Press translations [Japan]. Editorial Series 0089, 1945-12-14.

Full Translation:

Voters in NIGATA Prefecture for the forthcoming general election are estimated to be 1,270,000. This means nearly 55 per cent of the whole population in this prefecture will participate in politics through the general election. The figure of 1,270,000 voters is three times as large as that in the preceding general election of 410,000. Now that the voting age has been lowered to 20 years and woman's suffrage has been instituted 60,000 young men and 689,000 women are expected to vote. In addition, the majority of the demobilized servicemen, numbering 67,000, are entitled to vote. The participation in politics of such great numbers of the people marks a great moment in our march toward the democratization of JAPAN.

In view of the present acute shortage of food, some are assuming that many voters in this prefecture will abstain from voting. The authority must do their best lest people should abstain from voting, by stressing that the general election is the first step toward the solution of our pressing problems, including food production. In the preceding general election the non-voting percentage in this prefecture was l6.8 per cent. Considering that women will participate in the coming election, perhaps the abstention rate may be higher. However, we strongly encourage our officials to institute political and civic education for the people to make them realize the idea of democracy.

The names of political parties and statesmen are becoming mere familiar. For example, prefectural chapters of the Liberal and progressive Parties have been organized, while the Social Democratic Party is concentrating an gathering local members. But our scrupulous investigation of the Progressive and Liberal Parties shows that both are mostly comprised of super-politicians. It is absurd to find some cases in which the same politician is associated with both parties. Some politicians are being dragged into party movements before they are aware of it, and are util[illegible]to curry the favor of the prefectural citizens. We can not but sympathy with these innocent automatons, but, at the same time, we question the sincerity of parties.

The formation of the present political parties has not emanated from the people, but the fact of surrender motivated politicians to form parties. Therefore, we must be broadminded enough to allow some disorder at this stage of events. Nevertheless , the above parties are to be blamed for gathering as many members as possible, whether or not they are already forsaken by the people or whether or not they are leaders from the old political circles and are now worthy of sharp public criticism. Such being the case, both parties must be considered as being actuated more

EDITORIAL SERIES: 89 (Continued)

ITEM 1 (Continued)

by political tactics to gain superiority in the general election than by a sense of duty to execute their respective platforms. Under such circumstances, breakup or collapse is inevitable in both parties so it is absurd to think that our prefectural citizens will place confidence in either party.

Of course, we never intend to criticize new political parties unduly. On the contrary, we are very eager for them to attain fair maturity. To this end, our political parties should replace out dated, undemocratic ideas by fresh, democratic ones. Political parties should appeal to the younger generation and women, and be ready to win the confidence of our prefectural people. A total of 1,270,000 voters in NIGATA prefecture are expected to comprehend the true meaning of democracy, scrutinize the platforms of parties, and vote for good statesmen. In short, all the Japanese, including their statesmen, should act wisely.

Summary:

The five-year financial program, which was submitted and explained by the Finance Minister to the Diet on 5 December is nothing but a makeshift only at best , and hardly seems to be worthy of criticism. The reasons for such an indictment are as follows.

Our financial system, after will inevitably include so many indefinite factors that it cannot be expressed as a definite one. The Finance Minister is not to blamed for this.

The second reason is that this program was made up hastily as the result of an interpellation by KAWASAKI, Koku. The latter stressed that a speciic financial program should be made public by the Government, now that the settlement of the wartime profit tax and the property tax has been determined; Whereupon the Finance minister submitted the above program to the Diet too days afterward. So, it is only makeshift at be It may be said that he lacked the statesmanship and boldness to frankly reply "no". For all this, the program should be studied here in its outline, because it was presented to the Diet.

Let us begin with the conclusion we have drawn. We can see that the Finance Minister is too absorbed in optimistic opinions and never once seems to be conscious of our trying situation. His opinion is that although the deficit will inevitably amount to about 2,000 million yen in the first years, it will eventually become liquidated in 1948. If the war profits tax were put into effect, a surplus fund more than 3,500 million yen could result. Then the financial system of JAPAN could be said to be normal again.

But we must realize that in our homeland colossal capital sums and industrial potential will be confiscated by the Allied Powers, with a resulting decrease and decrease in production and the people's income. In addition, our nation will lose not only capital, facilities and important resources in foreign countries but also shall have to indemni[illegible]a part of the currencies connected with the yen. Such being the case, these estmates of the Government, of (1) 9,300 million yen of internal revenue in each of the five years , (2) 2,000 million yen of annual revenue from the sale of Government enterprises , (3) 300 million yen per year to be payed into the Bank of JAPAN, and (4 ) 800 million yen of annual revenue resulting from the sale of national property, have no factual basis.

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EDITORIAL SERIES: 89 (Continued)

ITEM 2 (Continued)

By such a mere guess, to calculate a 12,000 million yen annual revenue at present and to predict it to be 13,000 million yen in 1950 is nothing but playing with figures . And still more, as to the program of annual expenditures, which is distributed among such categories as (1) special expenditure (2) general expenditure, and (3) other expenditures, and still itemized in a complicated manner, we can only say that it is too formal. We cannot find any such basis for our nation's economy.

For example, consider the 4,500 million yen of the Governments yearly debt interest, Is it possible to consider this as stable for the year 1945 through 1948? After 1946 it is calculated as 5,700 million yen per year. Still further, inregard to (1) 1,300 million yen of foreign loans, the expenditure for its interest must be presumed to increase more and more, because it will inevitably be affected by a decline in the exchange rate, (2) 100 million yen of annual expenditure for pensions it cannot be considered as stable throughout the five years, (3) The reserve fund, which amounted to the colossal sum of 4,200 million yen in 1945, it is to be fixed at 100 million yen beginning with the next fiscal year and although we can see his administrative will in it, it is very doubtf[illegible]whether it is possible to carry out such a program over the next four years with the projected figures: (4 ) general administrative expenditure, it is to be reduced to about 1,500 million yen beginning with the next fiscal year, is it possible to go through the next four years with this projected figure? One question is followed by another.

As has been shown, the so-called "five-year financial program" is nothing but "a painted rice cake". The conclusion which is deduced from it is much more discreditable and all the more important. SHIBUZAWA concludes that the collection of the two war profit taxes may help to repay half the Government loans of 100,000 million yen, and thereby 3,500 million yen will be sliced off the expenditures for its interest. Obviously, this conclusion has no concrete basis. Of course such a program is bound to include some vague points. In connection with this, we stress that such a lack of political responsibility, exposed as it is above, is bound to fundament all shake the people's confidence in the Government. We cannot but hope for a more cautious attitude from all the other members of this cabinet as well as from the Finance Minister.

Full Translation:

Resolutions to relieve the cool famine passed the Diet and the Government will now organize a coal administration office. By this we know that the Government has a will to cope with the coal crisis, but if it simply entails passing resolutions we could say that this coal office was organized only to relieve jobless officials.

There is no sense in increasing coal miners rice rations from five go to five go five shaku, as long as their families must go hungry. Though the mines are so-called hells on earth, no collier would ever deny his ration to his wife and children. The Government might also think that it had taken a drastic step in raising unskilled colliers' wages by several tens of yen, but such means nothing compared with black market

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EDITORIAL SERIES: 89 (Continued)

ITEM 3 (Continued)

prices. We give credit for orders to start work which were given with hope of alleviating the present crises, yet it steps are not taken to improve the livelihood of the miners, their orders will be senseless.

One can not work when hungry and there would be much confusion with men taking days off, trying to obtain food. Nor can we assert that no stri[illegible]would be held now that workers have won their freedom with the inprovem[illegible]in rights, protection and treatment, This means that unless the Governs adopts their measures at the same time it adopts this emergency pleasure the coal famine will never be conquered. The famine is simply the result of evil practises, which grew steadily worse during the war. A hundred resolutions and thousand offices can not fundamentally solve their probl[illegible]if no understanding is reached.

We propose state-operated mines, a solution pressed by the Social Democratic Party. ENGLAND'S example is outstanding but, thinking of our Nation alone, as long as electric power as a source of heat is under Government control, it is natural for the coal mines to be state-operated, too. The electricity problem was solved first, only because its owners had weaker support in the Government than the mine owners who hold great influence in the Diet.

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