose to
bring unfair pressure to bear upon JAPAN,
JAPAN would be unable to resist, even if her very existance were in jeopardy. Therefore,
the time for decision had arrived.
Although the situation presented some danger, there was no need for apprehension so
long as the nation was united in the firm
resolve to overcome all difficulties. We had our weaknesses, but they had theirs,
too. If settlement of the CHINA war was to
be attained with American, assistance, resulting conditions would be too favorable
to the Chinese, thus establishing a Chinese
contempt for JAPAN. This condition would make it necessary to chastise CHINA a few
years later.
Being Premier, my own opinion is necessarily different. It is only with the greatest
difficulty that I can understand the
feasibility of plunging into a large-scale war, the outcome of which is uncertain,
while matters in CHINA are not yet settled.
Moreover, I feel a profound responsibility for the CHINA incident. True, a gradual
dipliion of war materials may come about as
a result of the freezing action. But in the case of oil, for example, if we attack
the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, we will have
to deal with the problem of destroyed production facilities and safe convoy. There
is no way of knowing whether we can expect
the required quantities after one or two years. Rathern than make war we should mobilize
labor and materials. By stepping up
the production of synthetic oil, the realization of 2,500,000 tons in 1943 and 4,000,000
tons in 1944 would not be impossible.
As conditions new stand, four years of war in CHINA have exhausted the Nation, and
it already displays symptons of a
deterioration in morale. I feel JAPAN should slowly and patiently proviate national
strength and consummate the CHINA
conflict, keeping the fleet intact and alerted.
- 3 -
ITEM 2 (Continued)
4. Opinions of the Navy: The Navy believes that the time has come for JAPAN to decide
whether she wishes to continue
negotiations or enter into a state of war. If JAPAN prefers negotiations, she should
pursae her course with no other purpose
than a settlement in mind, since, if it should become evident after two or three months
of negotions what no settlement can be
reached, it will be impossible to resort to war. Therefore, the Prime Minister must
decide whether JAPAN, to follow a policy
of war or diplomacy. That war should be avoid as far as possible, and that relations
between the UNITED STATES and should be
adjusted dipomatically are opinions widely held in the Navy.
B[illegible]About mid-April, Secretary of State HULL presented the "Draft plan for a Japanese-American
agreement" to Ambassador NOMUBA, adding that he believed relations could be improved
greatly if the matters contained in the
plan could be clarified and adjusted. The issues were: (a) the attitude of both Governments
to the CHINA Incident; and (c) the
policy of both Governments toward political stability in the PACIFIC. The Japanese
Government amended the plan by the middle
of May, after deliberations between the Government and the General staff, and often
Foriegn Minister MATSUOKA'S return from
GERMANY and ITALY. Before the end of June, AMERICA presented another revised plan.
At about the same time, war broke out
between RUSSIA and GERMANY, and the international situation became further complicated.
Moreover, in order to farther our
policy in CHINA, we began the peaceful occupation of Southern FRE CH INDO-CHINA in
July, in accordance with out treaty with
the French. Japanese-American relations entered a state of tension, however, when
AMERICA retaliated by freeing Japanese
assets. Although JAPAN had sent a reply to AMERICA'S June proposals, Ambassador NOMUBA
did not transmit it. Thereafter the
second KONOYE Cabinet resigned The third KONOYE Cabinet endeavored to continue negotiations
as far as possible, proposing a
conference between ROOSEVELT and KONOYE on the restoration of amicabll relations.
Events preceding and following the 6
September Imperial Conference make it appear that it was intended to reach a solution
of Japanese-American problems and the
CHINA conflict through all diplomatic means possible. Resorting to war only when all
Diplomatic means became exhausted.
Consequently, sometime after the beginning of September, the ROOSEVELT-KONOTE meeting
was proposed. On 20 September we
proposed to the Americans a thorough revision of their plans as well as our claims.
On 2 October, the UNITED STATES replied
with a memorandum which gave rise to doubts about AMERICA'S intention to continue
negotiating. Hope seemed futile. We could
not decide whether to abandon or pursue negotiations, and make concessions where necessary.
DISTRIBUTION "X"
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